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NOTES ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD

AND TENANT1
By ALLAN W. RHYNHART*
I.

WHEN RELATION EXISTS

The relation exists when the person in possession of
lands occupies them in subordination of the title of another
and with his express or implied assent.2 It always arises
by contract' express or implied, such as a lease which sets
out the terms of the letting; or by operation of law as the
result of the acts of the parties, as when one co-tenant
moves and the remaining co-tenant takes another in possession, in which case, if the landlord accepts rent from those
in possession, there is sufficient evidence of surrender and
the acceptance of the new occupant as tenant.4 A primary
test is whether there is an obligation to pay rent. While a
valid demise may exist even though no rent is paid," for
practical purposes it may be assumed that unless rent is
paid or reserved, there is no tenancy. The rent must issue
for the use or occupancy of land or a structure or a part
of a structure on the land. The furnishing of services, such
as housework, of an equivalent value to rent may create a
tenancy when the occupant has exclusive possession and
control of the quarters occupied.6 A provision in the lease
of a farm for payment to the owner of a percentage of the
net profits does not affect the landlord-tenant status, nor
create a partnership.7
ICitations to Alexander's British Statutes are to the Second Edition,
published by Coe in 1912, which is hereinafter cited "ArmxAND:M".
Certain texts are frequently cited throughout this Article by the names
of the authors only. The full title of each such text, and the edition thereof,
together with the method of citation is as follows:
McADAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910), hereinafter cited "McAnAM".
POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th ed,., 1925), hereinafter cited 'PoE".
TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910), hereinafter cited "TIFFANY".
VENAILE, REAr. PROPERTY (undated compilation), hereinafter cited
"VENABLE".

Chief Judge, Peoples' Court of Baltimore City; L.B., University of
Maryland, 1920.
*

21

MCADAM, n. 1, 127.

'Ibid, § 23.
"Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875).
1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 25, 1009.
6Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
'6 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 73A, § 7(4); Tomlinson v. Dille, 147 Md. 161,
127 A. 746 (1925).
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II. WHEN RELATION DOES NOT ExIST
Husband and wife. Husband and wife, holding as tenants by the entireties, cannot lease the property so held to
the wife or the husband' since that in effect is a rental from
a landlord to himself as a tenant.
Sub-tenants. There is no privity of estate or contract
between the landlord and a sub-lessee.9 An unrecorded
permissible assignment by the tenant in a recorded lease
for a term in excess of seven years merely constitutes the
assignee a sub-lessee.'" An occupant of premises who does
not hold an assignment from the lessee and who therefore
has assumed none of the obligations of a tenant, is not
entitled to assert against the landlord provisions in the
lease granting options to the tenant."
Receivers. A court appointed receiver who takes possession of leased premises does not thereby become the assignee of the lease and is not liable as tenant for use and
occupation. 2 However, such receiver has the right to
adopt the lease, in which event he becomes liable on its
covenants; and he has a reasonable time within which to
make such determination. 8
Lodgers and boarders. There are occupancies where
money is paid which do not amount to a landlord-tenant
relation. A lodger is not a tenant when (although having
exclusive use of the room) the landlord or his servant looks
after the house and furniture; likewise a boarder who
receives meals as well as lodging is not a tenant even
for his
though the living quarters occupied by him are
exclusive use,'" nor is a servant of the owner.'5 A lodger
is a person whose occupancy is of a part of a house and
subordinate to and in some degree under the control of the
owner. 6 Distinguishing between lodger and tenant, the
rule seems to be that a tenant has an exclusive possession
whereas the lodger has merely the use without actual or
exclusive possession.'" The occupant of a room in an office
building is a tenant, even though the owner provides ser8

Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163, 161 A. 510 (1932).
VENABLE, n. 1, 59.
10Rubin v. Leosatis, 165 Md. 36, 166 A. 428 (1933).
n Jay Dee Shoes v. Goldsmith, The Daily Record, January 11, 1950 (Cir.
Ct.1 of Baltimore City).
Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 A. 632, 10 A. 309 (1887).
23Dietrich v. O'Brien, 122 Md. 482, 89 A. 717 (1914).
'1
TIFFANY, n. 1, 34.
9

2

1 McADAm, n. 1, 131.

1143 C.J.S. 1137, Innkeepers.
17Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909), 43 C.J.S. 1138-1139,
Innkeepers. For a discussion of the distinction between tenant and lodger,
see Tenant, Lodger and Guest, 64 Yale L. J. 391 (1955).
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vices, such as cleaning and maintenance. The fact that the
accommodations are in a hotel does not necessarily mean
that the occupant is a lodger.
Remedies against lodgers and boarders. As to these,
the owner is not entitled to summary ejectment for nonpayment of rent, as the relationship is not that of landlord
and tenant. Practically speaking it would appear that if
the owner orders the boarder or lodger out of the premises
and the latter refuses to go, the owner may call on public
authority and have the police eject the erstwhile boarder
as a trespasser. The owner has rights under the Code:
Article 71, Section 5:18
"Any person taking boarders or lodgers into his
house and renting to them a room or furnishing them
with board or both shall have a lien upon any personal
effects, goods or furniture brought upon the premises in
pursuance of such contracting for room or board, .... 9"
It has been made a misdemeanor to fail to pay for lodging,
food or credit at any hotel, boarding house, inn, hospital, or
sanitarium."9 Hotels, rooming houses and lodging houses
are defined as buildings containing five or more beds which
are offered to the public for rental or hire.2"
Illustrative rules to determine existence of tenancy. To
determine whether a tenancy exists: (1) The occupancy
must be for a fixed period. (2) It must be accepted by the
parties that the occupant proposes to use the premises with
some degree of permanence. (3) The right of occupancy
must be exclusive with no right in others to use them
except on the occupant's permission. (4) The occupant's
rights are restricted to occupancy. Although services relating to occupancy, such as furnishing of cleaning services,
linens, etc., may not change his status away from that of
tenant, if he is entitled to other services such as food,
nursing, etc., then ordinarily he is not a tenant.
III.

CATEGORIES OF LETTINGS

All lettings fall into one of two categories: (1) leases
for years, which are for a fixed term and (2) leases at will,
which include both written and oral leases which run from
year to year, and parole lettings from week to week, or
month to month, as well as lettings at sufferance.
186 MD. CODE (1957).
"MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, §§ 161-162.
Baltimore City Code (1950), Art. 12, § 63.
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A. Leases for Years and From Year to Year.
The titles may be misleading. A lease for years simply
means a lease for a fixed term, which may be for any particular period. A lease from year to year, or periodic
tenancy, is a lease or letting which automatically renews
itself; leases from week to week, month to month, or year
to year, are included in this category. The fundamental
difference between a tenancy for years and from year to
year is that the first is for a definite period of time and
terminates by lapse of that time, without notice, although
for the exercise of the right to the summary remedy for
the recovery of possession of the land a statutory notice
must be given,2 1 and the second is for the first period of
time with an indefinite succession of periodic renewals
unless determined by a notice to quit to the other by either
the landlord or the tenant, since the right of a notice to
quit is reciprocal so that either landlord or tenant has the
right to terminate a letting from year to year.2
Statute of frauds. Under 29 Charles 2, Ch. 3, §§1, 2,
and 4,23 an oral lease may be for a period not exceeding
three years.2 4 Leases for more than three years must be in
writing. Leases for more than seven years must be signed,
sealed, witnessed, acknowledged and recorded. 5
Constructionof written lease. The principle that a lease
must be construed most strongly against a lessor and in
favor of a lessee is resorted to only when the words of the
instrument are doubtful in their meaning or susceptible
to more than one construction.2 6
Even though a document may not constitute a valid
lease, as for example, a lease for more than seven years
which has not been acknowledged, yet in a proper case it
can be treated as an agreement to lease and may be specifically enforced.27 A lease from year to year containing a
provision for automatic renewal, but which is terminable
by either party at the end of the original or a succeeding
term, does not create an estate for more than seven years.2"
MD. CODE (1957), Art. 53, §§ 1-8.
1 Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113, 98 A.L.R. 212 (1935).
2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 509.
24Union Banking Co. v. Gittings, 45 Md. 181 (1876).
12 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § 1.
Standard Garments Co. v. Hoffman, 199 Md. 42, 85 A. 2d 456, 30 A.L.R.
2d 485 (1952).
17Thompson v. Thomas & Thompson Co., 132 Md. 483, 104 A. 49 (1918).
Saul v. McIntyre, 190 Md. 31, 57 A. 2d 272 (1948). See infra, p. 8, Void
Lease.
2 Canary v. Wagner, 191 Md. 413, 62 A. 2d 257 (1948) ; 2 MD. COD (1957),
Art. 21, § 1.
215
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B. Leases for Years or for a Fixed Term.
A lease for years is one for a fixed term and not necessarily one for a certain number of years.29 At common law
there is no restriction upon the length of the term that
may be created.3" There is some statutory limitation on
this common law rule. A lease for more than seven years
must be executed, acknowledged and recorded; provisions
for renewal, optional with either landlord or tenant, do not
necessarily make a lease for more than seven years; and
even a lease for more than seven years which has not been
executed and recorded according to the statute, is binding
between the original parties to such lease." A lease for
more than fifteen years sets up in the tenant a right of
redemption,"2 unless the premises are leased exclusively
for business purposes and the term, including all renewals
provided for in the lease does not exceed ninety-nine
years.8 In the instance of a ground rent, when it is shown
that the ground rent has been neither demanded nor paid
for more than twenty consecutive years, the effect is to
bar not only the rent already due but also the reversionary
interest of the owner of the fee. It has been held that the
mailing of a bill for ground rent by the owner of the fee
within the twenty year period creates a presumption of
demand, thus preserving his title. 4 If the lease contains
no provision for automatic renewal, then the relationship
of landlord and tenant ceases to exist on the termination
of the lease. If the tenant fails to move on the terminal
date, then the landlord has the election (1) to treat the
tenant as a trespasser in the sense that he is a tenant holding over; or (2) to treat the lessee as a tenant from year
to year.85
C. Leases from Year to Year or Periodic Leases.
Agreement. Such a letting may be created by express
agreement of the parties, in which the terms and conditions
of the letting, as well as the mode of termination are
explicitly set forth.
Implication of law. Such a letting is created when the
occupant goes into possession as tenant, without any understanding or agreement as to the term of the letting.
2DI TIFFANY, n.

1, 45.

a' Op. cit. ibid, 55.

812 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § L

822 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, §§ 103-104.
Ibid, § 108.

"Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137, 99 A. 2d 743 (1953).
a Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1876) ; Fetting Etc. Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50,
152 A. 434, 71 A.L.R. 1443 (1930).
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"[W] here there is no evidence as to the terms of the
letting, . .. the monthly payment of rent would show a
letting at a monthly rent, thereby creating a tenancy from
month to month.... , Such a lease renews itself from
term to term, but is terminable by the giving of a notice
to quit by the landlord or a notice of termination by the
tenant. When payments of rent are made weekly this
creates a presumption of a tenancy from week to week. 7
Void lease. When a tenant enters upon land under a
void or defective lease, the periodical payment of a yearly
rent creates a tenancy from year to year." Prior to June 1,
1951, a lease for more than seven years which had not
been executed and recorded in accordance with Article 21,
Section 1,19 was invalid; if the tenant entered into possession and rent was accepted then a tenancy from month to
month or from year to year was created 0 and all of the
provisions of the lease applied excepting those as to its
duration. 41 However, Chapter 565 of the Acts of 195142
modified this rule to provide that an unrecorded lease for
more than seven years shall be valid and binding between
the original parties to such lease.
A lease invalid at law may be enforced in equity as a
would be
contract to lease although otherwise the tenancy
43
law.
of
implication
by
year
to
year
from
one
Tenant holding over. When a tenant for years holds
over after the expiration of his term, he becomes a tenant
from year to year by implication of law as when a tenant
after termination remains in possession with the landlord's
consent and without further contract, 44 the election is in
the landlord and not in the tenant. Any act of the landlord
which recognizes an existing tenancy after the terminal
date, such as acceptance of the rent, will be a binding
election upon him of the existence of a lease from year to
year.45 A landlord is not required to make a prompt election. When a tenant sends a check for one month's rent,
proposing that it be accepted as an amendment of the ten' 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 133.
McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 7, 113 A. 2d 95 (1955).
8 Falck v. Barlow, 110 Md. 159, 72 A. 678 (1909) ; Darling Shops v. Balto.
Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948), noted 9 Md. L.
Rev. 362 (1948).
'm2 MD. CODE (1957).
10Cook v. Boehl, 188 Md. 581, 53 A. 2d 555 (1947) ; Schultz v. Kaplan, 189
Md.1 402, 56 A. 2d 17 (1947).
' Hyatt v. Romero, 190 Md. 500, 58 A. 2d 899 (1948).
"Now MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § 1.
"Saul v. McIntyre, 190 Md. 31, 57 A. 2d 272 (1948).
" Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113, 98 A.L.R. 212 (1935).
'1 Vrooman v. McKaig, 4 Md. 450 (1853).
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ancy to a month-to-month one, acceptance and use of the
check by landlord does not alter or reduce a landlord's
rights because the amount of the check is what the landlord is entitled to if he elects to treat the tenant as one
holding over and, consequently, liable as tenant for another year.4" Once made such an election creates a tenancy7
upon the same terms and conditions as the original lease
except that the subsequent letting is from year to year.4 8
If the landlord demands and receives an increased rent
from the tenant, the new lease from year to year will be
on the same terms as the former lease but at the higher
rent.4 9 Provisions for premature termination of a tenancy
are as applicable in a lease from year to year thus created
as they were to the original lease for years.5 0 While a lease
from year to year thus created contains all of the covenants in the original lease applicable to the new situation,5
so that an option in a tenant to purchase contained in the
lease for years carries over into the subsequent tenancy,52
it is possible to so word an option contained in a lease for
53
years that it will not carry over into the subsequent lease.
Similarly, in a lease from year to year an option to purchase in the lessee may be so expressed as to be effective
only during the original term and not during a succeeding term.54 However, if the landlord and tenant are actually negotiating for a new lease at the expiration of the
old lease, and if the tenant remains in possession pending
such negotiations, with either express or tacit consent of
the landlord, the landlord is estopped from treating the
tenant as holding over for another term. To establish this
situation it is necessary that: (1) the landlord consent to
the tenant remaining in the premises for a temporary
period and; (2) that the parties were actually engaged in
negotiating as to a renewal of the lease when the previous
term ended. Unilateral acts or statements of the tenant
do not constitute "negotiations"; there must be positive
acts or statements on the part of the landlord. 5
"Donnelly Adver. Corp. v. Flaccomlo, 216 Md. 113, 140 A. 2d 165 (1958).
'7 Hobbs v. Batory, 86 Md. 68, 37 A. 713 (1897).
Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1876) ; Gostin v. Needle, 185 Md. 634, 45
A. 2d 772, 163 A.L.R. 1013 (1946).
"1Cramer v. Baugher, 130 Md. 212, 100 A. 507 (1917).
50Gostin v. Needle, supra, n. 48.
51Schaeffer v. Bilger, 186 Md. 1, 45 A. 2d 775, 163 A.L.R. 706 (1946).
Bagley v. Clark, 190 Md. 223, 57 A. 2d 739 (1948).
Gressitt v. Anderson, 187 Md. 586, 51 A. 2d 159 (1947).
"Canary v. Wagner, 191 Md. 413, 62 A. 2d 257 (1948).
5Donnelly
Adver. Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A. 2d 165 (1958).
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D. Tenants at Will And By Sufferance.
In this section will be found statements in conflict with
other portions of this manual. The reason is that the draftsmen of our statutes and ordinances have not always employed precision in the use of technical words and it is not
unknown for the Courts to fall into the same error. The
definitions of the law writers are here included to emphasize the principle that in solving a problem in the vexing
area of landlord and tenant, it is not always possible to
rely on the literal wording of a statute or a decision.
A tenant at will always is in occupation as of right.
A tenant by sufferance is one who enters by lawful lease
and holds possession wrongfully.56 A tenant at will holds
rightfully; a tenant at sufferance holds wrongfully.5 7 A
tenancy at will exists as a result of permissive possession
without any understanding as to the duration of the possession; as for example, one who goes into possession under
a void conveyance.58 "As a general rule, a person who
enters on land by permission of the owner for an indefinite
period and without the reservation of any rent, is a tenant
at will . ,,
"A permissive possession constituting a
tenancy at will because of payment of a periodic rent may
be changed into a tenancy from year to year or other
periodic tenancy."6 If a tenant at will transfers his interest in the land, and puts the transferee in possession, the
latter is not a tenant at sufferance but a mere disseisor or
trespasser since he did not enter by right. However, a sublessee of a tenant for years holding over after the expiration of the latter's term is a tenant at sufferance. A tenant
at sufferance is "one holding possession,... who was not
a trespasser and not a disseisor, and yet held of nobody".6
IV.

Co-Ow-ER LANDLORDS

One co-tenant cannot make a lease which will be binding upon his co-tenants without their consent, but he can
lease his own interest with or without the consent of the
others, and the lessee will become a tenant in common with
the others.62 One co-lessor can terminate the lease as to his
own interest without the concurrence of the others. 3
'a 1 MOADAM, n. 1,
5' 1 TIFFANY, n. 1,

676.
153.

11Op. cit. ibid, 105-106.

1 16 R.C.L., Landlord & Tenant, 611-612, § 91.
001 TIFFANY, n. 1, 125.
O1
Op. cit. ibid, 149.
Thompson v. Thomas & Thompson Co., 132 Md. 483, 104 A. 49 (1918).
Cook v. Hollyday, 186 Md. 42,45 A. 2d 768 (194).
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When a husband and wife are owners by entireties and
the husband leases the land giving warranties of title, he
cannot bind his wife, as Maryland has not adopted the
principle that under such circumstances the lease made by
the husband is valid against the wife during coverture.
However, after a divorce if the property leased comes into
the individual ownership of the lessor he is estopped, and
the lease will operate
upon his estate as if vested at the
64
time of its execution.
The statute of 4 Anne Ch. 16, Sec. 27,9 authorizes a
co-tenant to bring an action against his co-tenant for receiving more than his just share or proportion of the rent.
But equity has no jurisdiction for an accounting for rents
or claims for use and occupation by a single owner or one
of several co-owners against a co-owner as tenant.6
V.

TERMINATION OF LANDLORD'S

ESTATE

IN MID-TERM
If the landlord has an estate for life and makes a lease
for years and dies before the end of the term, then the
estate of the life tenant's lessee terminates with the death
of the life tenant. However, when the estate of the lessor
determines and the remainderman accepts rent from the
tenant the terms of the lease continue. 7
VI. ASSIGNMENTS OF LEASES
At common law restraints upon alienation are frowned
upon. Therefore, in the absence of a prohibition in the
lease the original tenant has the right to assign his interest
or estate without consent of the landlord. Similarly, the
holder of the reversion has the unqualified right to grant
or convey his interest.
By the Statute 32 Hen. VIII c. 34, §§1 and 2,68 the
grantee of a reversion in lands or tenements shall have like
advantages against the lessee as the lessors or grantors
themselves or their heirs or successors might have had.6 9
By this statute, ". . . all . . .Lessees . . .for a term of
Years . . . shall ... have like ... Advantage and Remedy
against ... every person ... which have ... any Gift or
Grant... of the Reversion of the... Lands... so letten...
for any Condition, Covenant or Agreement . . .expressed
" Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d
1232 (1955).
112 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 664.
Paradise Amusement Co. v. Hollyday, 190 Md. 48, 57 A. 2d 308 (1948).
'7 VENABLE, n. 1, 61.
1 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 335.
VENABLE, D. 1, 57; Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 A. 134 (1890).
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in the Indentures of their . . . Leases, . . . as the same
Lessees . . . might ... have had against the said Lessors
and Grantors .. ,70
The construction of this statute over the years has produced many complexities. What follows is an over-simplification, and is intended to serve as but a guide in solving
the simpler problems arising as a result of assignment of
either the term or the reversion. In any case, care must
be exercised to see whether the party to be held as tenant
is actually the assignee of the term, and not merely a
sub-tenant.
A. Effect of Conveyance of the Reversion.
The weight of authority at common law was that covenants ran with the land and not with the reversion.7 '
Under the statute, without a formal assignment of the
lease, the grantee of the reversion if it be a freehold title,
has all of the rights of the original lessor against the
lessee, or an assignee of the term of the lease, subject to
the principle that only those agreements may be enforced
which (1) run with the land, or (2) which, by the terms
of the lease are binding upon the assignee thereof. The
corollary to this appears to be that when the estate in
reversion is less than a free-hold estate (i.e. less than a
fee or estate for life) that a transfer of the reversion does
not carry with it any rights to enforce the lease, unless
there is an assignment of the lease. Here, it would appear
that under the provisions of 29 Char. 2, Ch. 3, Sec. 3,7 and
Code Article 8, Section 1, 73 that the assignment of the lease
must be in writing. The statement in the text is debatable.7 4
Chattelsreal. The prevalence of the ground rent system
in Baltimore City, under which properties are held under
ninety-nine year leases renewable forever indicates the
wisdom, and probably the necessity, of requiring a written
assignment of any sublease in existence at the time of the
conveyance of the leasehold as the estate of the grantor is
one less than freehold.
B. Assignment of Rent.
The assignee of the reversion is entitled to all rent falling due after the assignment. Rent which falls due before
"Liability to the tenant by the transferee of the reversion, on covenants
of the original landlord is discussed in L.R.A. 1915 C 190.
711 PoE, n. 1, § 332.
722 AT x. 'BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 509.
1 MD. CODE (1957).
"See 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 33, and Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 A. 134

(1890).
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the assignment belongs to the assignor but may be assigned
like any other debt.7 5 Rent follows the reversion so that
when the lessor dies before the rent comes due, it goes to
the person entitled to the estate;" if the lessor dies after the
rent becomes due, it goes to his personal representative."
The English rule is that an assignee of a rent cannot distrain for arrears arising previous to assignment. 7 Adherence to this philosophy would deny the purchaser of property the right to either distress or summary ejectment for
arrears of rent due at the time of purchase. An apparent
departure from this rule was the decision in Kaufman v.
Collick,7 9 wherein it was held that when in connection with
a transfer of real estate there is no assignment of accrued
rent in arrears, the vendor is left to his remedy in an
action of debt without any right to distrain or to summary
eviction; but when the accrued rent is assigned to the purchaser at the time of transfer, then the vendee is clothed
with every right of action which the former would have
had if he had continued in ownership of the property,
including the right of distress and summary ejectment."s
Payments to agents or assignees. All payments of
money or other dealings had with a person acting under
a power of attorney or other agency are binding upon the
representatives or principals of such attorney or agent,
even though the principal may have died or assigned his
claim - provided that the person making the payment
had no notice of the death or assignment."' Under the
statute of 4 Anne Ch. 16, Sec. 10,82 a tenant is not liable to
a new landlord for rent if he has paid it to a former landlord without notice of the conveyance. However, a tenant
may not defeat a claim of creditors of the landlord by
anticipating payments of rent" or transfer a growing crop
to the damage of a mortgagee of the realty.84 It is a general
principle that the assignee of a claim or chose in action
cannot recover from the original debtor who had paid it to
85
the assignor after, but without notice of, the assignment.
An order by the landlord to the tenant to pay accruing rent
Outtoun v. Dulin, ibid.
Getzandaffer v. Gaylor, 38 Md. 280 (1873).
Martin v. Martin. 7 Md. 368 (1855).
" Brown v. Metropolitan, 9 Eng. Rul. Cas. 610 (1859).
Kaufman v. C6llick, decided In Baltimore City Court, May 19, 1943.
7

80THOMAS, PROCEDURE IN JUSTICE CASES (1917)

§ 166.

" 1 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 10, § 42.
12 2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 661.

mMartin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855).
81Johnson v. Hines, 61 Md. 122 (1883).
85Robinson v. Marshall, 11 Md. 251 (1857) ; Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md.
1, 72 A. 407 (1909).
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to a third person may operate as an assignment, so that
the tenant may be bound to continue to pay such rent,
notwithstanding a later notice from the landlord or a
transferee of the reversion who took title knowing of the
assignment. 6
Prepaid rent and security deposits. Advance rent that
has accrued and been paid (in other words, prepaid rent)
may not be recovered by the lessee's receiver when the
lease has been terminated as a result of lessee's misconduct. In the circumstances of the particular case, recovery
claimed on the ground of unjust enrichment of the landlord was denied." In Tatelbaum v. Chertkof, 8s a distinction was drawn between prepayment of rent and a security
deposit; if a security deposit, it remains the property of
the tenant and passes on to the tenant's trustee in bankruptcy, subject to the landlord's claim; if a prepayment
of rent, then it becomes the property of the landlord and
is not recoverable by the tenant's trustee.
C. Effect of Assignment on Liability
of Original Lessee.
The liability of the original lessee is based upon two
principles: - privity of contract and privity of estate.8 9
Privity of contract. Expressed stipulations in a lease
continue to be binding upon the lessee in spite of an assignment and its recognition by the landlord, an illustrative
stipulation being the covenant to pay rent.9 0 The theory
is that the lessee binds himself to pay the rent, and this
may be an agreement whose enforcement is independent
of retention of an interest under the lease. Thus, provided
the lease is under seal,9 1 the lessor may proceed against the
original lessee under the covenants contained in the lease.
To be freed from obligation, the original lessor or covenantor must be released by an instrument of equal dignity
to that which created the obligation, i.e., an instrument
under seal.92
Privity of estate. The principle is that the person in
possession of land is liable to the owner on the covenants
or agreements that run with the land, contained in the
original lease, because he who has the benefit of the use
of the land as tenant, is bound to the owner.9 3
Abrams v. Sheehan, 40 Md. 446 (1874).
Lochner v. Martin, The Daily Record, Feb. 4, 1959.
"1212 Md. 475, 129 A. 2d 680 (1957).
81Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixier & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896).
0 Insley v. Myers, 192 Md. 292, 64 A. 2d 126 (1949).
I1I ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 337.
92l PoE, n. 1, § 388.
"Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler & Go., 84 Md. 437,35 A. 1086 (1896).
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When letting is by sealed instrument. When the lease
is under seal and contains a covenant to pay rent, the
original lessee will remain liable to the lessor under the
covenant, notwithstanding an assignment of the lease to a
third party, and acceptance of rent by the landlord from
the assignee of the term. 4 When a lessee transfers his
interest in the lease, he remains a proper party plaintiff
in a suit against the lessor to enforce the covenants of
the lease. 5
When letting is not by sealed instrument. An assignmnent of the term by the original tenant to another, plus
surrender of possession to the assignee of the term, combined with an acceptance by the landlord of the assignee
of the term as tenant, has the effect (1) of exonerating the
original tenant from any obligations to the original landlord; and (2) making the assignee of the term responsible
to the landlord.9 8 Even if the tenant has not legally terminated the tenancy, as by a written notice, the acceptance
of a third person as tenant by the landlord, operates as a
surrender in law and this acceptance consequently exonerates the original tenant from liability."'
No covenant to pay rent. If there is no express covenant to pay rent, the lessee's liability ceases if the lessor
consents to an assignment; and such assent may be inferred
by his accepting rent from the assignee of the term, or by
any other act accepting the assignee of the term as a
tenant. However, to destroy the privity of estate of the
original tenant (and thus his obligation, even though not
express, to pay rent) there must exist the concurrence of
the landlord in the transfer of the term by the original
lessee to the assignee of the term. 8
D. Effect of Assignment on Assignee
of Original Lessee.
Covenants that run with the land. The obligations of
an assignee of the term or lease to the original lessor or
to the grantee of the reversion, rest upon whether or not
the liability asserted is one that runs with the land. Fundamentally, these obligations rest upon privity of estate.9
Such covenants are those which relate to or touch and
concern the thing demised, or which extend to the land,
1 PoE, n. 1, § 388.
9Rubin v. Leosatis, 165 Md. 36, 166 A. 428 (1933).
1 PoE, n. 1, 388.
Lamar v. McNamee, 10 G. & J. 116 (Md., 1&38).
Oonsumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896).
9Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934) ; Jones
v. Burgess, 176 Md. 270, 4 A. 2d 473 (1939).
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so that the thing required to be done will affect the quality,
value or mode of enjoying the estate.10 0 For example, as
the covenant to pay rent runs with the land, the lessee is
contractually bound to the lessor to the end of the term' 01
and the assignee of the lessee is bound by virtue of his
possession because of privity of estate.10 2 Acceptance of
an assignment of a lease does not impose upon the assignee
any liability for rent other than that growing out of privity
of estate.0 3 The increasing scope of the role of equity in enforcing covenants finds expression in Raney v. Tompkins, °4
in which a covenant by vendor against use of his remaining
land as a filling station was enforced against his grantees
having knowledge of the restriction.01 5
Rent and taxes. The covenant to pay rent and taxes
runs with the land, so that an assignee of the term is under
an obligation to pay the rent issuing from the land under
the original lease, and this obligation does not depend upon
his actual possession or entry.0 6 Similarly, the holder of
the reversion has the right to enforce the payment of rent
due by the assignee, accruing during assignee's possession
of the land. 10 7 However, a suit at law cannot be maintained
against the assignee of a lease who has assigned over, for
ground rent falling due after the assignment to him and
before the assignment by him; the remedy of the lessor
being in equity alone. 0 The rationale of the principle is
that while there may be a debt, it is no longer enforceable
at law because the essence of the right to bring suit is
privity of estate and if there is no existing tenancy, then
under the statute, the right to sue at law is lost to the
landlord. 09
0
' °VENABLE, n. 1, 58; 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, § 149, pars. (2), (3), (4) ; Glenn v.
Canby, 24 Md. 127 (1866).
101Worthington v. Cooke, 56 Md. 51 (1881).
102 Union Trust 0o. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 189 A. 421 (1937).
-10Reid v. Wiessner & Sons Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 A. 877 (1898).

10 197 Md. 98, 78 A. 2d 183 (1951).

105The application of the principles to determine the covenants which do
and which do not run with the land is a matter of great difficulty, far
beyond the scope of this article. For beginning points of research into the
principles see 1 PoE, n. 1, §§ 149, 328-335 A and 389-392; 1 ALEx. BRIT. STAT.,
n. 1, 337-355; Spencers Case, 1 Smith Lead. Oas. 137 (1872), 1 TIFFANY,
n. 1, 886. Regarding damages, or relief, for breach of restrictive covenants
running with the land, see Easton v. The Careybrook Co., 210 Md. 286,
123 A. 2d 342 (1956).
116Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934) ; Jones
v. Burgess, 176 Md. 270, 4 A. 2d 473 (1939).
""Hughes v. Young, 5 G. & J. 67 (1832) ; Lester v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 415
(1868) ; Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896)
Gibbs v. Dldier, 125 Md. 486, 94 A. 100 (1915) ; 1 POE, n. 1, 149.
"" 4Hart v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 169 Md. 446, 182 A. 322 (1936).
101Gibbs v. Didier, supra, n. 107.
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E. When Assignee's Liability Begins.
Assignment of record. When the conveyance of the
term to the assignee of the leasehold estate is by an assignment necessary to be recorded, any liability to which he is
subject comes into being at the time the assignment is
recorded. There can be no hiatus in a tenancy. Therefore,
in the case of a lease for more than seven years, the
assignor of the term remains liable under the covenants of
the lease until the assignment is recorded. The recording
is the final and complete act which passes title and until
this is accomplished all else is unavailing. 110
Possession. If the estate acquired by the assignee is
one not affected by the recording laws, as for example,
a leasehold estate for less than seven years,"' then liability
under the lease for any covenant that runs with the land
does not arise unless and until the assignee goes into possession, and this liability ceases when he goes out of possession.
Sub-tenants. When there is a covenant by the lessee
that he will not assign his interest, a conveyance by him
(in the absence of waiver by the landlord) creates no
rights as tenant in the purported assignee who holds as a
sub-tenant without liability to the landlord and without
rights assertable against the landlord. Also, even though
there may be no prohibition against assignment (or there
being one, it has been waived) an incomplete or ineffective
assignment creates the status of sub-tenant in the purported assignee, who again, so far as the landlord is concerned, has neither rights nor liabilities.
When there is a conveyance of land, signed only by the
grantor but accepted by the grantee, a covenant in the
conveyance that the grantee will pay mortgage debts existing against the land conveyed, has the effect of binding the
grantee as though he had signed the deed." 2 By analogy,
if an assignment of lease contains an agreement on the part
of the assignee of the term to perform the covenants of
the lease, then the assignee will be liable to the same extent
as though he had executed the original lease, even though
the assignee of the term simply accepts the assignment
and takes possession of the demised premises thereunder."'
Based in part upon the foregoing discussion the following principles appear to apply in a proceeding brought in
Peoples Court or before a justice: (1) If the lease be under
1"0
Nickel

v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892).
§ 1.
2 Stokes v. Detrick, 75 Md. 256, 23 A. 846 (1892) ; Rosenthal v. Heft, 155
Md. 410, 142 A. 598 (1928), 159 Md. 302. 150 A. 850 (1930).
I Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934).
"2

MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21,
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seal, suit may be brought against the original lessee for
unpaid rent whether or not he holds possession. If the
lease is not under seal, then a legally effective assignment
of the term exonerates the original lessee from liability.
(2) An assignee of the term of the lease may rid himself
of future liability under the lease by effectively assigning
the term to someone else. (3) To be legally valid, the
assignment of a parole lease by the tenant or lessor must
be in writing.11 4 (4) When the original lease was made
by one whose estate determines, such as a life tenant, if
the remainderman accepts rent from the lessee after the
determination of the life estate, then the terms of the
lease continue and the remainderman becomes the landlord and the original lessee retains his rights as tenant
under the original lease.'15 (5) The grantee of a reversion
is not entitled to arrears of rent which became due prior
to the transfer of the reversion."' (6) When the original
lessor did not hold title of record at the time of the lease,
an assignee of the original lessor, being the holder of a
chose in action, may bring suit or levy distress only upon
a written assignment of the reversion. (7) When a tenant
under a lease for years transfers his interest in the lease,
he remains a proper party plaintiff in a suit against the
lessor to enforce the covenants of the lease." 7 (8) On the
principle that the whole carries with it all of its parts, a
grant of record title by the original lessor, vests in the
grantee the right to enforce any of the covenants contained
in a lease made by the grantor prior to the grant, including
distress for rent; as the conveyance of the reversion carries
with it all of the incidents thereof, including the right to
collect rent from the tenant or occupant and to enforce
the payment of the same." 8 (9) Distress. Regardless of
the term or nature of the lease, the assignee-occupant of
the premises should be named as tenant in the landlord's
affidavit; as, after a legally effective assignment by the
original lessee, the only liability that may be asserted
against him is in covenant, arising out of privity of contract.
VII.

IMPLIED COVENANTS

Fitness. When a lease contains no express warranty of
fitness of the property for the purpose for which it is
rented there is no implied warranty, and in case the prop29 Char. 2, Ch. 3, § 3, 2 ALx. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 521.
""VENABLE, n. 1, 61.
I1
1 ALEX. BRrr. STAT., D. 1, 355.

1 7

Rubin v. Leosatis, 165 Md. 36, 166 A. 428 (1933).
Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 A. 134 (1890).
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erty falls down because of an inherent defect, the lessor
is not bound to repair, although the lessee will still be
compelled to pay the rent.1 19
Possession. There is no implied covenant in a lease
that the landlord is required to give the lessee possession.
When at the time of the lease premises are wrongfully
held by a third person, such as a tenant holding over, the
lessee, having the right of entry, has no action against the
lessor, but is left to his remedy against the wrongdoer. 2 '
Where landlord locks the demised premises and refuses
tenant admission for the purpose of removing his furniture
and effects, the landlord is exposed to a suit for conversion
of the tenant's furniture and goods.' 2'
Quiet enjoyment. While there is an implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment, this implication does not extend to
indemnity against damage from the acts of a trespasser.'22
Use. When premises are leased for a specific purpose,
there is an implied covenant on the part of the tenant that
there will be no change of use and if such takes place the
landlord may enjoin him in equity 23 although when the
lease is general in terms as to use of the premises, the
tenant may use them
for any lawful purpose not injurious
24
to the reversion.
Wall advertisements. In the absence of a limitation in
the lease itself, a lease of a building includes the external
walls; and a landlord is not entitled to place an advertisement on the outside wall
of demised premises, or to lease
2
such rights to others.1 1
Waste. A tenant is liable for all waste committed on
the landlord's property, except when caused by an act of
God, public enemy or the lessor himself.'26
VIII.

CONSTRUCTION OF LEASES

Description of premises. When a bathroom is used in
common by the tenants of a building, a lease of the portion
of the building containing the bathroom does not give an
"IClark & Stevens v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504, 65 A. 326 (1906); See also,
Decedent's Estate, infra, pp. 38-39.
Sigmund v. Howard Bank, 29 Md. 324 (1868).
21Kirby v. Porter, 144 Md. 261, 125 A. 41 (1923).
Baugher v. Wilkins, 16 Md. 35 (1860).
1Gale v. McCullough, 118 Md. 287, 84 A. 469 (1912); North Avenue
Market v. Keys, 164 Md. 185, 164 A. 152 (1933).
124 Gallagher v. Shipley, 24 Md. 418 (1866).
12 Needle v. Scheinberg, 187 Md. 169, 49 A. 2d 334 (1946). For a discussion of the relative rights of landlord and tenant as to the use of
exterior walls for advertising purposes, see 32 Am. Jur. 197, Landlord and
Tenant; 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 586; L.R.A. 1915B 1057; 22 A.L.R. 800.
'" White v. Wagner, 4 H. & J. 373 (Md., 1815).
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exclusive right to its use by one tenant when his lease
generally describes that portion of the demised premises
which includes the bathroom,
but specifies rooms not in127
cluding the bathroom.
Effect of new lease. When, before the expiration of a
written lease, a new lease is entered into between the
parties, the new lease does not necessarily revoke the
provisions of the old lease, so that options contained in the
original lease are not necessarily extinguished by the
execution of a new lease, if the continued existence of the
options is 28not inconsistent with the provisions of the
new lease.
Modification by conduct. By their conduct after a tenant has gone into possession, the parties may construe the
terms of an ambiguous lease, as well as alter or modify
the contract of letting. 29 Thus, when an original lease did
not oblige a landlord to consent to a tenant's application to
a liquor license board for a license, the fact that landlord
had given such consent in the past made such use a term
of the letting, and the landlord was required to consent to a
renewal application.3 0

IX.

OcCUPANCY AS

NOTICE

The doctrine is that possession is notice of the rights
of the party in possession to the extent they would have
been ascertained upon inquiry. The extent of this imputed
knowledge is limited to those rights which are asserted
under subsisting relations between the party in possession
and the owner of the land, and thus to some actual outstanding title or equitable interest, and should not be extended to those which might arise from a non-existent, different and merely anticipated status with a third party.'
Open possession inconsistent with the record title charges
a prospective purchaser with notice of the occupant's
rights,. 2 but possession by the tenants of a vendor is not
notice to a mortgagee of rights in the vendor conflicting
with the rights of the vendee-mortgagor.'
However, the
purchaser of property occupied by a tenant is under notice
sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the terms of the

10 Needy

v. Middlekauff, 102 Md. 181, 62 A. 159 (1905).
12 Stedman v. Hill, 195 Md. 568, 74 A. 2d 41 (1950).
I" Saul v. McIntyre, 192 Md. 413, 64 A. 2d 282 (1949) ; Standard, Inc. v.
Alexander, Inc., 214 Md. 214, 133 A. 2d 460 (1957).
Saul v. McIntyre, ibid.
Liggett Co. v. Rose, 152 Md. 146, 136 A. 651 (1927).
s, Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1936) ; Irvington
Fed. Etc. Assn. v. West, 194 Md. 211, 71 A. 2d 1 (1950).
"3Wicklein v Kidd, 149 Md. 412, 131 A. 780 (1926).
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letting, and failing to make it he is visited with the consequences of knowledge.'
The existence of a "For Rent"
sign on property is not in itself sufficient to charge a
subsequent purchaser with notice of a previous purchaser's
rights. 8 '
X.

RENT

Bankruptcy.86
Double rent. The general law is that when the tenant
has the right to terminate the tenancy by giving notice
to the landlord; and actually gives a sufficient notice of
termination, but does not deliver up possession to the
landlord at the time contained in the notice, then the
tenant shall thenceforth pay to the landlord double the
rent originally contracted for during all the time the tenant continues in possession.8 7 It should be noted that there
is no such right in the landlord at common law when the
landlord terminates the tenancy. 8 ' In Baltimore City, in
the discretion of the judge, damages not exceeding double
rent may be assessed against a tenant holding over after
notice to quit. 1 9 It has also been held that in addition
damages may be awarded the landlord for his expenses in
and about the proceedings. 4 ° The Baltimore City Charter,
Section 743, provides:
"In all cases the tenancy mentioned in this subdivision of this Article, if the tenant, after notice, fail
to quit at the end of the term, or at a period when he
shall begin as aforesaid to be holding over, such tenant,
his executors or administrators, may, at the election
of the lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators or
assigns, be held as a tenant and bound to pay double
the rent to which the said tenancy was subject, and
payable and recoverable in all respects and to every
effect as if, by the original agreement or the understanding as to such tenancy, said double rent were the
reserved rent of the demised premises, according to the
terms and conditions of payment of such originally
reserved rent."
13 Engler v. Garrett, 100 Md. 387, 59 A. 648 (1905) ; Achtar v. Posner, 189
Md. 559, 56 A. 2d 797 (1948).
"5 Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Treuchel, 164 Md. 636, 166 A. 404 (1933).
m For a discussion of the landlord's rights respecting future rent when
bankruptcy terminates an unexpired lease, see In Bonwit, Lennon & Co.,
36 Fed. Supp. 97 (D.C. Md. 1940).
11 -Geo. II, ch. 19, par. 18, 2 ALFIX. BRIT. 'STAT., n. 1, 990.
2 ALEx. BRiT. STAT., n. 1, 740, 755.
Charter & P.L.L. of Baltimore City (1949), § 741.
U0 McElroy v. Wright, 1 Balto. City Rep. 26 (1889).
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The application of this section is subject to some obscurities. The question is, to what do the words "the tenancy
mentioned in this subdivision of this Article" refer? If
they apply to Charter sections 728-730 inclusive, then
double rent may be collected by the landlord in leases from
year to year (Sec. 728), as well as leases for a fixed term
for any period less than a year (Sec. 729), and to tenancies
at will, at sufferance or per autre vie (Sec. 730). However,
if the application is limited to the tenancies described in
sections 729 and 730, then a tenant holding over at the
expiration of a lease from year to year is not bound for
double rent. The matter has not been passed upon by the
Court of Appeals, although there have been a number of
cases before that tribunal involving tenants holding over
at the expiration of leases from year to year.'
Increased only by agreement. A landlord cannot alter
or amend the terms of a tenancy by giving a written notice
of the change. Any increase in the amount of rent must
be accomplished by agreement of the parties; it 14cannot
be
2
unilaterally increased by an act of the landlord.
Necessity for demand. Once the relationship of landlord and tenant is established, failure of the landlord to
demand the rent does not justify the presumption that he
has released or extinguished his right to rent
44 under the
lease,14 as no demand is necessary for rent.
Not apportionable. Rent does not accrue from day to
day as interest does, but the entire rent falls due on the
rent day, is not apportionable with respect to time and,
unless otherwise specially stipulated, is always payable
by the party holding the estate on rent day to the owner of
the reversion at the rent day,145 except with respect to rent
when the lessor is a tenant for life and dies in mid-term. 4 "
Overpayment recoverable. When rent is overpaid due
to a mistake of fact by the tenant, he may recover the overpayment back from the landlord, and as a private estate is
a complex conception, depending upon the facts and the
consequences thereof, a mistake of a person regarding his
I In Allegany County, there can be no action for doulble rent against a
tenant holding over, MD. LAws 1890, Ch. 265, Flack's Code of Public Local
Laws (1930), Art. 1, § 380.
I De Young v. Buchanan, 10 G. & J. 149 (1838).
"' Myers v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882).
I" Offutt v. Trail, 4 H. & J. 20 (Md. 1815) ; Campbell v. Shipley, 41 Md.
81 (1874).
11 LATROBE, JusTicEs PRACTICE (1889) 176 (736); Martin v. Martin, 7
Md. 368 (1855).
"11 Geo. II, Ch. 19, § 15, 2 ALzx. BRIT. STAT., a. 1, 738.
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private legal rights may be regarded as a mistake of fact;
147
it is not less a fact because it involves a conclusion of law.
Receivers. A court appointed receiver is neither the
assignee in fact or by operation of law of the premises and
14
cannot be held liable as a tenant for use and occupation.
Services other than direct money payment. A covenant
to pay as rent taxes, water-rent and fire insurance premiums, is sufficiently certain and definite as to make such
payments enforceable in the same manner as a money rent,
even though such provisions may create a rent which is
not uniform throughout the term of the lease.'49
Trustees. A trustee appointed to foreclose a mortgage
under the Charter of Baltimore City 5 ° is not clothed with
title to the mortgage; the title remains in the mortgagee.
Consequently, the holder of the reversion may proceed
against the mortgagor or mortgagee for a breach of the
covenant to pay rent.'5 ' When there is a decree for the sale
of the reversion in lands to which rent is incident, the
court may order any rent in arrear to be sold with such
estate, and the purchaser shall have the same right to
recover such rent by distress, entry or action, as if he had
been owner of the estate when the rent accrued.'5 2 If a
lease is made prior to a mortgage the purchaser at foreclosure has no greater rights than the lessor, but leases
subsequent to the mortgage
are not valid against the pur153
chaser at foreclosure.
When due. The general rule is that rent is not due until
earned and therefore rent is payable at the end of term
or period unless otherwise agreed.'
Such an agreement
can be implied. The actions of the parties at the inception
of the letting govern their rights thereafter, except as
amended by agreement. Thus, if rent is paid in advance
at the time of the letting it rent is payable in advance
thereafter. As rent may be paid by the tenant on Sunday,
if the rent falls due on a Sunday and is not paid, it is in
arrear on the following Monday and the landlord may then
",7B. & A. R.R. Co. v. Carolina Coach Co., 206 Md. 237, 111 A. 2d 464
(1955).
"I Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 A. 632, 10 A. 309 (1887).
"' Theatrical Corp. v. Trust Co., 157 Md. 602, 146 A. 805 (1929); Feldmeyer v. Werntz, 119 Md. 285, 86 A. 986 (1913).
110Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949) § 508.
'5 Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934); Hart
v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 169 Md. 446, 182 A. 322 (1936).
1522 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 16, § 160.
2m Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935) ; 5 MD. CODE (1957),
Art. 66, § 20.
"' Castleman v. Du Val, 89 Md. 657, 43 A. 821 (1899).
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distrain therefor.'5 5 However, there may be a question
arise because of our Sunday laws. 5 6
An obligation for the payment of a future rent cannot
be commuted into a present debt, as in advance of157the rent
day there is no present debt for future payment.
Who may collect. Payment of installments of rent to
the husband in an estate by the entireties is sufficient during the continuance of the marriage.15
Who may pay. If the party in possession is not the
tenant or his assignee then the landlord is not required
to accept a tender of ground rent due, but such payment
can be made by the next of kin of the tenant. 159 Under the
Baltimore City Charter 6 ° the surviving spouse or any
member of the immediate family or household who has
occupied the premises with the deceased tenant may, upon
payment to the landlord of the current rent and rent in
arrears be substituted as tenant to the same extent as
the original tenant.
XI. ENFORCEMENT OF RENT
Baltimore City. Landlord's rights when rent is unpaid
are: (a) Housing accommodations - residences or dwellings - Letting of less than three months - summary
ejectment exclusively. Letting of three months up to one
year - either summary ejectment or distress. Letting in
excess of one year - distress exclusively. (b) Commercial
or business accommodations. Letting of less than three
months - summary ejectment exclusively. Letting of
more than three months - distress exclusively.
Counties.'
XII. USE AND OCCUPATION
When a tenant occupies premises before completion of
renovation, his liability for use and occupation is the fair
Childs v. Edwards, 2 K.B. 753; 2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 767.
MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, § 492. The practitioner is referred to the
learned opinion of Judge Niles in Brennan v. Blouse, Baltimore City Court,
The Daily Record, August 29, 1956, in which the Sunday laws are examined,
although not in landlord-tenant litigation.
I Boulevard Corp. v. Stores Corp., 168 Md. 532, 178 A. 707 (1935).
1582 WiLsToN, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1959) 747-8. However, see Columbian
Carbon Co. v. fKight, 207 Md. 203, 209, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d 1232

(1955), in which the Court of Appeals affirms previous holdings that since
the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts the wife shares
equally with the husband In the income from a tenancy by the entireties.
For a discussion of husband's agency for his wife as regards real estate
see Twilley v. Bromley, 192 Md. 465, 64 A. 2d 553 (1949).
'm Chesapeake Realty Co. v. 'Patterson, 138 Md. 244, 113 A. 725 (1921).
10 Charter & P.L.L. (1949) § 462.
'a See Rhynhart, Distre8s, 13 Md. L. Rev. 185 (1953).
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value of the uncompleted accommodations and not necessarily the agreed rent.162 As regards city property, rents
and profits chargeable for the occupancy are confined to a
fair occupation rent for the purpose for which the premises
are adapted. 163
When a tenant removes from demised premises in
obedience to a notice to quit, but leaves trash and rubbish
on the premises this does not amount to use and occupancy,
64
nor can the tenant be deemed to have held over.
XIII.

CONSTRUCTIVE AND PARTIAL EVICTION

In order that there be constructive eviction, the landlord's acts must involve a substantial interference with
tenant's enjoyment and must be of a grave and permanent
character. 6 ' If the landlord makes a tortious entry on the
lessee and expels him, it is a suspension of the rent for the
time the tenant is kept out; if the lessee regains possession
the rent will revive.' 6 An entry by the landlord without
the expulsion of the tenant does not produce a suspension
of the rent. 6 7 When property is leased for a distillery and
the landlord refuses to execute documents required by the
United States showing his consent, then, since the tenant
is entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the premises for
such a purpose, there is a constructive eviction as the lease
for use as a distillery would be a nugatory and incomplete
act and in an action in assumpsit for the rent the tenant
had the right of recoupment for his damage to the extent
of the rent. 6 8 Partial eviction means more than mere trespass and must be something of a permanent character done
by the landlord with the intention of depriving the tenant
of a portion of the premises. Hence a negligent excavation
by a landlord, resulting in a broken sewer pipe affecting
the tenants' use of the demised property, is not a defense to
a suit by landlord for the rent.'6 9
When deprivation of the beneficial use is not by the act
170
of the landlord, the tenant remains liable for the rent.
Notice from a zoning enforcement officer prohibiting a particular use of premises does not amount to constructive
1lGuilford

Bldg. Co. v. Goldslorough, 140 Md. 159, 116 A. 913 (1922).
0 McLaughlin v. Barnum, 31 Md. 425 (1869).
TiFANY, n. 1, 1474, 64 L.R.A. 648.
15 Op. cit. ibid., 1260.
1' Mackubin v. Whetcroft, 4 H. & McH. 135, 155 (Md. 1798).
Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855).
16
Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236 (1875).
Jackson v. Birgfeld, 189 Md. 552, 56 A. 2d 793 (1948).
Wagner v. White, 4 H. & J. 564 (Md. 1815).
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eviction by the landlord. To constitute constructive eviction the act complained of must have been done by the
landlord or by his procurement with the intent and effect
of depriving the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the
leased premises.' 7 '
Most commercial leases prohibit the use of the premises
by the tenant for any but a specified business. If the business authorized by the lease becomes illegal then it would
appear that the familiar rule of contract law that supervening objective impossibility rescinds would become effective and the lease would be terminated by the passage
of the statute.'7 2 However, when premises are leased to
be used exclusively for saloon and restaurant purposes
and subsequently a liquor licensing authority forbids its
use for saloon purposes with which decision the landlord
has nothing to do, then as the lessee is not entirely deprived
of the beneficial use of the premises there is no constructive eviction and the tenant remains liable for the rent.'7 3
If by law a use of premises theretofore legal is prohibited,
there may result an impossibility of performance or a
frustration of the purposes of the lease that will allow
the tenant to terminate the lease when the tenants do not
bind themselves to pay rent regardless of such happening.
When a tenant receives notice from an administrative
authority challenging his use of premises, he is under an
obligation to pursue his remedies until impossibility of
performance
becomes a fact, as distinguished from a
7
possibility. 1
Zoning and use restrictions. A letting for a use prohibited by zoning law is not necessarily impossible of performance when there is an administrative
authority with
75
power to vary the zoning law.
In some jurisdictions a constructive eviction by the
landlord operates to suspend the rent. 1 76 It arises only by
the act of the landlord 77 amounting to serious interference
with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises, such as maintenance of an unsafe wall, depriving tenant of the use of a
part of the demised premises 17s or maintenance of defective plumbing, causing foul and offensive odors. 179 There
7

McNally v. Moser, 210 Md. 127, 122 A. 2d 555 (1956).

1" BRA.NTry, CON TACTS (2nd ed. 1912) § 195.

1

Standard 'Brewing Co. v. Well, 129 Md. 487, 99 A. 661 (1916).
, McNally v. Mkoser, supra, n. 171.

I" McNally v. Moser, ibid.
1712 MCADAM, n. 1, § 419, 2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1265, In. 34.
*7 2 McADAM, ibid., § 404.
1'7 Op. cit. ibid., § 407.
179
Op. cit. ibid., § 409.
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is no constructive eviction when the tenant is inconvenienced by the making of repairs.180 It has been held that a
tenant constructively but not actually evicted has the right
of recoupment or counterclaim on a suit by the landlord
for the rent. 8 ' Such constructive evictions have been held
to exist for breach of a covenant to heat, denial of the use
of an elevator, shutting off the water supply,
defective
82
plumbing, and breach of a covenant to repair.
The majority, and apparently the Maryland, view seems
to be that there is no constructive eviction suspending the
rent unless the tenant moves, and that acts of omission
by the landlord, such as the failure to supply power, heat,
or elevator service, or failure to perform a contract to
repair, do not amount to constructive eviction.'
Criminal liability. Any person who shall:
".... wilfully deprive a tenant of ingress to or egress
from his dwelling, or who shall without the consent of
the tenant diminish essential services to the tenant,
such as the providing of gas, electricity, water, heat,
light, furniture, furnishings, or similar services, to
which, under the expressed or implied terms of the
tenancy the tenant may be entitled, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be
subject to a fine not exceeding . . .$50 and imprisonment of not more than Ten (10) days, or both, in the
'1 85
discretion of the court, for each and every offense.'
XIV.

TENANT'S

RIGHT TO REcOUPMENT

In a suit for rent the defendant has the right of recoupment for a breach or nonperformance by the landlord, to
the extent of the rent, as when a lessee pays under compulsion taxes or mortgage interest owed by the lessor, he
is entitled to deduct such payments from the rent. 8 When
a sub-tenant pays rent due from a lessee to the original
lessor, he is entitled to deduct it from any rent he may
owe the lessee. 87 A tenant deprived of the beneficial use
of premises by the failure of the landlord to make repairs
contracted for, is entitled to an allowance for the proportion of the rent for the time he was so deprived. 8
Op. cit. ibid., §§ 408, 414.
2 UNDERHnLL, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1909) § 698.
1mOp. cit. ibid., §§ 678, 680-683.
1812 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1264.
Biggs v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892) ; of. op. cit. ibid., 1271.
'Baltimore City Ord. No. 769, May 27, 1942.
_ Woodcock v. Pope, 154 Md. 135, 140 A. 76 (1928).
VEN ABLE, n. 1, 59, 62.
SBiggs v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892).
's'
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XV. REPAIRS
There is no implied covenant requiring a landlord to
make repairs'89 so that when there is no agreement as to
payment for repairs it is not the duty of the landlord to
make repairs after the tenancy begins. '0 Unless compelled
by agreement, the landlord is not bound to make any repairs during the term of a lease, so that a covenant is never
implied that a lessor will make repairs.' 9 ' Even though a
landlord may be under no duty to make repairs, he can
be held liable therefor in a suit by a third party who makes
the repairs, notwithstanding that the order was given to
the third party by the tenant, provided there is sufficient
evidence to show tenant to have been landlord's agent for
this purpose. The mere existence of a landlord-tenant relationship does not constitute the tenant as the agent of
the landlord. But the landlord-tenant relationship does not
preclude an agency
status reached by express agreement
92
or authorization.
However, when the tenant makes repairs at the request
of the landlord, the tenant may be entitled to reimbursement.'9 3 When a landlord contracts to make repairs and
improvements and does not do so, the tenant has an action
for breach of the agreement, in which the measure of
damages is the difference between the fair rental value of
the unrepaired premises and the agreed rent.'9 Likewise,
when the landlord has expressly agreed to make repairs,
the tenant may, in a suit for rent, recoup to the extent of
the landlord's rent claim any damages sustained as a direct
result of the landlord's non-performance, including the
cost of the repairs.'9 5
Even though there is a covenant by a landlord to make
repairs, this covenant usually is independent of the covenant to pay rent and a failure to repair is no defense to an
action founded upon nonpayment of rent, although there
is obiter dicta in the Biggs case to the effect that when the
repairs required are of a trifling nature requiring but a
small outlay of money, the lessee may make the repairs
and claim an allowance out of the rent.19 If the covenants,
Gluck v. M. & C.C. of Balto, 81 Md. 315, 32 A. 515 (1895) ; Whitcomb
v. Mason, 102 Md. 275, 62 A. 749 (1905).
n0 Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 52 A. 496 (1902).
10'Woodcock v. Pope, 154 Md. 135, 140 A. 76 (1928).
"'Taetle v. Livezey Lumber 0o., 217 Md. 270, 142 A. 2d 821 (1958).
"Clark & Stevens v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504,65 A. 326 (1906).
"Bggs
B
v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892).
Cramer v. Baugher, 130 Md. 212, 100 A. 507 (1917).
"WILSTON,
CONTRACTS (1936) 887 F; Biggs v. McCurley, supra, n. 194,
415.
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by intention of the parties, are dependent then non-performance by landlord is a defense to a claim for rent.19 7
In a summary proceeding to recover possession because of
assert a counternonpayment of rent, the tenant cannot
8
claim for breach of the landlord.1
While neither the landlord nor the tenant, in the
absence of an agreement, is under a legal duty to make
repairs, any dangerous condition of the premises which
imperils either the occupant or members of the community
is forbidden. Under Ordinance 384, approved March 6,
1941, the Commissioner of Health of Baltimore City is
empowered to require the occupant or tenant of premises
to maintain them in a sanitary condition; 199 likewise, the
Commissioner is empowered to order that premises which
are in any way detrimental to life or health be altered or
improved by the owner." 0
In Givner v. Commissioner of Health,2"' the Court of
Appeals discussed the powers in the Commissioner of
Health to require installation of inside toilets, prohibit
the use of lead paint, and require a particular dwelling
to be vacated, all in the interests of public health or safety;
and held generally that if a particular regulation is fairly
debatable, the "courts will not substitute their judgment
for that of the official" charged with the duty of promulgation or enforcement.20 2

XVI.

TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

A. Notice to Quit
Here, as in summary ejectment, complexities arise
cause the subject is affected by two statutes: one,
general law affecting all of the counties; and second,
public local law of Baltimore City. It is provided
the Code:

bethe
the
by

"Where the public general law and the public local
are in conflict,
law of any county, city, town or district
23
the public local law shall prevail.
Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 117 A. 882 (1922).
2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1766.

§ 156 A.
§§ 156 B, 156 C.
'207 Md. 184, 113 A. 2d 899 (1955).
w2 See also State v. Reisfeld, The Daily Record, Feb. 25, 1955, (Criminal
Court of Baltimore City) where Niles, C.J., and Duer, J., held that the
holder of the bare legal title is subject to the penalty provisions of Sections 112 to 119 of Article 12 of the Baltimore City Code of 1950, for failure
to remedy conditions dangerous to health after having been served with
appropriate notice by the Health Commissioner.
1 MD. CoiE (1957), Art. 1, § 13.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

1. Public General Law
The Code provides:
"In all cases where any interest in real estate shall
be let or leased for any definite term or at will and the
lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns
shall desire to repossess the same after the expiration
of the term for which it was demised and shall give
notice in writing one month before the expiration of
said term or determination of said will to the tenant
or to the person actually in possession of the premises
to remove from the same at the end of said term, and if
the said tenant or person in actual possession shall refuse to comply therewith the lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns may make complaint
thereof in writing to any justice of the peace of the
2' 0 4
county or city wherein such real estate is situate.
"The provision of the preceding sections shall apply
to all cases of tenancies from year to year, tenancies
by the month and by the week; provided, that in case
of tenancies from year to year in the counties, a notice
in writing shall be given three months before the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, except
that in case of farm tenancies, the notice shall be given
six (6) months before the expiration of the current
year of the tenancy; and in monthly or weekly tenancies, a notice in writing of one month or one week,
as the case may be, shall be so given; and the same
proceeding shall apply, so far as may be, to cases of
forcible entry and detainer; and the benefit of all such
proceedings shall enure to the heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns of the owner of such estate as the
case may be. In case of removal of such proceedings
under a writ of certiorari, a sufficient record thereof
shall be the original papers with a copy of the judgment and entries by the justice under his hand and
seal. This section, so far as the same relates to notices,
shall not apply to Baltimore City. Nothing contained
in the laws relating to landlord and tenant contracts,
shall be construed as preventing the parties to any
such contract, by agreement in writing, from substituting a longer or shorter notice to quit than heretofore
required or to waive all such notice, provided the
property to which such contract pertains is located in
'5

over.

MD. CODE (1957), Art. 53, § 1. § § 2 and 3 deal with tenants holding
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any special taxing area, or incorporated town of Montgomery County."2 '
"When the tenant shall give notice by parol to the
landlord or to his agent or representatives, at least one
month before the expiration of the lease or tenancy in
all cases except in cases of tenancies from year to year,
and at least three months' notice in all cases of tenancy
from year to year in the counties, except in all cases
of farm tenancy the notice shall be six months, of the
intention of such tenant to remove at the end of that
year and to surrender possession of the tenement at
that time, and the landlord, his agent or representative
shall prove said notice from the tenant by legal and
competent testimony, it shall not be necessary for the
said landlord, his agent or representative to prove a
written notice to the tenant, but the proof of such
notice from the tenant as aforesaid shall entitle his
landlord to recover possession of said tenement under
the provisions of this article.
This section shall not
20 6
apply to Baltimore City.
2. Baltimore City Local Law and Practice
Leases for years. At common law, no notice to quit is
necessary to terminate a tenancy for years at the expiration of the term named in the lease."° However, if the
landlord desires to avail himself of the summary remedy
provided by Article 53, Section 1,20 he must give three
month's written notice to the tenant before the expiration
of the term. 9 If the landlord fails to give the notice, if
any, provided for in the lease, or the notice required by
Article 53, Section 1, or that required by the Charter, Sections 728-731,21 ° then being barred from the summary proceedings which are brought in the Peoples' Court, he must
proceed in an action of ejectment in a court of higher
jurisdiction.2 1 '
When notice to quit or notice of termination is given
with respect to a lease containing notice provisions, such
notice must be in accordance with the provisions and terms
-'Ibid., § 7.
Ibid., § 8.
201 Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935) ; 2
AND TENANT (1904) § 465; 2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1419.

TAYLOR, LANDLORD

M05 MD. CODE (1957).

m Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A. 2d 329 (1946) ; Darling Shops v.
Balto. Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948), noted
9 Md. L. Rev. 362 (1948).
210 5 MD.CODE (1957) ; Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949).
2u 2 'PoE, n. 1, § 482.
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of the lease itself. 12 In the absence of estoppel or waiver
by the landlord, the receipt by him of an oral notice of
termination does not preclude him from insisting upon
the requirements of a written notice as set out in the
lease.213 When a lease for years contains no such provisions, then the notice must be given at least one month
before the termination date of the lease.2 14
Leases from year to year. When tenant is in occupancy
under a lease from year to year, such as when he takes
possession under a void lease and pays a yearly rent, the
notice to quit necessary to be given by landlord upon which
to base a suit against a tenant holding over is the same
21 5
as that for a lease from year to year - i.e., ninety days.
3. Notice by Landlord
"Where any lands or tenements in the City of Baltimore are held from year to year, the tenancy shall be
terminated if the lessor give to the tenant ninety days'
notice before the end of the year."216
If land or tenements be held in said city by tenancy at
will, at sufferance or per autre vie, thirty days' notice by
the landlord or reversioner to the tenant or occupant shall
21
terminate such tenancy at the expiration of thirty days. 7
The Code provision is one month's notice;2 18 the Charter
provision is thirty days. A reconciliation of these provisions is: (a) If the lease is one from month to month, then
notice must be given at least one month prior to the terminal date on which the letting is to end. As examples: If the day on which rent is due is the fifth of the month,
then the notice must be served not later than midnight of
the fourth and the tenancy will be terminated at midnight
on the fourth of the following month. If the day on which
rent is due is the first of the month, then the notice must
be served not later than midnight of the last day of the
month preceding the "notice month" at the end of which
the tenancy is terminated. As regards tenancies beginning
S2upra,

n. 210,

§

735.

-18
Leonard v. Apartments Company, 161 Isd. 451, 157 A. 752 (1932).
214 5 MD. CoDE (1957), Art. 53, § 1.
215
Darling Shops v. Balto. Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d
677 (1948), noted, 9 Md. L. Rev. 362 (1948). See this annotation for a
discussion bf the incidents of a tenancy implied in fact by the tenant
entering under a void or unenforceable lease and the notice necessary to
be given by the landlord to terminate such a tenancy.
", Charter & P.L.L. of 'Baltimore City (1949) § 728.
17Ibid., § 730.
2185 MD. Com (1957), Art. 53, § 1.
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on the first of the month, the provisions of the City Charter
cannot be applied because of two inconsistent factors: (1) our Julian calendar contains months of 28, 29, 30 or 31
days, as the case may be; and (2) rent is not apportionable.
Consequently, the provisions of Article 53, Section 1 control, and a notice of termination must be given on the day
prior to the first of the month. There is room for argument
that when the particular month contains thirty-one days,
and a notice is served on the first of the month, under
Baltimore City local law since there are thirty clear days
between the date of service and date of termination, the
tenancy is terminated. In view of the fact that tenancies
may be terminated as regards months continuing as few
as twenty-eight days, it would seem logical that the same
rule should apply to all tenancies - so that as regards
tenancies beginning on the first of the month, (because of
the ambiguity contained in the local law in Baltimore
City) notice to quit must be given prior to the first of the
month of termination of the tenancy. (b) If the tenancy
is one from week to week, then neither the Charter provision nor the Code provision can be literally applied.
The practice in such case is to give five weeks notice,
beginning with the rent day next succeeding the service
of the notice to quit.
4. Notice by Tenant
A tenant may terminate a tenancy from year to year,
from month to month, from week to week, at will, or at
sufferance by giving to the landlord thirty days' notice
previous to the end of the term.2 1 Notice by a tenant must
be in writing.2 20
Count of time. As rent is not apportionable, neither the
landlord nor the tenant can give a notice by which a tenancy is terminated in mid-term, as for example, a notice
to quit terminating the tenancy on the fifteen of the month,
when the tenancy is one from month to month, with rent
due in advance on the first of the month. Therefore, the
count of time on a notice to quit begins with the next rent
day following the service of the notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
"Such notice shall be sufficient in form if it contains a request by the landlord to the tenant to leave
the premises, or if it states the intentions of the tenant
Charter & P.L.L. of Baltimore City (1949) § 728.
m Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875).
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to leave the same, and it need not state the time when
the tenant is requested to leave the same, or when the

tenant intends to do

So.221

Form of notice to quit:
"To Tenant: As I am desirous to have again and
repossess the premises which you now hold of me as
tenant, I hereby give you notice to vacate and remove
from the same at the end of the term of your tenancy,
w hich w ill expire on ...................................
Who may give notice.
"Notice on the part of the landlord may be given
either by the original lessor or by the person or persons succeeding him in the ownership of the reversion.
One having merely an equitable title based on a contract for the sale to him of the reversion has no
authority to give it. * * * An authorized agent of the
landlord may give the notice on behalf of his principal,
and he may . . . give it in his own name, if he has
general control over the property, as when he is an
agent to let and also to receive rents . . . while if
acting under a special authority for this particular
purpose he must, . . . give the notice in the name of
his principal. * * * "222
A notice to quit need not be signed by the landlord in person. It is sufficient if it clearly shows on whose behalf it
is sent, to what property it relates, and of what facts it is
intended to inform the tenant. A landlord's agent having
authority to rent a property is presumed to have like
authority to give to the tenant a notice to quit.2 23
"'When the reversion is transferred, the proper person to give the notice is the grantee and not the original lessor. A purchaser of the reversion cannot give
the requisite notice before he has received his deed.
The grantee of the reversion may take advantage of a
notice to quit given by his grantor prior to the conveyance of the reversion'."224
Quaere, can there be circumstances under which the
notice may be given by the purchaser before a conveyance
"ICharter & P.L.L., 8upra, n. 219, § 733.
2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1438, § 198.
O'Benton v. Stiokes, 109 Md. 117, 71 A. 532 (1908).
2 Walker v. Kirwan, 137 Md. 139, 111 A. 775 (120).
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of the property, on the theory that the contract purchaser
is the equitable owner?2 25 When the object is to secure
possession for the purchaser of tenant-occupied property,
the practice is to give the notice in name of both the
vendor-owner and the purchaser. The naming of an unnecessary person as landlord is treated as surplusage.
Service of notice. The notice required by the preceding
sections shall be in writing and served on the tenant or
left at his place of abode or business, or served on his agent
or servant, or served on any occupant of the premises; and
if there be no person living on the premises the same may
be served by being set upon a conspicuous part of the
premises. 2 6
Irregular notices. Service of a notice addressed to a
wife (being the tenant) upon her husband (her agent in
renting and living on the premises) is a sufficient notice.
A misdescription of the premises, or a mistatement of dates
which cannot mislead will not vitiate the notice; nor need
it be directed to the person. Even if directed by a wrong
name, such as the husband instead of the wife, if she keeps
it without objection, the error is waived. 227 However, refer2 28 which
ence is made to Wm. Penn Supply v. Watterson,
holds in a mechanic's lien case that agency as between
husband and wife may not be implied from marital status.
Premature terminal date in notice. At nisi prius it has
been decided that a notice to quit on April 28, when the
expiration of the lease was February 28, was defective and
did not terminate the tenancy.22 9 However, as a notice is
good if upon the whole it is intelligible and so certain that
the tenant cannot reasonably misunderstand it, an obvious
mistake in some part will not invalidate it if it is otherwise
so explicit that the party receiving it cannot be misled.23 0
If the person who gives the notice becomes committed
thereby even though there may be an error in the terminal
date, the notice is not thereby vitiated.2 31
As a notice to quit can be given only by the landlord
or on his behalf and as the tenant is bound by constructive notice as to ownership as shown by the Land Records,
then the tenant may rely on the title as shown by the
Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445, 87 A.L.R. 1500 (1931).
Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949) § 732.
Cook v. Creswell, 44 Md. 581 (1876).
2218
Md. 291, 146 A. 2d 420 (1958).
Matthews v. Whiteford, 119 Md. 122, 85 A. 1040 (1912).
2Cook v. Creswell, 44 Md. 581 (1876) ; Benfon v. Stokes, 109 Md. 117,
121, 71 A. 532 (1908) ; Walker v. Kirwan, 137 Md. 139, 111 A. 775 (1920).
m Dugan v. Yourtee, People's Court No. 13329-48, affd. in Baltimore City
Court by Sherbow, J.
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Land Records and this regardless of when the deed was
recorded. By Article 21, Section 16,232 a deed recorded
after six months is constructive notice from and after the
date on which it is recorded.233 A notice to quit or a suit
against a tenant holding over can be effective or maintained only when brought by the record title owner or by
a landlord to whom attornment has been made, as persons
dealing with the owner of the reversion23 4are bound only
by the title shown by the Land Records.

B. Surrender and Abandonment
A surrender of demised premises by a tenant before the
expiration of his term does not relieve him from liability
for rent unless the surrender is accepted by the landlord;
and a reletting by the landlord at the risk of the tenant
is not an acceptance of surrender by the landlord.235 How-

ever, in any such reletting the landlord faces the hazard
that his act may discharge the tenant's liability if the landlord relets the premises for a period longer than the remainder of the term.236
As a notice to quit by a landlord or a notice of termination by a tenant must be in writing, if the tenant removes
from premises held by him under a tenancy from month to
month, without a surrender accepted by the landlord, then
the tenant may be liable for rent accruing after the removal, and beyond the succeeding month's rent.23 7 When
a tenant abandons demised property without legal notice
to the landlord he remains liable for the rent.38
C. Fire
When premises become untenable because of fire or
unavoidable accident, the letting being for seven years or
less, the tenancy is thereby terminated and all liability

for rent ceases proportionately. 23 9 However, if the lease
provides for such a contingency, then the provisions of the
statute are inoperative.2 4 ° When premises are merely damaged by fire so that part thereof becomes untenantable,
the lease is not thereby terminated, as "untenantable by
m 2 MD. CoDE (1959).
ImNickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892).
2" Gable v. Preachers' Fund Society, 59 Md. 455 (1883).
2 Oldewurtel v. Wiesenfeld, 97 Md. 165, 54 A. 969 (1903).
2Ralph v. Dailey, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640, 61 A.L.R. 763 (1927); see
annotation at 61 A.L.R. 773.
Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875).
2 Emrich v. Union Stock Yard Co., 86 Md. 482,38 A. 943 (1897).
"MD CoDE (1959), Art. 53, § 37.
wOSpear v. Baker, 117 Md. 570, 84 A. 62 (1912).
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fire" means a permanently untenantable condition rendering further occupancy impossible and necessitating not
merely repairs, but rebuilding.2 4 '
Where a lease provided for its termination upon substantial destruction of the premises by fire, the elements,
or any other cause not the fault of the tenant, it was held
that such destruction must make the premises permanently
untenantable, or be so extensive as to require practically
the equivalent of a new building. When the cost of repairs
amounted to $5,000 to a building valued at $100,000, and
were completed within a month, the lessee was denied the
right to terminate.24 2
D. Judicial Sales
As a writ of possession under Article 66, Section 19,243
to a purchaser of lands sold at mortgage foreclosure is of
the same nature as a writ of possession or habere facias
possessionem under Article 75, Section 42,44 the rights
respecting property sold at mortgage foreclosure or on
execution against the occupant or tenant are as follows:
(a) Under Code Article 66, Section 20,245 a purchaser at a
mortgage foreclosure sale has all of the rights against the
tenant that the mortgagor had. Consequently, the purchaser may file appropriate actions in People's Court to
the same extent as could the landlord or owner whose
estate was sold.248 (b) The purchaser at a judicial sale
may secure out of the court which ordered the sale a writ
of possession against the occupants of the property, consisting either of the mortgagor or debtor or those who hold
under him. (c) An assignee of the purchaser at a judicial
sale may not have a writ of possession out of the court
which directed the sale, as in Turner v. Waters,247 where it
was held that the right to a writ of possession applied for by
a purchaser at an execution sale, did not devolve upon the
purchaser's administrator.
XVII. LANDLoRD's LmN
A landlord has no lien for rent unless he distrains,2 48
nor does he have an equitable lien upon property taken in
Barry v. Herring, 153 Md. 457, 138 A. 266 (1927).
Standard, Inc. v. Alexander, Inc., 214 Md. 214, 133 A. 2d 460 (1957).
" '5 MD. CODE (1957).
"'7 MD. CODE (1957).
I'Supra, n. 243.
" Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 349, 178 A. 113 (1935).
-714
Md. 62 (1859).
"8 Buckey v. Snouffer, 10 Md. 149 (1856) ; Stewart v. Clark, 60 Md. 310
(1883) ; Mears v. Perine, 156 Md. 56, 143 A. 591, 62 A.L.R. 1100 (1928).
21
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distress and replevied by the tenant.2 49 A landlord has a
quasi-lien on the goods of his tenant subject to distress
even before distress levied for arrearages of rent, but this
potential right does not become a lien on the goods until
they have actually been seized under a distress. This quasilien may be converted to a lien, even without a distress,
under the Statute of 8 Anne, Ch. 14,250 and if the landlord's
claim for rent is properly established it will take precedence over the debt on which an attachment issues and he
is entitled to be first paid out of the proceeds of the property condemned. 251 If a landlord permits distrained goods
to remain in a tenant's possession for an unreasonable
length of time, then a bona fide purchaser without notice
of the distress takes the goods free of the landlord's lien.
Three months has been held to be an unreasonable time.252
In bankruptcy. A landlord has no lien upon distrainable goods passing into the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy unless he levied his distraint before the filing of
the petition.2 5 3 If distress is levied by a landlord before
the tenant's adjudication as a bankrupt, the landlord is
entitled to priority for his accrued rent, out of the proceeds of sale of the bankrupt's assets by the bankruptcy
trustee.2 54 The lien acquired by a distress within four
months of a bankruptcy petition is not voidable as it is
one secured other than through legal proceedings.2 55
A. Attaching or Execution Creditor
By 8 Anne, Ch. 14, an execution creditor must pay rent
in arrear for a period of not less than one year before the
goods and chattels executed upon, may be removed by the
officer.25 The same principle applies to the rights of the
landlord against an attaching creditor.2 5 7 Therefore, when
goods are sold on execution by the sheriff, the landlord is
entitled to be paid the rent accrued and unpaid before the
levying of the execution, provided he gives reasonable
24

Gelston v. Rullman, 15 Md. 260 (1860).
2 ALEX., n. 1, 680; Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 A. 632, 10
A. 309 (1887) ; Calvert Bldg. & Const. Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A.
355 (1928).
"IThomson v. Balto. & Susq. Steam Co., 33 Md. 312 (1870).
Lamotte v. Wisner, 51 Md. 543 (1879).
"I Irving Trust Co. v. Burke, 65 F. 2d 730 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Loan Service
v. Grossman, 165 Md. 478, 170 A. 183 (1934).
In re Seward, 8 F. Supp. 865 (D.C. Md. 1934).
v1 In
re Potee Brick Co. of Baltimore City, 179 Fed. 525 (D.C. Md. 1910).
12 ALEX., n. 1, 681.
1 First Nat'l Bk. v. Corp. Comm., 161 Md. 508, 157 A. 748, 86 A.L.R.
1407 (1932).
21

1960]

LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT

37

notice to the sheriff or constable,25 and whether or not the
goods are removed from the premises.2 59 The notice given
by landlord to the constable to sell under a fi fa must state
under oath the amount of rent due.26 0
If the goods are not removed from the premises then
the landlord has no action against the constable under the
statute of 8 Anne, Ch. 14,261 if they be sold on the premises,
a motion by the landlord that the constable pay the rent
due out of the money in his hands is appropriate.2 6 2
When goods are removed from demised premises by the
sheriff under a writ of attachment, there being no rent due
at the time of removal, the landlord has no claim against
the proceeds of the sale, as he has no right to follow and
distrain on the goods. 263 As the purpose of the statute is
to protect the landlord's right to distrain, there is no such
priority in landlord's claims arising in Baltimore City,
when the term of the lease is three months or less, for the
right to distrain in such cases has been taken away and
the right to summarily eject substituted.26 4 In a suit for
taking goods under a void attachment, the defendant may
mitigate damages by proving payment of rent in arrear to
the landlord pursuant to 8 Anne, although such payment
must be either compulsory or by court order." 5
B. Bankruptcy, Insolvency and Receivership
"Whenever any person or corporation shall make
an assignment for the benefit of his or its creditors, or
shall be adjudicated insolvent, or shall be adjudicated
bankrupt, or shall be dissolved as a corporation, or a
receiver is appointed to take possession of his or its
2 POE, n. 1, § 635.
Washington v. Williamson, 23 Md. 244 (1865).
MD.CODE (1959), Art, 53, § 23 - Suggested forms are as follows:
Form of landlord's notice. "To . . . Constable. Take notice that
the sum of . . . dollars for . . . month's rent on the property . . .
street . . . County, Maryland, due at . . . last, is now due to me
from ... , on which premises were certain goods now in your pos8Cssion
by virtue of a writ of execution issued at the suit of . . . against . . ."
Form of affidavit. "Be it remembered, that on . . . before me, the
subscriber, a Judge of the People's Court of Baltimore City, personally appeared ....
and made oath in due form of law, that . . .is
justly and bona fide indebted to him in the sum of ... dollars and...
cents, for rent in arrearand already due to him for the property... ;
and that he, the said . . . , hath not received, either directly or indirectly, any part or parcel of the said rent, so claimed to be due and
in arrear, or any security or satisfaction for the same [Except the
credits (if any) given], to the best of his knowledge and belief."
Supra, n. 256, 680, 686.
Washington v. Williams, supra, n. 259.
White v. Hoeninghaus, 74 Md. 127, 21 A. 700 (1891).
Putman's Sons v. Van Buren, 1 Balto. City Rep. 130 (1890).
26
Wanamaker v. Bowes, 36 Md. 42 (1872).
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property or estate, in the distribution of the property
or estate of such person or corporation, all the money
owing from such person or corporation for rent of any
real or leasehold property in this State due not more
than three months, but not actually distrained for,
before the execution of such assignment or the filing
of the bill or petition for such receiver, dissolution or
adjudication, shall constitute a lien on, and shall be
paid in full out of, the distrainable property of such
person or corporation, to the same extent but no further than if distress for said rent had been '2levied
by
86
the landlord before such execution or filing.
267
This preference may be lost.

C. Decedent's Estates
A landlord having a claim for distrainable rent against
a deceased tenant has, of course, no problem if there are
sufficient assets in the estate. However, if the assets are
insufficient, the landlord's rights are not too clearly defined.
Claim in Orphans Court. Under the Code the landlord
may file claim in the Orphans Court.
"If the claim be for rent there shall be produced
the lease itself, or the deposition of some credible witness or witnesses, or an acknowledgment in writing of
the deceased, establishing the contract, and the time
which hath elapsed during which rent was chargeable,
and a statement of the sum due for such rent, with an
oath of the creditor endorsed thereon, 'that no part of
the sum due for said rent, or any security or satisfaction for the same hath been received, except what (if
any) is credited', and if the creditor be an assignee,
there shall be such oath of the original26 screditor with
respect to the time of the assignment."
If his claim is to be a preferred claim, then:
"The proof of a claim for rent in arrear, so as to
render the same a preferred claim, shall be the proofs
and vouchers for rent aforesaid; and proof that the
claim is such that a distress therefor might be levied
4 MD. CODE (1959), Art. 47, § 16.
A discussion of the rights of conflicting rights and claims when there
is insufficient money to pay claims will be found in Easter v. Tatelbaum,
198 Md. 636, 84 A. 2d 914 (1951). The Statute of 8 Anne, Ch. 14, 2 ALEx.,
n. 1, 680, is not superseded or abrogated by this Act; In re Seward, 8 F.
Supp. 865 (D.C. Md. 1934).
8 MD. CODE (1959), Art. 93, § 97.
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on said deceased's goods and chattels in the hands of
the administrator; but the preference given for rent
is not to impair the landlord's right'269
of distress if he
should think it proper to exercise it.
In the settlement of a decedent's estate, after taxes due
and in arrear, claims for rent in arrear against the decedent
for which a distress might be levied by law are preferred
debts,7 0 it is essential that a proper voucher be filed or the
claim will not be given a preferred status.2 ' Attention is
particularly called to the provisions of Article 93, Section 6, subsection (a),27' which apparently limits a landlord's preferred claim to rent for a period not more than
three months. Assuming the proper form of claim is filed,
then the claim for distrainable rent is payable as a preferred claim immediately after payment of taxes due and
in arrear.7 3 It appears that a number of expense categories
are paid before rent, or, for that matter, taxes. Article 93,
Section 6,' 74 dealing with the order of priority of disbursements (as distinguished from debts) treats a number of
items, including funeral expenses, as having priority over
all debts, including a landlord's preferred claim. Another
guide to the legislative intent to protect funeral expenses

may be found in Article 81, Section 202 (c)

,275

which gives

taxes priority over all debts excepting necessary funeral
expenses.
Distress. Article 93, Section 98,2' 6 provides that "preference given for rent is not to impair the landlord's right of
distress if he should think it proper to exercise it". A landlord may distrain during the term, after the death of the
tenant and before administration granted, for rent due and
2 78
in arrear.2 " While the case of Longwell v. Ridinger,
deals with the preferred status of the landlord's claim for
distrainable rent in the Orphans Court, there is obiter dicta
in this case that a landlord may distrain after letters of
administration have issued on the estate of the deceased
tenant.
Ibid., § 98.
2" Calvert Bldg. & Coonst. Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A. 355 (1928).
11Maynadier v. Armstrong, 98 Md. 175, 56 A. 357 (1903).
928 MD. CoDE (1959).
278 8 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 93, § 130.
"8 MD. CODE (1959).
7 MD. CODE (1959).
S8 MD. CODE (1957).
-Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660 (1867).
21
Gill 57 (Md. 1843).
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TORT LIABILITY

The liability of a landlord in tort arises from a breach
of a duty assumed by contract or imposed by law. As an
example of the latter, when there is more than a single
tenant the landlord is responsible for the condition of hallways and other rooms used in common 7 9 and is liable for
damages caused by his failure to remedy defects in the
appliances or parts of the building over which he retains
control.2"' When in a multiple unit dwelling inadequate
precautions by the landlord cause rat infestation in the
portions over which the landlord retains control, resulting
in a tenant being infected with typhus, the landlord may
be held liable for the damage resulting to tenant or his
family. 28 1 A landlord may be liable to third parties if
premises are unsafe when leased and property is of a public
character.8 2 As regards hazards in a recreation room maintained by a landlord in a multiple dwelling for the convenience of the tenants (thus not necessary for use in connection with portions of the building leased by them), there
is no duty owed by the landlord to a person not a tenant
injured in such a room while using it without the knowledge of the landlord. The injured person, being a trespasser or bare licensee, has no claim for injury against
the landlord despite being of tender years.8 '
The question of negligence in maintaining a dangerous
place depends upon whether such place of danger is in the
natural order of things or whether it is unusual in the
experience of reasonably prudent persons. Where a tenant
slipped and fell on linoleum-treaded outside steps during
a snowstorm, plaintiff was denied recovery because it was
not shown such use 4of linoleum was unusual or out of
common experience.28
A landlord may be liable to guests or customers of his
lessee only to the same extent that he is liable to the tenant
himself. However, where the premises are to be used for
public or quasi-public purposes, the landlord must use ordi2Whitcomb v. Mason, 102 Md. 275, 62 A. 749 (1905). Landay v. Cohn,
220 Md. 24, 150 A. 2d 739 (1959), points out that the use must be within
the confines of the invitation.
Kinnier v. J. R. McAdams, Inc., 142 Md. 305, 120 A. 838 (1923) ; Sezzin
v. Stark, 187 Md. 241, 49 A. 2d 742 (1946) ; Ross v. Belzer, 199 Md. 187, 85
A. 2d 799 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 360. See note, Iandlord's
liability for injury due to defects in inside passageways and chambers
used in common by tenants, 25 A.L.R. 2d 444.
281 State, use of Pumpbrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., U. S. Dist.
Ct.; Chesnut, J.; Daily Record, Aug. 20, 1949.
Smith v. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 48 A. 92 (1901).
Levine v. Miller, 218 Md. 74, 145 A. 2d 418 (1958).
Seaman v. State, use of Jeter, 213 Md. 359, 131 A. 2d 871 (1957).
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nary diligence to see that the property leased is in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the lease. Thus, when
a patron of a tavern is injured when falling down a flight
of steps, if there is evidence that the stairway was unsafe
or potentially dangerous at the time of letting, the landlord may be held liable to the injured person. A person
is a "patron" if his visit promises actual or potential
financial benefit to the occupant in connection with the
business conducted on the premises, so that the patron
may be a solicitor of new accounts for a bank as well as a
customer who wants to buy a bottle of beer.28 5
A landlord is not liable for injuries caused by defects
existing at the time of the lease except as he may have
failed to inform the lessee of defects known to him and
not apparent to the lessee. It is necessary to distinguish
between actual knowledge by the landlord of the dangerous condition, or whether he has information to reasonably support a conclusion of the existence of danger.
Maryland has adopted the rule of liability upon the landlord if "he had reason to know" of the danger, as distinguished from "should have known" of the danger.2 86 A
lessor who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any
natural or artificial condition involving unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to persons upon the land is subject to
liability. 287 However, a landlord is not an insurer of the
safety of the premises or the appliances supplied by him. In
Maryland the common law rule that there is no obligation
upon the landlord to repair or rebuild prevails, and in the
absence of agreement the tenant must guard against apparent dangers. 28 Here continues the philosophy that the
liability of a landlord to a tenant rests upon violation of
duty. Unless the particular condition which causes the
injury has been made known to the landlord a reasonable
time before the accident, giving him time to make correction, there is no liability on the landlord unless the landlord has exclusive control of the apparatus whose failure
causes injury. Thus, in the case of an unexplained explosion of a gas heater the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
did not apply, and the landlord was not liable when it was
shown that he merely retained the right and duty to adjust
and repair, since there was no notice to the landlord nor
opportunity to find and correct the condition causing the
Austin v. Beutner, 211 Md. 61, 124 A. 2d 793 (1956).
State v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A. 2d 100 (1955).
Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d 683 (1955).
2&1Tbid.
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explosion. 2 9 However, it has been held that when a landlord makes available a laundry room for the use of all of
his tenants, he is under a duty to keep it and the appliances
therein in a reasonably safe condition. 290 In 2310 Madison
Avenue v. Allied Bedding Mfg. Co.,291 the landlord was
held liable for damage to goods of a first floor tenant caused
by water coming from second floor due to a clogged drain
pipe, when there was an agreement by landlord to make
repairs and when he was notified three weeks earlier of a
water leak, and failed to discover the cause of the leak.
The landlord may not escape responsibility for an obligation to make repairs to appliances or equipment under his
control by delegating the making of such repairs to an independent contractor.
Liability may result from an obligation assumed by the
landlord's contract. The promise of landlord to repair must
be supported by consideration, such as inducing the tenant
to remain for a longer term; if the landlord's promise is
made after the tenancy begins and the tenant is not induced
to do anything but what he has already contracted to do,
the promise of landlord is without consideration.2 9 2 When
a landlord agrees to make repairs and does not do so, then
the tenant or a member of his family has an action for any
personal injuries sustained, provided there is some clear
act of negligence beyond the breach of contract.293 However, a tenant has no action for personal injuries resulting
from the mere breach of a contract to repair, since to be
actionable such breach must be a negligent one.294 When
a landlord makes repairs, whether or not bound by a covenant to repair, he must exercise reasonable care in making
the repairs or improvements and is liable for any injuries
sustained by the tenant, just as he would be if he were
obligated by a covenant in the lease to do the work.2 98
When an obligation is on the landlord to repair, he is not
responsible for injuries caused by hidden defects in the
premises unknown to him,296 and a casual expression of
Lee v. Housing Autho. of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 881 (1954).
See note, 25 A.L.R. 2d 565, dealing with a landlord's liability for personal injury or death due to defects in appliances supplied for use of different tenants.
'209 Md. 399, 121 A. 2d 203 (1956).
McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A. 2d 95 (1955).
Robinson v. Hell, 128 Md. 645, 98 A. 195 (1916) ; Edelman v. Monouydas, 186 Md. 479, 47 A. 2d 41 (1946).
" Thompson v. Clemens, 96 Md. 196, 53 A. 919 (1903).
Pinkerton v.
Slocumb, 126 Md. 665, 95 A. 965 (1915). Wilson v. Yates, 137 Md. 54, 111
A. 161 (1920).
"I Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d, 683 (1955).
0,King v. Compton, 187 Md. 363, 50 A. 2d 131 (1946).
2o
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opinion as to the safety of premises will not support an
action for negligent misrepresentation.2 9 7 The careful practitioner will keep in mind that the foundation of a landlord's tort liability lies in negligence, regardless of the
origin of his duty, whether in contract, or imposed
2 8 upon
him by his status or the ownership of the property.
Nuisance. The distinction between nuisance and negligence lies in definition of a private nuisance as "a violation
of an absolute duty so that it does not rest on the degree
of care used but rather on the degree of danger existing
with the best of care".299 When property leased is not a
nuisance at the time but becomes a nuisance only by the
act of the tenant while the latter is in possession, the owner
is not liable to third parties for the consequences of the
nuisance. 0
A distinguishing point seems to be whether the nature
of the tenancy detracted from the owner-landlord's control.
Here the duration of the tenancy seems to be of moment;
a short-term tenancy, such as from month to month, creates
the thought of the privilege of the landlord to regain control of the premises. Consequently, liability in the landlord
may exist on the ground of reasonable opportunity in him
to abate the nuisance created by the tenant."'
When the premises are a nuisance at the time of the
letting, then the owner is liable whether in or out of
possession. 0 2 Both the landlord and the tenant may be
liable to a third person damaged by the defective condition
of leased premises, notwithstanding the provisions of the
lease, when the premises contain a nuisance at the time
of the demise which becomes active by ordinary use of the
premises by the tenant.30 3 In this connection see Sherwood
Brothers, Inc. v. Eckard,"4 in which it was held that the
landlord is liable for injuries to persons on leased premises,
such as customers of the lessee, only to the same extent
as he is to the tenant himself; accordingly, the landlord is
Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A. 2d 287 (1948).
2 For a review of the authorities dealing with the liability of a landlord
for his failure to make repairs, see Richardson v. Katzoff, Ct. of Com.
Pleas, O'Dunne, J.; Daily Record, April 1, 1939.
21 State v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 34, 113 A. 2d 100 (1955).
1 Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 161 A. 172 (1932). In this connection
see note in 39 A.L.R. 2d 973, dealing with the liability of the owner or
landlord for injuries to a third party resulting from a nuisance created
by a tenant.
139 A.L.R. 2d 973.
Owings v. Jones, 9 Md. 108 (1856). Miller v. Fisher, 111 Md. 91, 73 A.
8910 (1909). Longley v. McGeoch, 115 Md. 182, 80 A. 843 (1911).
w Beck v. Hanline, 122 Md. 68, 89 A. 377 (1913).
204 Md. 485, 105 A. 2d 207 (1954).
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not liable for injuries caused by defects existing at the
time of the lease except as he may have failed to inform
the lessee of defects known to him and not apparent to the
lessee. When large numbers of patrons may be expected
to visit the leased premises, the landlord is obliged to see
to it that the leased premises are in a reasonably safe condition at the time of letting." 5 In Austin v. Buettner, °6 the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that the landlord
may be liable to a patron of his lessee if the property leased
is not in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the lease.
Also, in this case the Court indicated that it was not committed to the principle that the landlord may be liable to
a patron of his lessee if the property leased is not in a
reasonably safe condition at the time of the lease. Also, in
this case the Court indicated that it was not committed to
the principle that the landlord's liability would be affected
by the number of patrons. The reason for the presence of
the injured person on the premises is of importance. The
nature of liability of both landlord and tenant is affected
by whether the injured person is an invitee, a business
visitor or one with no existing potential business relationship. However, this liability exists only when injury occurs
in a portion of the premises to which patrons are invited. °7
Contributory negligence. A tenant is not guilty of contributory negligence unless the defect is so obviously dangerous that no person of ordinary prudence would be willing to use it.30s That a tenant knows of a defective condition and complains to the landlord does not necessarily
mean that the tenant was aware of the full extent of the
danger, and contributory negligence in such instance is a
jury question.3 09 A tenant of a portion of an entire building is not contributorily negligent if he fails to anticipate
a negligent lack of care on the part of other tenants of the
building, and if at the time of renting the building was
unsafe and unheated, the landlord is liable to a tenant
injured by the bursting of a water pipe when the landlord
took no precautions against such a happening. 10
"RESTATEMENT,

TORTS (1934)

§ 359.

211 Md. 61, 124 A. 2d 793 (1956).
Sherwood Brothers v. Eckard, 8upra, n. 304.
Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d 683 (1955).
SMcKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A. 2d 95 (1955).
31 Corn. Realty Co. v. Nat. Dis. Pr. Corp., 196 Md. 274, 76 A. 24 155 (1950).
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REMEDIES OF LANDLORD

A. At Law.
Most written leases contain covenants on the part of
the tenant relating to the use to be made of the demised
premises. The rights reserved to the landlord in most instruments of lease fall into one or more of three categories.
Reentry. The usual provision gives the landlord the
right to reenter upon the termination of the term or for
breach of covenant by the tenant. In practice a landlord
rarely avails himself of such right. It has been held at
nisi prius that when a landlord attempts to exercise a right
of reentry given him by the lease and is foiled by the
tenant's threats, equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the tenant
from resisting the entry. 1 ' However, in Redwood Hotel,
Inc. v. Korbien,32 the Court of Appeals denied equitable
relief to a landlord because the principal relief sought
was ejectment of the tenant. By analogy, see Glorius v.
Watkins, 1 3 in which the Court of Appeals denied equity
jurisdiction in a case brought by a vendor of real estate
against the vendee under an installment sale contract, the
purpose being to clear a cloud on title, the court saying
that to grant the relief would in effect give a chancery
suit the effect of an action of ejectment.
Tenancy determined by breach. Provisions in a lease
for determination of the tenancy for breach of covenant
by the tenant do not render the lease void upon such
breach, but voidable at the option of the landlord. 14 For
breach of a covenant in a lease the landlord has the right
to relief in equity by injunction 315 or at law by an action
in ejectment318 When a lease contains provisions that it
shall be void for a breach of covenant, such as payment of
rent, then upon a breach a court of law must hold the
estate divested. 317 However, equity will permit a forfeiture
only when it is the result of culpable neglect on the part
of the tenant but not when the omission is caused by
accident." 8 When rent is mailed in time to reach the
lessor in the ordinary course of mail there is no forfeiture
'Snyder v. Baslow, Cir. Ct. for Prince Georges Co., Gray, J.; Daily
Record, Aug. 24, 1943.
8"195 Md. 402, 73 A. 2d 468 (1950).
203 Md. 546, 102 A. 2d 274 (1954).
In'
Western Bk. of Balt. v. Kyle, 6 Gill 343 (Md. 1848); Baltimore v.
Steam Packet Co., 164 Md. 284, 164 A. 878 (1933).
" Live Stock Co. v. Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A. 2d 130 (1941).
Schlerf v. Bond, 139 Md. 10, 114 A. 739 (1921) ; 2 PoE, n. 1, § 482.
8" Cooke v. Brice, 20 Md. 397 (1863).
Wylie v. Kirby, 115 Md. 282, 80 A. 962 (1911).
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for tardy payment if the letter is miscarried or delayed
in the post office.319 When forfeiture is merely security for
the payment of money, equity will treat it as in the nature
of a penalty and in a proper case will grant relief. 2 0 However, when a lease has been declared forfeited by a landlord for default in rent payments and tenant is insolvent,
equity will not strike down the forfeiture, even though all
arrears of rent are tendered by officers of the corporate
lessee. This is on the theory that the promise of the tenant
to pay later rent is manifestly worthless, as solvency is
necessary to the performance of future rent obligations.
Only when a substantial compliance with the covenant to
to the landlord is assured will equity
pay future rent
8
deny forfeiture. 21
Conversion of tenancy. Some leases for years provide
that upon breach by the tenant of a covenant, the letting
is converted into one from month to month. If such a provision is effective, then, upon giving the notice of termination, the landlord would be entitled to the summary
remedy against the lessee as a tenant holding over, and, in
such case, the landlord would not be limited to ejectment
against the lessee in a court of record. While obiter dicta,
a nisi prius court did not criticize a provision in a lease
that a violation of a covenant by the tenant would result
in a conversion of the tenancy from one for years to one
from month to month. 22 The question has not been decided
by the Court of Appeals. However, some analogy may be
made to the cases involving the contract provisions in
Installment Land Contracts prior to Chapter 596, of the
Acts of 1951,8' under which the Court of Appeals has given
effect to provisions converting a vendor-purchaser relationship into a landlord-tenant relationship upon breach by
the purchaser.
B. Equity.
If a landower (by agreement, or by his failure to act
to terminate a tenancy) permits a negligent or insolvent
tenant to remain on his land, he cannot invoke the aid of
equity except to prevent waste or irreparable injury. 2 4 An
*"Phillips Roofing Co. v. Md. Broadcasting Co., 184 Md. 187, 40 A. 2d
298 (1944).
m Carpenter v. Wilson, 100 Md. 13, 59 A. 186 (1904).
Evergreen Corp. v. Pacheo, 218 Md. 230, 145 A. 2d 774 (1958).
SCaroletta Apartment Corp. v. Burns; Sup. Ct. of Baltimore City,
Mason, J.; Daily Record, March 3, 1950.
10Now 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, §§ 110-116.
Blain v. Everitt, 36 Md. 73 (1872).
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injunction will not lie to oust a tenant on the ground that
he is a bad tenant and worries the landlord; that his rent
is in arrears; that he is disagreeable; that he will not give
up possession of the premises upon demand of the landlord; or that he is insolvent. Even though it is contendable
that an equity action will avoid a multiplicity of suits, this
apparently is not an independent ground of equitable
jurisdiction.'
Fraud in inception. A landlord induced to enter into a
lease by fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation by
the tenant has a remedy in equity, the relationship having
a fiduciary character. 2 6
Waste. By injunction, a landlord may prevent his
lessee, or those claiming or holding under the lessee, from
converting the demised premises to uses inconsistent with
the terms of the contract of lease, and from making
material alterations for such purposes, as well as committing other kinds of waste. If the acts constituting waste
are those of a sub-lessee, the original lessee is not a necessary party. 27 However, the prevention of waste is not an
adequate basis for a suit in equity, in the absence of circumstances specifically
alleged and proved, to show irre2 8
parable damage.

XX. DEFENSES

AVAILABLE TO TENANT

While a tenant will not be permitted to dispute his
landlord's title, particularly when he has entered by virtue
of his tenancy, 329 he may show that his landlord's title has
expired, been transferred or defeated,3 0 or that landlord
himself admits a condition of the title which precludes the
relationship of landlord and tenant.3 1 Deficiencies in
premises ascertainable by the tenant before he enters into
a lease will not serve as defenses to a suit for rent.3 32 A
lessor cannot claim rent falling due after eviction of the
enjoyment of the land
tenant by title paramount, as the
833
is the consideration for the rent.
Redwlood Hotel v. Korblen, 195 Md. 402, 73 A. 468 (1950).
Gale v. McCullough, 118 Md. 287, 84 A. 469 (1912).
Maddox v. White, 4 Md. 72 (1853).
Glorius v. Watkins, 203 Md. 546, 550-551, 102 A. 2d 274 (1954).
82 G
1 Funk v. Kincaid, 5 Md. 404 (1854); Cook v. Creswell, 44 Md. 581
(1876).
m Giles v. Ebsworth, 10 Md. 333 (1856); Maulsby v. Scarborough, 179
Md. 67, 16 A. 2d 897 (1940).
Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163, 161 A. 510 (1932).
'
Lewis v. Clark, 86 Md. 327, 37 A. 1035 (1897).
Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

A. Waiver and Estoppel.
To waive forfeiture, an act of the landlord must amount
to an affirmance of the tenancy or a recognition of its continuance, such as distraining for rent accruing after the
right of forfeiture arises. 34 The receipt of rent after a
breach of covenant does not of itself operate as a waiver,
unless the rent accrued subsequently to the act which
works the forfeiture. 35 Acceptance of36rent accruing after
a breach is a waiver of the forfeiture.
As forfeitures for breach of covenant are not favored,
any slight acquiescence in a breach will be construed as a
waiver. 37 When a landlord fails to exact prompt payment
of rent he may be estopped from claiming a forfeiture for
tardy payment of a later installment.3
The weight of authority seems to be that a mere demand
by the landlord for rent after the term is not a binding
election.3 9 Normally, when rent is paid by the occupier
to the owner of land, the inference is that they intended
to create a tenancy; but when a landlord has judgment of
restitution, acceptance of rent by him during the period an
appeal is pending does not estop him from enforcing his
judgment when the judgment is affirmed on the appeal. 40
Renewal. Even though the lease provides for written
notice by tenant for its renewal, this may be waived by
the landlord; and if he waives in fact, this will be binding
upon the landlord's successor in title who has no actual
knowledge thereof. 4 '
Assignment. When a lease contains a covenant against
assignment, and the landlord permits an assignee to remain
in possession for a number of years, permitting him to
make improvements, the landlord has waived his rights
and is estopped from asserting them. 42 Similarly, if lessor
in a lease containing such a covenant by the lessee against
assignment, consents to an assignment without restriction
as to future assignments, the condition is waived by the
landlord, and lessee3 may
thereafter assign the term with43
out lessor's consent.
In re Hook, 25 F. 2d 498 (D.C. Md. 1928).
Morrison v. Smith, 90 Md. 76, 44 A. 1031 (1899).
109 A.L.R. 1269.
Live Stock Co. v. Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A. 2d 130 (1941).
Morrison v. Smith, supra, n. 335. Lombardo v. Clifford Bros. Co., 139
Md. 32, 114 A. 849 (1921).
11 55 A.L.R. 286. 289.
Hopkins v. Holland, 84 Md. 84, 35 A. 11 (1896) ; 109 A.L.R. 1281.
Achtar v. Posner, 189 Md. 559, 56 A. 2d 797 (1948).
Canary v. Wagner, 191 Md. 413, 62 A. 2d 257 (1948).
Reid v. Wiessner Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234,40 A. 877 (1898).
'3
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THE EDITOR'S PAGE
The Review is pleased to welcome back Allan W.
Rhynhart, Chief Judge of the People's Court of Baltimore
City, the author of this issue's lead article, Notes on the
Law of Landlord and Tenant. Judge Rhynhart's previous
articles in the Review, Distress, 13 Maryland Law Review
185; Execution and Fi Fa in the People's Court of Baltimore
City, 14 Maryland Law Review 203; Attachment in the
People'sCourt of Baltimore City, 14 Maryland Law Review
235, and the present article are chapters of Judge Rhynhart's forthcoming manual dealing with practice and procedure in the People's Court. In the instant article, Judge
Rhynhart again contributes a highly practical work to the
Maryland Bar, covering all aspects of the Maryland law
on the subject.
Our readers will be interested to know that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has adopted a formula for
the determination of ground rent income that was first
developed by Ronald Smullian in a casenote written in the
Maryland Law Review, Maryland Ground Rents not Realized Income on Sale of Leasehold, 17 Maryland Law Review
241. The note, written while Mr. Smullian was still a
student, is the subject of a Rewrite Bulletin at 118776 of
C.C.H. Standard Federal Tax Reports. We are especially
pleased when one of our undergraduate authors gains national recognition for work first published in the Review.

Comments and Casenotes
Best Evidence Rule - Unsigned Carbon Copy
Of Letter As Duplicate Original
ParrConstruction Co. v. Pomer'
The plaintiff Construction Company brought suit against
the defendant Construction Company and its president to
recover the balance due under an oral contract to perform
certain excavation work at a price of thirty-five cents per
cubic yard, being unable to agree as to the actual quantity
which plaintiff had excavated. The defendant engineer
estimated 12,673 cubic yards, whereas the plaintiff estimated 18,000 cubic yards. The plaintiff agreed with the
defendant to refer the dispute to one Matz as an impartial
arbitrator.
The issue here in question concerns the admissibility
in behalf of the plaintiff of an unsigned carbon copy of a
letter from Matz to the defendant giving Matz's estimate
of the quantity of earth excavated as 14,340 cubic yards.
After a previous effort to introduce the copy into evidence,
the plaintiff called the defendant's president as a witness
and had him identify the carbon copy as a copy of the
letter received by him. The defendant objected to the admission of the copy on two grounds: first, that it violated
the best evidence rule; and second, because the arbitrator
was not present to testify as a witness and explain the
method used in making his calculation.' The trial court
overruled the defendant's objections and admitted the letter
into evidence. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial
court said:
"The objection based on the best evidence rule is
without merit. (Defendant's president) was called as
a witness by (the plaintiff) and identified the unsigned
carbon copy as a copy of the original letter received
by him. * * * A carbon copy of a letter is considered
to be a duplicate original; and, as such, it3' constitutes
primary rather than secondary evidence.
The court appears to have based its holding upon two
alternative grounds: (1) that the unsigned carbon copy
1217 Md. 539, 144 A. 2d 69 (1958).
2 Only the first objection, in regard to the best evidence rule, falls within
the scope of this note.
8
Supra, n. 1, 542.
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was admissible as a duplicate original; and (2) that the
defendant's president had admitted that the carbon copy
was accurate and authentic.
In general terms, the Best Evidence Rule is one requiring the production of the best evidence obtainable in accordance with the nature of the case.4 As it exists today,
the rule applies only where writings are offered in evidence,' and so McCormick states the rule to be that:
"[I]n proving the terms of a writing, where such
terms are material, the original writing must be produced, unless it is shown to be unavailable for some
reason other than the serious fault of the proponent."
Following the view expressed by this rule, the original
document or writing is admitted as primary evidence of the
terms contained therein, and any other evidence, unless
given the status of a duplicate original, is considered to be
secondary evidence.7 The instant case appears to expand
the duplicate original rule to include unsigned carbon
copies.
At the inception of the original document rule, the most
reliable method of reproduction was hand copying." Therefore, all copies were susceptible to the possibility of human
error and production of the original document was strictly
required.9 However, with the advent of modern machine
reproduction methods, the courts have been faced with the
problem of determining what methods of reproduction will
create documents that can be considered duplicate originals
'TtAyE,
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAw, 489
(1898); 3 'BLcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, (1765) 368; MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE,
(1954), 408, § 195.
'McCoRMICK, op. cit., ibid., 409.
07 Ibid.
Primary evidence is the best evidence obtainable and secondary evidence
is that which may be admitted in the absence of the best evidence only
when a satisfactory excuse for such absence has been given. Anglo-American Packing and Provision Co. v. Cannon, 31 F. 313 (C.C.A. Ga., 1887);
U.S. v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. 352 (1832). It is noted that in most American
jurisdictions there exist certain preferences in secondary evidence where
such is admissible. The problem of preference among various kinds of
secondary evidence is outside the scope of this note. It Is involved in
Robinson v. Singerly Pulp Co., 110 Md. 382, 72 A. 828 (1909). For a more
complete discussion see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1265-1280;
2 JoNEs, EvDEN CE, §§ 859-862 (2d ed. rev. 1926); McCoRMICK, EVIDEN E
(1954), 421, § 207; Note, Degrees of Secondary Evidence, 38 Mich. L. Rev.
864 (1940).
8For detailed historical development see 4 WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed.
1940) §§ 1177-1179, 1 JONES, EVIDENcE (4th ed. 1938) § 209.
'A party claiming a right resting upon a document was required to
produce the document or lose his claim. Thomas of Utred v. Anon, Y.B. 24
ed. III, fol. 24, P1. 1 (1350).
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and be admissible as primary evidence. Due to their varying degrees of reliability, letterpress copies ° and photographic copies" have been generally held to be secondary
evidence and inadmissible without accounting for the original, whereas printing press copies are uniformly held to
be duplicate originals, and, as such, primary evidence
if
2
printed from the same type at the same time.
The holdings are not so well-defined in the case of carbon copies. It is generally stated that for such a copy to
be given the status of a duplicate original, the writer must
have so intended." As a corollary, it has often been indicated that such intent cannot be found unless the copy
is signed as well as the original. 4 Recognizing these views
McCormick, in discussing the use of carbon copies, says:
"... Here the copy is made by the same stroke of
the pen or pencil as the original, and there is an analogy
to the practice of signing counterparts where each copy
was intended to be an equal embodiment of the contract or other transaction. Indeed, today counterparts
usually consist of an original and one or more carbon
copies, all duly signed in multiplicate. What makes
them counterparts is the signing with intent to make
them equal."' 5
However, it cannot be said that the majority of courts
require that the copies be counterparts in the manner indicated by McCormick, since many courts have admitted
copies without making any mention as to whether they are
signed or not." It may well be that they were, but none10Marsh v. Hand, 35 Md. 123, 127 (1871) ; Spottiswood v. Weir, 66 Cal.
525, 6 Pac. 381 (1885) ; Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. F. W. Stock and
Sons, 104 Va. 97, 51 S.E. 161 (1905) ; Westinghouse Co. v. Tilden, 56 Neb.
129, 76 N.W. 416 (1898). Cf. McAuley v. Siscoe, -110 Kan. 804, 205 P. 346,
347 (1922), which appears to express a more liberal view.
n Hensel v. Smith, 152 Md. 380, 136 A. 900 (1927) ; Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co. v. Mendenhall, 183 Ark. 25, 34 S.W. 2d 1078 (1931) ; Cohen v. Elias,
163 N.Y.S. 1051, 176 App. Div. 763 (1917).
12People v. Chicago R.I. and P.R. 0o., 329 Ill. 467, 160 N.E. 841 (1928).
'2cCnOMIcK, 8upra, n. 4, 419-420, § 206; Lockwood v. L. & L. Freight
Lines, 126 Fla. 474, 171 So. 236 (1936) ; McDonald v. Hanks, 52 Tex. Civ.
App., 140, 113 S.W. 604 (1908).
1"Oberlin v. Pyle, 114 Ind. App. 21, 49 N.E. 2d 970, 972 (1943) ; International Harvester Co. of America v. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N.W.
252 (1907) ; Chrismer v. Chrismer, 103 Ohio App. 23, 144 N.E. 2d, 494, 499
(1956) ; Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 562, 59 A. 2d 325 (1947) ; Lockwood
v. 5L. & L. Freight Lines, supra, n. 13.
1 McCoRMICK, supra, n. 4, 419-420.
16Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. State, 82 Ind. App. 377, 149 N.E.
377, 384 (1925) ; Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 238 Ky.
322, 37 S.W. 2d 856 (1931) ; Carter v. Carl Merveldt & Son, 183 0kla. 152,
80 P. 2d 254 (1938) ; Totten v. Bucy, 57 Md. 446 (1882) ; Goodman v. Saperstein, 115 Md. 678, 81 A. 695 (1911) ;'See also 65 A.L.R. 2d 342, 355 (1959).
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theless the courts have not all drawn the distinction; some
seem only to require that the copies be created simultaneously. 7
The Maryland court has unquestionably given the carbon copies which have come before it the status of duplicate
originals. 8 The leading Maryland case on point, Goodman
v. Saperstein,9 disposed of the question by stating:
"Proof was given by the witness ... of the mailing of
the originals.., and carbon copies of such letters when
their custody is
' 20properly proven are regarded as duplicate originals.
It is noted that in so holding the court made no mention
as to whether the copies were signed or not, which might
indicate that the court did not feel that the question of
signing was important.
In support of its holding, the court cited International
Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom2' where the duplicate copy was
signed, the signature being reproduced by the carbon process. In the Harvester case the document in question was
a contract executed in duplicate by means of carbon paper.
In holding the carbon copy to be primary evidence, the
Court said:
"If the reproduction is complete there is no practical
reason why all the products of the single act of writing a contract and affixing a signature thereto should
not be regarded as of equal and equivalent value. In
this instance22the same stroke of the pen produced both
signatures."
Furthermore, in Totten v. Bucy,23 which was decided prior
to the Goodman case, the duplicate had been expressly
designated as a "duplicate", and in the more recent case
of Morrow v. State 4 the duplicate was signed. Although
prior to the instant case the Maryland court had not expressly made a distinction between signed or copies otherwise indicating that they were intended to be duplicate
17Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickenson, 247 Ill. 27, 93 N.E. 132 (1910);
Oberlin v. Pyle, 114 Ind. App. 21, 49 N.E. 2d 970 (1943) ; 51 A.L.R. 1498,
65 A.L.R. 2d 342, 355-356 (1959).
's Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 59 A. 2d 325 (1948) ; Totten v. Bucy, 57
Md. 446 (1882) ; Goodman v. Slaperstein, 115 Md. 678, 81 A. 695 (1911) ;
Parr Construction Co. v. Pomer, 217 Md. 539, 144 A. 2d 69 (1958); 65
A.L.R. 2d 342, 356 (1959).
"Supra, n. 18.

-oIbid., 683.
101 Minn. 263, 112 N.W. 252 (1907).
-Ibid., 264.
2 Supra, n. 18.
Supra, n. 18.

21
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originals and unsigned copies or mere file copies, the conclusion could have been drawn that the copies had to show
the writer's intent that they be treated as duplicate originals. However, the court in the principal case indicated
that an unsigned carbon copy constitutes a duplicate original. It cannot be said that such was the clear holding of
the court, since an alternative ground for admitting the
letter from the arbitrator was also indicated, and no clear
statement was made as to which ground was actually the
basis for the opinion.
As an alternative to admitting the letter as a duplicate
original, the court indicated that the policy of the best evidence rule was satisfied by the defendant's president admitting on the witness stand that the paper offered was
a copy of the original, without suggesting that it was inaccurate in any way. In such circumstances the policy of
the best evidence rule is satisfied.
The leading case on this point is Slatterie v. Pooley 5
where it is stated:
"If such evidence were inadmissible, the difficulties
thrown in the way of almost every trial would be insuperable. The reason why such parole statements are
admissible ... is that they are not open to the same

objection which belongs to parole evidence from other
sources where the written evidence might have been
produced; for such evidence is excluded from the presumption of its untruth arising from the very nature
of the case where better evidence is withheld; whereas
what a party himself admits
to be true may reasonably
'2
be presumed to be so."

6

It is noted that this case involved an out of court admission, but that the Maryland Court of Appeals has expressly
adopted the rule of the case in regard to admissions made
both in and out of court." Although the majority of jurisdictions have fully adopted the rule, 28 there are numerous

holdings in which the principle had been repudiated, but
usually only in respect to oral admissions made out of
court.2 9 While it is true that there may be valid objections
26 M. and W. 664, 151 Eng. Rep. 579 (1840).
Ibid., 664.

128 Marine Bank v. Stirling, 115 Md.90,80 A. 736 (1911).
Fontenot v. Lloyds Casualty Insurer, 31 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 1947);
Haas v. Storner, 47 N.Y.S. 1100 (1897) ; Norcum v. Savage, 140 N.C. 472,
53 S.E. 289 (1906) ; Gardiner v. City of Columbia Police Dept., 216 S.C. 219,
57 S.E. 2d 308 (1950).
",Plunkett v. Dillon, 4 Del. Ch. 198 (1871); Haliburton v. Fletcher, 22
Ark. 453 (1861) ; Swing v. Cloquet Lumber Co., 121 Minn. 221, 141 N.W.
117 (1913).
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to dispensing with production in cases where the admission
has been made out of court, 0 there seems to be no logical
basis for requiring production when the admission of the
party or his authorized agent is made from the witness
stand.
In Maurice v. Worden 8 l the action was for libel, the
statements in question being endorsed upon a written
resignation submitted by the plaintiff to the defendant as
Commandant of the United States Naval Academy. It was
necessary to prove this libelous endorsement made by the
defendant in order to sustain the action. The original document was not available and the plaintiff offered to prove
the endorsement by an oral admission which had been
made by the defendant to the wife of the plaintiff. The
lower court refused to admit the testimony of the wife to
this effect. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision,
said:
"This evidence is not secondary but comes within
the class of primary evidence. The admissions of a
party freely and voluntarily made, are always evidence, which may be introduced by the opposite

r32ty "82
8
This holding was followed in Marine Bank v. Stirling."
In this case the admission was made from the witness stand.
The plaintiff attempted to introduce a newspaper containing a published report of the condition of the defendant
bank. The president of the bank testified that he did not
have the original report, but identified the newspaper as
a copy of the report. The court disposed of the defendant's
contention that the report was inadmissible as a copy,
stating:
". .. it would be difficult to prove the authenticity
of a statement so published in a more definite way than
was done in this case - being proved by the president
who attested it. It cannot be said that such a publication is a copy in the sense that there is an original
which must be produced instead of the copy .... .34
See WIOMORE, op. cit., supra, n. 3, § 1255.
8'54 Md. 233, 258 (1880).
0Ibid., 256, citing Slatterle v. Pooley, supra, n. 25; Loomis v. Waldhams,
8 Gray 557, 562 (1857) ; Smith v. Palmer, 6 Cush. 513, 520 (1850), in which
the court said:
"A party's own statements and admissions are in all cases admissible
in evidence against him, thbugh such statements and admissions may
involve what must necessarily be contained In Some writing, deed,
or record."
Supra, n. 27.
Ibid., 100.
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The rule is apparently well settled in Maryland that
such an admission to the content of a writing will serve to
dispense with the production of the original. In the case
at hand the president of the defendant corporation apparently identified the carbon copy as an accurate reproduction of the letter received by him. On this ground alone,
under the rule of Slatterie v. Pooley,8 5 as adopted by the
Maryland Court, the copy was clearly admissible. There
is a third line of reasoning which might have been applied
to the facts of the subject case. The fundamental purpose
of the best evidence rule has confined its application to
the proof of the terms of a writing when the dispute is
about what those terms are. Some courts have held that
the rule does not operate to bar evidence of a transaction
merely because a written memorandum exists, unless that
memorandum, as opposed to the transaction, is the thing
which itself is to be proved.
The leading case illustrating this distinction is Herzig
v. Swift and Co."8 In this case action was brought under
the Florida wrongful death statute by the administratrix
of a deceased partner for a partnership accounting. In
proving damages the plaintiff offered the testimony of one
of the surviving partners as to the amount of partnership
earnings. This testimony was rejected by the trial court
on the basis of the best evidence rule, the books of the firm
being thought to be the best evidence of its earnings.
This ruling was reversed on appeal. The court, citing
numerous authorities in support of its holding, stated:
"Here there was no attempt to prove the contents
of a writing; the issue was the earnings of the partnership, which for convenience were recorded in the books
of account after the relevant facts occurred. Generally
this differentiation has been adopted by the courts....
The federal courts have generally adopted the rationale
limiting the 'best evidence rule' to cases8 where
the
7
contents of the writing are to be proved."
The distinction has been recognized by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in several instances. 8s Perhaps the
strongest case on the point is Cramer v. Shriner.39 Here the
Supra, n. 25.
146 F. 2d 444 (1945).
Ibid., 446.

"Glenn v. Rogers, 3 Md. 312 (1852); Cramer v. Shriner, 18 Md. 140
(1861) ; Beall v. Poole, 27 Md. 645 (1867).
SSupra, n. 38.
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plaintiff offered to prove solely by testimony that a settlement of all accounts between defendant and himself had
taken place on a certain day in the presence of the witness.
The witness testified that the settlement was based on
figures contained in a memorandum which was in possession of the plaintiff at the time of settlement. Although the
witness saw the memo he had no knowledge of its contents
and his testimony was based entirely upon the declarations
of the parties made to each other in his presence. Defendant objected to any parole evidence of the amounts and
items of settlement contained in the memo without production of the memo or proof of its loss. The trial judge
admitted the testimony over defendant's objection. This
ruling was affirmed on appeal. The Court citing Glenn v.
Rogers," stated:
"According to our construction of this exception, it
presents the single question, whether it was competent
for the witness, Titlow, to testify as to the settlement
made between the parties, without the production of
the memorandum used by them in the course of the
settlement.... The testimony was not offered to prove
the contents of the memorandum, but to prove a settlement for the wheat included in defendants receipts,
and it does not seem to be objectionable, on the ground
that it tended to prove the contents of the memorandum
as material to the plaintiff's case.
"It is difficult to see how the non-production of the
memorandum, at the trial could render the testimony
of Titlow, as to the settlement and its subject matter,
derived from the declarations and admissions of the
parties to each other, inadmissible. * * * Facts are
sometimes proved by parole of which there is evidence
in writing."'"
In Grey v. State4 oral testimony of a confession which
had been reduced to writing and signed by the defendant
was rejected by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
best evidence rule. Such a decision might appear to involve a repudiation of the prior rule, but it is believed
that there are grounds for special treatment of confessions.
In a sense, a confession reduced to writing may be compared to a written integrated contract; the oral proceedSupra, n. 38.

'1 Supra, n. 39, 146, 147.
181 Md. 439, 30 A. 2d 744 (1943).
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ing may be regarded as preliminary matter superseded by
the writing. We want to show the contents of the writing
for its own sake. We are dealing with an original which
is a writing. The desire for precision in what may be a
matter of great length, and of great importance, and the
suspicion which arises when the prosecution in a criminal
case does not produce such
43 a writing may also explain the
decision in the Grey case.

The distinction between evidence of the contents of a
writing and evidence of other facts which happen to have
been written down, has thus been recognized by the Maryland Courts as well as other reliable authorities."' This
ground alone would have provided sufficient basis for the
admission of the unsigned carbon in the instant case without resort to the duplicate original doctrine. Although not
admissible to prove the contents of the original letter the
copy could certainly be admitted as other evidence of the
facts in issue, i.e. the findings of the arbitrator. The fact
that the arbitrator had written down these findings in the
original letter should not bar any other evidence of the
arbitration agreement or its result. 5
It is difficult to say whether the instant case constitutes
authority for the future admission in evidence of unsigned
carbon copies where there is no admission of their accuracy.
The opinion of the court, when read along with the cases it
cites, seems to adopt alternative grounds for admitting the
letter. It would have been clearer if the court had merely
adopted the second alternative, or have admitted it as additional evidence of the terms of the arbitration agreement.
ROBERT E. POWELL
J. WILLIM SCHNEER, JR.
For decisions contra, see: Alexander v. State, 37 Ala. App. 533, 71 So. 2d
520 (1954) ; State v. Bruni, 79 R.I. 311, 88 A. 2d 162 (1952).
"WIOMoRE, op. cit., supra, n. 7, § 1242; MoKELvY, EVIDENCE (5th ed.
1944) § 345; A.L.R. MODEL ConE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 602 (4).
,5 If the decision of the arbitrator, and not his letter reporting that
decision, is the original, however, the court could not have aIvoided a
hearsay problem. Any letter would then be admissible only to prove the
truth of its contents - that the arbitrator had decided that the quantity
was 14,340 tons. Since Matz was not produced for cross-examination, the
letter is hearsay. If the letter itself is regarded as the decision, there is
no hearsay problem in proving what the decision was, if the letter or a
"duplicate original" is produced. However, it is probably unrealistic to
regard the letter as the decision of the arbitrator in the sense that a court
judgment "Is" the decision of the court. It does not appear to be something
which itself creates a legal relationship and thus escapes the hearsay rule
as an operative fact. See McConmici, op. cit., supra, n. 7, § 228.
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Grade Or Class Provision As A Basis For Disqualification
For Unemployment Compensation
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Board1

The claimants, employees of Bethlehem Steel Company,
worked in the latter stages of a continuous production line,
their jobs consisting of finishing, shipping, and warehousing tin plate which was produced in earlier stages of the
assembly line. The workers in two of the earlier stages
were more skilled and received higher pay, although all of
the workers were members of the same union and under
the same union contract with the company. Some of the
workers in the earlier stages who had become dissatisfied
with the incentive pay provisions of the contract, began a
deliberate slowdown of production and as a result, less
work became available in the sections in which the claimants worked. The claimants, who were the most recently
hired employees, were laid off in accordance with the contract which provided that those with the least amount of
continuous service would be laid off first. None of the
claimants worked in the stages engaged in the slowdown,
nor were concerned with the incentive pay provisions as
they were paid at a fixed hourly rate. The findings indicated that the claimants had not participated in, had not
financed, or had not been directly interested in the dispute.
They sought unemployment compensation, and the Superior
Court of Baltimore City affirmed a decision of the Board
of Appeals granting compensation. The Court of Appeals,
in reversing the decision of the lower court, held that where
the claimants belonged to the same union, the same collective bargaining unit, and were under the same employment contract as those engaged in the deliberate slowdown,
and whose duties were part of a continuous integrated
production line, they were in the same grade or class as
those engaged in the slowdown and therefore were disqualified from receiving benefits under Sec. 6 (e) (2) of
the Maryland Unemployment Compensation Act.
The appropriate part of the statute, Sec. 6 (e) (2) ,2
provides that a claimant shall not be disqualified from re'219 Md. 146, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959).
8 MD. CoDE (1957), Art. 95A, § 6, provides:
"Disqualification for benefit8. An individual shall be disqualified
for benefits (e) Stoppage of work because of labor disputes. - Flor any week
with respect to which the Executive Director finds that his
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or
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ceiving unemployment benefits, where his unemployment
is due to a labor dispute, unless he belongs to a grade or
class of workers engaged in the dispute.
Although the Court of Appeals has construed other parts
of Sec. 6 (e),1 the Court was afforded its first opportunity
to interpret Sec. 6 (e) (2) in relation to the issue of whether
the claimants were of the same grade or class of workers
as those participating in the slowdown.
The Court, in holding the claimants to be of the same4
grade or class, relied mainly on Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon,
an Illinois case involving a deliberate slowdown on the
assembly line in a shoe factory. There the employees belonged to the same union, had the same employment contract, and worked in the same continuous production line.
The claimants, who were laid off as a result of the slowdown, were paid at a different rate than that paid to those
instigating the slowdown, and had no interest in the outcome of the particular wage rate dispute. Nevertheless,
they were denied compensation on the basis of the Illinois
grade or class provision,5 which was substantially the same
as that presently in force in Maryland. The Maryland
Court, after weighing the factors in the instant case, comother premises at which he is or was last employed, provided
that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Executive Director that (1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage
of work; and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of
which, immediately before the commencement of the
stoppage, there were members employed, at the premises
at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; provided, that if in any case separate branches of
work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate
departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be
deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or
other premises."
In Mitchell, Inc. v. Md. Emp. Sec. Bd., 209 Md. 237, 121 A. 2d 198 (1956),
the Court interpreting § 5(e) (1) of the 1951 Code, the equivalent of §
6(e) (1) of the 1957 Code, supra, n. 2, upheld claimants' disqualification
for benefits for refusal to cross picket lines, this constituting a participation in a labor dispute. See also Brown v. Md. Unemp. Comp. Board, 189
Md. 233, 55 A. 2d 696 (1947). In Tucker v. American S. & Ref. Co., 189
Md. 250, 55 A. 2d 692 (1947), the Court in construing Sec. 5(d) of the
1943 Code Supplement, the equivalent of Sec. 6(e) of the 1957 Code, supra,
n. 2, determined that a Utah copper smelter plant which supplied copper to
a Baltimbre refinery owned by the same company did not constitute one
establishment so as to disqualify claimants for benefits.
'405 I1. 384, 91 N.E. 2d 381 (1950).
5 ILL. REv. :STAT. (1947), Ch.48,
223.
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pared them with those in the Brown case." Then, faced
with the language of the provision, undefined by the legislature, as opposed to the potential harshness on the individual claimant, the Court reached its result in stressing
the factor of the continuous production line.
In view of the broad purpose of unemployment compensation to protect involuntary unemployment, it is hard
to rationalize the diversity of decisions which deal with
the grade or class provisions which appear in the Unemployment Acts of all but two states.' Some courts base
their determinations on membership in a union,' on the
similarity of the work performed, 9 on the entire plant or
establishment,"0 or on the same bargaining unit;" while
many courts, basing each case solely on its own merits,
consider a variety of factors, such as single or separate
labor agreements, skills, and pay rates, in conjunction with
those enumerated above. 12 The Court in the instant case
indicates however, that the cases involving a continuous
production line, where the later stages are dependent on
the earlier, seem to hold uniformly that all the employees
are in the same grade or class.18
The reasoning behind the grade or class provisions is
three-fold: First, and foremost, use of the provision prevents a situation where a few key workers in key positions
could by striking curtail production and cause a work stoppage, and fellow workers laid off as a result could conceivably augment the workers' fighting fund with their
unemployment benefits. Second, use of the provision prevents the unemployment compensation system from being
used as an inducement to those who might defect from a
Supra, n. 4.

Only Vermont, 21 V.S.A. (1959), § 1844, and Louisiana, 23 L.S.A. - R.S.
1601 (1950), hlave no comparable grade or 1a88 provision.
ICopen v. Hix, 130 W. Va. 343, 43 S.E. 2d 382 (1947); In Queener v.
Magnet Mills, 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W. 2d 1, 4 (1942), the court said: "We
think that 'grade or class', as used, in the statute, means a group more or
less organized. Not necessarily a local CIO or AFL branch, nor a company
union, but at least a cohesive group acting in concert. . ."
9 In re Deep River Timber Co.'s Employees, 8 Wash. 2d 179, 111 P. 2d
575 (1941).

'oWestinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 165 Pa.
Super. 385, 68 A. 2d 393 (1949).
n Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E. 2d 865 (1942).
1Byerly
v. Unemployment Compensation 'Board of Rev., 171 Pa. Super.
303, 90 A. 2d 322 (1952); Unemployment Compensation Commission v.
Lunceford, 229 N.C. 570, 50 S.E. 2d 497 (1948) ; Kieckhefer Container Co.
v. Unemployment C. Com'n., 125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A. 2d 646 (1940).
"Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, supra, n. 4; Adams v. Review Board, Etc.,
121 Ind. App. 273, 98 N.E. 2d 681 (1951); Unemployment Compensation
Commission v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277, 45 .S.E. 2d 385 (1947) ; Local No. 658 v.
Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E. 2d 625 (1949).
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union which calls a strike by a promise of benefits to those
who take no part in the dispute.1 4 Third, use of the provision facilitates the administration
of the system by clas15
sifying claims on a broad basis.
The Court points out in the instant case:
".. . we think it is clear that the present statutory
provision was deliberately aimed at discouraging 'key'
workers in 'key' positions along a continuous production line from effectively tieing up (sic) the operations
of a whole plant."'"
The law writers have been critical of the grade or class
provision and have called it the "vicarious guilt provision", the "dragnet provision",' "guilt by association", 19
and "vicarious disqualification."' 0 Generally, they have
urged its abrogation for the reason that it actually thwarts
the basic purpose of the law, that of giving benefits to those
involuntarily unemployed. Thousands of workers throughout the country have been disqualified from receiving benefits without having the slightest connection with a dispute.
Perhaps the broadest criticism of the provision is that
it doesn't effectively distinguish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. The instant case exemplifies
this. As was said in Saunders v. Unemp. Comp. Board,2 '
"the purpose of the statute was to alleviate the consequences of involuntary unemployment." The grade or class
provision cuts sharply into this purpose.
It would seem that the direct interest provision, which
provides that a claimant shall be disqualified unless he is
not participating in or financing or directly interested in
the dispute, in itself is an adequate web for disqualification and would eliminate to a great extent the reason for
a grade or class provision. The more narrowly the courts
construe grade or class, the more it tends to equate the
worker under this provision with the worker who is directly
interested. Such a construction, in effect, virtually elimi"1Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J.
167, 169 (1945).
15See Note 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 763 (1949) ; see also opinion of Queener
v. Magnet Mills, supra, n. 8.
10219 Md. 146, 154, 148 A. 2d, 403 (1959).
17Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 294, 332 (1950).
"1Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification - A Primer and Some
Problems, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 338, 351 (1955).
19Op. cit., 8upra, n. 18, p. 355.
21See 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 565 (1949).
188 Md. 677, 682, 53 A. 2d 579 (1947).
"8 MD. CoDE (1957), Art. 95A, § 6(e) (1), supra,n. 2.
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nates the grade or class provision. This, however, should
be the function of the legislature,2 3 as the Court in the
instant case indicates:
"Understandably, the claimants argue that to deny
them benefits makes them victims of a labor dispute in
which they had no interest. On the other hand, if
such argument was accepted by us, it would have the
effect of equating the provisions of sec. 6 (e) (2) ...
with those of sec. 6(e) (1) ...thereby virtually eliminating sec. 6(e) (2) from the statute."24
It must be kept in mind that the grade or class provision
is an exception to disqualification. The statute says in
effect that a claimant shall be disqualified, but if he does
not belong to a grade or class of workers engaged in the
dispute, he will be entitled to benefits.25 Being an exception, it should not be construed so broadly as the courts
tend to do.2" Thus, we can see that if the provision is construed broadly, it frustrates the purpose of the Act, and
if it is interpreted narrowly, it virtually eliminates the
utility of it.
Under the provision, even claimants otherwise eligible
for benefits will be disqualified if one fellow employee of
their grade or class is himself disqualified by participating,
2
financing, or being directly interested in the disputeY.
The irrationality and arbitrariness of the application of
the provision is perhaps most clearly shown in a Pennsylvania case where a claimant received benefits under a
statute with no grade or class provision, but when the
statute was amended to include the provision, the claimant
was held to be disqualified.2 8
It is not clear what the approach of the Maryland Court
will be to a case lacking the element of a continuous integrated production process analogous to that of an assembly line. It is clear, however, that until the grade or
Op. cit., supra, n. 18, p. 375.
"219 Md. 146, 154, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959).
Sec. 6(e), supra, n. 21.
Op. cit., supra, n. 18, p. 351; see also 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 558 (1949).
In Re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma L. Co., 7 Wash. 2d 580,
110 P. 2d 877 (1941). A picket line was set up and ten claimants were told
not to return to work until called by the company. Eight others were told
to report but refused to do so because of the picket line. 'By refusing to
pass through the picket line, these eight became participants and were
therefore disqualified. The other ten, being engaged- in the same work as
the eight who refused to pass through the lines, were disqualified because
they were of the same grade or clas8 'as those participating; see also the
illustration in 8 Vand. I Rev. 338, 351 (1955).
See 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 565, n. 104 (1949).
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class provision is abolished, the Court will dutifully adhere
to it:
"It may be that the statute should be amended, but
whether the strikers, under circumstances similar to
those present here, would be acting solely for themselves or would also be acting directly or indirectly
for the claimants, is a decision the lawmakers must
make."2 9
The most logical approach would be to eliminate the
grade or class provision altogether. This would further the
ultimate purpose of the statute, which seemingly should
outweigh the more narrow justification for keeping the
provision, that of preventing the key-man work stoppage.
FRANK J. VECELLA

Estate Tax Deduction For An Entire Trust Containing
Charitable Bequest With A Possible Diversion
Of Trust Income
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. U.S.'
This was an action by the testator's executor to recover
estate taxes alleged to have been erroneously and illegally
collected. The testator, Dr. Raymond D. Havens, was a
resident of Baltimore City. After a number of specific bequests, he willed the residue of his estate as follows:
"Eighth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal and wheresoever situated, I give to my Trustee ... to hold, manage, invest,
and reinvest the same and pay to my sister, Ruth Mack
Havens so much of the net income as in its sole discretion it deems necessary and proper for her reasonable living expenses, comfort, maintenance, and general welfare. My Trustee in exercising this discretion
shall, however, take into consideration all assets owned
by her and any income received from any other source
of which my Trustee may have knowledge. It is my
desire that the discretionary power given to my Trus219 Md. 148, 154, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959). See a recent Pennsylvania case
remarkably similar on the facts to the instant case and citing it with
approval; U.S. Steel Oorp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 189
Pa. Super. 362, 150 A. 2d 361 (1959). And see cases collected in 28 A.L.R.
2d 287, 340-343.
'172 F. Supp. 72 (D. Md. 1959).
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tee be liberally construed. Any net income not so
required shall be accumulated and added to the principal of the trust from time to time. Upon the death
of my sister, or upon my death if she shall not survive me, I give the principal of said trust to the Johns
Hopkins University of the City of Baltimore, Maryland
for its library."
At the death of the testator the life tenant, Ruth Mack
Havens, was sixty-five years old and living in a nursing
home because of advanced senility. She was a woman of
considerable wealth, having an income of over $10,000 per
year from a pension and various trusts and the right to
use some $135,000 of capital. It was stated by the trustee's
vice president in charge of Dr. Havens' trust that the sister's income greatly exceeded her expenses, and that, therefore no part of the trust income would be used for her
support.
The government conceded that the value of the charitable remainder was deductible from the estate in the computation of the estate tax,' but it contended that the value
of the life estate was not deductible. The executor contended that under the terms of the will and the circumstances existing at the time of the testator's death, it was
apparent that none of the trust, including the income therefrom, would be paid to or used for the benefit of the life
tenant but would immediately pass to the University on the
death of the life tenant. The executor therefore claimed
that the entire residuary estate was deductible.
Chief Judge Thomsen of the District Court held that,
in computing the estate tax, the executor was entitled to
deduct the value of the entire trust, since the possibility
that the charitable remainderman would not take the entire trust was so remote as to be negligible.
An unusual feature of this case is that the non-charitable
beneficiary's interest was in the income from the testamentary trust, not in a right to invade corpus. The typical
conditional charitable bequest involves a remainder interest in the charity that is subject to possible diversion
of corpus. The court applied the rules used in such typical
cases, without mentioning any possible distinction between
21939 IRC Sec. 812(d) (new 1954 IRC Sec. 2055) provides that in determining the value of the net estate of the deceased, any bequests to a corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes where no part of the net earnings
of the charitable organization inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or Individual may be deducted from the value of the gross estate.
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the two situations.' This point was touched upon, however, in Gilfillan v. Kelm, 4 where the wording of the trust
disposition was similar to that in the recent case and the
tax issue identical. In that case, the court remarked:
"While counsel suggests that this case may be unique
as involving the invasion of income rather than of
principal, the rules involving
the invasion of principal
'5
would seem applicable.

The test deductibility which the court applied in this
case, the one developed for conditional charitable bequests
where diversions of trust corpus are possible, is a two-fold
one. First, there must be a definite ascertainable standard
controlling the life tenant's rights of invasion. The leading
case in this area is Ithaca Trust Co. v. U.S.,O where the
court allowed the value of the charitable remainder to
be deducted from an estate giving the life tenant the
power to invade the corpus of the trust if it were necessary
to do so, in order to maintain her station in life. This
standard is generally regarded as being sufficiently definite
and ascertainable.7 "The standard must be fixed in fact
and capable of being stated in definite terms of money."'
The invasion of the corpus can not be at the pleasure, happiness, or whim of the life tenant.9
The second requirement which must be satisfied before
a deduction for a conditional charitable bequest is granted
is that "the possibility that the charity will not take the
remainder interest must be so remote as to be negligible."10
3 The court did point out that there were no Maryland cases defining the
nature and scope of a beneficiary's interest in trust income in the case of
need, and considered of some relevance the Maryland cases dealing with
rights to corpus conditioned upon need.
'128 F. Supp. 291 (D.C. Minn. 1955).
5Ibid., 293.
0279 U.S. 151 (1929), noted 9 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 288 (1929).
Mercantile-Safe Deposit, etc. Co. v. U.S., 141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956)
hereinafter referred to as the Weglein case.
Supra, n. 6, 154.
Merchants 'Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256 (1943), noted 29 Cornell
L. Q. 406 (1943) ; Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595 (1949),
noted 10 Univ. Pitt. L. Rev. 424 (1949).
10
Regs. 105, § 81.46 which implemented 1939 IRC sec. 812(d).
"Sec. 81.46. Conditional Bequests.
(a) If as of the date of decedent's death the transfer to charity is
dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of a

precedent event in order that it might become effective, no deduction

is allowable unless the possibility that charity will not take is so
remote as to be negligible. If an estate or Interest has passed to or is
vested In charity at the time of the decedent's death and such right
or interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the
happening of some event which appeared to have been highly improbable at the time of decedent's death, the deduction is allowable."
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The court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. U.S.-" remarked that "there
must be no uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs." If the transfer to charity is dependent upon the performance of some
act which might or might not happen, then the charitable
bequest is not deductible. 12 Thus, where, the charity would
only take if the life tenant died without issue" or the designated remaindermen predeceased the life tenant, 4 no deduction would be allowed. On the other hand, if the transfer to charity is dependent upon some act or event which
is highly improbable, then the charitable bequest is deductible..5 In U.S. v. Provident Trust Co.'" the court
granted a deduction where the charity was to take under
the residuary clause if the life tenant died without leaving
issue. At the time of the testator's death, the life tenant
was fifty years old and had been rendered incapable of
having children by an operation removing her uterus,
Fallopian tubes, and both ovaries.
In the principal case, Chief Judge Thomsen reaffirmed
his position, previously stated in the Weglein case, 7 that
before a deduction is allowed, it must be shown that the
possibility that the charity will not take is so remote as to
be negligible. In Moffett v. Commissioner,8 the Fourth
Circuit (Judge Thomsen writing the opinion) held that a
29% chance that the residuary charity would not take was
not a possibility so remote as to be called negligible. In this
case the Fourth Circuit quoted with approval the following
from U.S. v. Dean:' 9
"The line between those chances which are so remote as to be negligible and those which are not lies
somewhere between these extremes. We can not say
exactly where. We can only decide specific cases as
they arise using the best judgment we have in placing
them on one side or the other of the line. And there is
no standard to guide us except our estimate of the
extent of the encouragement tax-wise which Congress
wished to give testators to make gifts to charity. Our
judgment being largely subjective, about all we can
say is that we do not think one chance in eleven (in
n Supra, n.

6, 154.

"Supra, n. 10.
Farrington v. Commissioner, 30 F. 2d 915 (1st Cir. 1929).
11U.S. v. Dean, 224 F. 2d 26 (1st Cir. 1955).
"Supra, n. 10.
10291 U.S. 272 (1934), noted 32 Mich. L. Rev. 702 (1934).
7Supra, n. 7.

269 F. 2d 738 (4th Cir.1959).
2Supra, n. 14.
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this case the odds are approximately three chances in
ten) can be considered so remote a chance as to be
negligible, that is, a chance which persons generally
would disregard as so highly improbable that it might
be ignored with reasonable 'safety
in undertaking a
20
serious business transaction.
Though the conclusion of the court in the principal
case, that the chance of any diversion of income to Miss
Havens was so remote as to be negligible, was supportable,2 ' this test is often a difficult one to apply. This test,
as promulgated in Regs. 105 Sec. 81.46, was presumably designed for charitable bequests contingent upon the happening of a single event. Later when the courts were
faced with the problem of granting tax deductions to
charitable bequests subject to possible invasions by noncharitable beneficiaries, they continued to apply the same
test, combined with the requirement of a definite and ascertainable standard controlling the life tenant's right of
invasion. Perhaps these diversion type cases should be
handled through a partial disallowance of the charitable
deduction rather than as granting either a deduction of
the entire bequest to a charity or no deduction at all.
Where the chance of diversion of corpus to non-charitable
beneficiaries has not been so remote as to be negligible
but has been limited to a maximum dollar amount per year,
a partial deduction of the trust has been allowed, the maximum possible diversion being subtracted from the value
of the trust.2 2 Where the rights of invasion are subject to
a definite standard, even though the chances of invasion
'Ibid., 29.
In applying these tests to the principal case, Judge Thomsen found as
a fact that "at the time of the death of Dr. Havens the possibility that
his sister's income and principaZ would not be sufficient to care for her
for the balance of her life was so remote as to be negligible". He tried to
evaluate the extent of the interest which the beneficiary had where she
could obtain income only in case of need and upon the exercise of a trustee's discretion. No Maryland case directly in point, however, could be
found. The court then turned to the testimony of the vice president of the
trustee, the one handling the trust estate, who had said that his understanding of the intention of the testator and the Maryland law was that
Miss Havens would have to exhaust her own assets before any income
from the trust could be paid to her. At least technically, the trustee's own
Interpretation of the trust instrument and the applicable law would not
seem relevant. A danger in giving weight to his opinion on these matters
is that nothing prevents him from changing his interpretation in the
future. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that the testimony of
the trustee had been admitted without objection, and the court presumably
would have reached the same result, even had the trustee's testimony been
completely disregarded.
22Estate of B. F. Sternheim, 2 T.C.M. 311 (1943), reversed on other
grounds, 145 F. 2d 132 (9th Cir. 1944).
21
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are more than negligible, it would seem sound to treat the
situation this same way; that is, to compute the deduction
for the bequests to charity on the basis of what would be
the maximum possible diversion under the standard used
in the trust and the particular circumstances of the case.2"
Under such an approach, some deduction could be allowed
without straining the "so remote as to be negligible" criterion, and still the government would be adequately
protected.
JuLIAN I. JACOBS

Continuing Corporate Liability For Federal Crime
After State Dissolution Of Corporation
Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States1
Three corporate defendants - Melrose Distillers, Inc.,
CVA Corporation, and Dant Distillery and Distributing
Corporation - all wholly owned subsidiaries of Schenley
Industries, were indicted for alleged violations of Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 Shortly after the indictment
against them was returned, they were dissolved under
their respective state statutes, (Maryland and Delaware)
and were recreated as divisions of the parent firm. Their
motion for a dismissal of the indictment under the claim
that their dissolution abated the proceedings was denied
by the United States District Court for Maryland, which,
upon the subsequent plea of nolo contendere, levied fines
against them. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.' On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court, in
turn, affirmed, stating that the three corporations retained
sufficient life under state law to allow these criminal proceedings to continue, without finding any need to resolve
the exact interpretation of provisions of the state abatement statutes. The Court reasoned: (1) that the Sherman
Act, §8, "defines 'person' to include corporations 'existing'
under the laws of any State", and (2) regardless of how
Maryland and/or Delaware construe their respective statutes allowing dissolved corporations to continue in existence for "proceedings" already begun (narrowly, so as
to preclude subsequent state criminal prosecutions, or
2

LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND

GIFT

TAXES

1359 U.S. 271 (1959).
226 STAT. 209, §§ 1, 2; 15 U.S.C.A. (1951), §§ 1, 2
'258 F. 2d 726 (1958), Rec. Dec. 19 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1959).

(1956)

366.
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broadly, so as to include them), the corporation was "an
'existing' enterprise for the purposes of §8".4 The Supreme
Court as a policy matter concluded:
"Petitioners were wholly owned subsidiaries of Schenley Industries, Inc. After dissolution they simply became divisions of a new corporation under the same
ultimate ownership. In this situation there is no more
reason for allowing them to escape criminal penalties
then damages in civil suits. As the Court of Appeals
noted, a corporation cannot be sent to jail. The discharge of its liabilities whether criminal or civil can
be effected only by the payment of money. '
A basic question presented by the case was whether
an analogy exists between the death of a natural person
and the dissolution of a corporation; and, if so, whether
the legal consequences and ramifications are identical. The
Supreme Court itself, in three prior decisions ranging from
1927 to 1949 had taken the position that, at common law,
dissolution and death are analogous as to the abatement
of liability.6 In each of these three cases, as well as three
others decided in the lower Federal courts,' the principle
that only a statute enacted in the state of incorporation
can sustain sufficient life in a dissolved corporation to render it liable in its transformed state, had been followed
without exception. Chief Justice Taft expressed this majority rule quite clearly in stating:
"It is well settled that at common law and in the
Federal jurisdiction a corporation which has been dissolved is as if it did not exist, and the result of its dissolution cannot be distinguished from the death of a
natural person in its effect."8
'359
U.S. 271, 273-274 (1959).
5
Ibid., 274.

4 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 (1927);
Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 31 (1949);
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Building Corp.,
302 U.S. 120 (1937).
'U.S. v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953) ; U.S. v. U.S.
Vanadium Corp., Electro-Metallurgical Co. and Electro-Metallurgical Sales
Corp., 230 F. 2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956); cert. den. 76 S. Ct. 836 (1956);
U.S.
v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765 (D.C. La. 1942).
8
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co v. State of Oklahoma, 8upra, n. 6, 259. The
existence of contrary holdings is admitted by the Court in a later case, in
which, though siding with the majority, the Court stated that the analogy
has "not been the subject of universal admiration . . . and is by no means
exact". Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., supra, n. 6,
634. The Appellate Division of the New York Court has adopted this
minority view. Wilson v. Brown, 175 N.Y.S. 688, 692 (1919).
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Proceeding from this principle, there is virtual unanimity in looking to the state statutes for changes in the common law rule. The states, however, are far from uniform
in their statutory treatment of the problem; for, not only
do the provisions themselves vary, but, in some cases, the
same thought is expressed in different ways, leading to
divergent interpretations. Under the Delaware statute, for
example, a dissolved corporation continues in existence
for a period of three years from its official expiration for
the purpose of prosecuting or defending "suits, actions and
proceedings" to which it is a litigant. The statute prolongs
the life of such a corporation until judgment or decree is
granted in cases where certain types of litigation were
commenced by or against the firm either prior to or within
the three year period.9
In Maryland, the effect of dissolution was expressed
quite clearly in Section 78 (a) of the 1951 Code, which
stated that dissolution shall not abate "any pending suit
or proceeding by or against the corporation, and all such
suits may be continued with such substitution of parties,
if any, as the Court directs."'10 In addition to the aforementioned section, the Court in the instant case cited Section 72 (b) of the 1951 Code, which provides that, although
the dissolution of a corporation is effective when the articles of dissolution are accepted for record by the State Tax
Commission, the firm nevertheless remains in existence
for the purposes of "paying, satisfying, and discharging any
existing debts and obligations ... and doing all other acts
required to liquidate and wind up its business and affairs.""
As to Section 78 (a), since the clarity and directness
of the statute's wording left little doubt as to its intent, the
Court concerned itself only with the interpretation as to
what forms of litigation were to be included under it, the
problem being centered on the construction of the words
"suit" and "proceeding." The question on point was
whether these words have sufficient latitude to encompass
criminal prosecution.
There has been little doubt but that civil litigation does
not abate under the statutes, both in the Federal and State
Courts. Only six days prior to the Melrose decision, the
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Baltimore County v. Glendale Corporation,wherein a suit for specific performance
of certain contracts was brought, stated unequivocably that
98 DEL. CODE (1935) § 42.
'°MD. CODE (1951), Art. 23, § 78(a) ; Cf. MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23,
"MD. CODE (1951), Art. 23, § 72(b) ; (1957), Art. 23, § 76(b).

§ 82(a).
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the mere fact of dissolution would not affect the civil liability of the defendant corporation. 12
As to whether the words include criminal prosecution,
a marked conflict exists among the courts. Taking the
words "suit," "proceeding," and "action" together in a
series, as they appear in the Delaware Code, the Circuit
Court for the Tenth Circuit decided, in an oft-cited opinion,
that they include only civil litigation, reasoning that criminal prosecution, being different in nature and not being
specifically mentioned, was not intended to be included
in the exceptions to the common law.13 Although abating
the cause before it, the Court was faced with a case similar
to Baltimore County v. Glendale,'4 in that the action was
not actually pending at the time of the defendant's dissolution; and its decision may be distinguished from those
contrary to it in that respect.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reached the same conclusion, however, finding that, although "action" and "proceeding" may explain "suit" they
do not expand its meaning sufficiently to warrant continuation of criminal prosecutions. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took issue
with this reasoning, stating:
"We agree that the word 'suit' or the word 'action'
standing alone might reasonably be held as not including a criminal prosecution, but when the word
'proceeding' is added we think a combination is presented which is well near inclusive of all forms of
litigation."'16
In documenting its interpretation, the Court referred to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which the
term "criminal proceeding" is used. 17 Also cited by the
Court is an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit which, in construing the more controversial Delaware law, agreed that the word "proceeding" is broader
than "action" or "suit," and, to fulfill the raison d'etre of
the statute, must be given full latitude. 8
219 Md. 465, 150 A. 2d 433 (1959).
U.S. v. Safeway Stores, 140 F. 2d 834 (10th Cir. 1944).
,Supra, n. 12.
"U.S. v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953).
1 U.S. v. P. F. Collier and Son Corp., 208 F. 2d 936, 939, 40 A.L.R. 2d
1389 (Cir. 1953).
1718 U.S.C.A. (1948), Rule 2.
Is Bahen and Wright, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F.
2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1949).
's
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In the instant case below, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit felt that the words of the statutes of
both Maryland and Delaware, for purposes of survival of
criminal suits, should include criminal as well as Civil
proceedings, and adopting the same policy approach as
the Supreme Court in the language quoted above said that
to exempt the survival of criminal actions "would offend
our sense of justice, pervert the obvious policy of the state
in enacting these survival statutes, and provide an easy
avenue of escape by corporations from the consequences of
their criminal acts by the easy process of dissolution."'19
The controversy concerning this technical interpretation of the three words, in so far as a federal criminal proceedings involving Maryland or Delaware corporations are
concerned, was, apparently ended when the Supreme Court
decided in the Melrose case that, "under both the Maryland and Delaware law the lives of these corporations were
not cut short, as is sometimes done on dissolution ... but
were sufficiently
continued so that this proceeding did not
''20
abate.
However, it should be observed that a question is necessarily raised as to whether the interpretation of the Maryland law by the Court of Appeals (the Supreme Court, as
indicated above did not rest on the interpretation below)
in this decision would still be applicable; for, though too
late to affect this case, the State Legislature has repealed
Section 78 (a), apparently intending it to be replaced
by
21
Rule 222 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.
While the Reporter's note to Rule 222 indicates that no
change in meaning from Section 78 (a) was intended, a
problem arises because the Rule omits the words "suit"
and "proceeding", which had been used in the statute, and
merely states that an "action" shall not abate by reason
of dissolution. In Rule 5 (a), stating definitions applicable
throughout the Maryland Rules "action" is defined as not
including a criminal proceeding.2 2 Thus, whereas Section
78 (a) prevented abatement of "any pending suit or proceeding", which was susceptible of construction to include
criminal proceedings, as accepted by the United States
Court of Appeals below in the instant case,2" Rule 222 applies by definition only to civil litigation.
1258 F. 2d 726, 728 (4th Cir. 1958).
"Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 272-73 (1959).
21 Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rule 222 (1958).
0Ibid., Rule 5(a).
2Supra, circa n. 4.
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Unless this situation is corrected, by re-enacting the
repealed portion of Section 78 (a), preferably with an
amendment to specifically include criminal proceedings, or
perhaps by adoption of a rule specifically related to abatement of proceedings against corporations as part of the
new criminal rules,24 the effect of dissolution of a Maryland corporation on abatement of state criminal proceedings would seem to become once again an unresolved problem, and also to suggest the possibility of further dispute
in federal prosecutions.
From the strong expressions of policy quoted above from
the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals
below in the instant case,25 it would seem probable that the
federal courts, even without further change in the Maryland statutes or rules, would take the liberal policy approach which the Supreme Court took in construing the
Sherman Act in the instant case.
However, there can be little doubt that some clarification of the state situation in the manner suggested above,
whether by statutes or rule, would be desirable. Possibly,
consideration should be given also to the desirability of a
provision for survival of corporations for purposes of any
criminal liability for the period of limitations specified for
any particular crime, whether or not proceedings had been
started before dissolution.
AIAN M. WILNE

The Effect Of The Interrogatory Form On
The Sufficiency Of The Answer
Britt v. Snyder1
The plaintiffs in this case are the widower and the two
infant children of a patient who died as a result of an
operation performed at the South Baltimore General Hospital. In a suit to recover damages for alleged malpractice
against two physicians - a surgeon and an anaesthetist and the hospital, the plaintiff submitted the following interrogatory to each of the defendants individually: "Give
a concise statement of the facts upon which you base your
"Currently in the form of a Tentative Draft (February, 1960) as prepared by a subcommittee of the Rules Committee of the Oourt of Appeals
of Maryland and circulated to the Bench and Bar for comment.
Supra, circa ns. 4 and 19.

1DAiLY

RECORD,

July 23, 1959 (Md. 1959).
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defense to this suit that you were not negligent as alleged
in the plaintiff's declaration."2
The defendant surgeon merely answered that the operation was carefully and prudently performed by him
"without any negligence on his part."' The anaesthetist, in
addition to asserting that he "exercised ordinary care, skill,
and judgment," denied the truth of the plaintiff's allegations of fact.4 The hospital's supplementary answer set

out the principal steps taken by the hospital as shown by
its records.5
The plaintiff excepted to these answers6 on the grounds
that the answers (a) were tantamount to the general issue
plea of the defendants; (b) gave no affirmative statements
of facts upon which the defense was based; and (c) that
the plaintiffs were entitled to receive, in answer to their
Ibid.
" The answer filed on behalf of Dr. Snyder Is as follows:
"For answer to Interrogatory No. 4, the defendant states that the
operation performed by the defendant in this case was carefully and
prudently performed by the defendant without any negligence on the
part of the defendant, and that the subsequent death of Sylvia Britt
was not in any way caused by any act or acts of the defendant."
'The answer filed on behalf of Dr. Wieciech is as follows:
"A concise statement of facts upon which this defendant will base
his defense that he was not negligent as alleged in plaintiffs' declaration is that such allegations of negligence are not true and are denied;
that this defendant exercised ordinary care, skill and judgment In
the performance of what he did as an anaesthetist and that the death
Of the patient was not the result of any negligence or want of ordinary
care, skill or judgment on his part."
5 The supplementary answer filed by the hospital listed the following
steps: furnishing all drugs ordered by the physicians In attendance,
furnishing all the equipment ordered by the physicians in attendance,
furnishing all the qualified nursing and lay personnel required to facilitate
the orders of the physicians in attendance, and employed and furnished
all the house doctors necessary to carry out the orders of the physicians
in attendance. The answer listed the names of the doctors and also the
various drugs and equipment which were furnished by the hospital in
response to the orders of the physicians.
Originally the hospital filed the following answer:
"That there was nothing that the defendant did, or should have
done but did not do, which caused or hastened the death of Mrs.
!Sylvia Britt, there was no Indication that Mrs. Brltt was In any danger
until after the operation, and as soon as it became evident that she
was not reacting properly, all possible steps were taken to revive her.
The steps that were taken are too numerous to list In a concise statement but, as far as known to this defendant, they are set out In detail
in the copy of the record of the South Baltimore General Hospital
which has been furnished to the plaintiff."
MARYLAND RULE 417c, Exceptions, does not set out a specific procedure
for filing an exception to an Interrogatory, but Chief Judge Niles in
Mazor v. Plein, DAILY RFiCOBD, July 21, 1958 (Md. 1958), has stated that
except under special circumstances, the Court will require, with respect to
Exceptions hereafter filed, that as to each Exception the following be set
forth in full: (1) The Interrogatory excepted to, in full; (2) The answer,
if any, filed thereto, in full; (8) The reason for the exception. See also
Wolf v. Hellman, DAILY REcoan, Dec. 28, 1956 (Md. 1956).
"
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interrogatory, specific factual information in response to
each charge in the declaration alleging negligence on the
part of each defendant.
The only issue before the court in the instant case was
the sufficiency of the respective answers. In overruling the
objection to the answers to the interrogatories, the court
held that a broad and generalized interrogatory does not
require a specific answer. It cited a similar case 7 in which
the court had found that an interrogatory requesting a
concise statement of the facts supporting an adversary's
position was proper. There, the court pointed out that an
interrogatory based on conciseness and simplicity would
not take the place of specific inquiries as to specific facts.
It is important to remember when framing an interrogatory that the function of the discovery procedure is to
obtain from one's opponent exact information as to the
true ground of attack or defense by discovering specific
facts on which the opponent relies." In this case the defendants relied on a negative defense rather than an affirmative one - they denied that the operation was negligently
and unskillfully performed. Therefore, their answers to
the interrogatory sufficiently apprised the plaintiff of the
nature of the defense.
There are two aspects of this case which warrant consideration - the form of the interrogatory and the sufficiency of the answer.9 According to Chief Judge Niles,
interrogatories should be directed to specific facts relevant
to the case as distinguished from blanket inquiries, the
answers to which might be either useless or impossible to
frame conscientiously. ° Interrogatories which are directed
to such facts as the operation and speed of vehicles, the
maintenance and repair of vehicles, the position and operation of traffic lights, the nature and extent of injuries, and
the calculation of damages, are proper.1 '
In several federal cases, based on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which closely parallel those of Maryland,
the same principle has been followed. The United States
7Wilhelm

8

v. Serio, DAILY

RECORD, Dec.

28, 1956 (Md. 1956).

Supra, n. 6. See also Barnett v. Middleton, DAILY RECORD, April 2,
1955 (Md. 1955).
OFor a more complete discussion of the Maryland deposition and discovery process see Pike and Willis, The New Maryland Deposition and
Discovery Procedure, 6 Md. L. Rev. 4 (1941), and Foreman, Depositions
and Discovery - Digest of Maryland Decisions, 18 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1958)*.
' 0 Currier v. States Marine Corp., D my RECORD, March 16, 1956 (Md.
1956).
"Rapacky v. Stanley Co., DAILy RECORD, Oct. 13, 1956 (Md. 1956).
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District Court for the District of New Jersey has ruled that
an interrogatory which is too general and all inclusive
need not be answered. 2 In May v. Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company," the court disallowed the following interrogatory: "State in detail the alleged negligence on the
part of the plaintiff contributing to the occurrence of the
accident, etc.?", on the ground that it went too far in asking for information in detail. The court suggested that the
plaintiff serve this interrogatory in its place: "What are
the facts upon which the defendant bases its allegation that
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the
occurrence of the accident?"
Numerous controversies have arisen over the form of
interrogatories which are an outgrowth of Federal Rule
26 (b) and Maryland Rule 410 (a) (3) .14 This portion of
the rule permits inquiry as to "the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." However,
interrogatories seeking this particular kind of information
that are framed in general terms rather than particular
ones, have been found to be too broad; they should be directed toward identifying persons having knowledge as to
specific facts or classes of facts. 5 The more particular the
request, the better reception it will probably receive from
the court in case of objection.'" Thus, for example, a request for names and addresses of all eye-witnesses to an
accident would probably be held proper. 7 However, an
interrogatory requiring the names of "all persons who have
any knowledge" about material facts of an accident or the
instrumentality involved is too general when it is filed in
addition to proper interrogatories asking the names of
persons who were at the scene and who actually witnessed
the accident. 8 To allow such a broad question would lead
to confusion rather than to order and precision in the
preparation of the case. 19 The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland has ruled that a party is not
Auer v. Hershey Creamery Co., 1 F.R.D. 14 (D.C. N.J. 1939).
17 F.R.D. 288 (D.C. Md'. 1955).
MARYLAND RuLE 410a (3) provides:
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a deponent may be
examined . . . regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...
(3) including
any information of the witness or party, however obtained, as to the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts..
1Supra, n. 10.
6 See 6 Md. L. Rev., 8upra, n. 9, 29.
17 Supra, n. 10.
86 Md. L. Rev., 8upra, n. 9, 29.
"Currier v. States Marine Corp., DAILY RECORD, March 16, 1956 (Md.
1956). In this case Chief Judge Niles gives an illustration of the kind of
question which is impossible to answer, which would lead only to recrimi-
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required to furnish his adversary with the names of witnesses on whose testimony he intends to rely; however,
the party may be required to furnish names of persons
known to him to have a specified connection with the controversy. 0 Similarly, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York has held that an interrogatory demanding the names of officers knowing anything about a particular accident was too broad.2 '
The emphasis on specificity has even been extended to
the requests for the submission of documents for inspection.22 According to one court, these requests should be in
the form of a definite statement directed to a party for
such things as may be in his possession, custody, or control,
specifically designating them.2" An interrogatory or request for "all", with reference to evidence, is improper.2 4
Thus, a motion for production of documents requesting
"all written reports, memoranda, or other records of conferences of officers or members of the technical staff of the
defendants" in which certain manufacturing processes were
discussed, was too general and comprehensive.2 5
Just as important as the form of the interrogatory is
the sufficiency of the answer. In the instant case, the court
decided that the answer to the defendants' request for a
concise statement of the defense was sufficient because of
the form of the question. In may cases, however, the court
has found it necessary to sustain an exception to the answer. For example, the court has ruled that an answer,
"See Declaration," was an insufficient response to an interrogatory requesting the defendant's own version of the
incident described in the declaration.2 6 Since the object
of an interrogatory is to obtain a simple answer to a simple
question, the court did not think it should be necessary
for a pleader to attempt to distill the essential facts upon
nation and confusion, and which produces no effective result in the conduct
of the case:
"Does the defendant, his agent, attorney, or insurer have any information which could be used for the purposes of surprise or impeachment of the plaintiff at the time of the trial of this case? If the
answer to this Interrogatory is 'yes', then state in full detail all
such Information."
2 Coca 0ola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labloratories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D.C. Md.
1939).
Barter v. Eastern Steamship Lines, 1 F.R.D. 65 (D.C. N.Y. 1939).
"MARYLAND
RULE 419a.
2Sheffield
Corp. v. George F. Alger Co., 16 F.R.D. 27 (D.C. Ohio 1954).
2Ibid.

"Lever Bros. Co. v. Proctor and Gamble Mfg. Oo., 38 F. Supp. 680 (D.C.
Md. 1941).
Robinson v. Baltimore Transit Co., DAmY REcoRD, Nov. 13, 1957 (Md.
1957).
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which his opponent relies from a technical and legallydrawn declaration. The interrogatory demanding or requiring a concise account of the happening should be answered concisely and simply in order to clarify, rather than
obscure the issues involved. Such an approach will further
the purposes of discovery by enabling a party to acquire
accurate and useful information with respect to testimony
which is likely to be presented by an opponent and to obtain information which appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.27 In a case 8
in which the interrogatory demanded an accounting of the
plaintiff's medical expenses, the answer, "Hospital bill not
received," was found to be insufficient under normal circumstances. As the court pointed out, both parties have a
duty to obtain all reasonable information relative to the
facts when the information is under their control, especially when the information sought normally must be
obtained prior to trial. Similarly, an answer that the "information has not been received," or that the "information
will be furnished later" is normally insufficient. 29 In still
another case,3 0 the court has ruled that the defendant may
require definite answers as to the nature, extent, and
permanence of injuries claimed in a personal injury suit.
The answer, "See attached medical report," referring to
certain reports of doctors which differ in scope and detail
was found to be too indefinite.
In conclusion, the effectiveness of the discovery procedure will be determined to a great extent by the form of
the interrogatory and the sufficiency of the answer. As
indicated in the principal case, an interrogatory itself must
be specific in nature.
HERBERT J. BELGRAD
Supra, n. 9.
SJones v. Salvation Army, DAILY RncoRD, Apr. 23, 1955 (Md. 1955).
Jones v. Baltimore Transit Co., DAiLy RECORD, Oct. 8, 1956 (Md. 1956).
®Brooker v. Stevens, Inc., DAILy RwcORD, Mar. 29, 1955 (Md. 1955).
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Recent Decisions
Attachment - Government Levy On State Employee's
Earnings. Sims v. U.S., 359 U.S. 108 (1959). Levies were
served on the petitioner, State Auditor of West Virginia,
seizing the accrued salaries of three employees of the state
government. Petitioner refused to recognize the levies and
paid the accrued salaries to the delinquent taxpayers. The
District Court held him personally liable for the amount
paid. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
and the Supreme Court, relying on Secs. 6331 and 6332 of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, in turn affirmed, pointing
out that Sec. 6331 was passed to make levies available
against the unpaid salaries of federal employees as well as
other taxpayers, including state employees. The Court also
referred to Sec. 301.6331-1(a) (4) (ii) of the Treasury Regulations, which declares Sec. 6331 authorizes levies on accrued salaries of employees of a state in order to enforce collection of any federal tax. By a West Virginia statute, the
state auditor is empowered and obligated to deduct withholding tax as required by the government. Another
statute allows garnishments to be served upon him to
sequester salaries of state employees. In that such act
empowered the Auditor to control the disposition of funds
and since his acts defeated the government's valid levy,
the Court reasoned that he was a person "obligated with
respect to" the salaries under Sec. 6332(a) and thus could
be held personally liable.
Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), Art. 9, Sec. 10
states, "Any kind of property or credits belonging to the
defendant, in the plaintiff's own hands, or in the hands of
anyone else, may be attached; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding this broad provision it has been consistently held that funds in the hands of a public officer,
governmental or municipal corporation cannot be attached,
the predominant reason being the great public inconvenience which would result in taking officials from their duties
to entertain such actions. See Hughes v. Svboda, 168 Md.
440, 178 A. 108 (1935), and Attachment - Public Institutions as Garnishee, 1 Md. L. Rev. 172 (1937). In view
of the Sims case, however, it would seem that the federal
government can levy on the salaries of Maryland's state,
county, and municipal employees under Sec. 6332 of the
Internal Revenue Code. As to state employees, the State
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Comptroller would seem to be the person who could be
held responsible for compliance with such levy. See Maryland Constitution, Art. VI, and 2 Md. Code (1957), Art. 19.
Constitutional Law - Bible Reading And Prayer
Recital In Public Schools. Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S. 2d
453 (1959). In a lengthy and exhaustive opinion which
treated the constitutions of both New York and United
States, New York State Judge Meyer held that a school
board resolution which directed the recital of the following
prayer during morning exercises was invalid: "Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country." The Court concluded that while the Board
could authorize, it could not require, the saying of the
prayer in question. Moreover, if it does authorize such a
prayer, "it must bring the authorization to the attention of
the parents of children in the schools, establish a procedure
for excusing non-participants not only from saying the
prayer but from the room, if they so elect, and take affirmative steps to protect the religious freedom of both nonparticipants and participants".
Approximately one month later, United States Circuit
Judge Biggs for a 3-judge federal District Court in Philadelphia, Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
Pa., 177 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Pa. 1959), held unconstitutional
a Pennsylvania statute which provided for the reading, at
the opening of each school day, of at least ten verses from
the Holy Bible without comment, accompanied by an established practice of reciting the Lord's Prayer, in conjunction with the Bible reading. The Court, in enjoining enforcement of the statute stated that it violated the proscription of the First Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it both provided for an establishment of religion and interferred with
the free exercise of religion, reasoning: (1) that the Holy
Bible was a Christian document and therefore the daily
reading of it, operating upon the receptive minds of children, aided and preferred the Christian religion and consequently interferred with the free exercise of religion;
(2) that teachers could be discharged for failure to conduct the ceremonies in their class; (3) that school attendance was mandatory upon children, and accordingly that
participation in this religious ceremony was compulsory
even though not, as such, required by statute.
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An effort to have the issue resolved by the Supreme
Court on facts closely related to those of the Schempp case
failed in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429
(1952), for want of sufficient interest of the complaining
party when suit was brought by a parent, as such, and as a
taxpayer. The Court ruled that, as a parent, his standing
ceased when his child graduated from the school in question, and that as a taxpayer he had not sufficiently shown
the directness of interest required to litigate a constitutional issue.
No dispute of this nature has reached the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The State Board of Education has promulgated no rules concerning morning exercises, but it
appears that in a number of Maryland classrooms, morning
exercises involving the reading of passages from the Holy
Bible and/or recital of the Lord's Prayer or others of a like
nature are conducted. It would seem that generally, the
participation or attendance is voluntary, at least in the
sense of being left to the decision of the children involved
or their parents if objection to participation is raised.
Corporations - Dissenting Stockholder's Right To "The
Fair Value" Of His Stock. Warren v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 220 Md. 478, 154 A. 2d 796 (1959). Appellant, a preferred shareholder, objected to the recapitalization of the
Baltimore Transit Company in 1953, and sought to recover
the "fair market value" of his stock under 2 Md. Code
(1957), Art. 23, Sec. 73. The lower court affirmed the report of appraisers, which set a value of $32.50 a share on
the appellant's stock in the Baltimore Transit Company.
The appraisers had valued the stock as a proportionate
interest in a going concern, considering such factors as
market value and prospective earnings as well as asset
values. Appellant stockholder contended for a valuation
of around $85 a share on the theory that the law required
the appraisers to postulate a liquidation of the corporation
and to determine what the net asset value of the stock
would be on such a liquidation. Appellant relied heavily
upon American General Corporation v. Camp, 171 Md. 629,
637, 190 A. 225 (1936), wherein the Court of Appeals
refused to establish a uniform rule for all "fair value" controversies, but in that instance recognized that ". . . it is
logical and consistent to infer that the fair value of such
stock to a dissenting owner is its intrinsic value on a liquidation .... " The Court of Appeals, affirmed the American
General case, holding that "fair value" of the appellant's
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stock was to be ".... valued as an interest in a continuing
enterprise with whatever benefits and liabilities as to value
its preferred status affords it.... ." In so holding the Court
joined Maryland with New York, Delaware, Ohio and the
general weight of authority. In addition, whether consciously or not, this decision effectively quiets the fears
expressed by an early Maryland Law Review author who
commented on the American General case in 1937 saying,
"If the Court of Appeals has laid down for the future the
rule that asset value in liquidation is controlling, it seems
to run contra to the better reasoned text writers and authorities * * * Viewed in its long-range aspects, the decision (American General) will be unfortunate only if commissioners appointed in future cases regard the opinion as
laying down an instruction that 'asset value in liquidation'
is a conclusive
nimum... .", Note - Appraisalof Shares
of Dissenting Stockholders in Consolidation - American
General Corporationv. Camp, et al., 1 Md. L. Rev. 338, 346
(1937). See also Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
(1943), Vol. 13, Sec. 5899, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS
(1946), Sec. 299, and Brune, MARYLAND CORPORATE LAw
AND PRACTICE

(1953), Sec. 317.

Evidence - Improper Denial By The Trial Court Of
A Witness' Claim Of Privilege Cannot Be Taken Advantage
Of By A Party. Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 156 A. 2d 423
(1959). At defendant's burglary trial, a witness was advised by the defendant's counsel that any further testimony on her part might tend to incriminate her. The witness thereafter claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, but when the State, with concurrence of the trial
judge, granted the witness immunity, the trial judge informed her that she must testify. The witness complied,
without objection, and the defendant was subsequently
convicted. The defendant appealed, relying chiefly on
Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Md. 446 (1885), and a footnote to that case in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954), Sec. 73,
n. 8, indicating that Maryland follows the minority view
that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a new
trial whenever material evidence of a witness is admitted
in violation of a privilege of the witness.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the trial
judge was in error in granting immunity to the witness,
but holding that since the privilege belongs to the witness
and not the defendant, material testimony given by the
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witness, even though his claim of privilege has been improperly denied, was admissible against the defendant and
the error in denying the privilege was not a valid ground
of appeal by the defendant. The Court declined to follow
the Chesapeake Club case and aligned Maryland with the
great weight of authority, with only Massachusetts apparently contra (Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366 (1827)). See

generally,

WIGMORE, EViDFNCE

(3rd ed. 1940), Sec. 2270;

McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE (1954), Sec. 73; and SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL (1957), 190.

Labor Law - States Pre-Empted From Awarding Damages Resulting From Peaceful Picketing. San Diego Building Trades Council, Etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
After the National Labor Relations Board declined jurisdiction, presumably for budgetary reasons, of employer's
representative proceedings for injunction of, and damages
arising from, union's peaceful picketing, the California
Supreme Court awarded damages and granted the injunction on the theory that the picketing constituted a tort
under state law [45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P. 2d 1 (1955)1. The
Supreme Court set aside the injunction, 353 U.S. 26 and
when, on remand, the California Court sustained the award
for damages [42 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P. 2d 473 (1958)]. The
Supreme Court again granted certiorari to consider the
damage award. Stating that when activities are either
protected or prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, the states
are deprived of jurisdiction, the Court in this instance held
that the state court lacked jurisdiction to award the employer damages for peaceful picketing by the union, as
such activity, even if not clearly protected or prohibited,
was arguably within the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act and
therefore pre-empted by Federal Authority. The decision
is a specific application of the ruling in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), noted, 18 Md. L. Rev. 50
(decided simultaneously with the first Garmon decision),
where the Supreme Court, faced with a question of state
action in a labor dispute where the N.L.R.B. declined jurisdiction for policy reasons, held that the failure of the
N.L.R.B. to assume jurisdiction did not give the States
power over activities that they would otherwise be preempted from regulating.
The Court stressed specifically the danger of state interference with national policy and federal uniformity, but
pointed out that when a state's interest is so urgent to re-
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quire action in situations marked by violence and intimidation, the state courts are not asked to yield to
federal authority, InternationalUnion, United Automobile
Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954). A concurring opinion by four members of the
Court urged that if past nonviolent tortious conduct was
"clearly" unprotected by Taft-Hartley, the Laburnum and
Russell decisions should allow state courts to award damages, and should not be construed solely as cases of violence allowing state action. See Note, Pre-emption and
Non-regulation - The No Man's Land of Labor Relations,
18 Md. L. Rev. 50 (1958).
It should be observed that Section 701 of the recently
adopted Labor-Management Reform Act, (86 Congress S.
1555, Pub. L. 86-257), amends N.L.R. Sec. 14, by adding
sub-paragraph (c) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164, so as to indicate
that nothing in the Act shall preclude States from assuming jurisdiction over labor disputes over which N.L.R.B.
declines to exercise jurisdiction, which would seem to open
the door to State action that was closed by the Guss and
companion cases, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
Libel And Slander - No Recovery Where Plaintiff
Unable To Prove Application Of Defamatory Words To
Himself. Cohn v. Brecher, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1959).
Plaintiff and two other employees, being confronted by
their employer, were told that they would be fired if some
missing money was not returned. Looking directly at
plaintiff, defendant said, "One of you is a crook". The N.Y.
Supreme Court held, in dismissing plaintiff's complaint,
that where defamatory language is directed to a small
group, indefinitely or impersonally referring to only one
of the group, one can only recover if he can prove the
application of the language to himself. The fact that defendant looked at plaintiff when he spoke was too speculative
a basis to permit the conclusion that the words were
directed to the latter.
The principal case can be supported by dictum in
Shutter Bar Co. v. Zimmerman, 110 Md. 313, 318, 73 A. 19
(1909), where the Court of Appeals said:
"In order to maintain an action for libel or slander
it must appear that the defamatory words refer to
some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that
person must be the plaintiff."

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

On the other hand, plaintiff may be able to recover if the
facts and circumstances unequivocably show that he was
the object of the defamatory language, despite the absence
of a specific reference to his name. Harmon v. Liss, 116 A.
2d 693, 695 (D.C. Mun. App. 1955). For a further digest of
related material, see annotation in 91 A.L.R. 1161, or 33 Am.
JuR., Libel & Slander, Sec. 89; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
Sec. 564.
Workmen's Compensation - Mental Disability Unaccompanied By Physical Injury Not Compensable. Chernin
v. Progress Service Co., 192 N.Y.S. 2d 758 (1959). A taxi
driver struck a pedestrian who had darted in front of his
cab. Although he sustained no physical injuries, the taxi
driver became quite excited and abusive after police questioning. Claimant taxi driver continued working for a
month after the accident, but was subsequently admitted to
Bellevue Hospital suffering from a severe emotional strain.
The N.Y. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that
claimant could not recover compensation for his mental
disability, unaccompanied by physical injury, which followed but did not result from the accident. The accident,
at most, had aggrevated a dormant repressed schizophrenia.
In Bramble v. Shields, 146 Md. 494, 127 A. 44 (1925), the
only Maryland compensation case dealing with mental disability, the Court of Appeals allowed recovery to an employee who was suffering from a neurosis that resulted
from a physical injury, on the grounds that the ultimate
mental disability was directly attributable to the accidental
injury that arose out of and in the course of employment.
In view of Maryland's "accidental means" requirement
(Kelly-Springfield Co. v. Daniels, 199 Md. 156, 85 A. 2d
795 (1951)), such a disease apparently would not be compensable under the present statute, 8 Md. Code (1957),
Art. 101, Sec. 67.6, if unaccompanied by a physical injury.
See City Ice and Fuel Division v. Smith, 56 S. 2d 329
(Fla., 1952) in accord with the Chernin case, but Bailey v.
American General Insurance Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.
2d 315 (1955), and Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J.
Super. 50, 95 A. 2d 446 (1953), are apparently contra.

Book Reveiws
Confessions Of A Criminal Lawyer. By Allen Lumpkin
Henson. New York. Vantage Press, Inc., 1959. Pp. 233,
indexed. $3.95.
To those of the non-legal world, the spectre of the
lawyer's memoirs may be difficult to explain. The author
of the present book, a Georgia judge, has come close to
explaining the trial which seems to impel almost every
successful attorney to set down his own triumphs and more
instructive failures - the lawyer, to be successful before
a jury, must be a good story teller.
"To fashion a trial lawyer, the great Personality Designer must rise to the acme of his art. He may not use
the pattern for any other type, but he must borrow from
all. He will need a bit of the actor for dramatic flair. The
propensities of the humorist he must use to lighten situations, and those of the satirist to punish with ridicule. And
there must be a part of the mathematician for exactness,
and some of the logician for reasoning. There must be a
bit of the vocalist for gracious voice. A dash of the Pied
Piper must go in, to lead and to charm. This personality
creation must shift back and forth from the tenderness of
the shepherd to the ferocity of the mandarin. The stern
bearing of the deacon and the levity of the clown are
needed too. And the story teller - since he must convince,
and to convince the more easily he must entertain. All of
these and more, for persons and situations are as unlike
as fingerprints, and the trial lawyer must, at every trial,
direct a new unrehearsed show. He may choose neither
the theme nor the actors. His players, be they parties or
witnesses, range from rogues to saints." [Frontis piece].
Encompassed within its all too brief pages, Judge
Henson, drawing on history, his broad knowledge of people
and on cases through-out his career, weaves a loose fabric
designed to show the importance of each of these elements
he believes the trial lawyer should possess, and how they
may best be used. Commencing with a sketch of the history of the county within which he, and generations of his
ancestors before him, lived, he tells of his own early days
at the bar, before World War I, riding circuit with the
experienced practitioners in the "Big Court". His tales
of the justice courts and the 'Squires both amuse and in-
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struct. In explaining his early entrance into politics, he
tells of convention trickery and of the Frank case, the
political implications of which remained a viable force in
Georgia politics for over twelve years.
In successive chapters Judge Henson tells what he has
learned about judges and juries. Since many of the cases
recounted were attended by much publicity in the press
the methods of obtaining the proper atmosphere in the
courtroom, - one of sympathy usually -, as well as direct
methods for winning acceptance by the press, were of
often paramount importance, and may prove suggestive to
the advocate in every jurisdiction. It is apparently the
judge's view that trial judges are reached by the tenor of
the court room spectators as by a personal appeal. It is a
common place that this is also true of a jury. On the latter
subject, Judge Henson includes chapters on the selection,
amazement, and amusement of juries.
For the pragmatists of the profession, this book has
little new to offer; but for those who enjoy reading a
literate and intelligent man's observations on the law in
action, with time along the way to listen to local history,
anecdotes with meaning, and an inquiry into the causes of
man's conduct, this book should definitely be considered.
It is far above the usual for its genre, and merits attention.
NELSON REED KERR, JR.
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The Apportionment of Stock Distributions
In Trust Accounting Practice
ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR.*

This inquiry deals with the question, "What is income?"
question inherent in the terms "life estates" and "future interests." It is a question which will be raised in
one form or another so long as transfers are made for the
immediate benefit of one person and the ultimate benefit of
another.
The purpose of this study is to analyze how the courts,
and particularly the courts of Maryland, have answered
this question in respect of corporate distributions received
on securities held by trust estates. This study will be
divided into six subsections to be considered in the following order:
I - Definition of Terms
II
The Law as to Pre-1929 Trusts
III - The Law as to Trusts Created between 1929 and
1939
IV - The Law as to Post-1939 Trusts Governed by the
Uniform Principal and Income Act'
V - The Donaldson and Apponyi Cases
VI- The Problem Restated
-a

I - DEFINiTioN OF TERmS
For present purposes, the following definitions are
adopted:
(1) A "dividend" is a distribution of corporate assets
by a corporation to its stockholders. Its essential characteristic is a severance of corporate property, followed by
a distribution of that property to the stockholders of the
corporation.
(2) A "cash dividend" is a dividend paid in cash.
* A.B. 1942, Princeton University, LL.B. 1948, Harvard Law School;
Member, Baltimore City Bar.
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B.
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(3) An "ordinary cash dividend" is a cash dividend
paid at regular intervals, representing a periodic division
of corporate profits.
(4) An "extraordinary cash dividend" is a cash dividend paid at irregular intervals, and is usually motivated
by some object other than the division of corporate profits.
(5) A "stock dividend" is a distribution by a corporation of its stock pro rata to its stockholders, intended as a
substitute for or an increment to an ordinary cash dividend. It is usually a small distribution in relation to the
stock previously outstanding - generally not over 25% and it has no appreciable effect on the market value of the
stock in public trading. The term is a misnomer in its
use of the word "dividend" since no "severance" of corporate assets is involved, and the proportional interest of each
stockholder in the capital and surplus of the company will
be the same after the distribution as it was before.' Accumulated earnings are transferred from surplus to capital
stock account but are not, as in the case of a cash dividend,
distributed to the stockholders. To be sure, a stockholder
receives something of value which he can convert into
cash if he wants to, and to this extent the distribution may
seem superficially to resemble a cash dividend. It should be
remembered, however, that if a stockholder spends his
cash dividends, his equity interest in the corporation remains unchanged. But if he sells a stock dividend and
spends the proceeds, he reduces his proportional interest in
the corporation.
(6) A "true stock split" is a distribution by a corporation to its stockholders of stock of a different par or stated
value in exchange for the stock previously outstanding,
resulting in a larger number of shares at a correspondingly
lower par or stated value but with no change in the comRule of the New York Stock Exchange entitled, "Statement on Stock
Dividends" dated July 21, 1955. This Rule establishes that stock distributions representing less than 25% of the shares previously 'outstanding
are stock dividends and must be capitalized by a charge to earned surplus
equal to the current fair value, i. e. the current market value adjusted
for the effect Of the distribution itself. A distribution representing 100%
or more of the stock previously outstanding is a "split", and only the
par value need be capitalized. See also: Accounting Research Bulletin
No. 11 issued on November 15, 1952, by the Committee on Accounting
Procedure of the American Institute of Accountants, advocating substantially the same rules.
I Some courts have so held. See, for example, Stipe v. First National
Bank, 208 Or. 551, 301 P. 2d 175, 186 (1956) holding that a stock dividend
is not a "dividend" at all. but is "nothing more than in incident or
process in corporate bookkeeping." And see: PATON, ADvAwCED AcCouNTING,
(1947) 587, commenting on "the questionable use of the term 'dividend'
in describing the phenomenon."
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pany's total capital outstanding.4 Since both the corporation and the stockholders thus remain in exactly the same
equity position after the split as they were before, its
principal results are the reduction of the market price
of the stock and the stimulation of its marketability.
These results are not usually accomplished by the stock
dividend. 5
(7) A "modern stock split" (admittedly a term coined
for purposes of this discussion) is a distribution by a corporation to its stockholders of a sufficient number of new
shares of stock, usually at least equivalent to 100% of the
stock previously outstanding, to reduce the market value
of the stock to levels attractive to the average investor of
100-share lots, thereby broadening the base of stockholder
ownership.6 The manner in which the split is accomplished on the corporate books is of no particular significance. It may, like a "true stock split", be supported entirely by a reduction in par value,7 and in such a case the
two terms may be considered synonymous. Or, unlike the
"true stock split," it may be accompanied by no change at
all in the par value' or even by an increase in par. Sometimes a modern stock split is supported by a charge to
capital surplus or paid-in surplus; or, it may be supported
by a charge in part to capital surplus, in part to paid-in
surplus, or, in whole or in part, to earned surplus." Even,
' McCormick v. Frisch, 199 Md. 181, 186, 85 A. 2d 793 (1952). See also:
CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) 483.
5For a clear statement of the difference between a stock dividend and
a stock split, see the remarks of Leland I. Doan, President of Dow Chemical
Co., at the annual stockholders' meeting of September 12, 1956. Among
other things, he observed:
"... If you declare 'a stock dividend of 25 or 50 or 100%, it in no way
reflects your earnings performance and really amounts to a stock split
rather than a dividend because the market value of the shares is
usually reduced proportionately . . ."
6 The Rules of the New York -Stock Exchange cited above in footnote
2 provide that distributions of between 25% and 1000o of the stock
previously outstanding are presumptively splits, but that each distribution
falling in this category must be independently analyzed to determine its
proper status.
7As, for example, the 1953 stock split of American Gas & Electric
Company, supported entirely by a reduction in par from $10 to $5 per
share. This distribution was referred to in Donaldson v. Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 425, 135 A. 2d 433 (1957).
8As, for example, the two Texas Company splits discussed in the
Donaldson case, ibid.
' As, for example, the 1956 split of American Gas & Electric Co., also
discussed in the Donaldson case, supra, n. 7, where par value was increased from $5 to $10 per share.
20 In
the Donaldson case, 214 Md. 421, 426, 135 A. 2d 433 (1957), the
court considered the 1951 split of American Gas & Electric Company
which was partly supported by a charge to capital surplus and to earned
surplus. The General Electric split of 1954, considered in the Apponyl
BALLANTINE,
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however, where some or all of the par value of the new
stock is supported by a capitalization of earned surplus,
the distribution is not a "dividend."" It does not represent
a "severance" of corporate assets in any sense of the word.
It differs essentially from a "stock dividend" in that it does
not represent a substitute for or an increment to an ordinary
cash dividend. To the extent that earnings are capitalized,
it may, to be sure, resemble a large or hybrid stock dividend. But corporate acts are to be judged in terms of their
cause, their effect and their outward appearance. One who
equates a modern stock split with a stock dividend does so
because of some of their similarities in effect and in outward appearance but despite their fundamental differences
in motivating cause.

II -

THE LAW AS TO

PRE-1929

TRUSTS

Gregg, 2

In the case of Thomas v.
decided in 1894, the
Court of Appeals was asked to determine how a 20% stock
dividend declared and paid by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in 1892 should be treated for trust accounting purposes. The question was one of first impression in this
State, and the court found itself "not helped, but rather
embarrassed"'1 by the large number of relevant and conflicting decisions in other States.
The court first reviewed the cases decided in Massachusetts, the decisions now forming the basis of the socalled "Massachusetts Rule." Its basic principle is that
"ordinarily a dividend declared in stock is to be deemed
capital, and a dividend in money is to be deemed income .. ."14 Although easy to apply, the rule seemed
case, 220 Md. 275, 152 A. 2d 184 (1959), represented the capitalization of
earned surplus and capital reduction surplus.
",See: Barber, Are Accounting Requirements for Stock Dividends Ob8oletef, published in the November, 1958 issue of "The Analysts Journal",
a publication of the National Federation of Financial Analysts Societies.
The author points out (at p. 70) that in modern corporate accounting
practice, the traditional distinctions between the various surplus accounts have lost most of their significance, and that today the balances
in these funds are switched around for tax reasons, for labor bargaining
purposes and a host of other motives totally unrelated to the distribution
of income to stockholders.
"78 Md. 545, 28 A. 565 (1894).
Ibid., 549.
"'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 559 (1890); Minot v. Paine, 99
Mass. 101 (1868) ; 2 ScorT, TRuSTS (1956), § 236.5. The states which followed the Massachusetts Rule and those which followed the Pennsylvania
Rule are catalogued in a Note, 44 A.L.R. 2d 1277. A third and much less
popular rule is known as the "Kentucky Rule" which awards all extraordinary dividends, whether of stock or cash, to the life tenant. This
rule was abrogated by judicial decision. Bowles v. Stilley's Executor, 267
S.W. 2d 707, 44 A.L.R. 2d 1273 (Ky. 1954).
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arbitrary and uncomprising. Then the court went on to
consider the Pennsylvania Rule emanating from the early
leading case, Earp's Appeal. 15 This case required the apportionment of a stock dividend between principal and income in proportion to the corporate earnings accumulated
prior to the testator's death and those accumulated after
his death. This rule is difficult to apply but represents an
attempt to balance the equities between two classes of
trust beneficiaries.
Faced with this sharp cleavage between the Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania Rules, our Court of Appeals
in Thomas v. Gregg adopted the rule which seemed at the
time to bring the fairest result in the case at bar. The
directors of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad had, in this
instance, made it plain that the 20% stock dividend was
justified as a matter of business policy because it was
fully supported by current earnings. A clearer example
could scarcely be found, therefore, to illustrate a stock
dividend as above defined - a distribution paid in stock as
a substitute for a cash dividend. It seemed unfair to the
life tenant to invoke the Massachusetts Rule, and thereby
to assign the entire dividend to principal, thus denying the
life tenant the right to share in a distribution of corporate earnings which was clearly labeled as such by the
paying corporation. Influenced largely by these equitable
considerations, the Court of Appeals adopted the Pennsylvania Rule in Thomas v. Gregg, and directed an apportionment of the 20% stock dividend which the trustee in
that case had received.
The next case in this series is Quinn v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. 16 Here, a testamentary trustee, holding shares
of stock in the Canton Company, received from that corporation an extraordinary cash dividend of $4,000. Canton
had maintained a sinking fund for the payment of certain
bonds of the Union Railroad, but this fund was later freed
of the obligation when Northern Central Railway Company, for valuable consideration, agreed to pay all subsequent installments of interest and also the principal on
maturity. The cash and ground rents in the sinking fund
thus having been released, the directors of Canton decided
to keep the ground rents and to distribute most of the cash
to the stockholders. Out of the $4,000 received by the
trustee from this distribution, $3,814 had been earned prior
to the testator's death, and the balance of $186 had been
'528 -Pa.868 (1857).
93 Md. 285, 48 A. 85 (1901).
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earned since the inception of the trust. The lower court,
relying on Thomas v. Gregg, decreed an apportionment
between principal and income in the same ratio.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Distinguishing Thomas
v. Gregg in that it had involved a 20% stock dividend, not
an extraordinary cash dividend, and that what was here
distributed "had not been capitalized", the court held the
entire $4,000 to be income distributable to the life tenants.
Even though more than 90% of the cash distributed had
been earned prior to the inception of the trust, the remaindermen were not allowed to share in the distribution
at all.
The decision is patently inconsistent with Thomas v.
Gregg. In the earlier case, the dividend was held apportionable in respect of earnings realized before and after
the inception of the trust. In the later case, 100% of the
distribution - and an extraordinary cash dividend at that
- was awarded to the life tenants even though more than
90% of the dividend had been earned before their right
to share in the income had begun. 7
In the earlier case, the court held that as to earnings
accumulated "before the life estate commenced, it is but
just and in accordance with the intention of the testator,
so far as it is shown, that such earnings be treated as
capital."'18 In the Quinn case, this theory of fairness was
ignored, and most of the earnings which had accrued
"before the life estate commenced" were nonetheless
ordered paid to the life tenant.
One of the arguments in support of the adoption of the
Pennsylvania Rule in Thomas v. Gregg is that the 20%
stock dividend there involved was the equivalent of an
extraordinary cash dividend which the directors of the
paying corporation elected to pay in stock. To apply the
Massachusetts Rule to these facts would cause the distribution to be paid entirely to the life tenants if paid in cash,
but entirely to the remaindermen if paid in stock. The
inconsistency of this result (which is more apparent than
17When the distribution is capitalized, as it was in Thomas v. Gregg,
8upra, n. 12, both life tenant and remainderman share in Its benefits
without an apportionment. The new stock will ultimately be paid to
the remainderman, and meanwhile the life tenant receives the income
therefrom. The effect of apportionment is to give the life tenant a larger
and more immediate benefit, but the remainderman still shares in the
distribution. In the Quinn case, aupra, n. 16, however, where the dividend
"had not been capitalized", the payment to the life tenant in its entirety deprived the remainderman of any share at all in the distribution. A fortiori,
therefore, should there not be an apportionment where earnings made
before the inception of the trust are distributed without capitalization?
18Supra, n. 12, 560.

1960]

STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS

real) seemed to justify the invocation of the Pennsylvania Rule of apportionment, so that both classes of trust
beneficiaries might be permitted to share in a distribution
of income covering their respective interests in the estate
-and
regardless of whether the directors of the paying
corporation elected to make the distribution in stock or in
cash.19
If this is the rationale of Thomas v. Gregg, it was certainly disregarded in Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
And it is not without interest that the Quinn case relies
for its authority primarily on Massachusetts cases and the
decisions of other states following the Massachusetts Rule,2"
even though the State of Maryland had by that time been
committed to the Pennsylvania Rule by the decision in
Thomas v. Gregg. Surprisingly enough, the Quinn case
is frequently
cited as a decision under the Pennsylvania
21
Rule.
This brings us to the next case dealing with an extraordinary
cash dividend - Foard v. Safe Deposit & Trust
22
Co.
In this case, a corporation sold certain stock which it
had purchased with earnings accumulated prior to the
testator's death. Out of the proceeds of sale, the corporation paid a 100% cash dividend labeled as a "special distribution" to its stockholders, of whom one was the trustee
in the case at bar. The Court of Appeals held "this unusual
dividend" traceable to the sale of assets "which had been
bought with earnings of the company prior to Mr. Foard's
death, and prior even to the making of his will. '28 Consequently, the entire $50,000 received by the trustee was
held to be principal, and no part thereof became payable
to the life tenant.
Obviously, this result is inconsistent with the holding
in the Quinn case. There, the dividend was made possible
by the liquidation of a sinking fund. Here, the dividend
19See particularly the reasoning of the court, 78 Md. 545, 557, and the
rhetorical question and answer:
"... Are they [the life tenants] to be deprived of all interest in
the dividend simply because it was made payable 'in common stock
of the company?' We think not."
'0Some commentators writing contemporaneously with the Quinn decision were even led to believe that the case "closely limits if it does not
virtually overrule" Thomas v. Gregg. See, for example: 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (1908) 1150, § 1389.
nAtlantic Coast Line Dividend Cases, 102 Md. 73, 79, 61 A. 295
(1905); Northern Central Dividend Cases, 126 Md. 16, 28, 29, 94 A. 338
(1915) ; Krug v. Mercantile T. & D. Co., 133 Md. 110, 114, 104 A. 414 (1918).
-122 Md. 476, 89 A. 724 (1914).
-Ibid., 481.
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was made possible by the liquidation of certain stocks held
by the paying corporation. In the Quinn case, the court
emphasized the fact that the paying corporation had decided to keep the ground rents which it had received from
the sinking fund, and to distribute to the stockholders the
cash received from the same source. This suggested that
what was kept was "capital" and what was distributed was
"income." In the Foard case, however, the whole amount
distributed was held to be capital.
Finally, it is of interest that in the Foardcase the entire
distribution was supported by earnings accumulated prior
to the inception of the trust, and in the Quinn case substantially all of the distribution also represented earnings
for this same period. Yet in the Foard case the whole
distribution was held to be principal, and in the Quinn
case the whole distribution was held to be income.24
We now turn to the pre-1929 cases dealing with stock
distributions.
In the Atlantic Coast Line Dividend Cases25 decided
in 1905, the court held a 20% stock dividend and an extra
5% dividend payable in certificates of indebtedness, both
of which had been charged to "surplus net earnings", were
apportionable dividends under the Pennsylvania Rule.
Since they were supported entirely by earnings accumulated since the death of the testator, they were payable
entirely to the life tenant. This case is a straightforward
reaffirmation of the Pennsylvania Rule as stated in Thomas
v. Gregg, supra.
The next case in the series is Coudon v. Updegraff,26 in
which the trustees had received a 100% "stock dividend"
from the Whitaker Iron Company. This case is far more
significant because of its facts than for any particular contribution to the law. In the latter respect, the case merely
reaffirms once more the Pennsylvania Rule, relying
especially on The Atlantic Coast Line Dividend Cases. The
facts presented in Coudon v. Updegraff seem of special
interest, however, first, because the distribution was equal
to 100% of the stock previously outstanding, and, secondly,
"The inconsistency between the Quinn and Foard cases has elsewhere
been noted. See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS (1948) 337 (§ 845), n. 34, indicating that
although the Maryland court in the Foard case "purports to follow the
Pennsylvania Rule," the Quinn case seems "to the opposite effect." In
Lindau v. Community Fund of Baltimore, 188 Md. 474, 479, 53 A. 2d 409
(1947), the court quoted with approval a statement from Matter of
Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913), indicating that extraordinary
cash dividends are apportionable. Query: What is the law today as to
extraordinary cash dividends in pre-1929 estates?
102 Md. 73, 61 A. 295 (1905).
"117 Md. 71, 83 A. 145 (1911).
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because the distribution was not accompanied by any
change in par value. This distribution thus becomes almost indistinguishable from the "modern stock split", as
hereinabove defined. This point will prove of special interest later when we consider the Donaldson and Apponyi
cases.
The next significant decision is entitled Northern Central Dividend Cases,2 7 an opinion dealing with several
trust estates which had received a 40% stock distribution
from the Northern Central Railroad. The distribution was
brought about by a dispute between the minority stockholders of Northern Central and the Pennsylvania Railroad, the majority stockholder. The minority had charged
that Northern Central had unreasonably accumulated its
profits without any dividends, all to the benefit of Pennsylvania and to the detriment of the minority interests.
As part of the settlement of this dispute, Northern Central
declared and paid a 40% stock dividend. The court held
the distribution to be apportionable under the Pennsylvania Rule.
In the resolution of Northern Central's stockholders
approving an increase in authorized capital sufficient to
cover the stock dividend, it was declared that the distribution was to be taken"... as and for a stock dividend upon the company's
present outstanding capital stock, representive of and
based on expenditures for additions and betterments
of the company's property made from time to time out
of its surplus earnings to a larger amount in the aggregate, and which might otherwise have been available
for and distributable as dividends among its stockholders, if the Directors had so determined....
In holding the distribution apportionable, the Court of
Appeals decided
"... to follow the precedent established in Quinn v. The
Safe Deposit and Trust Company, and in the Atlantic
Coast Line Dividend Cases, and hold the declarations
of the company and its stockholders that the dividend
represents earnings or income binding upon all parties
to these appeals."29
- 126 Md. 16, 94 A. 338 (1915).
' Ibid., 21. (Emphasis added.)
29 Supra, ns. 27, 28.
Some courts would hold that the corporate act of
dedicating earnings to capital creates an inequity which can only be
rectified by apportionment, but only to the extent that future dividends
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In defense of the decision in the Northern Central case,
one can argue that the stock distribution was really a threestep transaction telescoped into one - i. e. the corporation
could have used its earnings to pay a cash dividend, which,
in turn, the stockholders might then have reinvested in
the company through a subscription to new stock. Then
the company could have used the proceeds of the
stock subscription for "additions and betterments of the
company's property." This three-stage transaction, sometimes referred to as a "compulsory investment," would
have left the stockholders in exactly the same situation in
which they found themselves after the 40% stock dividend. Therefore, it can be argued, the stock dividend
should be treated as an apportionable distribution of income.
The fallacy in this argument lies in its major premise.
The corporation did not in fact distribute cash as income,
nor indeed was there any reinvestment by the shareholders
in new stock in the same company. Instead, the corporation had previously elected to capitalize its earnings by
spending them on capital improvements. Then, under a
good deal of pressure, it agreed to distribute to its stockholders shares of stock representing this additional capital.
The earnings, however, remained in the corporate till.
Manifestly, therefore, what the corporation did in fact was
quite different in form and substance from what in theory
it "could have done." 0
are limited thereby. Thus, for example, in the case of In re Terhune,
142 A. 2d 684 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1958), the court found it "necessary
to determine whether any funds which could benefit the life tenants in
the future have been irrevocably transferred to an account, the proceeds
of which will redound solely to the benefit of the remainderman." In that
case the capitalization of earnings by crediting capital surplus was held
not to require apportionment because under controlling corporate law
dividends could still be paid out of capital surplus. The earnings which
were credited to capital stock account, however, were placed "in a
category from which no future dividends could be declared", and hence
to that extent an apportionment was ordered. This rationale has been
repeatedly approved by the courts of New Jersey. Day v. Faulks, 79
N.J. Eq. 66, 81 A. 354 (1911), aff'd. 81 N.J. Eq. 173, 88 A. 384 (1912) ;
Plainfield Trust Co. v. Bowlby, 107 N.J. Eq. 68, 151 A. 545 (1930) ; In re
Wehrmane's Estate, 41, N.J. Super. 158, 124 A. 2d 334 (1956), aff'd. 23
N.J. 205, 128 A. 2d 681 (1957). The rule is now, apparently, In force in
Pennsylvania. In re Cunningham's Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A. 2d 72 (1959).
This so-called "New Jersey Rule" has been flatly rejected in Maryland.
Northern Central Dividend Cases, supra, n. 27; Apponyi v. MercantileSafe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 275, 152 A. 2d 184 (1959).
'OAdmittedly,
the expense and trouble of a public offering of securities
under modern federal regulation may have combined with tax considerations to stimulate the use of the modern stock split as a means of accomplishing the permanent conversion of accumulated earnings into working capital. Whatever the validity of this reasoning today, it can have
little application to the distribution of the Northern Central case in 1915.

19601

STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS

The next case on the list is Miller v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co.,81 also involving the same Northern Central dividend discussed above. This opinion adds nothing new to
the story of the Pennsylvania Rule in Maryland, but it
does emphasize that the date of the creation of the trust
is the significant date for purposes of applying the rules
of apportionment to original investments, and the acquisition date in the case of subsequently acquired investments.
Under the authority of this case, it would seem that the
death of an intervening life tenant after the testator's
death has no effect at all in applying the rules of apportionment. In other words, after a particular distribution
has been characterized as apportionable, then the portion
allocable to income is payable to the party who is currently
entitled to the income from the trust. 2 The Pennsylvania Rule as applied in Maryland does not require apportionment of income between successive life tenants.
The Miller case was followed by the decision in Baldwin
v. Baldwin,88 an opinion which explains the "intact value
test" as part of the rules of apportionment in this State.
It holds that the "actual" or "intact" value of the stock in
the hands of the trustee at the inception of the trust, determined with relation to the corporate books and not to
market value, must be maintained for the benefit of the
remaindermen, and to the extent that any apportionable
stock dividend would impair that book value, the application of the Pennsylvania Rule must be modified.m
The Baldwin case is also of interest because, like
Coudon v. Updegraff, it involved a 100% distribution of
stock, supported entirely by earnings accumulated since
the inception of the trust. On the surface, therefore, both
cases dealt with stock distributions which meet our defini127 Md. 610, 96 A. 766 (1916).
12In the Miller case, 127 Md. 610, 615, 96 A. 766 (1916), the court indicated
that the determination of the beneficiary entitled to the income is to be
made as of the declaration date of the dividend. Presumably, this means in
the absence of a specified record date. Compare: 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23,
§ 40(c) (2); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1956) 1809, § 236.2.
-159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282 (1930).
" The same rule obtains in Pennsylvania. In re King's Estate, 361
Pa. 629, 66 A. 2d 68 (1949); In re Stokes' Estate, 240 Pa. 277, 87 A.
971 (1913) ; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 A. 438 (1891) ; Biddle's Appeal,
99 Pa. 278 (1882) ; Moss' Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877). In Arrott's Estate,
383 Pa. 228, 118 A. 2d 187 (1955), however, the Pennsylvania court held
that as to securities purcha8ed by the trust (as distinguished from those
originally acquired) the market value at the time of the purchase is the
intact value to be preserved. The Maryland courts have not followed this
sensible refinement. Query: What better method could be found to measure
the corpus to be preserved "intact" than the dollar amount of cash
corpus which was used to buy the investment?
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tion of a "modern stock split." Again, this point will prove
of interest later when we take up the Donaldson case.
The latest stock distribution case in the series is Lindau
v. Community Fund of Baltimore." Although the case was
decided after the adoption of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, it was not governed by the Act because the
trust estate was created prior to June 1, 1939.36 Even apart
from this fact, however, the Act would not in any event
have controlled because the trust instrument contained
the following provisions dealing with principal and income:
.. . all stock dividends to the extent that they are
paid out of current earnings for the current fiscal or
preceding year shall likewise be treated as income as
of the date of their payment; but all other stock dividends shall be treated as corpus of the trust estate."3 7
In the light of this mandate in the controlling instrument,
the court ruled that a 20% stock dividend was apportionable. The case is of special interest today because it shows
how the discredited Pennsylvania Rule can be invoked as
to post-1939 transfers when the will or deed of
trust
38
contains a provision similar to that quoted above.
Although the Lindau case marks the last in the series
of decision dealing with distributions of stock of the distributing company and their apportionment under the
Pennsylvania Rule (except for the Donaldson and Apponyi
cases to be considered separately hereinbelow), the picture
would not be complete without a brief discussion of several
other decisions involving questions of principal and income
and hence directly or indirectly related to the Pennsylvania Rule.
(1) In Smith v. Hooper,3 9 the court held that profits
realized by a trustee on the sale of capital assets (i. e.
profits which are customarily referred to these days as
''capital gains") do not constitute income which must be
distributed to the life tenant. Accordingly, there was no
need for applying the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment. 0
85188 Md. 474, 53 A. 2d 409 (1947).
m The effective date of the Uniform 'Principal and Income Act, 7 MD.

CoDn (1957) Art. 75B.
81Supra, n. 35, 477.
117 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B, § 2, permits the testator or settlor to
"direct the manner of ascertainment of income and principal and the
apportionment of receipts and expenses . .
8995 Md. 16, 54 A. 95 (1902).
40The rule is apparently otherwise in Pennsylvania. McKeown's Estate,
263 Pa. 78, 106 A. 189 (1919).
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(2) In Safe Deposit v. Bowen,4 the court followed the
decision in Smith v. Hooper, and held that there was no
problem of apportionment where a trustee surrendered
preferred stock with unpaid accumulated dividends in exchange for cash, new preferred stock, debenture notes, and
common stock. This reorganization was likened to a sale,
and the new securities
were held to belong to corpus "in
'4 2
their entirety."
(3) In Girdwood v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.," the
court held that rights to subscribe to new stock, when exercised by the trustee, constituted corpus of the estate,
and, accordingly, no problem of apportionment under the
Pennsylvania Rule was raised.
(4) In Ex Parte Humbird,44 the court ruled that the
trustee's profit realized on the sale of its timber lands and
cash dividends paid to a trustee by a lumber company out
of the proceeds of sale of the company's timber lands,
were, in both cases, corpus. The profits on the sale of trust
assets were clearly governed by Smith v. Hooper. The
cash dividend, however, was more troublesome because of
the argument that it should be distributed in toto to the life
tenants as an extraordinary cash dividend under the
authority of Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. The court
of Appeals ruled, however, that the source of the dividend
controlled-in this case the liquidation of the corporation's timber land - that this dividend does not represent
income earned in the ordinary course of the company's
business, and that it must therefore, be treated in its entirety as non-distributable corpus.
(5) In Washington County Hospital v. Hagerstown
Trust Co.,45 the court relied on the distinction that the
profits there distributed were made in the ordinary course
- 188 Md. 482, 53 A. 2d 413 (1947).
"A recent case in Pennsylvania came to the opposite conclusion, applying the Pennsylvania Rule in a trust estate created before the adoption of
the Uniform Principal and Income Act in that state in 1945. In re King's
Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 66 A. 2d- 68 (1949). There, the new stock received in
exchange for the accumulated arrearages in dividends on the old preferred
was held distributable as income after the Intact value of the old stock had
been preserved.
"143 Md. 245, 122 A. 132 (1923) ; the rule is apparently otherwise in
Pennsylvania, Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 A. 862 (1928),
although the prior cases were In some conflict. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457, 139 A. 200 (1927) ; Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143, 34 A. 577 (1896) ;
Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (1870). The Jones case held that stocks
purchased through the exercise of rights are to be treated as an apportionable stock dividend, but in the later case of Waterhouse's Estate, 308
Pa. 422, 162 A. 295 (1932), it was held that the proceeds from the sale of
rights are presumptively principal.
"114 Md. 627, 80 A. 209 (1911).
124 Md. 1, 91 A. 787 (1914).
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of the distributing corporation's business, and not, as in the
Humbird case, from "economic laws operating independently of the corporate agency or existence."4 6 This suggests that profits derived from the sale of land will be
treated as income where the corporation actively contributes to its enhancement in value and where such a sale is a
regular part of the corporation's business. On the other
hand, if similar real estate is owned by another corporation which indolently relies on "economic laws" to raise
the value of its property, then the profits on the sale will
be treated as principal. The distinction seems somewhat
nebulous.
(6) In Spedden v. Norton,47 the court ruled that "liquidating dividends" payable in cash by a real estate development company should be treated as corpus in the
hands of the trustee until the intact value of the stock at
the time of the inception of the trust has been recouped.
Thereafter, presumably, these dividends would represent
a division of profits and hence distributable as income.
In this respect, it is interesting to note this flat statement by the court:
".**An extraordinary dividend declared after the
testator's death from earnings realized before that
event, would be'48 allocated to the corpus of the trust
under his will.
In support of this proposition, the court cited eight cases,
including Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. As hereinbefore noted, the Quinn case held just the reverse. An extraordinary cash dividend declared and paid after the testator's death derived to the extent of about 90% from earnings realized before that event, was in that case held to be
not principal but income in its entirety and payable 100%
to the life tenant.
(7) The next case in this group is Krug v. Mercantile
Trust and Deposit Co.,49 where a stock dividend payable
in stock of another corporation was held to be income.
This distributing corporation was held to be in the business
of buying and selling securities, so that in a very real sense
the profits distributed were earnings realized in the regular course of its business. The distribution would have
Supra, n. 44, 640.

' 159 Md. 101, 150 A. 15 (1930).

Compare Jones Estate, 377 Pa. 473,
105 A. 2d 353 (1954), holding that liquidating dividends are apportionable
in that state.
Ibid., 105.
"133 Md. 110, 104 A. 414 (1918).
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been treated as income even under the Principal and Income Act. 0
5 0 a the Court of Appeals
(8) In Rosenburg v. Lombardi,
held that capital gains dividends of regulated investment
companies are to be treated as income of pre-1939 trust
estates. Since the investment company's securities profits
are earned in the ordinary course of its business, this holding is consistent with the principles laid down in the Krug
case, supra, and
with the weight of authority in other
°
jurisdictions. b
III -

THE LAW AS TO TRUSTS CREATED BETWEEN

1929 AND 1939

In 1929 the State of Maryland made its first attempt
to solve this problem by statute. It was not a signal
success. The statute provided as follows:
"All rents, annuities, dividends and periodical payments in the nature of income, payable under the provisions of any will, deed or other instrument executed
after the first day of July, 1929 shall like interest on
money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day,
and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly, unless otherwise expressly stated by the instrument under which they are payable; but no acW 7 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 75B, § 5(1). The Act follows the Massachusetts Rule in holding that dividends paid in securities of companies
other than the paying corporation are to be treated as Income. Courts
of other jurisdictions have held that, even under the Pennsylvania Rule,
stock dividends payable In securities of corporations other than the paying
corporation, when charged to earned surplus on the books of the paying
corporation, are income. See, for example, the New York eases dealing
with the -Standard Oil distributions, collected In Note, 130 A.L.R. 492, 591.
10 Decided May 12, 1960; opini on not yet reported. (Case No. 163,
September Term, 1959.)
Wb The out-of-state court decisions have generally held such capital gains
dividends to be income. See: In re Byrne's Estate, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 23 (1948) ;
In re Bruce's Trust, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 25 (1948) ; In re Hurd's Will, 120 N.Y.S.
2d 103 (1953) ; In re Appleby's Estate, 175 N.Y.S. 2d 176 (1958) ; In re
Rosenthal's Estate, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (1951) ; Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.
2d 874 (Mo. 1957) ; Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 D. & C. Rep. 21 (Orphans
Court of Luzerne Co., Pa., 1951). However, these cases have met with
strong criticism from some learned commentators and strong support from
others. See, Shattuck, Capital Gains Distributions - Principal or Income,
88 Trusts & Estates 160, 429 (1949) ; Young, A Dissent on Capital Gains
Distributions, 88 Trusts & Estates 280 (1949) ; Rogers, Capital Gains Distributions, 90 Trusts & Estates 300 (1951) ; Rogers, Capital Gains Dividend8 - A Suggestion for Draftsmen, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 79 (1951);
Anderson, Should Capital Gains Distributions Be Principal or Income?,
90 Trusts & Estates 331 (1951) ; Putney, Capital Gains Dividends, 95 Trusts
& Estates 22 (1956) ; Oohan -and Dean, Apportionment of Stock Proceeds,
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 181 (1957) ; 3 SCOTT, TRuSTS (1956) 1844, § 236.14.
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tion shall be brought therefor until the expiration of
the period for which the apportionment is made."'"
The application of this statute to the problem of apportionment in Maryland was first considered by the Court of
Appeals in Zell v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,52 decided in
1938. There, it was held that the statute above quoted had
no application to an ordinary cash dividend paid by a
company with an irregular dividend-paying record because the dividend was not paid with reference to any
fixed period of time. The English authorities so holding
seemed especially persuasive, since the Maryland Act
followed closely the language of the English Act on Apportionments. 3
Although the Zell case illustrates the ineffectiveness of
the 1929 Act, it is difficult to find fault with the reasoning
of the court as applied to the facts there presented. The
case does show, however, how unwise it is to extend the
concept of apportionment to all corporate distributions.
The apportionment of dividends between successive beneficiaries may be appealing to one's sense of fair play, but
experience has shown that the only forms of income which
lend themselves to this treatment are those in which the
factor of time is an inherent characteristic. Thus, we have
heard little or no criticism of the use of daily accrual
tables for apportioning such fixed periodic payments as
rent, annuities, interest on loans, etc. But when we apply
these same rules to other forms of income which are not
pegged to the passage of time, we become engulfed in
a maze of troubles - troubles which are graphically illustrated by the Maryland decisions dealing with the Pennsylvania Rule and the 1929 Act.
No better illustration of this point could be found than
in the strange case of Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Company,5 4
decided by the Court of Appeals in February 1938, only a
few weeks after the Zell case. An eight-page majority
opinion by Judge Sheehan, the author of the Zell decision,
was modified after reargument by a seventeen-page
majority opinion written by Judge Offutt. Judge Parke
registered a vigorous twenty-five page dissent.
LAWS (1929) Ch. 495, 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 305(c).
173 Md. 518, 196 A. 298 (1938).
In re Jowitt (1922) L. R., 2 Ch. Div. 442; In re Muirhead (1916)
L. R. 2 Ch. 181; In re Wakely (1920) 2 Ch. 205; In re Sale (1913) 2
Ch. 697; Carr v. Griffith (1879) 12 Ch. D. 655; In re Taylor's Trusts
(1905), 1 Ch. 734; In re Armitage (1893) 3 Ch. 337; Marjoribanks v.
Dansey (1923) 2 Oh. 307; In re Sandbach (1933) Ch. D. 505.
174 Md. 639, 197 A. 292 (1938).
"MD.
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The case dealt with several different classes of dividends, but for present purposes the most interesting facet is
the holding that a payment on account of arrearages in
dividends on cumulative preferred stock is an extraordinary distribution not governed by any fixed period of
time and, hence, not controlled by the 1929 Act. Having
come to this conclusion, the majority of the court then
fell back on the Pennsylvania Rule to find the distribution
entirely income paid out of earnings accumulated after
the inception of the trust, and, hence, payable to the life
tenant.5 5 This overruled Judge Sheehan's previous conclusion that this same distribution was in the nature of a
liquidating dividend, and was to be treated entirely as
corpus.
As a result of the Heyn decision, it would seem that
the 1929 Act has no force at all today except as to the
apportionment of regular cash dividends, interest, rent,
etc. on a daily accrual basis, in trusts created in the 19291939 period.
The major contribution of the Heyn case may be found
in Judge Parke's brilliant dissent. After reviewing the
earlier Maryland cases on apportionment, he urged the
adoption of a "simple, arbitrary, universal rule" which
like the Massachusetts Rule, would make in most cases
for substantial justice.
Any hope that the 1929 Act might bring this result
had been surely and swiftly killed by the decisions in the
Zell and Heyn cases, but the Legislature was quick to
respond to Judge Parke's suggestion. In 1939 Maryland
became one of the first states to enact the Uniform Principal and Income Act. 56

IV - THE LAW AS TO POST-1939 TRUSTS GOVERNED
BY THE UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT.
The Principal and Income Act is one of the most successful products of the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws. There is perhaps no better test of a statute's
true merit than its effect on litigation, and on this score the
Principal and Income Act passes with flying colors. Since
"Note the seeming inconsistency between this result and that In Safe
Deposit v. Bowen, 188 Md. 482, 53 A. 2d 413 (1947), discussed in text,
supra, p. 101.

NOnly five states had adopted the Act prior to 1939- namely Florida,
Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia. Three other states besides Maryland joined the group in 1939: Alabama, Connecticut and Utah.
To date, 21 states have adopted the Act, including Pennsylvania, the
home state of the Pennsylvania Rule (1945).
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its adoption in Maryland in 1939, now over twenty years
ago, not one single case has reached the Court of Appeals
for a construction of its terms. In other states, the record is
almost as good. 7 The statute is clear in its language,
simple in its application and uniform in its result.
For all practical purposes, the Principal and Income
Act adopts the Massachusetts Rule. All distributions in
stock of the paying corporation, whether in the form of
stock dividends or stock splits, are treated as principal,
and all distributions in cash are treated as income.5" When
the trustee has the option of receiving a distribution in
cash or in stock of the paying corporation, it is treated as
the equivalent of a cash dividend and, therefore, income,
regardless of the election made by the trustee. 9 Distributions payable in securities or obligations of other corporations are treated as income. 0 Rights to subscribe to
securities of the distributing corporation and the proceeds
of sale thereof are deemed to be principal, but rights to
subscribe to securities in other corporations, and the proceeds of sale thereof, are treated as income." The Act contains special rules governing liquidations, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations.2
As noted in the Lindau case, the Principal and Income
Act permits the testator to prescribe some other method
for the "ascertainment of income and principal and the
apportionment of receipts and expenses."6' 3 Sometimes it
is necessary to resort to this privilege to satisfy the wishes
of the creator of the trust, and some testators will want to
leave the matter to the discretion of the trustee. But all
too often, it seems, the draftsmen of modern wills are prone
to copy one of several forms dealing with principal and
income, forms which were in vogue during the hey-day of
the Pennsylvania Rule. Generally speaking, these clauses
contribute nothing but confusion when used in present-day
trust instruments.6 4 The subject has been adroitly covered
"See the publication of the Act in Uniform Laws Annotated with
annotations.
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 753, § 5(1).
Ibid.
Ibid. Cf. n. 50, 8upra.
a7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B, § 5(2).
U7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 76B, § 5(3).
188 Md. 474, 477, 53 A. 2d 409 (1947). This deed of trust contained
a clause reading:
"All stock dividends to the extent they are paid out of current
earnings for the current fiscal or preceding year shall likewise be
treated as income as of the date of their payment; but all other
stock dividends shall be treated as corpus ......
"Query: In the clause used in the Lindau trust and quoted in the
previous note, what is a "stock dividend?" Does the term include a
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by the Statute, and most attempts to deal with it in the
controlling instrument accomplish nothing except to bring
the case back within the discredited and discarded Pennsylvania Rule.

V. - THE DONALDSON AND APPONyi CASES
The Donaldson case65 presented the following facts:
In 1957 the life tenant of a testamentary trust created by
a testator who died in 1908 brought a bill in equity to
compel an apportionment of three "modern stock splits,"
i. e. those of The Texas Company in 1951 and 1955 and of
American Gas & Electric Co. in 1956. The Texas Company distributions were each 2-for-i, and the American
Gas & Electric Co. distribution was 1%-for-1. Neither distribution of The Texas Company was supported by any reduction in par value, and the American Gas & Electric Co.
distribution even involved an increase in par from $5.00
to $10.00 per share. None of the three distributions, therefore, qualified as a "true stock split" which traditionally
results only in a reduction in par value and a corresponding
increase in the number of shares outstanding.
The trustee argued that the "modern stock split" was
a different genre from the "true stock split", and that the
discredited Pennsylvania Rule should not be extended to
cover this new phenomenon of corporate finance.6 6 In support of this contention, the trustee pointed to the resolutions of the corporate directors establishing as a motive
for each distribution the reduction of market value of the
stock to levels more attractive to the average investor.
The trustee also stressed the Rules of the New York
Stock Exchange requiring the capitalization of market
value of the new shares in the case of stock dividends
representing 25% or less of the stock previously outstand"modern stock split" of the type discussed infra In the Donaldson and
Apponyl cases? Would the answer be different if the clause had directed
that "all stock dividends be treated as Income" without reference to the
capitalization of earnings? Would the entire stock distribution be payable
as income? Or would there still be an apportionment based on the three
tests of the Pennsylvania Rule? See: Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y. 2d 646,
152 N.E. 2d 228 (1958).
6 Donaldson v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 135
A. 2d 433 (1957).
1 This contention was supported by the holding of the Surrogate's Court
of Monroe County, N.Y., In re Lindsay's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 374, 109
N.Y.S. 2d 600 (1952), but this decision was patently inconsistent with
other New York cases, such as In re Lissberger's Estate, 271 App. Div.
804, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 370 (1946); In re Strong's Will, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.
2d 75 (1950); and In re Davis' Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 372, 128 N.Y.S. 2d
152 (1953), the last named case involving ,the same 1951 Texas Oompany
split which was presented in Donaldson.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

ing.6 7 Distributions of 100 % or more of the stock previously
outstanding are, however, treated as splits, and only the
par value need be capitalized. Distributions between
25% and 100% are presumptively splits, but must be individually judged on their own facts. These rules, so
argued the trustee, show that in modern financial and accounting practice there is a very real distinction between
a small distribution of stock representing a division of
earnings and a large one representing a split-up of the
corporate equity into smaller lots at more attractive prices
for the average investor. The sharp increase in the number of these splits in the post-war period suggests further
that they are a by-product of the contemporary period of
inflation.
These arguments are persuasive but run afoul of the
principle of stare decisis. As we have already noted above,
6 8 and Baldwin v. Baldwin6 9 inboth Coudon v. Updegraff
volved the application of the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment to 100% "stock dividends" - distributions which
differ from our definition of "modern stock splits" only in
that they were not modern. This poses an interesting question for the student of jurisprudence: At what point must
the principle of stare decisis yield to changing social and
economic concepts? In his decision in the Circuit Court in
the Donaldson case Judge Reuben Oppenheimer answered
this question by saying: "Legal questions arising out of
corporate actions are no more to be decided in a vacuum
drained of the social and economic context of the times
in which we live than are questions of civil liberties and
due process of law."
The Court of Appeals reversed. Holding itself bound
by stare decisis, the court ordered an apportionment of the
three stock distributions received by the Donaldson trustee. Unless one is willing to accept Judge Oppenheimer's
jurisprudential approach, it is difficult to criticize the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In further defense of Donaldson, one may wonder what
formula the court could have devised to restrict the application of the Pennsylvania Rule to "modern stock splits"
and yet preserve its application to "stock dividends." The
Rules of the New York Stock Exchange might suffice for
distributions under its jurisdiction, but what about stocks
0 Discussed 8upra, n. 2. In this context, the term "market value" is
used in the sense of "current value adjusted for the effect of this distribution."
"117 Md. 71, 83 A. 145 (1912).
-159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282 (1930).
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not listed on this exchange? And what if these rules
should change? Would it be fair to resolve a question of
trust accounting in terms of such variable rules or even in
terms of a fixed listing agreement between the distributing
corporation and a stock exchange?7 0 Could it not be argued
that the decision of the lower court in the Donaldson case°
would have created as many problems as it would solve? a
As a result of the long line of Maryland decisions culminating in the Donaldson case, the Pennsylvania Rule in
this state may be said to involve the independent application of three tests, and the life tenant receives the least
number of shares resulting from each of them. These three
tests are as follows:
(1) The life tenant may receive no more than those shares
which represent the proportion of earnings capitalized.
Thus, if a 2-for-1 stock distribution of 100 shares were received by the trustee, equivalent to one share for each of
the 100 shares originally owned by the trust, and if the distribution were supported 80% by a charge to earned surplus and 20% to capital surplus, no more than 80 new
shares could be apportioned to income. The remaining
20 new shares, plus the 100 old ones, or 120 in all, would
stay in principal.
(2) The life tenant may receive no more than those
shares which represent earnings capitalized and earned
during the holding period of the stock by the trustee. Thus,
in the example given above, if the 80% charge to earned
surplus exceeded the earnings realized by the paying corporation during the period that the stock was held by the
trustee, so that, let us say, only 70 % of the total distribution
represented the capitalization of such earnings, then the
life tenant could receive no more than 70 shares out of
the 100 new shares paid to the trustee. The remaining 30
new shares, or 130 in all, would stay in principal. Manifestly, the application of this test introduces a factor of
approximation, if not guess-work, into the calculation, since
7°In the case of In re Terhune, 50 N.J. Super. 414, 142 A. 2d 684 (1958),
the New Jersey court refused to be bound by the listing agreement
between Socony Mobil Oil Co. and the New York Stock Exchange under
which earnings which are capitalized to support a stock dividend can
no longer be used to pay dividends even if credited to capital surplus
rather than capital stock account. Instead, the court insisted on looking
to controlling corporation law in applying the New Jersey Rule which
limits the apportionment to that portion of the capitalized earnings which
are credited to an account from which future cash dividends cannot be paid.
.. For a recent criticism of a stock exchange rule from a trust accounting
point of view, see McCaffrey, Stock Dividend or Split, 99 Trusts & Estates
366 (April 1960).
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precise earnings figures are rarely available for any given
holding period.
(3) The life tenant may receive no more than those
shares which would leave intact the book value of the
investment in the hands of the trustee reckoned as of its
acquisition date. Thus, in the example given above, if the
book value of the investment at the time of its acquisition
were, let us say, $10.00 per share, or a total of $1,000 for
the 100 shares originally owned by the trustee, and if, after
the stock distribution, the book value of the paying corporation's stock were $6.00 per share, then it would take
a total of 1 6 6 2/3 shares at $6.00 each to maintain in principal the original book value of $1,000. Hence, to avoid
an impairment of book value, only 33% shares of new
stock could be paid to the life tenant, and the remaining
662/3 shares would have to stay in principal. Since the book
value test, or Test No. 3, thus results in the least number
of shares to be apportioned to income from the application
of all three tests, it is the one which would be applied in
the hypothetical case presented. It would be noted, however, that the application of this test, like Test No. 2, introduces even more approximation and guess-work into
the calculation, since precise book value figures are also
rarely available for the two measuring dates. Moreover,
book values are even less indicative of intrinsic worth
than published earnings figures because a corporation's
various capital and surplus accounts may be affected by
corporate accounting practices which are wholly unrelated
to its business record.7 '
After the decision in the Donaldsoncase, there came the
case of Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Company v.
Apponyi,7 2 a consolidated test case instituted to clarify the
application of the above stated rules to the seven million
dollars worth of stock held by one trust company and subject to the Donaldson case. In this latest, if not the last
word on the subject, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
Donaldson rule even where it required the distribution, as
income to a life tenant, of $137,000 worth of stock in a
7See: PATON, ADVANCED ACCOTNTING (1947) 347, commenting on the
widespread depression practice of writing down the value of assets in
plant account and charging the write-down to a capital reduction surplus.
One large company is reported thus to have written off $50,000,000 in
plant account ait one fell swoop. If this company had later made a sflck
distribution subject to apportionment under the Donaldson case, the "book
value test" would have been something like an elastic yardstick. The day
before the write-dbwn, the test would have given one result, and on the
day 2after, a very different one.
- 20 Md. 275, 152 A. 2d 184 (1959).
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trust estate of about $450,000. 7 ' The court rejected the
trustee's contention that, in applying the book value test,
adjustments should be made for changes in the purchasing
power of the dollar, and ruled that the modern stock split
as hereinabove defined is to be treated as an apportionable
"stock dividend" to the extent that earnings are capitalized.7 4 Hereafter, it would seem immaterial that the paying
corporation may have labeled the distribution as a "split",
a "split-up" or words to that effect. To the extent that the
three tests of the Pennsylvania Rule are satisfied, the distribution is apportionable regardless of its label.75
The law is "settled," said the court, "and we shall not
unsettle it." In other words, the Pennsylvania Rule is
as to pre-1939 trusts not governed by the Unihere to stay
76
form Act.
Eventually, the problem will solve itself by the passage
of time, but, meanwhile, and possibly for another seventyfive or hundred years, the trustees of this State will have
to struggle with the application of the Rule to an ever increasing number of new situations - regular stock dividends designed to effect distribution of a company's entire
net annual income,7 7 stock dividends and splits issued in
"'The
distributions involved in the consolidated cases were the General
Electric split of 1954, the American Cyanamid split of 1957, as well as
the same Texas Co. and American Gas & Electric Co. splits which were
presented in Donaldson. Of these, and by far the largest was the General
Electric split of 1954 which the New York courts had held apportionable
under the Pennsylvania Rule. In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y. 2d 646, 152
N.E. 2d 228 (1958). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held otherwise
in In re Cunningham's Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A. 2d 72 (1959). For a

discussion of the recent Pennsylvania cases, see Oohan, Pandora's Boxx
Revisited, 98 Trusts & Estates 655 (1959), and Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham and Chaos, 98 Trusts & Estates 924 (1959).
1' This proposed "refinement" of the Rule was suggestive of the recent
Pennsylvania case. In re Harvey's Estate, 395 Pa. 62, 149 A. 2d 104 (1959),
which permitted the book value of the investment in stock of an insurance
company to be adjusted to reflect changes in the market value of the
insurance
company's invested portfolio.
7
See: In re Tealdi's Trust, 16 Misc. 2d 685, 182 N.Y.S. 2d 68 (1958),
dealing specifically with the problem of nomenclature and holding that
Standard Oil and Proctor & Gamble distributions, both labeled as "stock
splits" or "split-ups", are to be treated as "stock dividends" to the extent
that earnings are capitalized.
"0Although the trustee's contentions in the Apponyi case met with
scant favor in the Court of Appeals, they were given a gracious nod of
approval in a recent case note in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 108 Pa. L. Rev. 147 (1959). The Note concludes with the statement: "The argument made by the trustee in the present case offers a
reasonable solution to the problems of fulfilling the settlor's intent, compensates for Inflation and coincides with more recent views on the nature
of corporate stock distributions."
" See: for example, the unusual announcement of Commonwealth Edison
Co. of September 2, 1958, that henceforth it expects to pay a base quarterly
cash dividend and also an annual "supplementary stock dividend" substantially equivalent to the balance of the company's net annual earnings.
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connection with the consolidation of two or more companies,7" death sentence spin-offs in compliance with orders
under federal regulatory statutes,7 9 and a host of other
hybrid corporate transactions on a scale which was never
dreamed of when Thomas v. Gregg was decided in 1894.0
The application of the Pennsylvania Rule to modern
corporate distributions also causes serious inconveniences
in trust administration. The calculation of the American
Gas & Electric Co. apportionment in Donaldson required
the determination of corporate earnings and book values
for five different acquisition dates and their application
to eleven different sets of mathematical computations
stretching out over three folded printed pages in the record extract. The court referred casually to "these complicated calculations", but anyone who has shared the experience of studying them cannot but be appalled at their
complexity. "These complicated calculations" conjure up
the vision of a conscientious lawyer or trust officer trying
in vain to comply with the law against insuperable odds.
The late Judge Parke, himself a distinguished country
lawyer, visualized this same picture when he extolled the
simplicity of the Massachusetts Rule and urged in his dissent in the Heyn case that the 1929 Act be construed so
78
As, for example, the 1958 stock distributions of Springfield Fire &
Marine Co. in connection with the acquisition of Monarch Life Insurance
Co.
"For example, the stock divestiture provisions of the federal court
decree which were upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 189 (1944), a leading anti-trust case.
" Another serious complication develops from the application of principles of conflict of laws to the apportionment problem. Query: If the
Apponyi trust had been created by a Massachusetts domiciliary under a
will made and probated in that state but naming a Maryland trust company as trustee, would the Massachusetts Rule or the Pennsylvania Rule
have been applied? Or, suppose the situation were reversed and a
Massachusetts trust company were named as trustee in a pre-1939 will
of a Maryland domiciliary? Is the question one of "construction" to be
determined by the law of domicile, or is it one of "administration?" See:
Bank of New York v. Shillito, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 458 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co.,
1939), holding that the question is one of construction and applying the
law of the testator's domicile to the hypothetical question above stated.
Compare: Fell v. McReady, 236 App. Div. 390, 259 N.Y.S. 512, 522, aff'd.
263 N.Y. 602, 109 N.E. 718 (1933) ; Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200
A. 791 (1938); Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W. 2d 387 (1936);
LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICrTs OF LAWS, 14 (1940) 178-179. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICTr OF LAWS (1934), §§ 297-299, inclusive, suggests that the question
may be one of administration to be decided, in some cases, by the law of
situs of the trust rather than of the state of the testator's domicile. Although the question does not seem to have been squarely raised in the
Maryland cases, the decisions in Smith v. Mercantile Trust Co., 199 Md.
264, 86 A. 2d 504 (1952), Staley v. 'Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 189
Md. 447, 56 A. 2d 144 (1947) and Prince de Bearn v. Winans, 111 Md.
434, 74 A. 626 (1909) suggest that the Shillito holding might meet with
favor in the Maryland courts.
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as to bring about the same result. He said in this connection:
"... it [the Massachusetts Rule] relieves the fiduciary
of many heavy responsibilities, such as ascertaining
the intact or original dollar value of the trust corpus;
or whether the dividend is declared from surplus
which was earned before or after, or partly before or
after the operative date of the instrument creating the
successive rights; and, if accumulated partly before
and after either the operative date of the instrument
or the termination, during the period of the operation
of the instrument, of a successive right of income,
what are the relative amounts of the income which
had accumulated before and after such points of division. The discharge of such duties would oblige the
fiduciary to obtain information from the corporation,
which he may act upon and so run the risk of its accuracy. If he should desire to go back of such information and assure himself of the true condition of the
corporation, he would require expert aid, and, the
greater the length of time included by his inquiry, the
more costly it would become, especially if the corporation is of foreign origin or location. Not every fiduciary would be competent nor possess the facilities to
fulfill these obligations, nor is every trust or fund
possessed of the financial resources to acquire the
necessary information. So a fiduciary would be frequently compelled to choose among expensive investigation, litigation, or the assumption of a risk which he
ought not to bear. These considerations argue for the
reasonableness of the construction of the statute here
maintained."'"
VI -

THE PROBLEM RESTATED

It is too late to construe the 1929 Act as the equivalent
of the Massachusetts Rule - as Judge Parke has recommended. And in the light of the Apponyi decision, it is
certainly too late to ask the court to abrogate the rule by
judicial decision, as was done in New Hampshire. 2 However, there are several ways in which the apportionment
174 Md. 639, dis. op. 684-685.
8Langdell v. Dodge, 100 N.H. 118, 122 A. 2d 529 (1956), overruling
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N.H. 201, 66 A. 124 (1907). See also: Bowles v.
Stilley's Executor, 267 S.W. 2d 707, 44 A.L.R. 2d 1273 (Ky. 1954) overruling the Kentucky Rule by judicial fiat.
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problem may be controlled, and perhaps even solved, in
the years that lie ahead:
(1) Now that the law is settled as to the "modern stock
split", a trustee may, in appropriate cases and with the
consent of the life tenants, have to consider whether the
application of the Pennsylvania Rule should be obviated
by selling a particular stock after an announcement of the
split but before the stock of record date arrives.8 The
proceeds of sale will, under Smith v. Hooper,4 be principal, and after the split has been effected, the trustee can,
if desired, buy back the same investment in the larger
number of shares resulting from the split, or, of course,
he can buy some other investment. This will usually entail a capital gains tax and some risk of market fluctations,
but the principal of the trust will, it is believed, be better
off to pay this tax and take the risk of an increase in the
price of the stock in the intervening period than to submit to the depleting effect of the Pennsylvania Rule.8 5
In many cases the trustee may be able to secure the
advance consent of the life tenants to such a sale and repurchase. Frequently, the life tenants do not, or should
not want the stock distributable to them under the
Donaldson rule since such receipts can cause serious
federal estate tax complications. It is believed that more
often than not such a sale and repurchase might be welcomed by the life tenants and that the resulting capital
gains tax would be a small price to pay for the saving to
be realized in federal estate taxes. If, however, the life
tenants object, such a sale and repurchase cannot be recommended."
" For a discussion of the date as of which the identity of the Income
beneficiary is to be determined see supra, n. 32. Obviously, any sale to
obviate the application of 'the Pennsylvania Rule would have to be made
before the record date to avoid receipt of the new stock by the trustee and
a corresponding change In the market value of the old stock.
95 Md. 16, 54 A. 95 (1902).
5See: Dunham, Trustee's Dilemma As To Principal-Income,98 Trusts &
Estates 9.32 (1959), and authorities therein cited. As the author observes, a
trustee's duty of impartiality is put to a severe test If he sells in anticipation of a stock distribution.
'6As
a result of the Apponyl decision, for example, an elderly life
tenant was given outright, as income, about $137,000 worth of stock which,
If kept in the corpus of the estate, would have passed tax-free at her
death. Although the record shows that this life tenant very much wanted
to receive this distribution, other life tenants who feel differently may
encounter gift tax problems if they refuse to accept their apportionments.
I"Such a sale and repurchase might be challenged on the authority of the
second Bowen case. [Bowen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 188 Md. 490, 53
A. 2d 416 (1957)], involving a sale by a trustee of defaulted blonds after a
plan of reorganization has been announced. There, the Court of Appeals
held that the proceeds of sale should be apportioned between Income and
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(2) Draftsmen of wills and deeds of trust should be
warned to refrain from writing clauses which will only
perpetuate the Pennsylvania Rule as to post-1939 estates.
It would seem that in general the best procedure to follow
is to omit all provisions dealing with principal and income,
and to let the statute take care of the matter. In some
cases, to be sure, the Pennsylvania Rule may bring the
result desired by the creator of the trust, and in others the
testator may want to leave the matter to the discretion of
the trustee. In every such case, however, the consequences
of such clauses should be thoroughly understood by the
draftsman and explained to the testator.
(3) The General Assembly should be urged to enact a
statute amending the Principal and Income Act to extend
its application to all corporate stock distributions made
after the effective date of the amendment, regardless of
the date of the creation of a particular trust estate. Although the courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have
regarded such legislation as "retroactive" and hence inapplicable to existing trusts," there is respectable authority to the contrary. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has recently upheld the application of the Wisconsin Act
to all pre-existing estates, on the rationale that trust beneficiaries have no vested constitutional rights in future
earnings of companies in which the trust has invested
securities; and that although the income beneficiaries are
entitled to receive "income", this right does not carry with
it the right to freeze for all time the concept of what is
principal in the ratio that the accrued but unpaid interest bore to the
unpaid principal. The court emphasized that these bonds, unlike stocks,
carried fixed obligations as to both interest and principal, and that for
trust accounting purposes, therefore, It was only equitable that the proceeds of sale should be apportioned between the life tenants entitled to the
income and ithe remainderman entitled to the principal. Because of this
distinction, it is not believed that the second Bowen case would bar the
suggested sale and repurchase of stocks subject to modern stock splitsespecially since the Oourt of Appeals In the first Bowen case, (Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Bowen, 188 Md. 482, 487, 53 A. 2d 413 (1947))
reported only a few pages earlier In the same volume of the Maryland
Reports, reaffirmed its adherence to Smith v. Hooper and its rule that
"proceeds of sale or increase in the value of corporate stocks" are not
apportionable.
8In re Crawford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A. 2d 124 (1949) ; In re Pew's
Estate, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A. 2d 129 (1949) ; In re Steele's Estate, 377 Pa.
250, 103, A. 2d 459 (1954) ; In re Warden's Trust, 382 Pa. 458, 67 A. 2d 124
(955) ; In re Fera, 26 N.J. 131, 139 A. 2d 23 (1958) ; In re Wehrmane's
Estate, 41 N.J. Sup. 158, 124 A. 2d 334 (1956 Ch. Div.), aff'd. 23 N.J.
205, 128 A. 2d 681 (1957). Unlike the first Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act, the New Jersey Act did not purport to apply to existing trust
estates, and the comments in point which are made in the above cited cases
are dicta.
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income.8 9 After all, many trust concepts are subject to
change over the years, and some of them have a direct
bearing on the amount of income which the life tenants
receive- as, for example, the rate of the trustee's commissions which is not considered frozen at the percentages
in effect when the trust was created unless the trust instrument expressly so provides.
The commentators have been eloquent in urging statutory relief for the dilemma caused by the recent apportionment cases in Pennsylvania and New York. See, for
example, a recent comment concluding that "a retroactive
statute relating to stock dividends would be sustained in
most states- especially if the statute were restricted to
hybrid dividends . . .,"9Although the Maryland Court
of Appeals has been traditionally hostile to all forms of
''retroactive legislation" in the fields of testamentary and
trust law, a persuasive argument could be made that the
legislation here proposed is not "retroactive" at all in the
constitutional sense. Manifestly, the statutory solution is
the only truly effective method of controlling the apportionment chaos, and it seems to this writer well worth
the effort.
(4) And, finally, as new and different situations come
before the courts for interpretation and the application of
the Pennsylvania Rule, the nature of the problem should be
laid before the bench in terms which clearly explain it in
its historical perspective. In this regard, if this study has
clarified in some small measure some of the many inconsistencies of the Pennsylvania Rule as applied in this State
since 1894, it will have fulfilled its purpose.
'*In re Allis' Will, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W. 2d 226 (1959), noted with
approval in 73 Harv. L. Rev. 605 (1960).
10Russell D. Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham & Chaos, 98 Trusts & Estates
924 (1959). And see also a recent casenote in 73 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 606,
suggesting that the validity of a retroactive application of such a statute
should turn on three factors: (1) the nature of the public interest in the
legislation, (2) the extent to which preenactment rights are affected and
(3) the nature of those rights.
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THE PRODUCTION AND ADMISSIBILITY OF
GOVERNMENT RECORDS IN FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS CASESt
By GOODLOE E. BYRON*
The twelve year history of the Federal Tort Claims Act'
since its enactment in 1946 as a part of the Legislative
Reorganization Bill of the Seventy-ninth Congress, has
been marked by procedural disputes in litigation brought
under the Act. Since Congress had as its main purpose in
enacting the Federal Tort Claims legislation the substitution of the Federal Courts as a proper forum for adjudicating civil actions against the United States in place of
the cumbersome private bill legislative method,2 it was
anticipated that the new procedure would not only remove
this burden from the Congressional deliberations, but also
that it would prevent many of the injustices which had
been done in the past to the claims of private citizens
against the sovereign. There was a natural inclination
behind its passage for the Government to assume the
obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees
in carrying out its work and this Act was therefore Congress' solution, affording easy and simple access to the
Federal Courts for torts within its scope.' Consequently,
most of the Circuit Courts and some of the District Courts
which have considered the question have held that the
Act should receive a liberal construction in view of its
purpose.' And in connection with a liberal construction,
the United States was considered to be on a par with private litigants in litigation properly brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.'
In spite of this benevolent purpose and liberal construction, Federal Tort Claims litigation has become a
fertile area for the growth of procedural and evidential
t A seminar paper prepared for the Graduate Course in Evidence and
Trials, George Washington Law Scholi, in 1958.
* ARB., 1951, University of Virginia, J.D. 1953, George Washington University Law School; member of the Maryland and District of Columbia
Bars.
128 U.S.C.A. (1950) § 1346.
'By 1944 the 78th Ctongress was obliged to review 1,644 bills for
private relief, of which 549 were approved for a total of $1,355,767.12.
H. R. Report No. 1287, 79th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2.
8Dalhite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953).
'United States v. Campbell, 172 F. 2d, 500 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Panella v.
United Sitates, 216 F. 2d 622 (2nd Cir. 1954); Jones v. United States,
126 F. Supp. 10 (D.C. D.C. 1954).
1 Wunderly v. United !States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Cresmer v.
United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
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disputes, especially in connection with problems involving
the production and admissibility of Government records
and reports. Although it shortly became well established
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were applicable to Federal Tort Claims litigation,' the many interpretations given in such cases to the rules, and particularly
the discovery rules, have caused numerous procedural
headaches. Moreover, the problem of admissibility of
evidence once obtained by discovery, while not as significant, has also created much concern in Tort Claims cases.
Federal Government activities in gigantic proportions
and increased complexity in the already complex governmental operations are responsible for thousands of accidents involving damages or loss of property and personal
injury or death. Accidents involving military aircraft,
post office vehicles, federal doctors and hospitals," nuclear
tests and experimental activities conducted by the Atomic
Energy Commission, National Park Service Activities,8
and activities on United States owned property have been
common sources of Tort Claims' litigation. Government
regulations provide for extensive investigations and complete reports as an immediate aftermath of even the
smallest accident involving a governmental operation. This
is particularly true in the armed services where for example an airplane crash may be investigated in painstaking
detail by highly trained investigators not only for the
purpose of improving future flight safety, but also for the
preparation for future claims and litigation.9 Many of the
records and reports filed as an adjunct to such investigations are classified as confidential or secret by government
regulations."0
On the other hand, plaintiffs in such cases involving
alleged government negligence are often unable to make
a satisfactory investigation due to factors of time, inaccessibility, and expense, not to mention unfamiliarity with
the technicalities of the investigative procedures, and
must therefore turn to the Government's records and reports in their quest for information in order to prepare

6United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951) and language
In 28 U.S.C.A. (1946) § 932.
'There were over 392 U. S. Hospitals treating approximately 1,461,289
patients in the year 1953. AMA Journal May 15, 1954, Vol. 155, No. 3,
Hospital Service in the United States.
8A rather bizarre case involved a suit by Yellowstone National park
campers, whose camping ground was raided by bears after the plaintiffs
had been informed by park rangers that there was no danger from
bears. Claypool v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
9 Cf. Air Force Regulations 62-14.
10Title IV of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.-S.C.A. (1951) § 581.
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their cases. Obviously, plaintiffs must then resort to the
discovery rules and in particular to Rule 34 which provides in part for the production of documents, records,
etc.," and in many instances the Government's refusal to
produce because of lack of good cause or privilege or
other reason then creates the issue. In the event plaintiffs succeed in obtaining the requested records and reports
from the Government, there may be an additional question as to whether or not such evidence is admissible during
the trial. Ordinarily, however, since the court tries claims
under the Tort Claims Act without a jury, questions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are not
so important as in jury trials and it is therefore to the
problem of obtaining evidence that primary consideration
should be given.
PRODUCTION OF GOVERXNMNT RECORDS AND REPORTS

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide various discovery weapons such as depositions under
Rule 26, written interrogatories under Rule 33, and production of documents under Rule 34, the most effective
and most used method in the more complex Federal Tort
Claims litigation has been Rule 34. There is a good reason
for this and again the airplane crash situation provides
the best example. In the typical military plane crash
case involving injuries or death to private persons, the
instrumentality involved is usually within the exclusive
possession and control of the United States and it is virtually impossible for the plaintiffs to make an independent
investigation of the cause of the accident. Even if detailed
interrogatories are submitted to the Government requesting the names of witnesses who gave testimony at the
accident investigation board hearing held immediately
after the crash, it may often be exceedingly difficult for
technically-unskilled plaintiffs to obtain adequate information by depositions of such witnesses. Such difficulties
were encountered by plaintiffs in the case of Reynolds v.
Rule 34 Fed. R. Clv. P. provides in part:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule
30(b), the court In which an action Is pending may (1) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession,
custody or control . . ."
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United States,2 and the District Court, in rejecting the
Government's contention that plaintiffs could take the
depositions of the Government's witnesses stated:
"The plaintiffs have no knowledge of why the accident happened. So far as such knowledge is obtainable,
the defendant has it. When the airplane crashed, it
was wrecked and much of the evidence of what occurred was destroyed. Only persons with long experience in investigating airplane disasters could hope to
get at the real cause of the accident under such circumstances. The Air Force appointed a board of investigators immediately after the accident and examined the surviving witnesses while their recollections were fresh. With their statements as a starting
point the board was able to make an extensive
investigation of the accident. These statements and
the report of the board's investigation undoubtedly
contain facts, information, and clues which it might
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the
plaintiffs with their lack of technical resources to
obtain merely by taking the depositions of the survivors...
"Beside all this, the accident happened more than
18 months ago and what the crew would remember
now might well differ in important matters from what
they told their officers when the event was fresh in
their minds. Even in simple accident cases requiring
no technical knowledge to prepare for trial, the fact
that a long period of time has elapsed between the
accident and the taking of the deposition of a witness
gives a certain unique value to a statement given by
him immediately after the accident when the whole
thing was fresh - particularly when given to an employer before any damage suit involving negligence
has begun."
Thus it is apparent that Federal Tort Claims plaintiffs
when faced with the task of obtaining information for
preparation for trial will make every effort to require
production of government records, and most frequently
they will then encounter the Rule 34 requirement of
showing good cause and the Government's refusal to produce because of privilege.
-10 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd on other grounds 345 U. S.
1 (1953).
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Generally in determining what amounts to good cause
under Rule 34 the trial court has a wide discretion. To
keep the Federal discovery procedure flexible there has
been no attempt to establish rigid rules and the problems
13
of each particular case have been considered uniquely.
In all of the reported Federal Tort Claims cases in which
plaintiffs have resorted to the production power of Rule
34 and in which the Government has raised the question
of "good cause" the courts have almost uniformly treated
the issue separately and have been liberal in their requirements as to what constitutes "good cause." Thus in
Evans v. United States1 4 involving a Federal Tort Claims
action to recover for the alleged negligently caused death
of a certain cotton picker who was killed when an Army
Air Force plane crashed into a field in which deceased
was working, plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 34 for
the production of the official Air Force accident investigation report and copies of signed statements given by eyewitnesses. The United States in resisting the motion alleged
in part that good cause had not been shown. The District
Court granted the motion and stated:
"In view of the allegations of the complaint and
the motion to produce to the effect that all of the
sources of information, documents, and witnesses with
respect to what caused the accident are in the possession of and under the control of the government such
as the officers, enlisted men, employees and records
of the Army Air Base at Barksdale Field, who refuse
complainants request to see them, and the latter have
no other source from which the information sought
can be had, it is the view of this court that the same
constitutes good cause sufficiently within the meaning
of the rule justifying the granting of the motion to
produce."
And in Bentley v. United States," a Tort Claims action by
the widow of a deceased Air Force sergeant who was found
beside the tracks of the Santa Fe Railroad after he had
been permitted to board the train allegedly through the
defendants' negligence, despite a recent attack of insanity,
plaintiff moved for the production of the Army-Air Force
investigation report (the so-called "line-of-duty determination") into the cause of the death of deceased. The
-Ibid, 470.
1410 F.R.D. 255, 258 (W.D. La. 1950). [Emphasis supplied].

16 F.R.D. 237, 239 (M.D. Ga. 1954).
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United States Attorney, without formally answering the
motion to produce, insisted on oral argument that the
plaintiff be held to the requirement of "good cause." The
Court in rejecting the lack of good cause argument noted:
"The magnanimity of the sovereign in laying aside
its immunity from suit to the extent expressed in the
Federal Tort Claims Act must be paralleled by a
fairly liberal interpretation of procedural provisions
to the end that, in the case of a tragedy under such
unusual circumstances as these, the facts may be
known by the next of kin."
A similar ruling was announced by the Delaware District
Court in Eastern Air Lines v. United States,' 6 when the
defendant United States sought to prevent the production
of a confidential investigation file made by the Air Force
Inspector General, by claiming that plaintiff, which had
suffered extensive property damage to an airliner in a
collision with an Army bomber whose pilot was practicing
military maneuvers, had not shown good cause. The
Federal Tort Claims case of Synder v. United States 7 is a
rather noteworthy exception to the liberality given the
good cause requirement in the previous cases. In proceedings on plaintiff's motion to strike out the Governments'
answer and for incidental relief upon the ground that the
hearing records of the aircraft accident board and records
of repairs, inspections, and for maintenance of the airplane alleged to have caused the damage, the Court announced that under all of the circumstances, plaintiff had
not established good cause for invading the privacy of
his adversary's preparation for trial. The unusual reasoning then given was that the hearing records constituted
the so-called "work product" of an attorney and that it
was contrary to public policy to require a lawyer to furnish his adversary with his work product. Here the rule
against the compulsory disclosure to an adversary of the
"work product" of an attorney was applied to statements
obtained by others for the use of counsel as well as to
statements taken personally by counsel, and the court
indicated that the fact that statements of witnesses had
been obtained by government investigators for use in connection with claims or suits against it would not deprive
the Government of the benefit of the rule against com16110 F. Supp. 491 (D.C. Del. 1953). It is interesting to note that the
question of confidential privilege was not raised by the United States in
this case although it arose after the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Reynolds, 8upra, n. 12.
"20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. N.Y. 1956).

1960]

U. S. RECORDS IN EVIDENCE

pulsory disclosure, where such statements had been channeled to the United States Attorney who was charged with
defending a suit against the Government arising out of
accidents. Even though it was announced that the point
involving the sanctity of the so-called "work product" was
based on public policy as established in Hickman v.
Taylor,' and as modified by Alltmont v. United States,9
the Court further stated that production might be justified
where the witnesses are no longer available or can be
reached only with difficulty. It would seem, therefore,
when adequate consideration is given to the liberal treatment of good cause in the other Tort Claims cases, that
even in the event the witnesses, whose statements are
sought to be made available, are within easy reach for
deposition purposes, where the subject involves nonprivileged technical matter requiring for its discovery
especially trained investigators, production under Rule 34
should be required in spite of the work product rule. This
in effect was recognized by the District Court in the
Reynolds case ° in ruling that plaintiffs had shown good
cause.
While there has been some difficulty with the good
cause requirement of Rule 34 in Tort Claims' litigation,
there has also been considerable confusion caused by the
production of material not privileged aspect of the rule.
Although the courts universally recognize the common law
privilege against revealing state secrets of a diplomatic
or military nature,2 ' a less clearly defined privilege against
disclosure of confidential communications and official information of other kind (i.e., information obtained in the
so-called governmental "house-keeping" investigations)
has caused doubt on several occasions. 22 The additional
dilemma raised by the Government's refusal on a claim of
privilege to submit the material in question to the court
18329 U. S. 495 (1947).
"116 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Here on motion for production of
written statements of certain witnesses in a libel in admiralty the discovery was denied as to those witnesses whose depositions libelant had
made no effort to obtain and whk) were within easy reach. Although the
court modified the work product rule by extending it to cover statements obtained by others for the attorney in connection with his preparation for trial, it touched the heart of the problem by distinguishing the
situation Involving technical matters which counsel, with)ut the experience and knowledge necessary, might not be able to elicit upon
depositions and which might have been disclosed in the witnesses'
original statements given to technically trained Investigating officers.
2oSupra, n. 12.
2132 A.L.R. 2d 391.
2 See Berger
and Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59
Yale L. J. 1451 (1950).
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for an "in camera" inspection for the purpose of considering the claim has been no less of a problem.23 These issues
involving the question of privilege and its determination
have been considered in several military plane crash cases.
The plaintiffs, in each case, brought a claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for wrongful death and in the
course of the proceedings moved under Rule 34 for a copy
of the official investigation report of the crash.
The case of Cresmer v. United States, 24 involved a Federal Tort Claims action for the death of plaintiff's intestate
who was killed by the crash of a naval aircraft into his
home at Bayside, Long Island. Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule
34 moved for the production for inspection and copying of
the report of the Navy Board of Inquiry. The Government
opposed the motion on the ground that the report was
privileged. To make certain that the report contained no
military secrets the Court requested Government counsel
to produce the report for examination, and after reading
it and ascertaining that no such secrets were contained
therein, granted the motion. Since the very nature of the
defense made necessary an inspection of the data which
plaintiff required in order to sustain his case, in the absence
of a showing that a war secret or any secret appliance used
by the armed forces was involved, it was considered to be
unseemly for the Government to thwart the efforts of
plaintiffs to learn as much as possible concerning the
cause of the disaster. In Evans v. United States25 as previously mentioned, a Rule 34 motion for production of certain reports was resisted in part by the defendant for the
alleged reason that the documents were confidential. In
allowing the motion the Court stated:
It is not the exclusive right of any such
agency of the Government to decide for itself the
privileged nature of any such documents, but the court
is the one to judge of this when such contention is
made. This can be done by presenting to the judge,
without disclosure in the first instance to the other
side whatever is claimed to have that status. The
court then decides whether it is privileged or not.
This would seem to be the inevitable consequence of
the Government's submitting itself either as a plaintiff or defendant to litigation with private persons .... ,26
232 A.L.R. 2d 391.
24 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
- 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950).
2 Ibid, 257. [Emphasis supplied.]

1960]

U. S. RECORDS IN EVIDENCE

Reynolds v. United States2 7 brought a change of direction
from that of the previous two cases and somewhat modified the "in camera" technique of inspection by the court
where the Government asserts privilege. Here the widows
of three deceased civilian observers brought consolidated
suits against the United States under the Tort Claims Act
alleging that their deaths had occurred as a result of
negligence in the crash of a B-29 aircraft which was testing
secret electronic equipment. In pre-trial procedure plaintiffs moved under Rule 34 for production of the Air Forces
official accident investigation report and after the Government moved to deny access to its files on the basis in part
that privilege applied under Air Force Regulations," the
claim of privilege was rejected for the reason that the
United States in such cases waived any privilege based
upon executive control over government documents. After
the District Court's decision, the Secretary of the Air Force,
in a letter to the court, indicated that it had been determined that it would not be in the public interest to furnish the reports in question since the aircraft, together
with its personnel, had been engaged in a highly secret
mission for the Air Force. A formal claim of privilege was
then filed along with an affidavit by the Judge Advocate
General of the Air Force, asserting that national security
would be impaired by the production of the demanded
material and offering to produce the witnesses and to
allow them to testify as to all matters except those of a
classified nature. The District Court then ordered the
Government to produce the documents in order that the
Court might determine whether they contained privileged
matter and when the Government declined, an order was
entered under Rule 37 (b) (2) that the issue of negligence
be decided in plaintiffs' favor. The Court of Appeals
affirmed as to both the showing of good cause and the ultimate disposition of the case as a consequence of the Government's refusal to produce the documents. The case was
then reviewed by the Supreme Court,2 9 which held through
the majority opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson that there
was a valid claim of privilege under Rule 34 and that the
judgment entered after application of Rule 37 subjected the
F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
- R.S. 161, 5 U.'S.C.A. (1958) § 22. Air Force Regulation No. 62-7 (5) (b)
provides:
"Replorts of boards of kfficers, special accident reports or extracts
therefrom will not be furnished or made available to persons outside
the authorized chain of command without the specific approval of
the Secretary of the Air Force."
345 U. S. 1 (1953).
2110
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United States to liability on terms to which Congress
did not consent by the Tort Claims Act. The Court decided
further that where, as in the instant case, the Government
asserts a formal claim of privilege based on military secrets lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter after actual personal consideration
by that officer, the claim should prevail and the Court
should rely upon the executive determination without
forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. As noted in the opinion, matters of current importance involving preparation for national defense
and the reasonable certainty that the accident investigation report would contain references to secret electronic
equipment along with the opportunity provided plaintiffs
to interview the witnesses certainly influenced the majority of the Court. A standard of necessity was established
by the Court wherein in each case the showing of necessity
should determine how far the Court should probe in satisfying itself that the Government's claim of privilege
should prevail, and stated:
"... where there is a strong showing of necessity,
the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted,
but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori,
where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege,
made under the circumstances of this case, will have to
prevail...
Thus the Supreme Court established a difficult test for
future cases and it left unexplained how a court is to determine, except in the most obvious cases of military privilege, the validity of a claim of privilege without an examination of the questioned documents. Apparently a court
must take an executive officer's word that the report contains military information, without inspecting the report,
thus abdicating judicial control over the evidence in a
case to the caprice of executive officers. The earlier procedure, wherein if the court was in doubt as to the validity
of the Government's claim of privilege it would request
that the information be submitted to it for an "in camera"
inspection and if the Government refused (as it might) it
would have to suffer the procedural consequences, seems
to be more equitable to both parties. Since the Reynolds
case the scope of the "in camera" practice has been limited,
- Ibid, 7.
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certainly on similar facts; however, the judge still has the
ultimate power to determine whether the military secrets
exist, although he must make the determination without
examining the alleged secret documents and reports.8 1
It would seem therefore that although Reynolds would
be applicable where privilege based on pure military or
state secrecy is raised by the Government, the less-clearly
defined executive privilege against disclosure of official
information should not apply in Federal Tort Claims cases
where the Government is liable in the same manner as a
private individual. The latter concept was considered in
Wunderly v. United States," involving Tort Claims litigation to recover from the United States for damages resulting from a collision between plaintiffs' automobile and
an army jeep. The Government refused to furnish a
copy of a statement made by the jeep driver's superior
officer on the basis that official correspondence of the
United States Army was privileged. The Court, in considering plaintiff's motion under Rule 37, refused to recog=In this connection, dictum In Synder v. United States, supra, circa n.
17, 9, decided three years after Reynolds, is directly to the contrary
when it is stated that:
"As to item No. 1 relating to military secrets, the Government should
realize that at such time as it comes before a court of law, it is
subjected to and bound by the rules of law and may not, without
regard to the law, arbitrarily decline to produce information upon
the claim of a self-imposed restriction that it is classified information
or that its disclosure would injure national security. As stated in
the aforesaid earlier decision herein, if an adversary party in a
pending action properly requests the information and the Government
declines to respond because of alleged military secrecy, then it Is
obligated to submit the information or records to the court for its
determination as to whether the claim of privilege is well-founded.
The point is that when the matter is In litigation the court and not
a government agency must ultimately adjudicate the question of
privileges." [Emphasis supplied].
Furthermore, there are convincing arguments against the limitation imposed on the "in camera" practice by the Reynolds case and they are
aptly stated in United States v. Certain 'Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224,
232 (.S.D. Cal. 1953) :
"Even in a case where the matter sought to be discovered from the
Government is an object of rarest secrecy it is a high probability that
duplicates have been made by subordinates in the department. Thus
the secret is known to one or more stenographers or file clerks or
photographers or other craftsmen, and likely as not to others including the United States Attorney, as well as his deputy who
stands at the bar asserting the Government's privilege."
And in 8 WIOMORE (3d Ed.) 779, § 2379, it is said:
. . . It would rather seem that the simple and natural process of
determination was precisely such a private perusal by the Judge.
Is it to be said that even this much of disclosure cannot be trusted?
'Shall every subordinate in the department have access to the secret,
and not the presiding officer of justice? Cannot the constitutionally
coordinate body of government share the confidence? .. "
8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
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nize the claim of privilege3 3 to protect documents in the
files of the Department of Justice and indicated that where,
as here, no contention is made that any military secrets
possibly protected by the scope of the common law privilege are involved, the Government should produce the protected materials, or alternatively, face the procedural consequences of Rule 37.
The dilemma of the Tort Claims plaintiff, when faced
with the problem of failure of proof to sustain his case
because of the bar of military secrecy, could be resolved
under some situations by a resort to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, although on at least one occasion reliance
on res ipsa was to no avail. In Williams v. United S tates4
plaintiffs relied upon res ipsa loquitur to sustain their
burden of showing negligence on the part of the Government and introduced limited evidence showing only that
an accident had occurred due to the falling of flaming
fuel from an exploded jet plane. Government counsel
stated that because the national security might be imperiled thereby, no witnesses would be called on behalf
of the Government. The Florida District Court decided
in favor of the Government apparently on the theory that,
since Section 421 (a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the sections of the Act granting jurisdiction to
the United States District Courts and establishing the general liability of the Government "shall not apply" where
injury is the result of the exercise of a discretionary function,3 5 the plaintiff has a duty of negativing this exception
before he can properly qualify as a Tort Claims' plaintiff.
Translated into the proceedings of the instant case, this
would indicate that the plaintiff had failed to show that
the jet plane was not on an experimental flight (discretionary function) and thus had not established that the
explosion was probably the result of operational negligence. On the other hand, the Tort Claims case of
O'Connor v. United States" brought a different result
where the Government's motion to dismiss the complaint
was denied. Plaintiff's husband had been killed in a plane
crash while aboard a B-36 in Oklahoma on a training
mission as a civilian employee of the Sperry Gyroscope
Company and plaintiff, having been denied access to the
Air Force Investigation Board hearing reports, relied upon
8

5 U.S.C.A. (1958) § 22.

218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955).
828 U.S.C.A. (1952 Supp.) § 268(s).
251 F. 2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958).
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res ipsa loquitur to establish her case. Here the court made
no mention of plaintiff's failure to prove that her case did
not fall within the discretionary function aspect of the
Tort Claims Act, but indicated that the reasons underlying
the theory of res ipsa are particularly applicable where, as
here, plaintiffs are refused access to government records
and reports. This would appear to be the more equitable
approach, accepting the Government's dilemma of being
forced to deny access to secret information, "as a risk necessarily concomitant to allowing suits against itself.""7

ADMISSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT

RECoRDs AND REPORTS

Having once obtained evidence from the Government
in Federal Tort Claims litigation, the plaintiff is still confronted with the problem of presenting it to the court in
order to sustain his burden of proof. Thus the allimportant investigation report may contain information of
a most compelling nature in favor of plaintiff's case and
yet may be of little or no probative value and consequently
inadmissible in evidence, and, as already seen, this can
have disastrous effects on plaintiff's case, especially where
there is material testimony in the report given by witnesses who are no longer available. Furthermore, in cases
involving matters of a highly technical and complicated
nature it may be most important for the court to have
available not only the evidence contained in the report,
but also the findings of fact and conclusions of the investigating board. In Chapman v. United States -plaintiffs
sued the Government to recover for the death of their son
who died in a military plane crash and after obtaining the
investigation report which contained the Board's conclusion that the crash resulted from the exercise of poor
judgment on the part of the pilot, offered the entire report
into evidence. The District Court sustained defendants'
objection to the admissibility of the report and found no
negligence. This was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, indicating that the exclusion of the report, if error, was harmless, but that there was no error in its exclusion.
On the other hand, in cases of a less sophisticated nature, the results are more frequently different. Hence,
an employer's treatment record from the Medical DepartSee Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1279 (1958).
194 F. 2d 974 (5th Cir. 1952).
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ment of plaintiff's employer was admitted under the
Federal Shop Book Rule" over defendant's objection, after
the doctor in charge of the traumatic section of the company's hospital not only testified to his own treatment of
the plaintiff, but also identified the record as one made in
the regular cause of business of his department.4 0 And,
an investigation report made by the clinical director of a
United States Marine Hospital into the attendant circumstances of plaintiff's treatment while a patient in the
hospital was held to be admissible as a whole in an action
for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff after jumping
out of a fourth floor window in the hospital, as the aftermath of an alcoholic binge while out of the hospital on a
three-day pass.4 ' Photostatic copies of letters from the
Bureau of Employees Compensation and the War Shipping
Administration have been admitted for the purpose of
determining whether plaintiff was an employee of the
United States and therefore not entitled to recover under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.42 Even the summarized
record of an Army Special Court martial at which the
private, whose vehicle struck the plaintiff's, pleaded guilty
to a charge of wrongfully appropriating the Army vehicle,
was considered to be appropriate to prove that the defendant's employee was outside the scope of his employment.4 8
Perhaps the liberal approach to admissibility of Government records in Tort Claims cases would be more desirable
since the cases are tried by the court without a jury and
the court is less likely to be influenced by extraneous
matter. This view was taken in EasternAir Lines v. United
States 44 during determination of the admissibility of the
so-called "Booth Letter". General Booth, an executive in
the office of the Under Secretary of War, had written to
Associated Aviation Underwriters admitting contributory
negligence on the part of the Government with respect
to the collision in question. The Court admitted the letter
but indicated that the statements with reference to contributory negligence could have no probative value unless
it was shown that the General had authority to make such
admissions.
-'28 U.S.C.A. (1948) § 1732.
"°Landon v. United States, 197 F. 2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952). Here the
entire record was -admitted in spite of the fact that it contained the
diagnosis of another doctor identified by the testifying doctor, who did
not himself make the diagnosis.
"Googe v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. N.Y. 1951).
"Faleni v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
"Miller v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 734 (1S.D. Ga. 1956).
"110 F. Supp. 491 (D.C. Del. 1953).
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CONCLUSIONS

Apparently the courts in most instances have applied a
liberal treatment to questions of discovery and admissibility of Government evidence (generally records and
reports) in Federal Tort Claims litigation. Certainly as to
most issues of good cause under Rule 34 in the production
of such Government records plaintiffs have received ample
leeway in establishing their own inability to obtain substitute sources of information. Equally favorable treatment has been received in connection with the Government's refusal to produce because of confidential privilege
or privilege as defined by Executive Regulations. Although
the well-established rule protecting state secrets of a
military or diplomatic nature has been recognized without
question, the problems created by the Reynolds decision"
continue to plague the courts. Especially troublesome is
the question of how a court can adequately decide whether
or not military secrets are involved without examining
the records and reports alleged to contain such secrets.
Reynolds clearly establishes the rule for future Federal
Tort Claims cases that even in the event of the most compelling necessity (i.e., where there is no other evidence
except that contained in the Government's file) the Government through the Executive Department Head may refuse
to make its file available to the court for inspection. Although it would then be entirely possible for the court to
decide, without examination, that no secrets were involved
and to subject the Government to liability under Rule
37(b), this result would be most unlikely without some
indication in the Federal Tort Claims Act suggesting it
as an alternative.
Perhaps then the logical solution to this dilemma
would be by Congressional expression of intent on the
subject. Congress in establishing the basis and procedure
for Federal Tort Claims litigation was apparently aware
46 of
It
the difficulties involved in suing the Government.
10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (1957) 141, says:
"The Government is represented in the defense of its cases by able
attorneys. The injured plaintiff needs someone to protect his interests who is on a par with the lawyers employed by the Government and should be permitted to pay him a reasonable fee for his
services. To assist the United States Attorney who will defend the
case, 'there is a corps of lawyers in the Justice Department in
Washington with all of the law at their finger tips, gathered from
the hundreds of cases defended by the Department. The attorney for
the plaintiff usually has to start from scratch in an unusual case.
"In a serious personal injury case, the plaintiff is generally in no
position physically even to think intelligently for some time after

0WRIGHT,
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would seem that a procedure which would satisfy the
otherwise meritorious claim of the Tort Claims plaintiff
who is denied access to Government reports and records,
and at the same time preserve the sanctity of the secret
matter contained therein, would not be unattainable and
would make continued reliance on the rather vague procedures established by Reynolds4 7 completely unnecessary.
the accident. But during this period, one or more investigators for
the Government are busy in securing any and all evidence that
might later prove useful in the defense. On the happening of an
accident in which it is likely that a claim may be filed against the
United States, the investigating agencies of the Government immediately spring into action. If the injury is caused by an employee of
the Post Office Department, the Post Office inspectors will commence
an Investigation, interviewing witnesses and securing their version
of 'the accident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with
the investigation of many accidents. Many government agencies make
their own investigations, which are often thorough. Plaintiff's attorney
must make his own Investigation, sometimes not being employed to
do so until witnesses are scattered or their memories are dimmed.
As a consequence, the plaintiff's lawyer is generally placed at a disadvantage from the minute he accepts the case."
Supra, n. 45.
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Lord Baltimore and the Maryland County Courts
AuBmEy C. LAND *
Anyone who leafs through that curious collection of
death warrants, ship registries, and like miscellanea
known as the Commission Records cannot fail to be struck
by the unusual appearance of the twenty-third folio. Here,
on 4 August 1733, a clerk entered in the usual way a new
commission of the peace for Talbot County. But the
entry itself is not at all ordinary. The striking feature of
the page is a dramatic bracket that encloses the quorum of
the court, no less than seventeen persons in all, headed by
"The Honble Charles Calvert." Altogether the commission names the extraordinary number of twenty-two persons as justices of the Talbot County court.
Now everyone familiar with the county court sessions
of the eighteenth century knows perfectly well that no
instance can be cited from the records of twenty-two
judges, or for that matter of even two-thirds that number,
sitting at a meeting of the court. To our surprise, then,
we add a puzzle. Nor is the puzzle made clearer when
we scrutinize the quorum, for here we find that the first
eleven members of this panel were also members of Lord
Baltimore's Council of State and that they are set down
in the commission in exactly the order of their rank as
councillors. This unexpected result suggests no solution to
our mystery, unless perhaps that a clerical error has occurred. But this easy answer is ruled out by the succeeding folios. One by one for each county of the province a
new commission of the peace is recorded, every one
beginning with the oversize quorum, each quorum containing all and several the members of the right honorable,
his Lordship's Council of State.'
These are the facts. Taken with the obvious inferences,
they add up to a statement of the case about like this:
At some time before 4 August 1733 the Lord Proprietor
and his advisers had decided to make all the councillors
ex officio members of all twelve county courts. Between
4 August and 28 August his governor, Samuel Ogle, issued
new commissions for the counties to implement this policy
decision. But still we have been told nothing we really
* Professor and Chairman, History Department, University of Maryland; B.Ed., Southern Illinois University, 1934; M.A., State University of
Iowa, 1938, Ph.D. 1948.
1Commission Records, 1726-1786, Maryland Hall of Records (hereinafter cited MHRecs.) folios 23-26.
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want to know about this extraordinary procedure. Did
Baltimore expect his councillors- the gravest and
weightiest persons in the province - to do regular judicial
duty on the county benches? If he did, what was his
object? Did his plan, whatever it was, work at all and if
so, what were the results? How long did this arrangement continue? And finally why have we not heard of it
before?
Only the last three of these questions can with any
certainty be answered from evidence now before us. The
addition of the Council to the quorums of the county
courts lasted until the province overthrew the proprietary
establishment at the time of the Revolution.2 This was,
then, a permanent alteration in the constitution of the
Maryland judiciary. The discernable results of this reconstitution of the judiciary were, as we shall see, quite
negligible. Partly because the arrangement was barren
of results it has not figured in general works of history.
But more lamentably we are not informed on this, and
many similar matters of interest, because the legal and
judicial history of colonial Maryland has not yet been
written.' To the other questions- Lord Baltimore's purpose and expectations - only partial and not altogether
satisfactory answers can be given at this time.
In the lack of direct information on the origin and
object of this scheme there are some bits of evidence that
may be admitted to this hearing, evidence that is, I think,
sufficiently material to create a strong supposition that
Lord Baltimore had devised what was essentially a courtpacking scheme. The earliest shreds that we can pick up
come from the day of Governor John Seymour nearly a
generation before, back in the days of royal rule.
John Seymour (1704-1709) may not have been the
first governor of Maryland to clash with the county courts,
but he was the first to formulate a definite plan for taming
them. In his eyes the administration of justice was shot
through with favoritism and, even worse, with indifference
to the Queen's peace and good government. He found the
judges deaf to his exhortations to mend their ways and
2 Talbot County Civil Judgments, 1770-1773, MHRecs., March Court, 1773.
8 Judge Carroll T. Bond's admirable introduction to the first volume
of the American Legal Records comes nearest to providing an overall
view, BOND, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS, 1695-1729
(1933).
Limited periods and special aspects are treated in SAMS AND
RILEY, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MARYLAND (1901), SEMMES, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND (1938), and in the introductions to
court series in the ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND (vols. IV, X, XLI, XLIX, LI,

LIII, LIV) (hereinafter cited ARCHIVES).
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powerful in their resistance to his efforts to purify the
judicial branch. His letters to the Board of Trade at
Westminister, filled with denunciations of "country borne"
justices and their obstructionist ways, disclose an ingenious
plan to clip the wings of the justices of the peace. Very
simply Seymour proposed for each Shore a circuit court
composed of learned, tough-minded judges selected by the
governor to hold assizes in the counties for hearing the
more important cases that ordinarily would have been
decided at the quarterly session of the county court.
These hand-picked itinerant judges, Seymour predicted,
would allow no nonsense in their courts. They would give
"handsome, and regular charges to the Grand Jurys of
Inquest" and generally'4 teach the commonalty "their Duty
to the Queens Matye.
Seymour's reading is understandable. As governor he
represented the crown and thought in terms of royal
authority exercised for the welfare and good order of
society. From this point of view his solution to the problem of the administration of justice was by no means
unsuitable. But there were other views, the conceptions
provincials held of their own welfare. And these Seymour
either ignored or failed to see.
Whatever limitations his position and outlook imposed
on his vision, Seymour did clearly perceive the importance
of the county courts in the Maryland scheme of things.
Not only were the county courts closest to the everyday
life of provincials, they were also vested with functions
and duties that made them the focus of local government.
Beside hearing several dozen civil and criminal cases the
court did an astounding amount of other business, so much
in fact that we are mystified to discover how it was all
discharged in a three- or four-day session. During the
session the justices appointed constables of the hundreds
and overseers of thoroughfares, committed the poor and
orphans to responsible citizens, examined and paid bounty
claims for destruction of wolves, squirrels, and crows, determined the county levy, fixed prices of accommodations
at public houses, gave necessary orders of keeping the
records - especially the vital land records - in its custody,
and over the years assumed the authority of licensing
taverns and ferries. It is possible that the justices often
lacked formal training, as Seymour charged, but that they
were ignorant or without ability we can hardly believe.
ISeymour to the Board of Trade, 10 March 1709, AROHIVES, XXV,
296-270. See also same to same, 10 June 1707, ibid., 263.
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Nor were they inconsiderable persons in either property
or prestige. Indeed, if we rule out a dozen or so higher
officials in the great offices of state and a handful of
wealthy Roman Catholics ineligible for public service, the
justices of the county courts were the substantial planters
of their neighborhoods. Very frequently their neighbors
elected them to the parish vestries and chose them as
delegates to the lower house of the Maryland assembly,
adding to their prestige and power. Altogether the
justices of the peace were personages in the eyes of the
citizenry that converged on the county seats for court
sessions and made court days the busiest, most colorful
of the year prosecuting suits, selling crops, trading land,
talking politics, gossiping, drinking, and - occasionallyfighting. This was the life of tidewater Maryland in
Seymour's day and, whether the governor liked it or not,
the inferior court judges were articulated to it and expressed its imperatives.
Seymour got his plan in operation. The assemblymen
did not approve of itinerant justices, at least for the end
the governor intended them to serve, but Seymour ignored
their objections and established the new courts by prerogative action., Their life proved short, however. The assizes
did not long survive the founder, who died in 1709. They
had never been popular with the country justices and few
other provincials mourned their disappearance, certainly
not the planters whose representatives within a few years
were acting in such concert in the elective house of the
assembly that they earned the name "country party."6
In the decade 1720-1730, the country party stood Seymour on his head. Led by a small band of expert attorneys,
the country party developed its own program for supervising the courts, not in the interests of English authority
but of the country. The crown had in the meantime restored the province of Maryland to the Lords Baltimore,
who now bore the full brunt of country party attacks.
Smarting under a severe depression in the tobacco trade,
militant representatives of Maryland planters assaulted the
palatine authority of the Lord Proprietor for ten years.
They threatened to reduce the fees which provided all
proprietary officers their income. They denied his Lordship's
right to collect certain export duties on tobacco. Finally
rSeymour's

speech

opening

the

spring

session

of

1707, ARCHmVES,

XXVII, 4-5.

0 Several features of the Seymour assizes deserve elaboration. This
instructive episode will be given fuller treatment in a forthcoming
article.
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they even questioned Baltimore's authority to veto acts
passed by the assembly. The more aggressive spokemen
of the country party demanded the introduction of English
statute law into Maryland and preached political solutions
to their economic ills- crop quotas, paper money, and
the like. And they continually eyed the Maryland courts.
Scarcely a year passed without a demonstration of country
party determination to divorce the courts from proprietary
control. At session after session delegates to the assembly
formulated oaths binding Maryland judges to disregard
instructions from higher authority in the administration
of justice and to follow the law.7 The noise they created
emphasized the importance of the "court question" in these
years when major constitutional problems were debated.
The echoes in England focused official attention on the
battle between Lord Baltimore and his faithful tenants in
Maryland. Baltimore's secretary feared that the ministry
might even go to the length of taking the province back
under crown control.
In the end Charles, Lord Baltimore, made a personal
visit to Maryland to settle the constitution on the spot and
thus to end the noisy debate. Whatever the citizenry
thought of the Lord Proprietor's actions in 1732-33 while
he was in the province, Baltimore himself was surely
entitled to regard his accomplishments with satisfaction.
First of all he removed from debate in the assembly most
of the negotiable issues. He established by proclamation
tables of fees for payment of chief officers in the proprietary government. He ordered the collection of export
duties which the assembly claimed unauthorized. He
reorganized the system of collecting his quit-rents. All
these actions were naked exercise of the prerogative. In
the second place Baltimore projected a renovation of the
proprietary staff in Maryland. Many of the recruits who
shortly afterward took office proved to be the ablest
lieutenants ever to serve the Lords Baltimore in the century and a half of Maryland colonial history.'
Charles, Lord Baltimore, was never one to make records
of his doings, let alone give reasons for them. Even for
the most important matters historians must depend on
his actions as reported by contemporaries to tell nearly
the whole story. For the rest inference must suffice.
I This

constitutional struggle is discussed at length in LAND, DULANYS
(1955), 62-85, and BARKER, BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTION
IN MARYLAND (1940), 117-139.
8 Baltimore's visit is also discussed at greater length in LAND, DULANys
OF MARYLAND (1955), 125-132, and BARxER, BACKGROUND (1940), 134-139.
OF MARYLAND
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Undoubtedly the court question came up for discussion
within the inner circle of proprietary advisers. The question was of first importance and had been debated between proprietor and province in the bitterest verbal battle
of the century. Consequently, it was not one to meddle
with unwarily or lightly. The presumption is strong that
Baltimore, after deliberating with his advisers, determined
to add the whole membership of his Council of State to
each of the county benches. Actual performance of this
task he left to his viceregent, Governor Samuel Ogle, a
staunch supporter of the proprietary prerogative. In early
August, 1733, Ogle began issuing the commissions.
Again we are left to conjecture when we inquire into
the motives for this alteration of lower court panels. Did
Baltimore expect that the councillors would regularly
take their places as senior justices - and, of course, as prerogative men - at county court sessions? Or did he regard
this "court packing" merely as a reserve weapon, a threat
to any intransigeant county bench that the local justices
would be outvoted unless they mended their independent
ways? Or did he perhaps hope that occasionally a councillor would attend the court sessions in his home county
and thus bring along a breath of that superior learning,
as well as the sense of duty to authority, that Seymour
had once found conspicuously lacking among the inferior
judiciary?
Unfortunately the record tells us little, for the results
of this unusual proceeding were all but negligible. In the
first trial of strength between the agents of the new
proprietary dispensation and the county courts the courts
packing machinery, if court packing was intended, failed
to operate. Late in 1733 Daniel Dulany, newly appointed
Agent and Receiver General, began a campaign to recover all and sundry the rights and prerogatives of Lord
Baltimore usurped by the country courts. At the November court in Baltimore County Dulany served notice on
the justices that his Lordship had decided to resume his
"ancient and undoubted" right of issuing all ferry licenses
in the county and warned them against granting licenses
as they had customarily done there several years pastY
A court properly packed with councillors should have returned a submissive and entirely satisfactory answer. At
the session that took Dulany's letter under consideration
not a single councillor appeared on the panel of justices.
OCourt Proceedings of Baltimore Oounty, Liber H W S No. 9, folios
126-127.
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And the court behaved most intractably. Not only did the
justices deny Baltimore's claim to sole authority over
ferry licenses but vigorously asserted "the undoubted right
of this court" to license all such public necessities. Moreover in framing their reply they ignored Dulany, the
Agent and Receiver General, entirely and sent the minute
of their action directly to the governor. 1°
There are excellent reasons why Lord Baltimore should
never have expected his councillors to add attendance at
the county courts to their schedules. Besides their legislative duties as members of the upper house during assembly time and as the governor's advisers when called together as the Council of State at other times, all of them
were men of large affairs - planters, merchants, land
speculators, entrepreneurs. Regular court duty would have
made almost intolerable demands on their leisure. At any
rate they were conspicuously absent, at least as justices,
from sessions of the county courts. The practice of adding
the councillors to the county benches in the commissions
continued, but the records themselves suggest that the
practice shortly became a mere formality. After 1735 the
commissions of the peace were directed "To all the members of his Lordship's council" and to specified local
justices - the only persons actually named - who would
actually preside."
The date is significant. By 1735 the constitutional crisis
that had brought Baltimore from the pleasures of London
to the capital of his palatinate had passed. Resistance and
criticism were never entirely suppressed. But until the
years immediately before the Revolution the proprietary
regime did not face dire threats to its existence. Evidently
the Maryland establishment had not seen fit to employ
the weapon provided by the new commissions of the peace
on such side issues as the licensing of ferries. After 1735
no emergency sufficiently ominous arose to call the councillors out to the county seats.
Now if it is asked whether any councillor ever sat as
county justice, the answer must be yes. A single instance
redeems the record from blankness. 2 In 1748 at the first
meeting of the court in newly-organized Frederick County
10Ibid. The Dord Proprietor never succeeded in making good hie claim
in the face of provincial determination expressed by the courts and In
the assembly.

GOULD,

MONEY

AND TRANSPORTATION

IN MARYLAND,

1720-

1765, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political
Science, XXXIII, 139-142.
1 Commission Records, 1726-1786, pa88iM.
12If there are other instances I have not found them while turning the
pages of these stately old libers.

140

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

Daniel Dulany the Elder attended the session. By virtue
of his rank as councillor he took precedence over the other
judges present and sat at this and several subsequent
sessions as Chief Justice. His long experience as judge in
admiralty and in the testamentary court enabled him to
expedite organization of the new county court and to get
the judicial business at Frederick Town well started. It
is only fair to add that Dulany had private motives, only
remotely connected with the Lord Proprietor's welfare, for
going to Frederick County as a judge."3 Even so, this
unique instance rescues the curious judicial arrangement
of Charles, Lord Baltimore, from barren results.
Is LAND,

THE DULANYS

OF MARYLAND

(1955),

195-197.
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THE EDITOR'S PAGE
This issue of the REvmw is pleased to present three
articles, "The Apportionment of Stock Distributions in
Trust Accounting Practice," by Arthur W. Machen, Jr.,
"The Productionand Admission of Government Records in
Federal Tort Claims Cases," by Goodloe E. Byron, and
"Lord Baltimore and The Maryland County Courts," by
Aubrey C. Land.
Mr. Machen's article, written on a highly complicated
area of the law, thoroughly analyzes all of the Maryland
cases and the statutes that have affected the Court of
Appeals decisions, and his conclusion indicates that legislation is needed to completely abrogate the much-maligned
"Pennsylvania Rule." The REviEw trusts that this article
will help clarify a difficult problem.
Ever since the landmark Reynolds case, the problem
of when a claimant under the Federal Tort Claims Act has
a right to compel production of government records has
become increasingly more important. Mr. Byron's article
presents the case for each side of the controversy in a
manner that should prove helpful to all practitioners in
this area.
Professor Land, Head of the History Department at
College Park, is beginning a series of studies on Early
Maryland History of which his article is an early sample.

Comments and Casenotes
Effect Of Power Of Revocation Vesting Subsequent
To Execution Of Deed Of Trust On Measuring
Period of Perpetuities
RoBERT

E. POWELL

Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile Safe Deposit and Trust Co.1
In 1876, H and W executed a deed of trust covering certain real and personal property to T in trust for W for life,
with full power to appoint by will to or for the benefit of
her children or her descendants, in such a manner as she
should see fit. She also had the power to appoint any of
the property she should wish to her present or any future
husband, or if she should have no children 'or descendants
living at her death, to appoint the property to whomever
she desired. In default of appointment, it was provided that
the property was to pass in trust for the benefit of her
children, if any, per capita and the issue of any deceased
child, per stirpes. Furthermore, in the event that the
trustee, T, should die during the life of W, she was to
have the power to appoint a new trustee or to revoke the
trust and stand seized of all the property.
On July 24, 1895, T, died and thereafter, in accordance
with her power, W appointed a new trustee, R, by a deed
dated August 6, 1895. W died in 1924, leaving a will in
which she, by reference to her power, in her residuary
clause, appointed the trust property to R in trust to divide
the income into four parts, one of which was to be paid
to each of her four childhen respectively for life. Upon the
death of her children, the trust, in respect to each child's
portion, was to continue for twenty years at which time
the corpus was to be distributed among her grandchildren.
One of her children was en ventre sa mere at the time
the original deed of trust was perfected; the remaining
three were born after the execution of that deed but prior
to the appointment of the second trustee in 1895. After
the death of one of W's children, the appellee, as trustee
under W's will, instituted suit for construction of the deed
of trust.
'220 Md. 534, 155 A. 2d 702 (1959).
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The lower court determined that the secondary limitations were valid under the rule against perpetuities, the
chancellor concluding that the period of perpetuities was
measurable from the date of execution of the second deed.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, since W
had originally possessed a contingent right of revocation
which became vested for a period of time, and the rule
against perpetuities has no application to a trust which is
subject to a power of revocation, the period of perpetuities
had to be measured from the date of the second deed.
Therefore, the conclusion was reached that, since the
secondary limitations had to vest within a life in being
(the children of W constituting measuring lives) and
twenty-one years, they did not violate the rule against
perpetuities.2
The instant case raises for the first time in Maryland or
any other jurisdiction, so far as this writer has been able
to find, the issue as to whether the period of perpetuities,
with respect to the provisions of an inter vivos trust and
an appointment made in accordance with a testamentary
power granted by the deed of trust, should be measured
from the date of expiration of a power, given to the initial
life tenant, to either appoint a new trustee or to revoke
the trust on the happening of a contingency, which occurred. In order to resolve this issue, it is necessary to
discuss certain collateral questions: (1) what is the nature
and purpose of the rule against perpetuities; (2) what
is the legal effect of the rule upon powers of appointment;
(3) from what point of time does the law require that an
appointment made under a testamentary power of appointment be measured; and (4) is the rule with respect to
ascertaining the point of commencement of the period of
perpetuities any different when the power of appointment
is granted by a revocable deed of trust?
The rule against perpetuities, as stated by Professor
Gray, is that: "No interest is good unless the condition must
be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest.'3 To this period
2
Judge Henderson filed a dissent in which he agreed with the findings
of Court except on the primary issue as to whether the fact that W
possessed a power 'of revocation for a short period of time caused the
date from which the period of perpetuities was to be measured to be
the date of the second deed. See infra, circa, n. 39.
1GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942) § 201. (Italics
added.) This general definition of the rule was cited by the Maryland
Court of Appeals In Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 52 A.
2d 100 (1947) ; Fitzpatrick v. Mercantlle-Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
supra, n. 1.
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the courts have added actual periods of gestation. 4 Thus,
the permissible period of perpetuities may extend to an
outside limit of twenty-one years plus actual periods of
gestation beyond some life in being at the creation of the
interest.
The rule is one of law and not one of construction, and
applies equally to contingent legal and equitable future
interests in both real and personal property.5 Thus the
rule is directed solely at interests which might vest too
remotely, if at all, as distinguished from interests which
have a long duration.6 This point was stressed by the
Court in Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan,7 wherein it said:
"The object of the rule is to prevent the limitation
of estates for future vesting upon contingencies which
are not certain to happen within the period [of perpetuities]. * * * It relates to the commencement of
future interests, and not to their duration, and it is
therefore immaterial whether the estate limited is
in fee, for life or for years, provided the event upon
which the limitation depends is certain to occur within
the period which the rule defines.""
The rule was developed for the purpose of preserving
free alienation of property; basically it prevents property
from being held extra commercium for lengthy periods of
timeY In view of the purpose of the rule, it was held in
' Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A. 2d 672 (1944) ; Ryan v. Ward,
192 Md. 342, 348, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949); Thellusson v. Woodford, 32 Eng.
Rep. 1030 (1805). It is noted that the Court of Appeals has also
referred to the additional period covering periods of gestation as "n
fraction of a year", Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 169-172 (1867);
Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; and as
"ten months", Ortman v. Dugan, 130 Md. 121, 100 A. 82 (1917) ; Hawkins
v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 A. 212 (1928). Nonetheless, it is believed that
the rule, as properly stated in Maryland includes only actual periods of
gestation.
5Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 275, 57 A. 609 (1904) ; Hawkins v.
Ghent, 154 Md. 264, 265, 140 A. 212 (1928); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v.
Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; Fitzpatrick v. Merchantile-Safe
Deposit and Trust Co., supra, n. 1. See also: Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C.
101, 52 S.E. 2d 229 (1949); McEwen v. Enoch, 167 Kan. 119, 204 P.
2d 736 (1949); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199
S.W. 2d 344 (1947).
1Curtis v. Maryland Baptist Ass'n., 176 Md. 430, 5 A. 2d 836, 121
A.L.R. 1516 (1915); Salisbury v. Salisbury, 92 Kan. 644, 141 P. 173
(1914); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121 N.J. Eq. 366,
189 A. 653 (1937). See also discussion in Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md.
203, 94 A. 652 (1915) ; Ortman v. Dugan, supra, n. 4.
7 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935).
'Ibid., 106.
Hollander v. Central Metal Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 A. 442 (1908) ; Ryan
v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v.
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Hollander v. Central Metal Co.'° that a covenant by the
lessor, his heirs or assigns for the redemption of a ground
rent under a 99 year lease was not open to any of the
objections against perpetuities, even though it might not
be exercised within the period set out by the rule. In so
holding, the Court said:
"Property is not thereby placed extra commercium.
On the contrary, these leasehold interests devolve
upon the personal representatives of the owner, are in
terms made assignable, and they, as well as the ownerships in fee under the denomination of 'ground rents',
are subjects of daily transfer, and are constantly sought
for a safe investment of capital.""
In applying the rule against perpetuities to powers of
appointment, two basic problems arise: first, it must be
ascertained whether the power itself is valid; and second,
whether the exercise of the power is valid. In order to
properly analyze these problems it is necessary to distinguish between general and special powers. A power is
said to be general when there are no restrictions placed
upon its exercise, nor as to the persons in whose favor
the power is to be exercised. 2 Under the view taken by
most courts, the donee of a general power is entitled to
appoint the property to anyone including himself and his
creditors. In Maryland, however, a general power is restricted in that the donee is not permitted to appoint to
himself or his creditors, unless expressly given such power
by the donor. 3 On the other hand, a special power is a
power which is restricted as to the person or persons to
whom an appointment can be made.'4 Thus, if the donee is
Sheehan, supra, n. 7; GRAY, op. cit. 8upra, n. 2, §§ 2, 2.1; SIMES AND
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) § 1222: Jones, The Rule Against
Perpetuities As Applied To Powers Of Appointments In Maryland, 18 Md.

L. Rev. 93, 108 (1958).
10109

Md. 131, 71 A. 442 (1908).

"Ibid.,
159, quoting from :Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876).
12 liamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 479, 64 A. 2d 704
(1949); Henderson v. Rogan, 159 F. 2d 855 (9th Cir. 1947); In re
Rowland's Estate, 241 P. 2d 781, 73 Ariz. 337 (1952) ; Clauson v. Vaughn,
147 F. 2d 84 (1st Cir. 1945); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d
813, 163 A.L.R. 1444 (1946); Srims AND SMITrr, op. cit. supra, n. 9,
§ 875; 3 RESTATEMENT, PaoPEnr (1940) § 320; Jones, op. cit. supra, n.
9, 94.
I Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888) ; Connor v. O'Hara, 188
Md. 527, 53 A. 2d 33 (1947) ; Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., ibid.,
Jones, op. cit. supra, n. 9, 94-95; Note, Rights of Creditors Under a Testamentary General Power of Appointment, 4 Md. L. Rev. 297 (1940).
",See discussion in O'Hara v. O'Hara, 184 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d 813, 163
A.L.R. 1444 (1946); Fitzpatrick v. MercantilemSafe Deposit and Trust
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restricted in making his appointment to a limited group of
persons, not including himself, the power is special. Therefore, in the principal case, W had both a special and a
general power, since she had the power to appoint only to
her children and her present or any future husband, and
in addition, in the event that she had no children or
descendants to anyone whomever. The first power was
clearly special, but the latter, although contingent upon a
failure of issue, was general. It is also important, at this
point, to make a distinction between testamentary powers
and powers presently exercisable. A power is testamentary
if it can be exercised only by will. 5 On the other hand,
if it can be exercised by deed it is a power presently exercisable.' 6 Both general and special powers may be either
testamentary or presently exercisable. In the present case
both of W's powers of appointment were testamentary.
Regardless of whether the power be general or special
it must vest in the donee within the period of perpetuities.
If it does not, it is void. 17 As long as a general power
presently exercisable vests in the donee within the period,
it is valid.'" However, a special power or a testamentary
power (whether general or special) must not only vest but
must also be exercised within the period. 19 Thus, a testaCo., 220 Md. 532, 155 A. 2d 702, 706 (1959) ; it is arguable in Maryland
that a general power is actually a special power. For some purposes it
is so treated while for others it is treated as an actual general power.
Cf. Blalls v. Dampman, ibid, denying the donee of a general testamentary
power the right to devise the subject matter for payment of her debts,
with Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., ibid, where the normal rules
were applied to a creation of a new power by the exercise of a general
testamentary power.
' SIMES AND SMITH, Op. Cit. 8upra, n. 9, § 874; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPRTY (1940) § 321; Jones, op. cit. supra, n. 9, 95.
16Ibid.
17

Levenson v. Manly, 119 Md. 517, 87 A. 261 (1913) ;

SIMES AND SMITH,

Op. Cit. supra, n. 9, § 1272; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 390;
Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Hiarv. L. Rev. 638, 651-653 (1938) ;
Jones, op. cit. 8upra, n. 9, 96; Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and
Trust Co., supra, n. 14, 706, ". . . if a power can be exercised at a time
beyond the limit of the rule it is bad. . . ."; Burlington County Trust
Co. v. Di Castelcicala, 2 N.J. 214, 66 A. 2d 164 (1949).
sMifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 205, 15 A. 525 (1888) ; of. Ortman v.
Dugan 130 Md. 121, 100 A. 82 (1917) ; SIMES AND SMITH, Op. cit. supra,
(1944) § 390(1); Jones, The
n. 9. § 1273; 4 RESTATEMENT, 'ROPERTY
Rule Against Perpetuities As Applied To Powers Of Appointment in Maryland, 18 Md. L. Rev. 93, 97 (1958) ; Leach, op. cit. supra, n. 17, 653.
19 Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra, n. 12; SIMEs AND SMITH,
op. Cit. supra, n. 9, § 1273; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 390 (2) ;
Jones, loo. cit. supra, n. 18; Leach, op. cit. supra, n. 17, 652. It is noted
that there can be no objection to a power granted to a donee who is in
e88e at the creation of the power. See: Collins and Bernard v. Foley, 63
Md. 158 (1884).
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mentary power granted to a person not in esse when the
power was created is necessarily void. In the principal case
the testamentary power given to W was valid, since she
was in esse when the deed granting her the power was
executed and it could only be exercised in her lifetime.
The second question, whether the exercise of the power
was valid, is more difficult to answer. At the outset, one
must understand the underlying legal theories with relation
to the exercise of a power. Under the law the property,
over which one has been given a power of appointment,
is considered to be that of the donor, or of his estate, until
the power is exercised; and the exercise of the power is
held to pass the property directly from the donor to the
appointee.2" Conversely, the appointment is considered to
relate back to the donor, and as a result is to be read into
the instrument creating the power. 2 What might be considered an exception relates to general powers presently
exercisable. The courts have expressed the view that, since
a donee of such a power has virtually as much control
over the property as he has over his own and can appoint to
himself or his creditors, for the purpose of the rule against
perpetuities, the exercise of the power is not to be read back
into the instrument creating the power.2 2 Essentially the
concept is that the property is readily transferable by the
donee at all times either by making a direct appointment
or by appointing to himself and thereafter alienating it
for his own benefit. Therefore, it is not held extra conmercium, and is not subject to the rule against perpetuities.
On the other hand, property subject to special power or a
testamentary power (whether general or special) is held
extra commercium. The limitations placed on a special
w Connor v. O'Hara, 188 Md. 527, 53 A. 2d 33 (1947) ; Lamkin v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949) ; Pearce, et al. v.
Van Lear, 5 Md. 85 (1853); Ray v. Pung, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1822);
3 RESTATEMENT, 'PROPERTY (1940) § 318 (1), comment b.
Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 275, 57 A. 609 (1904) ; Pearce et al.
v. Van Lear, ibid., 89; Commonwealth v. William's Ex'rs., 13 Pa. St.
29 (1850) ; Connor v. O'Hara, ibid; GRAY, THIE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
(4th ed. 1942) §§ 514, 515, 525, 526; SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS
(2d1 ed. 1956) §§ 1274, 1275; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 392;
Jones, op. oft. supra, n. 18, 101.
2SIMES AND SMITH, ibid., § 1274; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) §
391; GRAY, op. cit. 8upra, n. 21, § 524; Jones, toc. cit. supra, n. 18. It Is
noted that in Maryland the donee of a general power is incapable of
appointing to himself, see supra, n. 13. Therefore, it is less arguable that
he has power akin to ownership. However, the Maryland Court by its
holding in Ortman v. Dugan, supra, n. 18 has implied acceptance of the
view that the limitations created under a general power presently exercisable are to be measured from the termination of the power. See also
discussion In Collins and Bernard v. Foley, supra, n. 19, 162-3.
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power prevent the property from being freely alienable,
while property subject to a testamentary power is completely withdrawn from commerce during the life of the
donee, since the law forbids an inter vivos execution
or contract for later execution of such a power. 3 Therefore,
the rule that an appointment is to be read back into the
instrument creating the power is applicable to special or
testamentary powers. Following this concept, the courts
have universally held that the period of perpetuities with
relation to a special or testamentary power is to be measured from the date of execution of the instrument creating
the power. Thus, if there were no additional factors in
the present case, the appointment made by W in her will
would have been void with respect to the secondary
limitations. Her provisions, for the property to be held
in trust for the benefit of her children for life and thereafter for the trust to continue for twenty years after
which time the corpus was to 'be distributed among her
grandchildren or their descendants, would have to be
added to the life estate given to her under the deed of
trust. Since her children, with the exception of one which
was en ventre sa mere, were not in being when the original
deed of trust was executed, her life would be taken as
the measuring life, and the secondary limitations would
not necessarily vest within twenty-one years after her
death.24 Therefore, those limitations would 'be void.
The question then arises whether the fact that W, for a
period of time, had an absolute power to revoke the trust,
affects the validity of the secondary limitations. The rule
against perpetuities applies to contingent beneficial inter25
ests in a trust as well as to contingent legal interests.
Therefore, the beneficial interests or gift over following
Wilks v. Burns, 60 Md. 64, 73 (1883); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md.
321, 324, 44 A. 2d 813 (1945); Palmer v. Loche, L.R. 15 Ch. D. 294
(Eng. 1880); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N.Y. 290, 114
N.E. 389, 390 (1916); 4 RESTATEMENT, 'PROPERTY (1944) § 339, 340. See
Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 479, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949)
"... the power must be exercised in the manner directed, that is, if the
grantor says it shall be exercised by will, it cann'ot be exercised by deed."
Since the donee split (the trust into four parts for the separate benefit
of each of her children, the gift over following the life estate in the
child that was en ventre sa mere at the creation of the deed of trust Of
1876, in any case might have been valid- his life being usable as the
measuring life. !See Turner v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 148 Md. 371; 129
A. 294 (1925). For the purposes of this comment onsideration will
only be given to the law in relation to the limitations following the life
estates in the children born after that deed.
1 Gambrill v. 'Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094 (1914); Safe Dep. &
Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935).
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a trust must vest within the period of perpetuities. 5 Generally this period is measured by looking forward from
the date of the instrument creating the trust.27 Thus, under
a trust created by deed the measuring period, for the
purposes of the rule, runs from the date of execution of
the deed, while under a trust created by the settlor's will,
the measuring period is limited from the date of his death.
Similarly, where one has a testamentary power to appoint
the corpus of the trust or beneficial interests thereunder,
such appointment is to be read back into the instrument
creating the trust.2"
Where the settlor of a trust retains the power to revoke
it, or gives such power to the person who, for the time
being, is entitled to the property, the courts have generally
held that the measuring period for purposes of the rule
against perpetuities is to be determined from the date
when such power expires, which is usually the death of the
person having such power.2 9 It is simply a question of
whether the trust is destructible; if so, the property is not
actually extra commercium. In other words, so long as
the trust under which the property is held is revocable
at will, it is not within the purview of the rule. The Court
in Graham v. Whitridge3° recognized this when they defined a perpetuity as being:
"A future limitation whether executory or by way
of remainder and of either real or personal property,
which is not to vest until after the expiration of, or
will not necessarily vest within, the period fixed and
prescribed by law for the creation of future estates
and interests, and which is not destructible by the
person for the time being entitled to the property
Gambrill v. Gambrill, ibid., Turner v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., supra,
n. 24.
2Ryan
v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 348, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949); Bowerman
v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 212, 94 A. 652 (1915); Goldberg v. Erich, 142
Md. 544, 548, 121 A. 365 (1923), Hawkins v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 265, 140
A. 212 (1928).
1' Ryan v. Ward, ibid.; Gambrill v. Gambrill, supra, n. 25; Hawkins
v. Ghent, ibid.; Thomas v. Gregg, 76 Md. 169, 24 A. 418 (1892).
Ryan v. Ward, supra, n. 27, 353; Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248,
274, 57 A. 609 (1904); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179
A. 536 (1935) ; GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 21, §§ 203, 524.1; Leach, Perpetuitie
in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 662-3 (1938) ; Jones, The Rule Aagainst
Perpetuities As Applied to Powers of Appointment in Maryland, 18 Md.
L. Rev. 93, 108-109 (1958) ; SIMEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed.
1956), § 1250.
- 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609 (1904).
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subject to future limitations except with the concurrence 'of the individual interested under that limitation.""'
In Ryan v. Ward 2 the court, measuring from the date of
an inter vivos deed of trust, struck down certain end limitations which gave the corpus of the trust to the children
of the settlor's son or their descendants following successive life estates in the settlor and his son, although the
settlor had retained the right to withdraw portions of the
corpus so long as such withdrawals did not surpass a certain figure each year. In so holding the Court cited the
Restatement of Property which provides:
"The period of time during which an interest is
destructible pursuant to the uncontrolled volition and
for the exclusive personal benefit of the person having
such a power of destruction is not included in determining whether the limitation
is invalid under the rule
' 's3
against perpetuities.
Recognition was given to the fact that "it was the indestructibility ... of future interests which forced upon the
judges the rule against perpetuities . . . ," but the court
could not find that the trust in the Ryan case was destructible. It was reasoned that at the creation of the trust
it was foreseeable that the settlor could over the course
of years withdraw the entire corpus of the trust, but at no
one particular time could he exercise an uncontrolled
volition and revoke the entire trust. Therefore, it was
concluded that the trust was not destructible and its provisions would have to be tested with respect to the rule
against perpetuities by measuring from the date the deed
became operative.
The Court in the Ryan case, as in the principal case,
relied in part upon two analogies. First, that the situation
presented by limitations created under a destructible trust,
or a power of appointment given under such a trust, is
analogous to limitations following an estate tail, in which
case the period of perpetuities is computed from the termination of the estate tail.3 ' Second, that the situation
is similar to that of gifts in default of general powers exercisable by either deed or will, in which case the period
8t

Ibid., 274 (emphasis added.)
192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949).

(1944) § 373.
"Ibid., comment b. See also, Leach, op. cit. 8upra, n. 29, 663.
834 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
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is measured from the date of expiration of the power."
In each of these cases the analogy exists because the limitations may themselves be destroyed by the exercise of
some power which prevents them from taking effect. If
an estate tail is disentailed, the limitations following it are
ineffective; and if the donee of a power exercises his power,
the takers in default are cut off, unless the appointment
is to them. Likewise, if a power of revocation over a trust
is exercised and the donee thereby stands seized of the
property in his own right, he holds the property absolutely
and may freely alienate it. The analogy is especially strong
with relation to limitations following estates tail, since
such estates by statute were made freely alienable and the
act of alienation in and of itself acted to disentail the
estate. 6 Alienation of property held under a revocable
trust only requires one additional step, and hence, it can
be said that such property is freely alienable. In neither
of these cases can the property be considered as being held
extra commercium, and therefore, the rule against perpetuities does not apply.
An analogy also exists between a general power
presently exercisable and a power to revoke a trust. Under
the former the donee can appoint to anyone including himself (except in Maryland). He has, in fact, as much control
over the property as an actual jowner would have. It only
takes one act to make the property his own so as to be
able to alienate it for his own benefit, and even if he does
not take that measure 'he can appoint it at will and readily
transfer it to whomever he pleases. For this reason limitations created under such powers are not considered by
the law to be invalid as long as they must vest within the
period set by the rule measuring from the death of the
donee.17 There is no logical reason why the same result
should not be reached with respect to revocable trusts,
since the donee can as easily perfect title in himself and
thereafter alienate the property at will. In fact, there is
more reason for holding the rule against perpetuities to be
inapplicable to recovable trusts in Maryland than to general
powers presently exercisable, since by revocation of the
5 Leach, ioc. cit. 8upra, n. 29; see discussion in Jones, op. cit. supra,
n. 29, 106.
M See 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 22. This analogy is weakened somewhat due to the fact that it is merely historical, since under the cited
statute a fee tail has been held to constitute a fee simple absolute. See
Thomas v. Higgins, 47 Md. 439 (1878).
SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra, n. 29, § 1274; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1944) § 391; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942), n.
29, 101.
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trust the donee of the power of revocation can become
absolutely seized of the property, whereas the donee of a
general power can, only transfer to another and can never
appoint to himself or to someone in a manner that the
benefit would actually be cast on himself, unless the donor
explicitly gave him such power.
Thus, it is clear under the law that if a power to revoke
a trust and thereby become the sole owner of the trust
property is certain to be exercised, if at all, within a life
in being and twenty-one years, as in the present case, then
the power to revoke is itself not too remote, and limitations
created by the exercise of a testamentary power are to be
measured for purposes of the rule from the date of termination of the power to revoke. However, should the result be
any different, if the power to revoke is itself contingent?
In regard to situations of this nature it has been stated that:
"The destructibility prerequisite for an application
of the rule ...exists only when some person possesses
a complete power of disposition over the subject
matter of the future interests which have been limited
and can exercise this power of disposition for his own
exclusive benefit. * * * The destructibility prerequisite
for an application of the rule ... can exist when the
power of disposition (or of revocation) is not presently
exercisable at the time of its creation, provided that
the period, during which the exercise of such power
is postponed, does not invalidate all interests created
by the exercise of such' 38power, and thus, in effect invalidate the power itself.
Thus, the contingent power of revocation given to W by
the deed of trust was subject to the rule. However, there
is no question but that it was valid. Viewing it from its
creation it is clear that it not only had to vest, but had to
be exercised within her lifetime; and since she was one
of the settlors of the trust, she was clearly a life in being
884 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944)

§ 373 comment d

(emphasis added.)

See also SIMES & SMrIi, op. cit. 8upra, n. 29, § 1272. Judge Henderson,
in dissenting, could not agree that this section of the Restatement supported the position taken by the Court and advocated herein. He laid
emphasis upon the second clause of the omitted sentence which states:,
"Similarly it [the destructibility prerequisite] does not exist when
the power of revocation is exercisable only with the concurrence of
one or more persons other than the settlor, or i8 otherwise 8ubject
to any condition8 precedent." (Emphasis added.)
It cannot logically be said that the latter clause supports the position
taken by the dissent, when read In context with the whole sentence and
comment.
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at the creation of the power. It, therefore, becomes clear
that the destructibility prerequisite was present, at last
during the period of time which elapsed between, the death
of the original trustee, on July 24, 1895, and the appointment of a new trustee by the second deed which was executed by W on August 6, 1895. At any time during that
period W, acting on her sole volition, could have revoked
the trust and stood seized of the property. Since the trust
was destructible, the property was not held extra commercium and hence was not subject to the rule against
perpetuities. Therefore, the rule could not logically be
held to be operative with regard to this trust and the limitations created under the testamentary power, until W's
power to revoke was extinguished in August of 1895.
In measuring the end limitations in the instant case,
some reference must be made to the so-called "second look"
doctrine. Although the general rule provides that, if, in
viewing the circumstances as they might occur from the
ascertained date for commencing the period of perpetuities,
it is possible that a limitation will not vest within the
period, it is void, the courts, for the purpose of testing
limitations created under powers of appointment, have
adopted a slightly different rule. The "second look" doctrine
takes cognizance 'of the facts which were known to the
donee of a power when such power was exercised, but
which were not certain when the original instrument was
executed. 9 The result has been stated to be that:
".... in determining the validity of the interests
created by the donee in the exercise of the power, the
facts existing at the time he exercises the power may
be considered although the time period is computed
from the date the donor created the power."40
In the instant case, if the limitations made by W in her
will were strictly read back into the trust deed, they would
have been invalid, since that deed gave her power to appoint
to her "children", which she did, but without the knowledge
that all of the children she would have were in esse when
the 1895 deed of trust was executed, it would have to be
recognized that one, if not all, of her children could have
been born after the execution of the original deed, and
hence, the limitations over to their children 20 years after
GRAY, op. ct.
8upra, n. 37, § 523.5; SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. 8upra, n.
29, § 1274; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 392; Jones, op. cit. supra,
n.429, 102.
oJones, too. cit. supra, n. 39.
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their death would be too remote. However, by applying
the "second look" doctrine, although the Court did not refer
to it specifically, recognition was taken of the fact that W
knew that her "children" were in, esse when the deed of
trust was executed. Therefore, their lives could be used
as lives in being, and the limitations over to her grandchildren, twenty years following the deaths of her children,
were not too remote.
In conclusion, it is clear that the Court reached the
proper result in the instant case. Under the original deed
of trust, W was given a contingent power to revoke the
trust or appoint a new trustee, if the trustee died during
her lifetime. This power was not void for remoteness, and
in 1895 the specified event happened causing an absolute
power of revocation to become vested in W. Since the law
provides that the rule against perpetuities is not applicable
to the provisions of a revocable trust, and that limitations
created under a testamentary power of appointment are
to be read back into the instrument creating the trust,
thereby becoming provisions of such instrument, the provisions of the trust in the instant case, including the limitations created under W's power of appointment, were not
subject to the rule during the period in which -shepossessed
her right of revocation. Furthermore, since the law specifies that the rule is to be applied from the date of termination of the power to revoke, logically it could only be
applied from the date of execution of the second deed of
trust.
Criticism cannot be leveled at the Court for looking
at the facts as W had known them to be when she exercised
her testamentary power of appointment, and recognizing
that she knew that her children were all in esse when she
executed the second deed of trust. In so doing, the Court
clearly applied the so-called "second look" doctrine, although not specifically referring to it. It would have been
desirable if the Court had made specific reference to that
doctrine, and thus, cleared up what little doubt remains
as to whether it has been recognized in Maryland.
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Right Of Owner Of Personal Property
To Challenge Assessments
Of Real Property
National Can Company v. State Tax Commission'
The taxpayer, National, appealed from the assessment
for the year 1957 of its tangible personal property,2 levied
by the Maryland State Tax Commission pursuant to the
Maryland Code, Article 81, Sections 6, 14, and 15, as
amended by Chapter 73 of the Maryland Laws of 1958.The appeal was taken to test the validity of the provisions
of Chapter 73 separately classifying real and personal property, and the right of National to challenge the inflation
factor provided for in Chapter 73 with respect to the valuation of real property. The lower court upheld the Commission's assessment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals
found that amendments introduced by Chapter 73 were
valid and constitutional under both the Maryland Constitution and the Federal Constitution, and that National was
not permitted to challenge the inflation factor.
The Court of Appeals noted that this case was a sequel
to the case of Sears, Roebuck v. State Tax Commission,4
in which it held that the assessment practice of the State
1220 Md. 418, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959).
2The aggregate assessed value of the taxpayer's property exceeded
$5,200,000, some $3,737,000 being placed on manufactured products and
raw material and $1,432,000 on tools and machinery used for manufacturing.
8MD. CODE (1957). Chapter 73 was approved April 4, 1958, and the
order of the lower court in the present case (Circuit Oourt No. 2 of
Baltimore City, Joseph L. Carter, J.) was given April 8, 1958. The appeal
to the Court of Appeals was decided July 9, 1959.
§ 14 of MD. CODE (1957), Art. 81, as amended by MD. LAWS 1958, Ch.
73, effective January 1, .1957, and reads as follows:
Sec. 14. (a) (Classification) Real and personal property shall be separately classified, and personal property separately subclassified for assessment purposes. The following shall be
separately sub-classified for purposes of personal property
assessment:
(b) (Method of Assessment) Except as hereinafter provided:
(1) all real property directed in this Article to be assessed,
shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof on the date
of finality. The term full cash value as used in this subsection shall mean current value less an allowance for
inflation, if in fact inflation exists.
(2) All personal property directed in this Article to be
assessed, shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof
on the date of finality. The term full cash value as used
in this subsection shall mean current value without any
allowance for inflation.
The "date of finality" mentioned in subsection (b), as defined by Art.
81, § 31(c) and as applicable to National's assessment for the year 1957,
was January 1, 1957.
'214 Md. 550, 136 A. 2d 567 (1957) ; noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 66 (1958).
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Tax Commission of making a deduction from the "full cash
value" of real property for inflation, but denying a comparable deduction from the value of personal property was
a discrimination not authorized by the then existing law5
and that an owner iof personal property was entitled to relief by having his assessment lowered. As a result of the
Sears decision of November 22, 1957,6 the legislature enacted Chapter 73.
In the present case, -the Court stressed that in the
Sears case 7 it based its decision not upon Article 15 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights,' but rather upon the
pertinent Maryland statute. The Sears decision, in requiring the Tax Commission to lower Sears' assessment to that
percentage of value applied to real property, relied on the
"equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution (".. . No State shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.") The Court of Appeals in the Sears case
followed the decisions of Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota
County9 and Hillsboroughv. Cromwell,0 which interpreted
the equal protection clause as requiring that discriminatory
treatment of a taxpayer be remedied either by increasing
the same taxes of other members of the same class or by
reducing the tax against the complainant; and, moreover,
that the State itself must remove the discrimination and
5

MD. CODE (1951), Art. 81, § 13(a) :
"Except as hereinafter provided, all property directed in this article
to be assessed, shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof on the
date of finality . . ."
This may be compared with the excerpt from Art. 81 as amended by
Ch. 73, supra,n. 3.
6 Supra, n. 4.
7Supra, n. 4.
8 Art. 15 does In fact permit separate assessment of real and personal property :
.. . [T]he General Assembly shall . . . provide for separate assessment of land and classification and sub-classification of improvements
on land and personal property, as it may deem proper; and all taxes
thereafter provided to be levied by the State for the support of the
general State Government, and by the counties and by the City
of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform as to
land within the taxing district, and uniform within the class or subclass of improvements on land or personal property which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to the
tax levy; . . ."
The above section of Art. 15 was substituted in 1915 for the following
provision:
"..
E.
[B]ut every other person in the State, or person holding
property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes,
for the support of government, according to his actual worth in
real or personal property;
'260 U. S. 441 (1923).
10326 U. S. 620 (1946).
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may not place on the taxpayer the burden of seeking upward revision of the taxes of other members of the same
class.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals ruled that separate classification, for purposes of taxation, of real and personal property is permissible under Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution so long as such classification is reasonable, and found
that the classification in the amended statute was reasonable. The opinion continued that, even if it were assumed
that the provision for an inflation factor is invalid, the provision for taxation of personal property at full cash value
would remain in full force. Therefore the Court indicated
that the appellant, since it had not demonstrated that the
statute discriminated unreasonably against personal property, was in no position to challenge the provision allowing
an inflation factor in assessment of real property. The
majority opinion found the situation in this case to be
clearly distinguished from that in the Sears case," where
the inflation factor was applied to real property without
benefit of12a statute separately classifying real and personal
property.
The Court, referring to the preamble to Chapter 73,13
pointed quite clearly to the principle which was determinative of the instant case:
"The preamble of the Act (Par. (5)) speaks of the
inherent differences between real and personal property and the peculiarities of certain classes of personal
property (first) as requiring and justifying separate
classification and sub-classification for assessment
purposes and (second) as requiring and justifying the
making 'of an allowance for inflation with respect to
real estate but not personal property. Other recitals
Supra, n. 4.
The appellant, National, in addition to its argument that the separate classification of real and personal property was discriminatory, had
urged that the attempt to make the statute retroactive to January 1,
1957 was invalid withiout regard to its other provisions. The majority
opinion concluded with a thorough consideration of the provisions of
Chapter 73 as to retroactivity and found them valid.
The fifth paragraph of the preamble is as follows:
"Whereas, it is the belief of the General Assembly that the natural
and inherent differences between real and personal property, and the
peculiarities of certain classes of personal property require and
justify separate classification and sub-classification for assessment
purposes as aforesaid, and require and' justify the making of an
allowance for inflation in respect to real estate assessments but not
in respect to personal property assessments;".
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show, we think, that inflation at least prompted the
adoption of the statute.... [W]e cannot say that the
legislative classification based upon the finding stated
in preamble clause (5), supra is unsustainable. There
is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a
legislative finding."' 4
In dissent, Judge Henderson strongly criticizes the
majority interpretation of the separability provision of
Chapter 73. His opinion does not argue that Article 15
of the Declaration of Rights requires uniformity of tax
rates or assessments between real and personal property;
however, he questions the arguments of the majority that
the Legislature was, independent of the provision in
Chapter 73 for the inflation factor, exercising its power to
classify. Judge Henderson argues that, on the contrary,
the declared reason for the enactment of Chapter 73 was
to continue legally the disparity which the Sears case"
had found to be illegal. Since he finds the only purpose
of the classification required by Chapter 73 to be the perpetuation of the disparity in assessments, he maintains that
National may properly attack the vagueness of the provision for an inflation factor, that provision being the
means of discrimination. As a consequence, the State could
reasonably be required, under the precedent of Hillsborough v. Cromwell'6 which was followed in the Sears
case, to remove the discrimination if the provision sustaining it were shown by the appellant to be invalid.
Judge Henderson proceeds to consider the appellant's
charge of vagueness and improper delegation of the taxing
power, and finds subsection 14(b) (1), as enacted by
Chapter 73, to be a hopelessly inadequate guide for assessment. The provision for valuation of real property suggests no previous price level by which inflation is to be
measured, nor any other objective standard for defining
inflation.'7 Judge Henderson further disputes the argument
-"220Md. 418, 432, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959). The Court continues with
a quotation from Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 210 Md. 58, 62, 92 A. 2d 560
(1952) :
"'An invalid act eannot be made valid by a "preface of generalities"
in the form of a legislative declaration of purpose. Schechter V. United
States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 . . .But if a legislative declaration
is not demonstrably untrue or meaningless, and if true, would support the validity of the act, the courts must accept the judgment of
the legislature and cannot substitute a contrary judgment of their
own.'s"
'214 Md. 550, 136 A. 2d 567 (1957), noted 18 Md. L. Rev. 66 (1958).
18 Supra, n. 10.
17The dissenting opinion, 220 Md. 418, 445, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959), states:
"[T]he amount to be allowed would depend in each case upon the
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of the Commission that the term "full cash value" is equally
vague; that term, he says, has come to have a definite,
objective meaning, whereas "inflation" has not.'"
It seems thoroughly established that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits
different classes of property to be taxed at different rates,
provided the classification is reasonable. 19 Neither the
majority nor the dissent of this case questions this. The
Court is at pains to show that the classification provided by
Chapter 73 is a reasonable one, citing what it feels are
very pertinent differences between real and personal property.20 The majority does not feel that, in view of these
differences and of the provision in Article 15 of the Maryland Constitution permitting separate classification, it
would be warranted in declaring Chapter 73 invalid. It
would be difficult to deny the right of the Court to thus
avoid encroachment upon legislative prerogative, or the
propriety of the restraint with which it reviews Chapter 73.
It is not so difficult, however, to question the wisdom
of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 73. The criticism
point of reference, which is not designated. Inflation exists both
as regards real and personal property. Its amount depends on the
arbitrary selection of a previous price level. As I see it, the legislative directive is an open invitation to the taxing authorities to
reduce assessments on real estate to whatever percentage of full
cash value they please. This was precisely the vice we found in
the Sear8 case. The directive supplies no point of reference, and
hence leaves the matter to the uncontrolled discretion of the taxing
authorities, without any objective standard at all."
IsHow definite the meaning of "full cash value" is could be disputed;
see Tam Assessments of Real Property: A Propo8al for Legislative Reform, 68 Yale L. J. 335, 344 (1958). There is little doubt that "inflation"
under Maryland assessment practices is a term of uncertain and unpredictable meaning. While unchallenged testimony in the present case
would seem to imply that the usual deduction for inflation by the State
Tax Oommission is about 40 percent, it was indicated in the Sears decision
that deductions ranged from 40 to 75 percent.
IABell's Gap R'd Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890); Michigan
Central Railroad v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245 (1906) ; Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911). Corwin, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITID

STATES

(Library of Congress Edition, 1952) 1152, states both

this principle and its limits:
"Intentional and systematic undervaluation by State officials of other
taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right
of one taxed upon the full value of his property (Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U. S. 350 (1918); Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 35, 37 (1907)) . . . Differences in
the basis of assessment are not invalid where the person or property
affected might properly be placed in a separate class for purposes of
taxation. (Charleston Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182 (1945) ; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940)). An owner
aggrieved by discrimination is entitled to have his assessment reduced
to the common level."
The same principle was reaffirmed very recently in Allied Stores of Ohio
v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526, 527, 528 (1959).
'°220 Md. 418, 433, 434, 153 A. 2d 287 (1959).
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in the dissenting opinion of the vague mandate to assess
with an allowance for inflation, now embodied in subsection 14(b) (1) of Article 81, should be viewed against
the background of assessment practices both in Maryland
and in other States. The Maryland statute is apparently
unique, among State constitutional and statutory provisions
governing assessment, in its express reference to inflation.2 '
However, the same consideration appears less explicitly
in many other jurisdictions where assessors have hesitated
to raise assessments of real property from pre-World War
II levels.22 It is generally accepted that assessment of property should be as objective as possible and - at least
within particular classes - uniform. In many jurisdictions,
if not most, the reality must fall far short of this ideal;
nor is the situation necessarily better even if a State constitution, as Maryland's before 1915,28 or statute (as Article
81 before enactment of Chapter 73) apparently requires
complete equality without regard to classes. Facts brought
out in the Sears case indicated that deductions for inflation
in Maryland assessments had ranged from 40 to 75 per
cent. 4 Somewhat similar situations have lately cropped up
in two nearby States. In New Jersey, shockingly discrepant
variations 'between counties in percentage of assessments
used for taxation have been found and have been overthrown by the courts.25 In Connecticut a recent decision
found certain assessments void for lack of uniformity. 0
The Maryland Legislature and the State Tax Commission have attempted to insure some uniformity and
objectivity in assessment throughout this State. Over a
period of years commencing in 1935 a system of rotating
21Tao Asses8ments of Reat Property: A Proposal for Legi8lative Reform, 68 Yale L. J., 335, 355 and chart 'opposite 386 (1958).
22Ibid., 355 :

"Even after the economic tide had turned and inflationary pressures
increased the revenue demands of municipalities, 'normal market'
concepts remained in vogue. Nor have they been abandoned despite
continued pressures for the release of additional taxing, borrowing,
and spending power. The judiciary has evidently recognized the
inequity of abandoning the normal-market standard before taxpayers
could recoup their overpayments in depression years. In any event,
courts have not overruled the assessors' adherence to that standard.
Thus, taxpayers have benefited from the implicit extension of judicial language about inherent value to cover an area- valuations in
inflationary periods - almbst completely free of legislative guideposts. Today, assessments are made and reviewed In terms of a
normal period, usually one somewhere around 1940."
Supra, circa n, 7, 8.
Supra, n. 14.
1 See 'Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Tax., 16 N.J.
329, 108 A. 2d 598 (1954).
E. Ingraham Company v. Town and City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374,
132 A. 2d 563 (1957), cited in 18 Md. L. Rev. 66, 69, n. 10 (1958).
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reassessments was authorized, in order that all taxable
property in each county and Baltimore City might be
periodically reassessed. 27 It is difficult to believe that
Chapter 73 represents a further step forward. If an owner
of real property believes that his assessment is too high,
relative to other owners, the -burden of showing this undoubtedly rests on him. Where real estate has been generally underassessed, proof of discrimination may be difficult to obtain under any circumstances.2 8 In view of the enactment of Chapter 73 and of the present decision, it is apparent that such an aggrieved owner of real property will
be forced to contend with a mysterious variable of inflation which seems to be for the first time, firmly established
in Maryland law. However, some question arises as to
whether the inflation factor attacked by National in the
present case on the ground iof vagueness would be sustained
if attacked by an owner of real property.
JAMES

P. LEWIS

Insurance - Right Of Insurer To Subrogate
To Collateral Contract Rights
Of The Insured
In The Matter Of Future Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc.1
Future Manufacturing purchased certain refrigeration
equipment from the Scatena York Company under a conditional sales contract which among other things provided
that the vendee was to have the equipment insured against
fire for the benefit of the vendor and that the vendee would
remain liable for the purchase price should the property
be destroyed before such price was fully paid. Future
failed to have the equipment insured, but Scatena York,
on its own initiative, procured the desired coverage. Subsequently the equipment was destroyed by fire while
$17,654.88 of the purchase price remained unpaid. Scatena
2 Rogan v. Commrs. of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299, 71 A. 2d, 47 (1950),
discusses these efforts. See also Lewis, THE TAx ARTICLES OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 13 Md. L. Rev. 83 (1953).
2" When general undervaluation exists, the taxpayer may have to prove
not only the proper tax value of his realty but also, through an independent
appraisal of similar property, that his realty is assessed above the
general level." Tax Assessments of Real Property: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 Yale L. J., 335, 348 (1958). Tax Comm. v. -Brandt Cabinet
Works, 202 Md. 533, 97 A. 2d 290 (1953), is illustrative of the difficulty
of challenging an assessment where the inflation factor has been employed.

1165 F. 'Supp. 111 (D.C. N.D. Cal. S.D. 1958).
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recovered $13,244.20 from the insurer and, in addition,
realized $810.00 in salvage from the sale of the damaged
equipment. Shortly thereafter, Future was adjudged bankrupt, and Scatena asserted a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings for $16,844.88, representing the unpaid portion of
the purchase price less the salvage recovery. The referee
allowed Scatena's claim to the extent of $3,600.88 (the
value of the unpaid purchase price less the recovery under
the insurance policy and the recovery by way of salvage).
An additional amount equal to the value of the premiums
paid for the insurance was also allowed Scatena. The
referee found that the insurer could not assert a claim
against the bankrupt by way 'of subrogation to the vendor's

rights under the conditional sales contract, despite the
fact that the insurance policy expressly granted the insurer the right to subrogate to any claims the vendor had

against the vendee under the sales contract.2 The District
Court affirmed, giving the vendee the benefit of the vendor's
insurance.
In discussing the possible remedies which could be
afforded under the circumstances of the instant case, the
court suggested three ways in which the rights of the
interested parties might be resolved: (1) to allow the
vendor to recover the full contract price and the insurance
(which in effect would allow a double recovery); (2) to
allow the insurance proceeds to affect the unpaid portion
of the purchase price to the extent of such proceeds, thereby
giving the vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance; or
(3) to allow the insurer to subrogate to the vendor's contract rights for the unpaid purchase price.3
The Court was of the opinion that the first approach
would contravene public policy, by increasing the moral
hazard of the insurer -bymaking the property more valuable
after its destruction than before, and in actually allowing a
double recovery by the insured vendor. Courts, in general,
are in accord with this view.' The Court of Appeals of
The policy provision as to subrogation read:
"In the event of any payment under the policy the Company shall
be subrogated to all the assured's rights of recovery therefor against
any person or organizatiton and the assured shall execute and deliver
instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights." Ibid., 112.
3 Ibid., 113.

' Deming v. Merchants Cotton Press & Storage Co., 90 Tenn. 306, 17
S.W. 89 (1891) ; Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 315 Mich.
393, 24 N.W. 2d 104 (1946) ; Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Chicago Tunnel
Terminal Co., 12 Ill. 2d 539, 139 N.E. 2d 770 (1956) ; Washington Fire
Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421, 442 (1870). For a general discussion of
this problem see: 2 RIOHARDS, INSURANCE (5th ed. 1952), 662.
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Maryland, in Washington Fire Insurance Co. v. Kelly,' rejected the suggestion of a possible double recovery under
similar circumstances, saying:
".... the contract of insurance is strictly a contract of
indemnity, and the mortgagee is not entitled to recover from the insurer the value of the property lost,
and his whole debt besides, from the mortgagor."'
Since the courts are almost uniformly opposed to allowing a double recovery by the insured vendor, the basic
problem in the instant case becomes one of determining
whether to allow the vendee to benefit from the vendor's
insurance, although he failed to fulfill his obligation under
the contract of sale by not obtaining the insurance 'himself,
or to allow the insurer to minimize his loss by subrogating
him to the contract rights of the vendor. Before dealing
directly with this problem, it is desirable to briefly inquire
into the nature of the doctrine of subrogation and determine if and when it is applicable to collateral contract
rights.
Generally it is recognized that subrogation is an equitable right taken from the civil law,7 and is considered to
be legal when it arises by operation of law,' as in most
cases, or conventional when it arises by express provisions
in a contract.9 The basis of the doctrine seems to be analogous to the theory of suretyship. Thus, a tortfeasor is
considered to be the party primarily liable, and the insurer
secondly liable, producing the result that the insurer is
entitled to proceed against the party primarily liable
when he is caused to idemnify the insured. 10 Likewise, in
the vendor-vendee situation, such as is present in the
instant case, the debtor vendee is considered to be primarily liable while the insurer is only secondarily liable,
since in effect he is merely insuring the vendor's security
'32 Md. 421 (1870).
'Ibid., 442. It is noted that the Washington case Involved a mortgage
situation rather than a conditional sale.
729 Am. Jur. 1000, Insurance, § 1335; Comment, Subrogation of the
Insurer to Collateral Rights of the Insured, 28 Col. L. Rev. 202 (1958) ;
King, Subrogation under Contract8 In8uring Property, 30 Texas L. Rev.
62, 71-85 (1951).
'The word "legal" is not used in contradistinction to "equitable".
'Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 Md. L. Rev. 201
(1939). In addition it is noted that in Maryland 8 MD. CODE (1957),
Art. 101, § 58, grants an employer the right of subrogation where the
employee recovers from him for an injury sustained because of the acts
of a third person, and by 1 Mo. CoDE (1957) Art. 8, § 3, the right of subrogation is given to a surety in a bond or other obligation.
10Supra, n. 7; VANCE, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1951), 787-8, § 134; Leavitt
v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Me. 153, 160; 37 A. 886 (1897).
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for the debt." Essentially subrogation is an equitable
right which places the 'burden of loss upon the person
primarily responsible for it and the insurer's right of
subrogation arises out 12of the nature of the contract - as a
contract of indemnity.
In mortgage cases, where the mortgagee obtains insurance for his own benefit, the insurer has been allowed to
subrogate to the mortgagee's right to recover payment of
the debt from the mortgagor." The reasoning behind the
rule seems to be that the mortgagor takes the risk of loss,
and consequently, the insurer is actually insuring the
property which represents the security for the debt. In
such cases the theory of suretyship applies. Conversely,
where the mortgagee and the mortgagor are both insured
under the same policy, there can be no right of subrogation,4
unless the policy is somehow voided as to the mortgagor.
Similarly, where a shipper procures insurance on his
goods which are then entrusted to a common carrier, the
shipper's insurer is allowed to subrogate to the shipper's
rights on the coverage contract. 5 The reasoning in such
cases appears to be based on the fact that almost absolute
liability is imposed upon the carrier by law. Since the
carrier is legally responsible for the goods, and can escape
liability only by proving an act of God or similar occur"Interstate Ice & Power Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y.
95, 152 N.E. 476 (1926) ; McCoy v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 261, 40
N.W. 2d 146 (1949).
Nat. Garment Co. v. N.Y.C. & St. L. R. Co., 173 F. 2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949).
'First National Bank of Elk City v. 'Springfield Fire and Marine Inance Co., 104 Kan. 278, 178 P. 413 (1919); Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto
Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So. 807 (1930) ; Union Assurance Society
v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 Tex. 618, 84 -S.W. 2d 1151 (1936); Combs v.
American Insurance Co., 286 Ky. 535, 177 S.W. 2d 881 (1944); Pacific
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 266 Ala. 606, 97 So. 2d 797 (1957); Leyden
v. Lawrence, 79 N.J. Eq. 113, 81 A. 121 (1911); Milwaukee Mechanics
Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 76 Or. 570, 149 P. 542 (1915). The only jurisdiction
consistently in disagreement with the rule is Massachusetts, e.g. International Trust Co. v. Boardmon, 149 Mass. 158, 21 N.E. 239 (1881) which
reasons that the mortgage contract Is wholly collateral to the insurance
and therefore not available to the insurer. In Maryland see Washington
Fire Insurance Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421 (1870); Grangers Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Farmers National Bank, 164 Md. 441, 165 A. 479 (1933);
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dilworth, 167 Md. 232, 173 A. 22 (1934)
and Frontier Mortgage Corp. v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 13, 125 A. 809 (1924)
where the court remarked:
"The mortgagor derives no benefit from a policy covering the
interest of the mortgagee alone, but is bound to pay the mortgage
debt to the insurers when they become his substituted creditors."
"Savings Bank of Ansonia v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588, 144 A. 36
(1928); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 98 Neb.
446, 153 N.W. 553 (1915).
1Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150 U. S. 99 (1893) ; National Garment
Co. v. New York, C. & ,St. L. R. Co., 173 F. 2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Adams
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1027, 188 N.W. 823, 24 A.L.R. 189
(1922).
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rence, he is, in effect, an insurer of the goods and is the
primary obligor, and again the theory of suretyship will
apply. It is general practice today for carriers to provide
in their bills of lading that any insurance on the goods will
inure to their 'benefit. Such a provision has been held to
vitiate the right of the insurer to subrogate to the insured
shipper's right against the carrier.16 On the other hand,
the insurance companies have adopted a policy provision
which acts to avoid the contract insurance where the insured agrees that the benefits received through the insurance are to inure to the carrier's benefit. This type of policy
provision has also been sustained by the courts, on the
theory that the parties are free to contract as they desire.'
The greatest divergence of opinion is found in the cases
involving contracts for the sale of realty or personalty, such
as the one currently under discussion. Some jurisdictions
have maintained that the situation is closely analogous to
the mortgage situation mentioned above, and have applied
the same rules. 18 In Home Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 9 the
Maine court found that an insurer is entitled to subrogate
the rights of a conditional vendor against the vendee for
the balance due on the purchase price, where the vendee
intentionally destroyed the goods. Likewise, where the
insurance originally covering both vendor and vendee is
cancelled as to the vendee for failure to pay premiums or
for similar reasons, the insurer is subrogated;2 0 however,
this rule only applies where the policy contains a losspayable clause,2 thereby making the right of subrogation
contractual or conventional and not a legal application of
the equitable doctrine.
The general view in cases of this nature seems to be
that expressed in Leavitt v. CanadianPac. Ry. Co.,2 2 where
the court said:

1e Jackson Co. v. Boylslon Mutual Ins. Co., 139 Mass. 508, 2 N.E. 103
(1885): Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N.W. 4,
39 A.L.R. 1116 (1925) ; Carsairs v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 18 F. 473 (D.C.
Md. 1883).
11Insurance Co. of N.A. v. Easton, 73 Tex. 167, 11 S.W. 180 (1889):
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N.W. 4, 39 A.L.R. 116
(1925).
"Home Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 140 Me. 72, 34 A. 2d 22 (1943);
Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95,
152 N.E. 476 (1926); Leavitt v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Me. 153, 37
A. 886 (1897).
"Ibid.

Oadillac Auto Co. v. Fisher, 54 R.I. 264, 172 A. 393 (1934).
"Fields v. Western Millers, 290 N.Y. 209, 48 N.E. 2d 489 (1943). The
court pointed out that the insurer collected the premiums for a risk and
could not in good conscience keep its premiums and be made whole too.
22Supra, n. 18.
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"...
an insurer who has paid a loss for which
another is responsible, either by statute or at common
law, is subrogated to any claim that the insured had
against the person whose tortious act caused the injury;
or who, for
any other reason, is liable to the owner
23
therefor."
In each of the above cases the conclusions seem to be
justified that the vendee, by his acts (while either amounted
to malfeasance or non-malfeasance), should not be entitled
to any equitable relief and what equities are present favor
the insurer.
However, this doctrine has been applied in less compelling circumstances. In Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co.,24 the Court of Appeals of New
York held that the insurer was entitled to subrogate to
the insured vendor's rights where the goods were destroyed
during a period of negotiation between vendor and vendee
- after the latter had been in default and the former had
caused the goods to be attached and seized by the sheriff.
Likewise, in McCoy v. Continental Ins. Co.,25 the Michigan
Court allowed the insurer to subrogate to the insured
vendor's rights where the insurer was caused to indemnify
the vendor for loss by fire, but in this instance the policy
contained a subrogation clause and in addition had been
procured by the vendor on his own initiative.
The Court in the instant case, recognizing the holdings
of the above cases, said:
"... an insurer upon indemnifying an insured mortgagee for the loss of his interest in destroyed mortgaged property is entitled to be subrogated to the
mortgagee's right
to enforce payment of the mort'28
gagor's debt.
However, the Court refused to apply this principle 'of the
mortgage cases as it did not feel the analogy compelling,
but rather gave the benefit of the vendor's insurance to the
vendee. In so doing, the Court, after voicing its opinion
that authority in support of either view was almost equal,
said:
"But when an insured vendor has been indemnified
by his insurer for the loss of property subject to a
"Ibid., 888.

Supra, n. 18.
"326 Mich. 261, 40 N.W. 2d 146 (1949).
"In re Future Manufacturing Cooperative, 165 F. Supp. 111, 113 (D.C.
N.D. Cal. S.D. 1958).
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sales contract, the tendency has been to give the vendee
the benefit of the vendor's insurance rather than to
subrogate the insurer to the vendor's' 2' right
to recover
7
the purchase price from the vendee.
This theory, which has been accepted by a number of
jurisdictions is based upon the idea that the vendee is the
equitable owner of the property he buys from the time
the contract of sale is made and, as a result, is entitled to
any benefit that may inure to the estate in the interim,2 8
and that the vendor retains an insurable interest in the
property in the form of a lien upon the property29 until
he is fully paid. Thus, if the property is destroyed between
the time of the contract and the payment of the purchase
price, the vendee is considered to be entitled to the benefit
from the vendor's insurance which itself is looked upon as
a benefit accruing to the insured property.
In Gilbert & Ives v. Port,0 the court said:
"The vendee, because he is the equitable owner,
and, as such, is compelled to sustain the loss, occurring
after the sale and before the conveyance, is entitled
to any benefit that may accrue to the estate."'"
Following this theory, the courts have given the vendee the
benefit of the vendor's insurance; where the vendor, before
being paid by the vendee, reconveyed the property to
another, and the other in turn conveyed the property to
a fourth person who had it insured;8 2 where the vendee
actually contracted to bear the loss 'of damage due to fire
and to purchase insurance on the property, but failed to
do so;"3 where the vendor had purchased insurance on his
own and in his own name; 4 where the insurer required
the vendor to assign to it the vendor's rights to the purchase price; 5 and where the sales contract actually con- Ibid., 114.
2Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 P. 586 (1911) ; Gilbert
and Ives v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876) ; Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton,
92 Md.68, 85, 48 A. 85 (1900).
"White v. Gilman et al, 138 Cal. 375, 71 P. 436 (1903); Skinner &
Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 85, 48 A. 85 (1900) ; McRae v. McRae,
78 Md. 70, 27 A. 1038 (1893).
soSupra, n. 28.
81Ibid., 293.
"White v. Gilman et al, 138 Cal. 375, 71 P. 436 (1903).
aAutomatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robinson-Slagle L. Co., 147 So. 542
(La. 1933).
8Brakhage v. Tracey, 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363 (1900); Marion v.
Walcott, 68 N.J. Eq. 20, 50 A. 242 (1904) ; In the Matter of Future Mfg.
Coop., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 111 (1958).
"Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926)
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tained a subrogation clause. 36 The doctrine has been applied where the vendor was required to obtain the insurance, but failed to do so."
The fact that the vendee in the instant case failed to
obtain insurance on the property, as he was contractually
bound to do, made little difference, since it is well established that where the vendor obtains insurance, despite
the vendee's contractual duty, it is unnecessary for the
latter to perform his 8 obligation, and he is, nonetheless,
entitled to the benefit.
This view clearly prevails in Maryland. 9 In Skinner
& Sons" Co. v. Houghton,40 the Court of Appeals held that
the assignee of the vendee was entitled to the benefit of the
insurance despite the fact that the vendors had obtained
it prior to the contract of sale and had not surrendered
title or possession at the time the property was destroyed
by fire. In reaching its decision the Court said:
"It is true that she [the vendor] had an insurable
interest in the property until the purchase money
was paid.... Under a contract of this kind, in equity,
the vendee is in fact considered as the owner of the
land, and although the vendor may still retain the title,
he holds it as a trustee for the vendee, to whom all the
beneficial interest 'has passed, with a lien on the estate
[or property] as security for any unpaid portion of the
purchase money .... Thus, if property is destroyed
between the time of effecting the contract for the sale
and delivery of the deed, the proceeds of an insurance
policy upon such property belongs to the vendor between him and the (insurer), but the former is held
to act as trustee for the vendee and must therefore
account to his cestui trust in equity.""1

"'Inthe Matter of Future Mfg. Coop., Inc., 165 F. 'Supp. 111 (D.C. N.D.
Cal., S.D. 1958).
-Sommers v. Dukes, 214 Md. 351, 135 A. 2d 419 (1957). This case
seems to be more justifiable than some of the others as the seller was
required to obtain the insurance for the buyer's protection.
18Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robtilon-Slagle L. Co., 147 So. 542, (IA.
1933) ; Marion v. Walcott, 68 NJ. Eq. 20, 59 A. 242, 37 A.L.R. 1324 (1904);
Russell v. Elliott, 45 S.D. 184, 186 N.W. 824, 22 A.L.R. 556 (1922);
McGinley v. Forest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, 22, A.L.R. 567 (1921).
8'Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 A. 85 (1900) ; McRae
v. McRae, 78 Md. 70, 27 A. 1038 (1893); Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md.
530 (1884); Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md. 301 (1869); ,Sommers v. Dukes,
214 Md. 351, 135 A. 2d 419 (1957); Royal Insur. Co. v. Drury, 150 Md.
211, 221, 132 A. 635 (1926).
0

' Ibid.
11Ibid., 85-86, 88.
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In making a thorough examination of the problem, the
court in the Skinner case adopted the view of Hall v. Jones42
that, where the sale concerns real property, after a contract
of sale is made the vendor's interest is not real estate but
personal property, 4 the interest being in the security for
the debt. The court further recognized the view of Heller
v. Marine Bank44 that an insurance policy is only a contract
for personal indemnity, but that indemnity is against a
possible loss on account of the interest of the insured
in the thing mentioned in the policy and when the vendee
fully pays the vendor that interest is at an end and likewise
the indemnity no longer exists.
It would appear that the decisions which adopt this
view, giving the vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance, violate the concept of an insurance policy being a
personal contract, but this violation is excusable on the
theory that the vendee could have taken an assignment
of the policy if he had so desired. Nonetheless, it is clear
that where the risk of loss remains on the vendor under
the contract of sale, the vendee obtains no benefit from
the insurance because he can suffer no loss in the event
of damage to or destruction of the property.45 Thus the
doctrine is limited to those situations where the risk of
loss is upon the vendee. Furthermore, at least in Maryland,
the doctrine will only apply where the vendor-vendee relationship exists and not in the analogous situation between mortgagor and mortgagee. 6
In conclusion, it appears that the court in the instant
case, in denying the insurer the right of subrogation and
instead granting the vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance, adopted the more equitable approach since the
insurer did contract to indemnify the vendor and did, in
fact, accept the risk of loss. Furthermore, the equities
clearly favor the vendee as he was not responsible for the
loss, and should not be called upon to suffer such loss when
another actually obligated itself to take the risk of loss.
DONALD

ROBERT

C. AL.L
E. PowEIL

21 Md. 439 (1863).
"Ibid., 447, citing Smith & Gage, 41 Barbour 60 N.Y.S. Ct. (1863).

"89 Md. 602, 43 A. 800 (1899).
41It follows as a natural result of the principle laid down in the cited
cases that if the vendee We to gain the benefit of the vendor's insurance
where the risk of loss is upon him, he should not be entitled to so benefit
if the risk of loss remains on the vendor, as the vendee cannot be held to
be the equitable owner.
," Mullan v. Beldin, 130 Md. 313. 322, 100 A. 384 (1917).
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Time Limitations On Actions Against
Administrators Or Executors
Chandlee v. Shockley'
The appellant, Clara Chandlee, was injured by an auto
negligently driven by Homer Shockley, who died. on October 8, 1956, from injuries sustained in the accident.
Appellee, who qualified as decedent's administratrix on October 18, 1956, admitted liability to appellant but requested
her to refrain from filing suit, explaining that once the
extent iof her injuries was ascertained, a settlement could
be reached. No settlement having been offered, appellant
filed suit against appellee on June 25, 1957, by virtue of
Article 93, Section 112 of the Code.2 Appellee demurred
on the grounds that the suit had not been filed within the
time limitation of the statute requiring such claims to be
filed within six months from the date of the qualification
of the administratrix. The trial court sustained the demurrer.
In reversing the judgment of the lower court by a 3 to 2
decision, the Court of Appeals held that if the fraudulent
statements of the administratrix had delayed earlier prosecution of a ppellant's claim, she was estopped from asserting
the statutory time limitation, and the appellant had the
right to have the case heard on its merits.
In dissenting, Judges Henderson and Homey felt that a
statutory time limitation, contained in a statute creating
the right to sue, constituted a condition precedent to the
plaintiff's right of action, and noncompliance with the
limitation destroyed all rights that the statute could confer.
The earliest time limitations on actions were found in
Roman law which limited the right to recover property. 3
Under the common law, the Act of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, enacted
in 1623 ".

.

. was the first comprehensive statute to adopt

the modern method of arithmetical computation, instead
of the earlier method of referring to certain well-known
historical events."4 This Act was the forerunner of present
day Statutes of Limitation which

"...

are such legislative

1219 Md. 493, 150 A. 2d 438 (1959).
18 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 112 provides:
"Executors and administrators ... shall be liable to be sued in any
court of law or equity, in any action (except slander) which might
have been maintained against the deceased . . . provided, however,
that any such action for injuries to the person to be maintainable
against an executor or administrator must be commenced within six

calendar months after the date of the qualification of the executor or
administrator of the testator or intestate."
'Developments-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1950).
Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 591, 597 (1933).
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enactments as prescribe the period's within which actions
may be brought upon certain claims or within which certain rights may be enforced. . ."'". Their purpose is to encourage prompt ascertainment of legal rights and the suppression of fraud which may be the outgrowth of stale
claims.6 Courts have adopted the principle that, since the
purpose of the Statute of Limitation is to suppress fraud,
they will not allow the Statute to become a means for
perpetrating fraud.7 Therefore, fraud will toll the running
of the Statute in common law actions against one who -has
committed the fraud, yet asserts the Statute as a bar to the
innocent party's claim."
Paralleling the growth of modern Statutes of Limitations was the emergence of many remedies unknown in the
common law. The accuracy of Lord Mansfield's maxim
actio personalis moritur cum persona was challenged by
statutes creating remedies for wrongful death and rights
of actions against decedents' estates. These statutes, creating new remedies, also created their own, time limitations.
Writers and courts interpreted these limitations as conditions precedent, and noncompliance with the limitation
resulted in the loss of the entire right.9 The leading case is
5 1 Woo, LIMITATIONS OF ACTION (4th ed.) 1, 2.
o0sbourne v. U. S., 164 F. 2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947).
"All Statutes of Limitations are based on the assumption that one
with a good cause of action will not delay in bringing it for an unreasonable perilod of time ..

' First Massachusetts Turnpike v. Field, 3 Mass. 201, 206 (1807):
"If this knowledge is fraudulently concealed from [the plaintiff] by
the defendant, we should violate a sound rule of law, if we permitted the defendant to avail himself of his own fraud."
O Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason 143, 154 (1st Cir. 1828) :
"Every statute is to be expounded reasonably, so as to surpress,
and not to extend, the mischiefs, it was designed to cure. The statute
of limitations was mainly intended to surpress fraud, by preventing
fraudulent and unjust claims from starting up at great distances of
time, when the evidence might no longer be within the reach of the
other party, by which they could be repelled. It ought not, then, to
be so construed, as to become an instrument to encourage fraud, if It
admits of any other reasonable interpretation, and cases of fraud,
therefore, form an implied exception. . ....
'34 Am. JuR. 16, Limitation of Actions, § 7:
"A statute of limitations should be differentiated from conditions
which are annexed to a right of action created by statute. A statute,
which in itself creates a new liability, gives an action to enforce it
unknown to the common law, and fixes the time within which that
action may be commenced, is not a statute of limitation. It is a statute
of creation, and the commencement of the action within the time it
fixes is an indispensible condition of the liability and of the action
which it permits. The time element is an inherent element of the
right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is a limitation of
the right."
See also State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 482, 129 A. 793, 797 (1925) ; Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 26, 187 A. 881, 883 (1936).
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0 in which suit was brought for a wrongThe Harrisonburg,"
ful death after a twelve month statutory time limitation
had expired. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Circuit
Court's allowance of the claim, held:

"... The statutes create a new legal liability with
a right to a suit for its enforcement, provided 'suit is
brought within twelve months and not otherwise.
The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and
not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to
the right to sue at all ....
Time has been made an
essence 'of the right, and the right is lost if the time
is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statute, and the limitations of the
remedy are therefore to be treated as limitations of
the right.""
As a result of decisions following this statutory construction propounded in The Harrisonburgcase, many statutes
expressly include provisions stating that fraud is to toll
the running of statutory time limitation. The Maryland
Workmen's Compensation statute provides:
"Filing after fraud or estoppel - When it shall
be established that failure to file claim by an injured
employee or his dependents was induced or occasioned
by fraud, or by facts and circumstances amounting to
an estoppel, claim shall be filed within one year from
the time of the discovery 'of the fraud or within one
year from the time when the facts and circumstances
amounting to an estoppel cease to operate and not
afterwards."'"
Also courts have created implied exceptions for enemy
aliens during time of war," and for American citizens who
were prisoners of the enemy. 4 These cases were the basis
for the opinion of the court in Scarboroughv. Atlantic Coast
Line Railway Co. 5 This case is heavily relied upon by the
10119 U. S. 199 (1886).
Ibid., 214 (1886). Many decisions citing this case fail to give weight to
the closing statement in the opinion:
"No question arises in this case as to the power of a court of admiralty
to allow an equitable excuse for delay in suing, because no excuse of
any kind has been shown." Ibid.
8 MD. CODM, (1957) Art. 101, § 39.
lHangar v. Abbott, 6 Wallace, 532 (U. S. 1867).
14 Supra, n. 6.
178 F. 2d 253, 15 A.LR. 2d 491, cert. den. 339 U. S.. 919 (1949).
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majority opinion in the principal case. In that case, a seventeen year old boy was injured by the defendant and the
defendant's agent induced the boy to wait until he reached
the age of twenty-one to bring his claim in order that his
injuries might be more accurately ascertained. When suit
was brought, defendant claimed plaintiff was barred because the Federal Employers' Liability Act 16 contained
a three year limitation. The defense contended this constituted a condition precedent to plaintiff's suit as the Federal
Employers' Liability Act created a right unknown in the
common law. The court rejected this defense and held
that the defendant's fraud estopped him from asserting
the statutory time limitation. This view was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern DistrictTermi7
M, 1'
decided shortly after the decision in the principal case
was rendered. In holding that fraud by the defendant
stopped the running of a statutory time limitation, the
Supreme Court added: "... we need look no further than
the maxim
that no man may take advantage of his own
'8
wrong.'
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also distinguished
procedural and substantive remedies and has held that
non-compliance with a statutory time limitation on a
remedy created by the legislature results in the destruction
of the entire right.' But closer in point to the principal
case is Bogart v. Willis,2 ° in which the plaintiff brought his
claim after the statutory limitation had elapsed. There the
Court held a letter from the administrator of the estate,
admitting the claim, before the period had elapsed tolled
the statute.
"Any other construction would permit a defendant
to play fast and loose, and claim the benefits of the
statute while at the same time leading the plaintiff
to believe that he proposed to pay the claim. "21
The dissent in the principal case is based upon the
grounds that the Court cannot "properly write in exceptions
to the condition imposed by the Legislature, on general
"45 U.S.C.A. (1954) § 56, provides:
"No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced
within three years from the day the cause of action accrued."
"359 U. S. 231 (1959).
"Ibid., 232.
"State v. 'Parks and Dunnigan v. Cobourn, supra, n. 9.
o158 Md. 393, 148 A. 585 (1930).
Ibid., 407.
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equitable grounds.2 2 The cases cited in the dissent refer
Chief Judge Marshall's opinion in
to an excerpt from
23
McIver v. Ragan:
"Wherever the situation of a party was such as, in
the opinion of the legislature, to furnish a motive for
excepting him from the operation of the law, the legislature has made the exception. It would be going far,
If this
for this court to add to those exceptions ....
difficulty be produced by the legislative power, the
same power might provide a remedy; but courts cannot, on that account, insert in the statute of limitations, 24an exception which the statute does not contain.,
The dissent distinguishes the Osborne21 and Hanger26 cases
as being decided on the principle of international law that
during war, "no court was available to which jurisdiction
could be ascribed."27
The reasoning of Bogart v. Willis2 8 and Scarboroughv.
Atlantic Coast Line29 seems more compelling and more in
point as to the effect of fraud. While an express exception
concerning fraud would have made the Court's decision
easier, the writer believes that the Court has properly decided the principal case. The decision seems in accord with
the modern trend of decisions, which give no effect, insofar
as the question of fraud waiving the time limitation, to the
distinction between common law Statutes of Limitation
and time limitations on statutory remedies unknown to
the common law. Statutory rights and limitations must be
considered in the light of the body of the law of which they
are to become a part. As common law time limitations are
tolled by fraud, no adequate reason can be presented for
applying a different interpretation as to statutory time
limitations.
IRVIN N. CAPLAN
'2219 Md. 493, 503, 150 A. 438 (1959).
232 Wheat. 25 (U. S. 1816).
Ibid., 29, 30.
Osbourne v. United States, 164 F. 2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947), see
supra, n. 6.
v. Abbott, 6 Wallace, 532 (U. S. 1867), see supra, n. 13.
,Hangar
7 Supra, n. 22, 505.
28 Supra, n. 20.
178 F. 2d 253, 15 A.L.R. 2d 491, cert. den. 339 U. S. 919 (1949).
21
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Automobile Driver Cannot Be Held To A Normal
Degree Of Care Under Extraordinary
Circumstances
Robinson v. Walls'

The defendant, after leaving his employer's restaurant,
was held up by a former employee, forced to turn over all
the cash in his possession, and told to get into his car
and drive as directed, with the robber taking a position
directly behind the driver. After riding for more than ten
minutes, the defendant felt there was little hope for his
survival, and decided to take a calculated risk. With the
car in motion, and after seeing that there were no pedestrians or moving cars in the vicinity, he jumped from his
car and ran. The robber, while attempting to control the
car, struck the parked unoccupied cars of the plaintiffs,
causing damage to each. The plaintiffs brought this suit
asserting that the defendant was negligent in abandoning
his car while in motion, and that this negligence resulted
in the damage to their cars.
The court held that the circumstances under which the
defendant acted constituted an emergency situation, and
that under the doctrine of emergency he could not be held
liable for the resulting damage to the plaintiff's automobiles. In so holding, the court indicated that the defendant
acted not only prudently, but more intelligently than most
people under such circumstances.
To determine the issue of defendant's liability, two basic
questions must be answered: first, did the defendant act
as a reasonable and prudent man by exercising the proper
degree of care in this particular situation; and second,
assuming the defendant was negligent in his actions, were
such actions the proximate cause of the resulting damage?
It has long been established that one is not negligent if
he has used the same quantum of care as would have been
exercised by a reasonable man under like circumstances.
That degree of care has been described as that which experience has found necessary to prevent injury to others
in like cases.2 The circumstances of each particular case
must be taken into consideration to determine the proper
degree of care that one owes in respect to another's person
'People's Court of 'Baltimore City (No. 25189-58), reported In the Daily
Record, August 22, 1959 (Md. 1959).
'P., W. & B. RR. Co. v. Kerr, 25 Md. 521, 530 (1866).
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or property.3 The doctrine of emergency, which holds the
actor not liable for taking a course of action which results
in disaster if such action was taken in a situation which
arose suddenly and unexpectedly, would operate to lower
the required level of care, so as to find an act done, without
opportunity for deliberation, not negligent."
In Burhans v. Burhans,5 it was held that the driver was
not negligent when, is swerving to avoid a dog, she overturned the car, injuring the occupants. The court said, in
this opinion:
"Because of the peril of the position in which she [the
driver] was placed.., and the possible consequences
resulting from a collision . . .she is not held to the
same accuracy of judgment as is required of her under
ordinary circumstances. And though a course of action other than that which she pursued might have
been more judicious, she is not to be held liable for
her error of judgment in pursuing the course she did,
if, in doing so, she acted with such care and caution
as -ordinarily prudent persons would have exercised
under the stress of like circumstances. 6
In applying the doctrine to the facts of the instant case,
there is difficulty in meeting the requirement that to be an
emergency, there must be a sudden and unexpected situation, such as to deprive the actor of all opportunity for
deliberation.' In the case of the automobile driver, it is
held that the emergency doctrine cannot be applied where
a driver has had an opportunity to exercise his deliberate
judgment between alternative courses of action.'
8Kent County v. Pardee, 151 Md. 68, 75-76, 134 A. 33 (1926); Yellow
Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588, 596, 170 A. 190 (1934).
'PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) 137, § 32.
'159 Md. 370, 150 A. 795 (1930).
Ibid., 375. Other cases reaching a similar result include Baker v.
Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 72 A. 2d 30 (1950) ; Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll,
205 Md. 137, 106 A. 2d 98 (1954); Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 112
A. 7 2d 475 (1955) ; Mason v. Triplett, 217 Md. 433. 141 A. 2d 708 (1958).
1PROSSE,
loc. cit., supra, n. 4. "Sudden and unexpected" restriction
applied in Hercules ,Power Co. v. Crawford, 163 F. 2d 968 (8th Cir.
1947) ; Kaestner v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 254 Wis. 12, 35 N.W.
2d 190 (1948) ; Horton Motor Lines v. Currie, 92 F. 2d 164 (4th Cir.
1937) ; Henderson v. Land, 42 Wyo. 369, 295 P. 271 (1931).
860 C.J.S., § 257. "Sudden and unexpected" restriction applied in
Horton Motor Lines v. Currie, 92 F. 2d- 164 (4th Cir. 1937) ; Poneitowcki
v. Harres, 200 Wis. 504, 228 N.W. 126 (1929); Bloxom v. McCoy, 178 Va.
343, 17 S.E. 2d 401 (1941). Similar restrictions are found in 1 CYCLOPEDIA
OF AUTOMOBiLE LAW (1948), Part 2, § 668. Recent Maryland cases in
point are: Lehmann v. Johnson, 218 Md. 343, 146 A. 2d 886 (1958) and
Warnke v. Essex, 217 Md. 183, 141 A. 2d 728 (1958).
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The defendant had been in the perilous situation of
being forced to drive at gunpoint for more than ten minutes. He testified that he took a calculated risk when he
decided to jump from his automobile, which apparently
involved a decision between two alternatives: (1) Remain in his automobile and take his chances with this
"desperate criminal", or (2) Jump from the car, causing
possible injury to himself as well as to other persons and
their property. The first alternative was obviously rejected, and the second chosen only after ascertaining that
there were no pedestrians or moving cars nearby. It is
clear that the defendant made a definite, deliberate decision
in his taking this calculated risk and that his abandoning
the car was no mere impulse; and therefore, the situation
does not actually fall within the strict definition of an
emergency.
In Lange v. Affleck, the driver of an automobile had
ample opportunity, although less actual time than in the
instant case, to observe the approaching danger of an oncoming automobile pulling into the wrong lane preparatory
to making a left turn, yet he made no decision as to a
course of action which would avoid an accident until the
last moment, so that the accident occurred anyhow. Here,
the court, disallowed any claim of emergency because the
necessary elements of suddenness, unexpectedness and
lack of time for deliberation were missing. However, compare Cordas v. Peerless TransportationCo.,' in which it
was held that an emergency was present, where a fleeing
criminal jumped into the defendant's cab and ordered the
operator to drive away. The driver leapt from the moving
cab within seconds when he realized the nature of his
passenger, giving the element of suddenness and unexpectedness, thereby distinguishing it from the Walls case.
Assuming that the defendant's act of abandoning his
moving automobile was negligent, however, it becomes
necessary to determine if the negligent act was the proximate cause of the damage. Where a chain of events has
been started due to the alleged negligence of the driver of
an automobile, he may be held liable for all mishaps which
are properly the proximate results of the improper conduct."
The principal means of attacking this doctrine of proximate cause is to show an intervening cause in the chain of
160 Md. 695, 155 A.. 150 (1931).
• 27 N.Y.S. 2d 198 (1941).
60 C.J...S., § 255.
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events that was sufficient to supersede the driver's original
negligence. 2 In Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Co. of
Baltimore," the doctrine of superseding intervening cause
was held to relieve the defendant ice cream truck driver of
negligence, if any, in his inviting a child to a place of danger by having him cross the street to make a purchase,
because the acts of the child and the approach of the car
which struck him were intervening causes superseding
the defendant's act of negligence. So it may reasonably be
argued that in the present case the criminal's attempts to
steer the car after the defendant had jumped were the
intervening causes, and would thus relieve the defendant of
liability by superseding his act of jumping.
However, the mere fact that another cause has intervened between the defendant's negligence and damage for
which recovery is sought, is not of itself sufficient in law
to relieve the defendant of liability; and if the damage is
the natural and probable consequence of the original act,
or is such as might reasonably have been forseen as probable, the original wrongdoer is liable notwithstanding the
intervening act or event. 4 Also, an intervening act of a
person which is the normal response to the stimulus of
a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not
a superseding cause. 1 5 And in addition, if the occurrence
of the intervening cause might have reasonably been anticipated by the wrongdoer as a probable consequence of
his own negligence, such intervening cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the
damage. 6
These restrictions would most likely operate to defeat
any contention that the criminal's attempts at steering
the abandoned automobile were an intervening cause. It
is obvious that damage to property would be a reasonably
forseeable consequence of abandoning a moving car. Likewise, the fact that where the driver of a moving car had
abandoned it the normal response of a passenger would
be to try to control it, would prevent such conduct from
being an intervening superseding cause. And finally, such
attempts at controlling the moving car should have been
reasonably forseeable, and the defendant should have ex12This doctrine is set out in 65 C.J.S., 685, § 111 and upheld in Garbes
v. Apatoff, 192 Md. 12, 63 A. 2d 307 (1949).
179 Md. 384, 18 A. 2d 592 (1941).
4
1 Brown v. New York Cent. R. Co., 53 F. 2d 490, 491 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
5 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
§ 443. Also 65 C.J.S., 695-696, § 111.
16State of Maryland v. Hecht Company, 165 Md. 415, 422, 169 A. 311
(1933).
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pected such to happen when he chose to abandon the automobile.
It would seem therefore, that not only is the defendant
unable to avail himself of the emergency doctrine as a
means of finding his act to be non-negligent, but that the
doctrine of superseding cause cannot be invoked to release the defendant from liability for the damage resulting
from his act.
Yet how does the law expect a reasonable man to act
in such a situation? Although the principle that a person
is to be held responsible for any injury he causes is the
foundation of all tort law, the theory that "One assaulted
and in peril of his life may run through the close of another to escape from his assailant,"' 7 has a definite place in
the development of tort law to its present state. In Ploof
v. Putnam,8 a well known case that did much to promote
this theory, the court held that "One may sacrifice the personal property of another to save his life or the lives of
his fellows." 19 This theory has become known as the doctrine of necessity; and, although it does not abolish liability
for actual damage done, it could certainly operate to lower
the level of care required of the defendant in the instant
case and prevent the recovery of any punitive damages.
A person being forced to drive with a gun in his back
has every reason to believe that his life is in danger. The
concept of self preservation cannot be so disregarded as
to consider a person guilty of a negligent act in attempting
to save his life; and, even though his actions resulted in
certain property damage, it cannot be said that the defendant acted without reason because of the necessity of the
situation.
To summarize the effect of the decision in this case,
it can be said that a reasonable decision made by someone
in a perilous situation to save his own life by taking a
course of action which results in certain damage, is not
to be considered a negligent act because the normal degree
of care required of a driver cannot be required of a person
in such a perilous situation. The instant case thereby
demonstrates a tendency to expand upon the limitations of
the doctrine of emergency.
HARRY E. SILVERWOOD, JR.
rY 37

Hen. VII, pl. 26.
81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).

1Ibid., 189.

Recent Decisions
Criminal Law - Circumstantial Evidence Of Corpus
Delicti Held Sufficient For Murder Conviction. People v.
Scott, 1 Cal. Reptr. 600 (1959). The California District Court
of Appeal, in affirming a first degree murder conviction,
held that, despite the lack of a corpse or any part thereof,
the circumstantial evidence introduced in the trial was
sufficient to supply proof of guilt so convincing as to preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is
apparently the first United States decision where a murder
conviction has been upheld without a body, or any part
thereof, having been found. The defendant, by his behavior following the disappearance of his wife, indicated
that her absence had not been voluntary and that he had
knowledge of her death after her disappearance. The Court
noted that murder convictions, under similar circumstances,
have been upheld in the English cases of The King v. Horry,
[1952] N.Z.L.R. 111, 68 L.Q. Rev. 391 (1952), and The King
v. Onufrejczk, 1 Q.B. 388, 33 Can. B. Rev. 603 (1955).
In order to sustain a murder conviction, there must be
proof of the corpus delicti of the crime, which includes
proof that a human life has been taken. This is usually
satisfied by direct evidence of the fact of death, but there
is no bar in theory to circumstantial proof. Such proof
is in fact sometimes the only kind likely to be available.
See St. Clairv. United States, 154 U. S. 134 (1894) (Throwing victim overboard on the high seas), and 159 A.L.R.
524 (Infanticide). See also 26 Am. Jur. 475, Sec. 461, for
general discussion of necessity of proof of corpus delicti.
The circumstantial evidence of death must, of course, be
clear and satisfactory.
Maryland courts have never been confronted with the
problem. In Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 177 A. 2d 549
(1955), and Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A. 2d 484
(1946), the Court of Appeals indicated that proof of corpus
delicti is sufficient if it is established that the person for
whose death the prosecution was instituted is dead, and
that the death occurred under circumstances which would
indicate that it was caused criminally. However, both of
these cases involved the identity of the corpse rather than
the lack of one.
Evidence - Admissibility, In A Rape Trial, Of Testimony Of Defendant's Prior Rape Victims. State v. Finley,
85 Ariz. 327, 338 P. 2d 790 (1959). Based on admission
of testimony of a 17-year-old girl that the defendant had
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raped her five days before raping the prosecutrix, the defendant was convicted of raping the 44-year-old prosecutrix, where in both instances the defendant had bluntly
declared his intentions, proceeded to accomplish same with
brute force in parked automobiles at night and had exhibited a personality transformation of the "Dr. JekyllMr. Hyde" variety. The Supreme Court of Arizona in a
3-2 decision affirmed the conviction, finding the facts sufficient to establish a scheme or design and in addition, reinforced their holding by indicating that rape is the type
of sexual offense where, for the purpose of showing
"criminal desires" and "lustful propensities", evidence of
prior rapes may be admissible. The dissent, relying heavily
on Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir., 1948),
refused to include rape among the sex offenses where
greater liberality is exercised, and required that for the
"common scheme" exception to apply, evidence of the
prior offense must establish a preconceived plan which
resulted in the commission of that crime, reasoning that a
prior rape merely having certain elements in common
with the rape for which the accused was on trial has no
tendency to establish a plan or design such as would render
the evidence admissible.
Although Maryland has no decision on this precise
point, dictum in Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 164, 150 A.
278 (1930), indicates that in "sexual offenses", especially
adultery, bigamy, criminal conversation, sodomy, indecent
liberties, and incest there is a well recognized exception to
the general rule, but limits this exception to prior offenses
against prosecutrix. In the Wentz case since the previous
incestuous act was against the prosecutrix's sister, such
testimony was excluded. In Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410,
20 A. 2d 146 (1941) evidence of a prior act of sodomy, and
in Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A. 2d 273 (1956) testimony of previous unnatural sex acts were excluded because they were committed against persons other than the
prosecutrix. See also, 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed.
1940), § 357; 167 A.L.R. 594; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954),
§ 157.
Maryland Industrial Finance Law - What Constitutes
Error Of Computation. Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corporation, 221 Md. 271, 157 A. 2d 265 (1960). Plaintiff's loan
payment became due on Friday, but was not paid until the
following Wednesday. Defendant loan company, unaware
of the Time Statute, 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 94, § 2, which
excludes Sunday in computing a period of seven days or
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less, collected a $2.68 delinquency charge from plaintiff.
Collection of a delinquency charge is authorized by the
Maryland Industrial Finance Law, 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art.
11, § 196 (A) (3), for any default continuing for five or
more days. The defendant contended that the collection of
the delinquency charge, while admittedly erroneous, was
done as "the result of an accidental or bona fide error of
computation." Unless the defendant's error met this test,
the defendant would lose his right to collect the entire loan
under Sec. 196(c) of the Finance Law. In reversing the
lower court's judgment for the defendant, the Court of
Appeals held that the collection of the overcharge was not
an "error of computation" and consequently the entire loan
of $800 was void and uncollectible. The Court pointed out
that the Finance Law plainly excuses errors as to the
honest miscalculation of interest, as the result of a computation, but does not excuse a mistake of law as to what,
legally, may be collected. Although the Court felt that the
situation at hand did not, technically, involve usury, it
nevertheless applied usury principles in arriving at its
final decision.
The authorities on the subject indicate that where there
is an exaction of more than legal interest resulting from an
honest mistake of fact, there is no usury; but that a mistake as to the law will not ordinarily relieve a transaction
from being usurious, 55 AM. JuR. 349, 350, Usury, Sec. 35;

6

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

(Rev. ed. 1938) § 1698. It appears

harsh to hold, on the one hand that a mistake of fact,
such as an error in the calculation of interest or a clerical
error, does not constitute usury, and on the other, that a
similar error, as in this instance a mistake of law, though
admittedly an "honest error" is in effect usurious. For a
comprehensive historical sketch of usury and the problems
involved, see Plitt v. Kaufman, 188 Md. 606, 53 A. 2d 673
(1946), and Finance Company, Inc. v. Catterton, 161 Md.
650, 653, 158 A. 17 (1931).
Negligence - Assumption Of Risk By Golf Course Employee. Meding v. Robinson, 157 A. 2d 254 (Del. 1959).
Plaintiff, a greenskeeper who was standing on the edge of
the green approximately seven feet from the pin, was
injured when defendant's approach shot from ninety yards
out hit him. The Court, finding that defendant did not
give the normal admonitory warning held that a greenskeeper did not assume the risk of the golfer's act. A golfer
has the duty of giving timely and adequate warning to
those in the general intended line of play.
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Because of the known dangers incident to the game of
golf, players, spectators and employees assume the risk
of injury due to accident or inadvertence, unaccompanied
by negligence, Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471,
157 A. 10 (1931). However, before driving, a player must
warn persons who are in the general line of play and who
are unaware of his intention to play. The word "fore" is
recognized by golfers the world over as the appropriate
and adequate warning cry, Alexander v. Wren, 158 Va.
486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932). But such a warning need not
be made if the subsequent injured party was in a safe place
or knew of the intended play, Boynton v. Ryan, 257 F. 2d
70 (3rd Cir., 1958), Walsh v. Machlin, 128 Conn. 412, 23 A.
2d 156, 138 A.L.R. 538 (1941).
The Maryland Court of Appeals apparently has not been
presented with any similar type situations. For a thorough
review of decisions from other jurisdictions, see 138 A.L.R.
541, 7 A.L.R. 2d 704.
Practice - Length Of Time During Which Jury Is Kept
Together Is Within The Discretion Of The Trial Judge.
Commonwealth V. Moore, 157 A. 2d 65 (Pa. 1959). Defendant, appealing from a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, bases her appeal on the grounds that the decision
of the jury reached under undue strain and duress imposed upon the jurors by the failure of the trial judge to
make provisions for them to rest and sleep during an extensive deliberation period. After having received instructions, the jury retired at 7:08 P.M. During the next
eleven hours they recessed from deliberating only twice,
the first time at 11:15 when they asked for and received
further instructions from the judge, and the second at
5:00 A.M. in the morning when the judge called them back
into the court room for the purpose of answering any
questions which the jurors might have so as to enable
them to reach a verdict. The forelady at this time expressed the opinion that the jury was deadlocked, but the
judge sent the jurors back into deliberation and urged
them to make every effort to reach a unanimous decision.
At 6:08 A.M., a little more than an hour later, the jury
returned with the verdict. In affirming the conviction the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the extent of time
during which a jury shall be kept together is entirely
within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his action
will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. In light
of the facts stated above and due to the fact that the jury
at no time made any requests for the suspension of the
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deliberations, the Court felt that there was no abuse of
judiciary discretion in this case.
Maryland, in addition to many other states, is in accord with the rule laid down by the Pennsylvania Court.
In Brigmon v. Warden, 213 Md. 628, 131 A. 2d 245 (1957),
the Court of Appeals, in denying an application for a writ
of habeas corpus stated that the length of time that a
jury should be required to deliberate upon a defendant's
guilt or innocence lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court.
For an interesting annotation on this point, see 8 A.L.R.
1420 et seq.
Real Property - Taking Of Air Easements By Landings
And Take-Offs Of Aircraft. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,
348 P. 2d 664 (Wash. 1960). In an action by landowners
adjacent to a large commercial airport to recover for
diminution in market value of their land due to repeated
low flights of aircraft in take-offs and landings, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that such flights were not within
public domain of navigable airspace as set out by Congress
in Civil Air Regulations, and thus amounted to a taking of
air easements, for which landowners are compensable.
The Court relied on United States v. Causby, 328 U. S.
256 (1946), in differentiating between the police power
of the government and the right of eminent domain. Both
Courts said that state governments cannot simply arbitrarily declare that all airspace over a private land is
public domain, and thereby avoid paying damages to property owners for use of such airspace by the state. Only
air above minimum navigable airspace altitudes is part of
the public domain, and repeated invasions of airspace below this minimum is a "taking" of an air easement, compensable under the Washington State Constitution as the
taking of private property for public use under the power
of eminent domain.
Maryland has followed this rule in Mutual Chemical Co.
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, Daffy Record, Jan. 27, 1939, the only case
of this type in this state to date. In this case, a prior
Maryland statute was held invalid. In 1949, a new statute
was enacted (1 Md. Code (1957) Art. 1A, Sec. 13(d))
requiring air rights necessary for a public airport to be
acquired by condemnation proceedings under the right of
eminent domain. For a further analysis of this area, see
Aviators Right in Airspace, 8 Md. L. Rev. 300 (1944).

Book Reveiws
Administrative Law Text. By Kenneth Culp Davis. St.
Paul. West Publishing Company, 1959, pp. xxiv, 617. $8.00.
Perhaps no other test of a book is so all-conclusive as
pitting it against its avowed objectives. Does it meet, in
satisfactory manner, those objectives? Mr. Davis states'
that he is writing "... exclusively for law students. ... not
for practitioners, not for judges, not for administrators,
and not for legal scholars." Being, by choice, a teacher of
law students, Mr. Davis feels qualified to set forth those
items which he believes they want in a text, namely :2
".... significant problems to be opened up for them.
They want informational background, and they want
reasons, pro and con. They want to know the general
drift of the authorities and they want spirited criticism of the authorities. They want ideas to spark their
own imagination in trying to solve problems. They
want the foundations for formulating their own
opinions on major issues. They want illustrations and
concreteness, not abstraction."
Measured against even this formidable array, it can
quite fairly be said that Mr. Davis's book answers such
needs most adequately.
His approach to the shibboleth of "separation of
powers" is at once frank and refreshing. He takes little
time and less space to demolish this erstwhile bastion of
administrative law as it was viewed and taught even as
recently as this reviewer's law school days, using as his
wrecking tool Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting statement8
that in describing administrative agencies as ". . . quasilegislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within
the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution," the
courts have implicitly confessed ". . . that all recognized
classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth
cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use
a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed." In seeking to
direct the student's approach to this matter, Mr. Davis lays
1

8

DAVIS, IX.

Ibid.
F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487 (1952).
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down the view that the principal guide is that of check,
not separation, of powers; for ". . tyranny or injustice
lurks in unchecked power, not in blended power." 4 Concomitantly, he points out that in the federal courts, the
doctrine of nondelegation of power has been so far watered
down as to be of relatively small importance while also
making it clear that the same doctrine has found favor
in many state court decisions. Having disposed of these
matters, Mr. Davis plunges exuberantly into the work of
dissecting and analyzing the many other facets of his
chosen field.
While recognizing full well that oft-times one may
become impatient and irritated in his contacts with some
of the individuals who collectively make up the vast agglomeration of boards and commissions on both state and
federal levels, it is nonetheless regrettable that at times
Mr. Davis allows his feelings to discolor an otherwise
dispassionate treatment of his subject. His repetitive use
of the term "petty," carrying with it a sense of smallmindedness or unyielding rigidity of position, to denote
those agency officials or employees who carry out the
lesser functions of such bodies, detracts from his work and,
so far as this reviewer's experience is concerned, is largely
without warrant. But of more importance, this attitude,
manifested by one of the real authorities in administrative law, may bias students against such persons before
they appear or practice before one or more of these many
agencies.
That Mr. Davis has not merely produced a work of
great scholarship, but has at the same time demonstrated
a very practical working knowledge of the various administrative agencies themselves was forcefully brought
home to the reviewer by the coincidental reading of Mr.
Davis's chapter entitled "Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally Adjudicating," and Mr.
Louis Loss's Foreword to the October, 1959, issue of the
Virginia Law Review, devoted in its entirety to "Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation." Mr. Davis,
in critically pointing out the virtual unreviewability of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's exercise of its
supervisory powers, they being neither adjudicatory or
legislative,5 went on to illustrate their awesome coerciveness so far as registrants under the federal securities acts
' DAVIS, 30

-69 § 4.01.
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are concerned." It was, therefore, noted with a great deal
of interest that Mr. Loss, who has written the landmark
ITo the reviewer, whose administrative agency experience has been
gained primarily in the field of securities regulation, it seems that Mr.
Davis, steeped as he Is in his subject, assumes for the student a knowledge of this specialized field of corporate finance which few, if any, students
possess, and by so doing loses some of the force of his illustration of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's coercive powers over registrants,
after the deficiency letters have been complied with and the final price
amendment has been filed, via the granting or withholding of acceleration
when he summarily says that at this point In the issuer's registration
process, "[blusiness reasons usually make acceleration of amendments s;)
compelling that the registrant is willing to yield to onerous conditions".
(70). To assign "business reasons," rather than explaining that it is the
fear of the collapsing of the underwriting contract which is the force
involved, seems oversimplification. In practically every large public offering of securities, the issurer (a) in the case of a negotiated sale of
bonds or equity securities not having preemptive rights, executes a purchase contract with an investment banking house in which it is agreed
that the investment banker will purchase all of the offered securities at
a certain price, or (b) In the case of a negotiated underwriting of equity
securities which do have preemptive rights, executes an underwriting
contract which provides that for a fee, plus not infrequently certain profit
sharing possibilities and additional fees for shares "laid-off," the underwriter will purchase at a certain price all of the offered securities which
are not subscribed for by the issuer's stockholders under their preemptive
rights within a stated number of days (usually about two weeks) after
the initial public offering. This latter firm-commitment type of underwriting contract is the issuer's assurance that it will receive at least the
agreed-upon price for Its securities even if it cannot sell any of them
to such stockholders. The underwriter's fee to the Issuer for underwriting
the sale of the preemptive securities Is based, of course, on several factors
such as the past performance of the issuer in earnings, its standing in the
industry, and the current state of the market generally in the type of
securities being issued. Overriding all of this, however, Is the fact that,
in the case of bonds or nonpreemptive equity securities, the purchase price
is predicated upon the registration statement becoming effective promptly
after the underwriting agreement is signed, and, in the case of a preemptive
offering of securties, the underwriter's fee is predicated on this same
factor. Under the Federal Securities Laws, the underwriter is unable,
until the registration statement becomes effective, to "lay-off" or spread
(through sales) the risk of having to take up and pay for the unsubscribed
securities. Since securities markets fluctuate, often with great rapidity,
the price which the underwriter agrees to pay for the securities is one
based on his judgment of the market at the moment. However, without
substantially increasing his fee to protect himself against possible declines In the market, no underwriter is willing to remain solely liable for
the securities at a set price withlout being able to sell for a period of
twenty days after the making of the underwriting contract. It is customary, therefore, for the underwriter and the issuer to conclude that
the underwriter's fee and the price which he agrees to pay for the
securities will be based upon the registration statement promptly
becoming effective. To this end the underwriting contract contains a moreor-less standardized paragraph which provides:
"The obligations of the Underwriter to purchase and pay for the
[Securities offered under the registration statement] will be subject
to . . .the following conditions:
(a) The Registration Statement 8hall have become effective not
later than [a stated hour] -Standard
Time, on the second bu8ines8
day following the date of thi8 Agreement. . ...'
Here the SEC's power to grant or withhold acceleration following the
filing of any amendment to the registration statement comes into proper
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work in the securities field,7 should be making the same
point in his Foreword when he wrote: s
"Still another matter which cannot be reiterated
too frequently is the largely theoretical nature of judicial review in great areas of the Commission's work.
In the case of Securities Act registration especially,
there is no need to belabor the point that the Commission - if not a Branch Chief or Assistant Director
of Corporation Finance - is the Supreme Court of the
United States to all intents and purposes." (Emphasis
added.)
This is corroborative evidence, if indeed such were
needed, of Mr. Davis's keen insight into a very technical
and detailed segment of administrative law.
In only two instances involving substantive analysis of
decisions of the Supreme Court did this reviewer find Mr.
Davis's delineations somewhat hard to follow. First, in his
chapter on Bias,9 Mr. Davis, after noting that "[bias] in
the scene of crytallized point of view about issues of law
or policy is almost universally deemed no ground for disqualification," reviews the minority position as expressed
focus. The student must visualize the registration statement relating
to the security as filed with the 'SEC containing almost all of the
necessary statements and disclosures with respect to the issuer and the
security save for the price at which the security is to be sold. This price
is not fixed until a day or two before the contemplated offering and is
then negotiated between the issuer and the underwriter in the execution
of the underwriting agreement. The issuer then files its price amendment
to the registration Statement and requests acceleration of the newly
begun 20-day waiting period which, as Mr. Davis explains, was activated by
the filing of such amendment. The grant of acceleration then becomes vital
in the face of the above-quoted provision In the underwriting contract and
this is the compelling "business reason" to which Mr. Davis refers. Unless
acceleration is granted, the underwriter folds its tent and slips away,
while the registrant solaces itself by gnashing it corporate molars.
Finally, Mr. Davis did not make it clear that no such "acceleration"
problems exist in the case of a registration statement covering securities to
be offered at competitive bidding. Rule 415 of the 'SEC requires the
issuer to include in such registration statement an undertaking "to file an
amendment to the registration statement reflecting the results of the
bidding, the terms of the reoffering and related matters . . ." and provides that the order declaring such a registration statement effective for
bidding, "shall be deemed to declare... [the price] amendment thereto...
effective at the time such [price] amendment is filed" unless a stop-order
proceeding has been previously instituted. This effectively removes the
necessity for requests for acceleration upon the filing of the price amendment to such registration statements.
7Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION (1951) supplemented (1955). Mr. Loss,
in 1951 Associate General Counsel for the SEC, is presently Professor of
Law at Harvard University.
845 Va. L. Rev. 787, 791 (1959).
9 DAVIs, 215, Chapter 12.
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by the British Committee on Ministers' Powers ° (quoted
with approval by the Administrative Law Committee of
the American Bar Association" that "[b]ias from strong
and sincere conviction as to public policy may operate as
a more serious disqualification than pecuniary interest."
In commenting on the view of the British Committee,
Mr. Davis refers to the case of F.T.C. v. Cement Institute.2
In his description of the factual background, he states:"
"The Commission had issued a cease and desist
order against use of a multiple basing-point system in
the selling of cement. The Commission before instituting the proceeding had made reports to Congress
and to the President expressing the opinion that the
multiple basing-point system was a violation of the
Sherman Act. The companies contended that the Commission had expressed a 'prejudgment of the issues'
and that it was 'prejudiced and biased.' The Court
specifically said that it was deciding 'on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result of its
prior official investigations.' Then the Court held that
the Commission's previously formed opinion 'did not
disqualify the Commission.'
Without reference to the Supreme Court's opinion here,
one would be entitled (aside from the extremely oblique
reference to the Commission's "prior official investigation") to assume from Mr. Davis's text that the Federal
Trade Commission had of its own initiative and without
directive or other sanction from Congress, begun a study
of the multiple basing-point system and filed its conclusion
with respect thereto with Congress and the President in
an effort (a) to secure legislative action with respect to
such system, or (b) to have the President direct the Attorney General to institute proceedings against the cement
companies under the Sherman Act, all in addition to the
action which the Federal Trade Commission planned under
the Federal Trade Commission Act. If this had been the
fact, then the Supreme Court's refusal to hold the Commission disqualified for bias would have been quite extreme. Upon reading the full opinion, however, one finds
very sound grounds upon which the court could and did
10Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932) 78.
"61 A.B.A. Rep. 734 (1936).
"333 U. S. 083 (1948).
DAVis, 216.
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reach its conclusion. It pointed out that one of the cement

companies :14
"[I]ntroduced numerous exhibits intended to support its charges [that the Federal Trade Commission
had previously prejudged the issues and was prejudiced and biased against the cement industry]. In the
main these exhibits were copies of the Commission's
reports made to Congress or to the President, as required by § 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C.A. § 46. [This section of the act states in part
that "The Commission shall have power... (d) upon
the direction of the President or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to
any alleged violation of the antitrust acts by any corporation.] These reports, as well as the testimony
given by members of the Commission before congressional committees, make it clear that long before
the filing of this complaint the members of the Commission at that time, or at least some of them, were
of the opinion that the operation of the multiple basing
point system as they had studied it was the equivalent
of a price fixing restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act." (Emphasis added.)
The court went on to state that the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as a result of its prior
investigations did not mean that the minds of the members
were closed on the subject of the defendant's basing point
practices for here the industry participated in the hearings
and produced some 49,000 pages of testimony on the matter. It concluded:
"[The argument that because the Commission had
previously concluded that the operation of multiple
basing point system was a violation of the Sherman
Act] . . . if sustained, would to a large extent defeat
the congressional purposes which prompted passage
of the Trade Commission Act. Had the entire membership of the Commission disqualified in the proceedings against these respondents, this complaint could
not have been acted upon by the Commission or by
any other government agency. Congress has provided
for no such contingency. It has not directed that the
Commission disqualify itself under any circumstances,
has not provided for substitute commissioners should
14

Supra, n. 12, 700 et 8eq.
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any of its members disqualify, and has not authorized
any other government agency to hold hearings, make
findings, and issue cease and desist orders in proceedings against unfair trade practices. Yet if [the complainants are] right, the Commission by making
studies and filing reports in obedience to congressional
command, completely immunized the practices investigated, even though they are 'unfair,' from any cease
and desist order by the Commission or any other
governmental agency.
"There is no warrant in the act for reaching a
conclusion which would thus frustrate its purposes.
If the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally required reports would bar its members from
acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would appear that
opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair
trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them
from ever passing on another.... Thus experience acquired from their work as commissioners would be a
handicap instead of an advantage. * * *
"Neither the Tumey decision [holding it a violation
of procedural due process for a judge who had a direct
personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant, to try, convict, and commit him to jail] nor any
other decision of this Court would require us to hold
that it would be a violation of procedural due process
for a judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an
opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were
prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try the
same case more than once and decide identical issues
every time, although these issues involve questions of
both law and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court."
While this case does reject the view of the British
committee, it would certainly seem that the student would
be more likely to understand the basis for such rejection
had Mr. Davis placed this case under his discussion of
"The Rule of Necessity."' 5 In that section, he quite well
points up [though for some reason without using this case
as an illustration] the principle that "many cases recognize a clear reason for disqualification, but, nevertheless,
hold on the basis of the rule of necessity that the tribunal
5 DAVIs,

221, § 12.04
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should act" for without such action persons might enjoy
immunity from violations of the law.'"
The second of these matters arises in what is probably his most scintillating and instructive chapter Official
Notice. 7 Having there stated the proposition
8
that: 1
16See Timbers and Garfinkel, Examination of the Commission's Adjudicatory Process: Some Suggestions, 45 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1959), which brings
this matter down to tlate in discussing the case of Gilligan, Will d Co.
, 4 L. ed.
U. S.
v. SEC. 267 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir., 1959), cert. den.
2d 152, 80 S. Ct. 200 (1960). There a broker-dealer involved In the distribution of securities in the Crowell-Colier case was, on August 9, 1957,
named in an order of the SEC which commenced, administrative proceedings
against the broker-dealer and others. On August 12, 1957, and before the
briefing and argument of the case before the Commission (hearing and
recommended decision by hearing examiner having been waived by stipulation), the Commission issued a press release (Securities Act Release No.
3825) in which it indicated that Gilligan, Will & Co., along with others,
had violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 by its distribution of
unregistered securities of Crowell-Oollier. Thereafter, following briefs
and argument, the Commission found a violation of such act by the
defendant (Securities Act Release No. 5689, May 7, 1958) and suspended
it from membership In the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc.,
for five days.
The broker-dealer appealed to the Second Circuit, contending among
other things that the Commission, by its press release of August 12, 1957,
had prejudged the matter. The Second Circuit dismissed this contention
on the ground that the broker-dealer's failure to raise such issue before
the Commission was a waiver of such objection on appeal. Nonetheless,
referring to the bias, or prejudgment, Issue the court cited C'ommissioner
Sargent's statement (unreported but set out in Appellant's Brief) of his
reason for not participating in the hearing "because I reached a defilnite conclusion of law upon findings of fact on August 12, 1957," and
said (267 F. 2d 461, 468-469) :
"While we of course express no opinion on the correctness of
Commissioner Sargent's assertion that §5 of the Administrative Procedure Act does not permit such participation as occurred here by the
Commission Itself In both the release and subsequent proceedings, we
think it appropriate to express our doubts whether such participation
was either necessary or desirable.
". .. the Commission's reputation for objectivity and impartiality
Is opened to challenge by the adoption of a procedure from which a
disinterested observer may conclude that it has in some measure
adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance
of hearing it."
Here is the critical reaction of the Second Circuit that denouncement,
ahead of the hearing, of the acts of the defendant by the agency prosecuting
the defendant was neither "necessary or desirable."
In the Cement Institute case, 333 U. S. 683 (1948) such action, as
noted above, was required by Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, and a denouncement by the F.T.C. without such responsibility imposed by statute could well have fatal results so far as a later hearing is
concerned.
1
7DAvIS, 267, Chapter 15, which begins with the statement that "[n]o
other major problem of administrative law surpasses in practical importance the problem of use of extra record Information in an adjudication."
18Ibid., 269, § 15.02.
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"Whatever the proper limits on official notice may
be, those limits apply only to proceedings in which a
trial type of hearing is required. Far more difficult is
the determination of what fact finding is subject to the
limits when it is clear that a trial type of hearing is
required. Two Supreme Court cases give rise to the
question whether a tribunal may use extra-record
information as it chooses, without giving parties a
chance to meet the information, when the information bears upon devising a remedy or imposing a
penalty."
After having considered one administrative agency case,
he discusses a criminal case in the final development of
this theme. Recognizing the difficulty involved in using a
criminal case to illustrate his point, Mr. Davis notes that
0 case, which ".... may have unduly broadened
the Williams"
the principle" [that a tribunal may use extra-record facts
bearing on a remedy or penalty], did "not involve administrative action, but the basic problem of fairness - of due
process - is the same in all types of adjudications. 0 He
then proceeds to consider that case, wherein the Supreme
Court affirmed the action of the New York Court of Appeals2' which had affirmed a conviction of murder and the
imposition of the death sentence by the trial judge despite
the jury's recommendation of a life sentence. The trial
judge had decided on the death sentence for the defendant
after receipt of a pre-sentence probation report which
covered some thirty other burglaries by the defendant in
the same area where the murder was committed, and
which pointed up other distasteful propensities of the
defendant. Having set out these facts, Mr.22 Davis follows
with the Supreme Court's flat holding that:
"In determining whether a defendant shall receive
a one-year minimum or a twenty-year maximum sentence, we do not think the Federal Constitution restricts the view of the sentencing judge to the information received in open court. The due process clause
should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure. * * * We cannot say that the due process
clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge
"Williams v. New York, 337 U. S.. 241 (1949).
DAVIS, 270.
298 N.Y. 803, 83 N.E. 2d 698 (1949).
Supra, n. 19, 251-252.
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gets additional out-of-court information to assist him
in the exercise of this awesome power of imposing the
death sentence."
He states that the court reached this result by reasoning
that a trial judge has to rely on extra-record probation
reports because "3 "... the modern probation report draws
on information concerning every aspect of a defendant's
life. The type and extent of this information make totally
impractical if not impossible open-court testimony with
cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay
criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues."
From this, Mr.Davis concludes that this is the Supreme
Court's guide to administrative agencies in their own use
of extra-record facts. Certainly, this seems an unwarranted
conclusion when the adjudicative process (if one may
so divide a criminal case) was fully completed when the
defendant had been convicted by a jury on record facts
so that the only use of extra-record facts was not to determine adjudicative facts at all, but merely to assist in sentencing the defendant.
Although one might wish at times (for who among us
has not done the same thing?) that Mr. Davis would not
conclude that on a particular point the better reasoned
opinions support his views, whilst aligning with any dissent from such conclusions the less well-thought-out decisions;24 or that he would pontificate less dogmatically upon
what the Supreme Court will or will not do in the future
on various issues,2 5 it would certainly be unfair to hold out
that such matters detract seriously from a most effective
and erudite work. This text serves a very definite need and
is a fine distillation of the disciplines which abound in this
field of law.
BIRD H. BISHOP*
24

Ibid., 250.
DAviS, 291, § 15.14.
Ibid., 294, § 16.04, "The Supreme Court since the Panama case [293 U.S.

388, (1935)] has not again assigned constitutional reasons for the findings
requirement, and it is unlikely to do so."
* A.B. 1942, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1950, University of Maryland School of Law.
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SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS: USES,

ABUSES, AND 'SOME PITFALLS
By WILLIAM P. CUNNINGHAM*
The Subchapter S Corporation, a creature of interest to

the owners of small businesses and their lawyers, was born
in 1958 with the enactment of the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958,' which added Subchapter S2 to the Internal
Revenue Code. The technical aspects of these new provisions of the Code are complicated; to acquire a workable
understanding of their operation demands considerable

effort. Final Regulations' have recently been issued under
these provisions and a number of comprehensive articles

have been published that would be helpful to those seeking a technical mastery of the area.4 It is not the purpose
of this article to replow this ground. Rather, the objective
is to help the general practitioner faced with making a
decision on the advisability of his client's electing Subchapter S tax treatment. At this juncture, the lawyer
especially needs help (1) in spotting those situations where
the use of Subchapter S would be appropriate, and (2) in
* A.B. 1944, LL.B. 1943. Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
'P.L. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stalt. 1650 (September 2, 1958).
'INTExNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (hereinafter called I.R.C.), §§ 1371-1377.
'T.D. 6432, Dec. 18, 1959, Regs. 1.1371-1 to 1.1377-3.
4Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The CorporateElection cad
Collapsible Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146 (1958); Comment, Subchapter S: A New Concept in the Tax Status of Business Associations,
44 Cornell L. Q. 560 (1959) ; Comment, Subchapter S Tax Option for Small
Business Corporations, 7 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 523 (1959) ; Comment,
Tax Election Corporations: Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 351 (1959); Hoffman, Let's Go Slow with Tax
Option Corporations,37 Taxes 21 (1959) ; Meyer, One Year of Subchapter 5,
38 Taxes 105 (1960) ; Moore and Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and
Section 1244, 14 Tax L. Rev. 453 (1959) ; Murdoch, Effect of Subchapter S
on Decisions as to Form of Business Organization, 38 Taxes 19 (1,960);
Note, Optional Taxation of Closely held Corporations under the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710 (1959) ; Note, Practitioners'
experience with Subchapter S reveal many doubts, fears; use is limited,
10 J. Taxation 130 (1959); Note, Subchapter S of the 1954 Code, 33 St.
John's L. Rev. 187 (1958) ; Willis, Subchapter S: A Lure to Incorporate
Proprietorshipsand Partnerships, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 505 (1959) ; Wright
and Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest Enterprises, 57
Mich. L. Rev. 1131 (1959).
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planning and drafting arrangements among the owners of
a business desiring to operate through a Subchapter S corporation that will tend to minimize potential friction between the various shareholders that might otherwise develop as a consequence of Subchapter S tax treatment of
the business income.
UsES
When to use a Subchapter S corporation should not be
treated as an isolated problem, for it is one aspect of a
broader problem - determining the best type of business
organization to use in various business situations. Weighing the tax and non-tax considerations involved in the
choice of a form of business organization has long been
one of the most difficult tasks that lawyers have to handle.
Congress, in enacting Subchapter S,sought to simplify this
task by reducing the importance of the tax factors involved,
through allowing a business in corporate form to elect
approximately the same tax treatment it would have received had it been organized as a partnership. The enactment of Subchapter S was desirable, according to the
Senate Committee Report on the bill, ". . . because it permits businesses to select the form of business organization
desired, without the necessity of taking into account major
differences in tax consequences".' This statement has been
called ". . . almost incredibly naive . . .",6 for, now, more
than ever, it is necessary to consider tax factors. Before
Subchapter S, the usual choice was between corporation
and partnership. Instead of making corporation and partnership equivalent tax-wise, Subchapter S has added a
third alternative, the Subchapter S corporation. Thus, the
task of the lawyer and business advisor has become considerably more complex.7
According to a 1959 report, 62,000 businesses have
already elected Subchapter S tax treatment.' Despite this
evidence of an initial favorable reaction to Subchapter S,
it would seem unwise to assume that Subchapter S will be
5Senate Finance Committee Report No. 1983, 1958 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm.
News, 4791, 4876; the Report continued (at 4876) :
"... In this respect, a provision to tax the income at the shareholder.
rather than the corporate, level will complement the provision enacted
in 1954 permitting proprietorships and partnerships to be taxed like
corporations. Also, permitting shareholders to report their proportionate share of the corporate income, in lieu of a corporate tax, will
be a substantial aid to small business."
6 Freeland & Stephens, The Commissioner and the Corporation,11 Univ.
of Fla. L. Rev. 509, 535 (1958).
1Moore & Sorlien, supra, n. 4, 457.
61959 P-H Federal Taxes, 32,621.
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used on a grand scale. Certainly, the enactment of Subchapter S does not mean that every business that previously selected partnership for tax reasons will now incorporate and elect Subchapter S tax treatment. Nor does it
mean that small corporations will jump at the chance to
elect Subchapter S tax treatment merely because the tax
structure otherwise imposes a "double tax" on corporate
earnings, once at the corporate tax rate, and then again at
the individual rates of the shareholders when such earnings
are distributed as dividends. Subchapter S will have no
appeal for those owners of small businesses who are successfully using the corporate form so as to have the business earnings taxed at the corporate tax rate in lieu of any
individual tax on the owners, as, for example, where the
corporate earnings are retained in the corporation and used
to finance the growth of the business. In such situations,
the owners will not want to substitute individual tax rates
for the corporate tax rate - the chief effect of a Subchapter S election. Subchapter S should not be sold in
wholesale lots; rather, the choice between partnership,
corporation, and this new alternative, a Subchapter S corporation, turns on the proper assessment of each individual
business situation.
At the outset, the particular business situation must
be examined to determine whether the Code's qualifications
for electing Subchapter S tax treatment can be met. To
govern this question of eligibility, the Code sets out an
elaborate definition of a "small business corporation".' To
be so classified, a business must be a domestic corporation
that does not: (1) own more than 80% of the stock of another corporation," (2) have more than ten shareholders,
(3) have a shareholder (other than an estate) who is not
an individual," (4) have a shareholder who is a non-resident alien, or (5) have more than one class of stock.' 2
Moreover, to retain such classification, a Subchapter S corporation must stay within certain limitations on the type
and source of its income. Not more than 80% of its gross
receipts can be derived from foreign sources nor can more
than 20% of its gross receipts be derived from royalties,
rents, dividends,
interest, annuities, and gains from the sale
3
of securities.
I.R.C. § 1371(a).
negative characteristic results from the rule that a small business
corporation can not be a member of an affiliated group (as deflned in
I.R.C. § 1504).
11See Reg. 1.1371-1(e).
12'See Reg. 1.1371-1(g).
1I.R.C. § 1372(e) (4) and (5).
9

"0This
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Even though a business can meet these requirements,
once met they can not be forgotten, for the business will
not be able to keep its Subchapter S tax treatment if, at
some future time, it violates these restrictions. A Subchapter S election entails serious disadvantages because of
the restrictions that these "qualification" rules impose with
respect to the tax and estate planning of the individual
owners and with respect to the operations and investments
of the business itself.
The loss of freedom in estate planning is especially
significant. Testamentary trusts can not be used by the
shareholders since a trust can not be a shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation. Distribution of stock among the
members of a shareholder's family, by will or gift, is hampered because of the rule that there can not be more than
ten shareholders. Some estate plans require an issue of
preferred stock for eventual distribution to non-active
members of a shareholder's family. The Subchapter S corporation, however, can have only common stock. Also, the
voting trust14device can not be used with a Subchapter S
corporation.
A business may find it difficult to keep its dividend, interest, and rent income, plus its gains from security sales,
at less than 20% of its gross receipts. At the least, keeping
constant check on the business operations to make sure
that this limit is not exceeded adds a bothersome detail to
the duties of corporate management. Also, a Subchapter S
corporation is precluded from having any subsidiary, by
reason of the rule that a Subchapter S corporation can not
be a member of an "affiliated group" as defined in I.R.C.
§ 1504." A corporation with a large amount of debt in relation to the amount of its stock capital may run afoul of the
rule that a Subchapter S corporation can have only one
class of stock. 6
The complicated rules governing the tax treatment of
business income under the Subchapter S election create
various difficulties that should be considered additional
disadvantages of a Subchapter S corporation. For instance,
every adjustment in the Subchapter S tax return for the
corporation, such as a change in its depreciation deduction,
"A choice between freedom in estate planning and, Subchapter S tax
treatment need not be made until a conflict between the two actually
develops. As the business prospers and estate planning becomes a serious
problem, it is likely that the owners (now in higher tax brackets) will
want to terminate the Subchapter S election anyway.
See Reg. 1.1371-1(c).
"See Reg. 1.1371-1(g); Caplin, Subchapter S and its Effect on the
Capitalization of Corporations,13 Vand. L. Rev. 185 (1950).
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requires a corresponding adjustment in the tax returns of
each individual owner. A partnership has the same problem, but the inter-relationship between the return of a
Subchapter S corporation and its shareholders is at a higher
level of complexity than that between the returns of a
partnership and its partners. The additional accounting
expense a Subchapter S election entails may be a significant item to a small business.
The rule that a shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation must report as income his share of the corporation's
undistributed taxable income existing on the last day of
the corporation's taxable year presents difficulties in the
case of sales of stock during the year, and inequities when
a shareholder dies during the year. The buyer of stock must
report as his income the whole year's "constructive dividend" no matter how late in the year he made the purchase.
It may be possible to adjust the purchase price of the stock
to compensate the buyer for this extra tax burden, but this
adjustment may be awkward at the least." Similarly, even
though a shareholder dies toward the end of the corporation's taxable year, his estate must include its proportion of the entire year's earnings in the estate's income
tax return. 8
The Subchapter S corporation, since its distinctive features have their origin in the federal law, is unfavorably
treated under most state income tax laws. The Code encourages the actual distribution of a Subchapter S corporation's earnings to its shareholders since no additional
tax results therefrom. Yet dividend distributions will mean
extra taxes under many state income tax laws.'" For
example, corporate earnings paid out as salaries to shareholder-employees are taxed at 3% under the Maryland
income tax, while the same earnings distributed as a dividend would be subject, first, to the 5% Maryland corporate
income tax, and, second, to a 5% Maryland individual income tax.
17It is also important to withdraw earnings on which the seller has
already paid income taxes, since the right to receive such earnings out of
the corporation without further tax can not be transferred to the buyer.
If a cash shortage makes this unfeasible, the seller might return the
amounts involved to the corporation as a loan.
18Apparently I.R.C. § 691 (Income in Respect of Decedents) does not
apply to such income items; therefore, the estate does not get any deduction
for estate ,tax paid on such amounts under I.R.C. § 691(c). See Anthoine,
Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible
Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1169 (1958).

"Stine, Subchapter S election may increase state income tax on corporation or stockholders, 10 J. Taxation 91 (1959).
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In considering the general disadvantages of electing
Subchapter S tax treatment, the fact that the election can
be abruptly terminated by acts of a single shareholder
creates a sense of uncertainty in the tax picture of all shareholders. Although such terminations can be guarded against
by proper planning, 20 such plans mean restraints on shareholders' rights, as well as additional lawyer's fees. The
least tangible, but for many perhaps the most significant,
consideration against making the election lies in a general
fear of the new and unknown, particularly justifiable here
in view of the chance that, sooner or later, Subchapter S
will be repealed."
If a small business can meet the Code's qualifications for
Subchapter S election and the general disadvantages of
such an election, already mentioned, have been considered
and found not too serious, the next step for the tax planner
is to examine the chief features of Subchapter S tax treatment as they apply to his particular situation. The Senate
Finance Committee Report on Subchapter S indicated three
types of business situations in which the use of a Subchapter S corporation could be desirable:
"It will be primarily beneficial to those individuals
who have marginal tax rates below the 52-percent corporate rate (or 30-percent rate* in the case of the
smaller corporations) where the earnings are left in
the business. Where the earnings are distributed (and
are in excess of what may properly be classified as
salary payments), the benefit will extend to individuals with somewhat higher rates since in this case a
'double' tax is removed. The provision will also be of
substantial benefit to small corporations realizing losses
for a period of years where there is no way of offsetting
these losses against taxable income at the corporate
level, but the shareholders involved have other income
which can be offset against these losses."22
The suggestions of the Committee assume the existence of
a corporation, the question of choice being merely whether
or not to make the election. The possibility of operating

I See

text, infra, p. 209 et seg.; Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Sub-

chapter S and Section 1244, 14 Tax L. Rev. 453, 489 (1959), observe that

such shareholder arrangements "When drawn for all possible protection...
become something of a monstrosity" and that the difficulties involved may
constitute a decisive factor against making the election in some situations.
Note, Practitioners'experiences with Subchapter S reveal many doubts,
fears; use is limited, 10 J. Taxation 130 (1959) ; Hoffman, Let's Go Slow

With Tao Option Corporations,37 Taxes 21, 28 (1959).
2 Senate Report No. 1983, 1958 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News 4791, 4876.
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the business as a partnership is assumed unavailable as an
alternative. This, of course, will be the case where the business is already in existence in corporate form or where
there are compelling non-tax reasons for using a corporation. In examining the Committee's suggestions, let us
make the same assumption, for eliminating the partnership
alternative simplifies the problem.
As the Committee indicated, the first thing to do is to
make a comparison between the corporate tax rate and the
rates of the individual shareholders. The corporate rate
starts out at 30%, and moves up to 52% for corporate incomes over $25,000. This means the average corporate rate
for an annual income of $25,000 or less is 30%; for $50,000,
an average rate of 40%, and for $100,000 an average rate of
46%. An individual will not reach a tax rate over 301% till
his taxable income exceeds $8,000 ($16,000 if he is married
and files a joint return). Perhaps more relevant, the individual's average tax rate does not exceed 30% till he
reaches roughly $14,000 ($28,000 if a joint return). To take
a concrete example, if A and B own a corporate business
making $20,000 a year, and A and B's only income is the
$10,000 each receives out of the business, a Subchapter S
election would seem desirable.
.But more is involved than merely comparing the corporate rate and the individual rates. The amounts that
shareholders can withdraw from the business in the form
of salary is an important factor. If all the shareholders are
employees of the business and all the corporate earnings
can be taken out as salary, there is no need for a Subchapter S election since the only tax on the business earnings would be the individual income tax - roughly the
same result as is achieved by an election. In fact, there
are some definite advantages in using the salary route
rather than Subchapter S. The chief advantage of the
salary route is that it provides a more flexible tax planning
arrangement. The salary route permits the owners to split
the corporate earnings so that a part is taxed at the corporate rate and the balance (that part withdrawn as
salary) is taxed at the individual rates. Especially as the
individual owners reach the higher tax brackets, a combination each year of the corporate rate and the individual
rates often provides the optimum over-all tax result.2 3
The salary route has other advantages, avail-able whether or not a
Subchapter S election is made: (1) Under the Maryland state income tax
there is a 7% differential in favor of withdrawals as salary as compared
with withdrawals as dividends. (2) Withdrawals as salary provide a
higher base for contributions to a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan.
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On the other hand, even though all the shareholders are
employees, if they want to retain some of the business earnings in the corporation and are in low individual brackets,
a Subchapter S election may be indicated. Referring back
to our example of A and B owning a business with $20,000
annual earnings, if A and B wanted to leave $10,000 each
year in the business and take out as salary only $5,000
apiece, a Subchapter S election would result in a total immediate annual saving of $800 in federal income taxes
(assuming both A and B are married and file joint
returns) .24
Regardless of the relative rates of the corporation and
its shareholders, if the shareholders are not employees
and an appreciable part of the corporate earnings are distributed as dividends, a Subchapter S election will reduce
federal taxes. For example, a widow, inheriting her husband's interest in a close corporation, will usually favor a
Subchapter S election. That is to say, where corporate
earnings are subject to "double" taxes because distributed
as dividends, the election, by eliminating the corporate tax,
will result in tax savings.
If a business is losing money in its operations, a Subchapter S election will be advantageous. Here, the higher
the individual rates in comparison to the corporate rate,
the greater the advantage of an election will be. Once such
losses exhaust a shareholder's basis for his stock and his
loans to the corporation, however, the election becomes
disadvantageous."
For the successful small business that is growing
steadily and needs to retain its earnings, Subchapter S has
no appeal, at least where the individual rates approximate
the corporate rate. Such shareholders hope to take out the
corporate earnings at capital gain rates through eventual
liquidation of the business or sale of their stock, or perhaps
hope to avoid even the capital gains tax by waiting until
On the other hand, an advantage of the salary route combined with a
Subchapter S election is that the danger of controversy with the Internal
Revenue -Service as to the "reasonableness" of salaries will be greatly
reduced; but see Hoffman, supra, n. 21, 25.
'A The Subchapter S election would eliminate a $3,000 (30% times $10,000)
corporate tax at the expense of $2,200 in individual taxes (roughly a 22%
tax bracket for A and B).
I Once the shareholder's basis is exhausted, any additional losses
are neither deductible currently nor usable in any later year. Reg.
1.1374-1(b) (4). It should also be noted that an existing corporation with
a large net operating loss carryover would be unwise to elect Subchapter S
tax treatment in view of Reg. 1.1374-1(a). See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710,
715 (1959).
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their deaths step up the basis for the stock to its fair
market value.2"
Where it is possible to operate the business as a partnership, there are additional factors to consider and weigh
before deciding to use a Subchapter S corporation. Whenever a new business is started (assuming that non-tax considerations do not demand the use of a corporation), or
where an existing business is being conducted as a partnership, a tax comparison between partnership and Subchapter S corporation should be made. When a business is
started, some lawyers use an old tax rule of thumb - begin
as a partnership and change to a corporation when the business becomes successful. This general rule may have some
validity still, despite the enactment of Subchapter S. That
is, it would be dangerous to incorporate all new businesses
on the theory that should partnership tax treatment turn
out to be preferable a Subchapter S election could then be
made; for there are some important differences tax-wise
between partnerships and Subchapter S corporations. Partnership may still be the best form to use in many situations.
And it must be kept in mind that the shift from a partnership to a normal corporation or a Subchapter S corporation
may be made without tax consequences, while
a shift in the
28
opposite direction can be costly tax-wise.
Let us first examine the tax advantages of a Subchapter
S corporation over a partnership. The chief advantage is
that a Subchapter S corporation can confer on shareholderemployees a number of so-called fringe benefits that are not
available to partners since partners are not considered employees of the business for tax purposes.29 The most valuable of these fringe benefits is a qualified pension or profitsharing plan. Such plans have four tax virtues: (1) The
corporation gets an immediate tax deduction for amounts
it puts into the plan. (2) The employee is not taxed until
he receives the benefits. (3) If the employee withdraws his
benefits in a lump sum he can get capital gain treatment.
See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 720 (1959).
"IThechief non-tax advantages of a corporation are usually listed as (1)
limited liability, (2) transferability of shares, and (3) continuity of existence despite the death of an owner. The answers of partnership partisans
to these alleged advantages are: (1) serious liability risks can be insured
against, (2) stock in a small business from a practical viewpoint is not
readily transferable, at least to outsiders, and (3) by skillful drafting, the
partnership agreement can adequately handle the problems posed by a
partner's death.
28The shift to a corporation is "tax-free" under I.R.C. § 351, while the
shift to a partnership from a corporation may involve a heavy capital gains
tax under I.R.C. § 331.
2Note, Fringe benefits important factor in considering Subchapter S
election not to be taxed, 9 J. Taxation 376 (1958).
21
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(4) The pension, or profit-sharing, fund, itself, can accumulate its earnings free of tax. In addition, a shareholderemployee of a Subchapter S corporation can get the tax
benefits of an accident and health plan, which means that
the medical bills of both the employee and his family can
be paid by the business without any tax to the employee.3 °
Similarly, tax-free "sick-pay" (I.R.C. § 105(d)) and meals
and lodgings in kind (I.R.C. § 119) are available to the
shareholder-employee of a Subchapter S corporation. I.R.C.
§ 101(b), excluding from income death benefits paid by an
employer to the deceased employee's family up to $5,000,
can also be exploited by the Subchapter S corporation. 3 1
There are signs that these advantages of a Subchapter S
corporation over a partnership may be too good to last. In
September, 1959, Chairman Mills of the House Ways and
Means Committee introduced a bill that would prevent the
use of all these fringe benefits by Subchapter S corporations. 2 If these fringe benefits are taken away, it is hard to
conceive of any situation where Subchapter S tax treatment would be better than that accorded a partnership.
A less significant advantage of the Subchapter S corporation lies in its ability to adopt as its taxable year a
different period than the taxable years of its shareholders.
Because "constructive dividends" of Subchapter S corporations are deemed received by shareholders at the end of the
corporation's taxable year, if the shareholders' taxable
years end just before that of the corporation, they can postpone paying any tax on the initial earnings of the business
for a period up to 23 months.3 Moreover, different taxable
years allow shareholders to control, to some extent, the
year in which the business earnings will be reportable by
them, since, by actually paying out a dividend, the shareholders can report the earnings on their tax returns a year
earlier than such earnings otherwise would be reportable. 4
On the other hand, a partnership has some definite tax
advantages over a Subchapter S corporation. Under partnership tax treatment, income and deduction items have the
30Ibid.
Mickey & Wallick, Tax saving plans under Subehapter S now more

reliable as a result of new regulations, 10 J. Taxation 268, 271 (1959).
H. R. 9003, § 2, introduced September 1, 1959, and still in the House
Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 10, passed by the House, and in
the Senate, -also should be watched, since it would extend the advantages
of pension plans to partners and self-employed individuals.
Wright & Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest Enterprises, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1131, 1145 (1959) ; Note, 10 J. Taxation 130, 133
(1959). § 5 of H. R. 9003 (supra, n. 32), if enacted, would block the use of
different fiscal years in most situations.
81Mickey & Wallick, supra,n. 31, 269.
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same tax character in the partners' tax returns at they had
in the partnership return. With Subchapter S corporations,
however, the conduit idea has a much more limited application. Only long-term capital gains and net operating
losses pass through the Subchapter S corporation without
losing their advantageous tax character. Tax-exempt interest and life insurance proceeds passing to partners from
a partnership retain their tax-exempt quality in the partners' hands, but such items become taxable in the hands of
a Subchapter S corporation's shareholders."
Partners are also treated more favorably under state
income tax laws. For instance, under the Maryland income
tax law, a Subchapter S corporation is not specially treated,
and thus must pay a 5% tax on its earnings. When these
earnings are passed on to its shareholders as dividends, the
shareholders must pay a second 5% tax. In contrast, partners receiving business income pay a single 3% tax. This
7% differential constitutes a significant factor in favor of
partnership over the Subchapter S corporation. Also, under
Maryland law, operating losses of the business are deductible by partners, but they can not be exploited at all by
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation. As to Social
Security taxes, partners have to pay only three-quarters as
much as do shareholder-employees of a Subchapter S corporation." Where several individuals want to start a business and make their capital contributions in the form of
property, it is possible under a partnership agreement to do
equity between the owners and adjust for the differences
between the basis of the property contributed and its current market value.3" Such adjustments are not feasible if
the business is organized as a Subchapter S corporation.
There are a number of other minor advantages of the partnership over the Subchapter S corporation that may be
significant in particular situations."
85Reg. 1. 1377-2 (b).
8 For 1960, a partner's self-employment tax rate is 4%%, while the combined rate of a corporate-employer and shareholder-employee is 6%.
Similarly, Maryland and Federal Unemployment Compensation Taxes and
workmen's compensation premiums must be paid with respect to shareholder-employees by -a corporation while with a partnership such costs
are avoided.
87 See Reg. 1.704-1(c) ; Willis, A Lure to Incorporate Proprietorshipsand
Partnerships,0; U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 505, 507 (1959).
88Partnerships have various technical advantages over Subchapter S corporations: (1) as to Additional First Year Depreciation (I.R.C. § 179);
(2) as to long-term compensation averaging (I.R.C. § 1301); (3) as to
the use of losses in excess of the owner's basis for his interest (cf. I.R.C.
§ 704(d) and § 1374(c)); and (4) as to the pass through of long-term
capital gain despite the existence of operating loss for the year (see Note,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 719 (1959)). As to the comparison of partnerships
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One conclusion from this detailed comparison of the
partnership, the corporation, and the Subchapter S corporation is inescapable: the enactment of Subchapter S has
not made the job of selecting the best form of doing business any easier. Another conclusion is that business situations in which the Subchapter S corporation clearly should
be used will be comparatively rare.
ABUSES

Although there may be only sporadic use of Subchapter
S corporations as a result of weighing the factors already
suggested, commentators have pointed out numerous opportunities for abuse of Subchapter S, using "abuse" in the
sense of a use advantageous tax-wise that seems to be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Subchapter as envisioned by Congress in enacting it. It is not unlikely that
these abuses, or "gimmick" uses, will result in repeal of the
whole Subchapter. 9 Distinguishing between the legitimate
and the illegitimate in tax planning is often difficult.4" The
newness of this legislation makes it particularly difficult to
draw the line. In any event, for a full picture of Subchapter
S, the lawyer should be aware of the nature and variety of
these potential abuses.
The most frequently mentioned abuse is the so-called
"one-shot election"; that is, electing Subchapter S tax treatment for one or two years and then deliberately revoking
or terminating the election. Such one-shot election may be
advantageous where the business has an usually large capital gain in prospect. 1 Suppose a mercantile business owns
a building that has greatly appreciated in value. Under
normal corporate taxation, on selling the building the corporation would have to pay a 25% capital gain tax and then,
on distribution of the cash proceeds to its shareholders, the
shareholders would pay an individual tax on the dividend
received. If, however, a Subchapter S elections is made for
the year in which the sale is to occur, at the most a 25%
and Subchapter S corporations in general, see Willis, supra, n. 37, 510;
Caplin, Subchapter S

vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program,

46 Va. L. Rev. 61 (1960).
1Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The CorporateElection and
Collapsible Amendment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1175 (1958).
40The problem may not involve ethics so much as the exercise of sound
judgment (reaching a decision that will prove wise in the long-run). See
generally -Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 Rocky Mountain L. Rev.
412 (1953) ; and Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners,8 Tax L. Rev. 1
(1952).

4"Roberts & Alpert, Subchapter S: Semantic and procedural traps in its
usc; analysis of dangers, 10 J. Taxation 2 (1959).
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tax is levied; for the long-term capital gain would not be
subject to tax in the corporation and would be taxed at only
capital gain rates on distribution of the cash to the shareholders." Another one-shot election possibility exists where
a loss year is anticipated; the Subchapter S election is made
for that year so that the shareholders can exploit the operating loss on their individual returns, and then the election
is terminated the following year. It has also been suggested
that the Subchapter S election can be used (1) to avoid in
certain situations the effect of the "collapsible corporation"
provision,4" and (2) on liquidation of the business as a substitute for Section 337.44
Subchapter S may be exploited by a one-man business
in questionable ways. For example, a manufacturer's agent,
or a public relations consultant, may decide to do business
as a corporation in order to get the advantages that corporate employers can give to their employees, particularly
pension and profit-sharing plans.4 5 Also, the Subchapter S
election may be used to get cash out of a one-man corporation with accumulated earnings and profits, without payment of an individual tax, by paying a high enough salary
to the owner-employee so as to cause the corporation an
operating loss for the year. Since the Subchapter S shareholder can deduct the loss from his salary income, he is
only taxed on the difference between the salary and the
loss; thereby getting cash out of the corporation without
tax to the extent of this manufactured loss.4 6 The Subchapter S provisions may enable an individual to avoid the
If the capital gain on the sale of the building (plus the corporation's
other "investment" income) exceeds 20% of its gross receipts for the year,
the corporation will forfeit its right to Subchapter S tax treatment; see
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5). § 4 of H.R. 9003, supra, n. 32, if enacted, would
severely limit the "usefulness" of this maneuver.
,1Anthoine, supra, n. 39, 1171. § 4 of H.R. 9003, supra, n. 32, if enacted,
would eliminate this "gimmick" use of Subchapter S.
11Anthoine, supra, n. 39, 1173; Note, Unforeseen effects of Subchapter S
are big help in liquidations, other tax planning, 10 J. Taxation 223,
224 (1959).
1 Anthoine, s8upra, n. 39, 1166; Note; Fringe benefit important factor in
considering Subchapter S election not to be taxed, 9 .1. Taxation 376 (1958)
but see Rev-Rul. 57-163, Part 4(a), 57-1 C.B. 128, 139.
"The salary must still be "reasonable", see Reg. 1.162-7 and Reg.
1.1372-1(c) (1) ; if the salary deduction is disallowed, there will be no net
operating loss. See Note, How to use election under new law to save taxes
on small corporations, owners, 9 J. Taxation 263, 264 (1958). It has also
been suggested that a sole proprietor over 65 years old may Incorporate
and exploit the Subchapter S election to avoid the Social Security rule
against working beneficiaries earning over $1,200 a year. See Wright &
Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stimulants on Modest Enterprises, 57 Mich.
L. Rev. 1131, 1168 (1959) ; but see OASI Bureau Letter, 3/6/59, 1A CCH
Uvemployment Insurance Reporter, p. 4185.
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so-called "hobby loss" provision 7 by setting up his hobby
business in a corporate shell, and electing Subchapter S.48
Sometimes where a closely held business has been split
up among several corporations, it may be possible to make
the election for those corporations likely to suffer losses,
and not elect for those corporations whose stock is appreciating in value. The resulting combination of gains at capital
gain rates and losses offsetting ordinary income may be particularly attractive to high bracket shareholders.4 9
It has been suggested that a Subchapter S corporation
can be profitably used to shift income within a family group
so as to minimize the total family tax bill.5" To illustrate,
if a father and two sons owned a corporation, the father,
if in higher tax brackets than his sons, would find it advantageous to take a low salary from the corporation and
thereby increase the amount of corporate earnings flowing
to his sons by way of dividends. I.R.C. § 1375 (c) would
appear to block such misuse of a Subchapter S corporation.
This section, however, is limited to readjusting the amounts
taxable to the various shareholder-members of the family
group where artificially low salaries are paid to shareholder-employees. Suppose the father gave all his stock to
his sons (perhaps retaining control through an irrevocable
proxy to vote the shares) 1 and the father continues to perform substantial services for the corporation at a low salary.
The diversion of the father's compensation income to the
sons that occurs in this situation is not covered by I.R.C.
§ 1375 (c).1- A limited shift of income to the sons can be
achieved by giving the sons stock just before the end of the
corporation's taxable year, for then the stock's pro rata
share of the corporation's earnings for the whole
year is
3
taxable to the sons rather than to the father.
Combining the Subchapter S election with distributions
of dividends in kind may enable shareholders to realize
gains and get cash out of the corporation without any tax
at all. This "gimmick" is rather involved, and may best be
§ 270.
Note. 10 J. Taxation 133 (1959) ; hut see Reg. 1.1374-2.
4 See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 715 (1959); Anthoine, supra, n. 39, 1162.
IoAnthoine, supra, n. 39, 1167.
See Ecclestone v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W. 2d 679 (1947).
See also O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPOPRATIONS: LAW AND PRACTE (1958) §§ 5.36
and 6.15; 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 43(b) (2).
1Note, 9 J. Taxation 263 (1958); Meyer, Subchapter S Corporations,
36 Taxes 919, 924 (1958). The Commissioner might successfully tax the
father, however, on the theory that assignments of compensation will not be
recognized tax-wise, Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) ; Rev-Rul.
55-2, 1955-1 C.B. 211.
'3Reg. 1.1373-1 (a).
' I.R.C.
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explained through using a hypothetical situation. Assume
T sets up a Subchapter S corporation with a $50,000 capital
contribution, assume that the business earns $10,000 a year,
and that it invests $20,000 in stock that pays low dividends
but has high growth potential. Assume further that in a
few years the stock purchased by the corporation appreciates in value to $40,000. If this stock is then distributed to
T as a dividend in kind, the only tax consequence to T is
that the basis of his stock in the Subchapter S corporation
is reduced by $32,000.14 Moreover, T now has a $40,000
basis for the stock distributed to him and thus he can sell
it for $40,000 and will have no gain on the sale. To escape
the individual dividend tax in this situation, the Subchapter
S corporation must have no accumulated earnings and
profits; and a business that starts as a Subchapter S corporation will not usually have any appreciable earnings
and profits because its income is taxed currently to the
shareholders. Thus, the enactment of Subchapter S may
breed new interest and activity in the dividend in
kind area. 5
Subchapter S does not seem to be sound legislation. It
may be abused more than it is used; if so, it probably will
not endure as a permanent part of the federal tax structure.
But while it lasts, it is a tool to be used with restraint, and
only after thoughtful consideration of its risks and disadvantages and after a careful weighing of the available
alternatives.
SOME PITFALLS To AvoID IN SETTING-UP
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION.

A

Once the decision has been made to elect Subchapter S
tax treatment, the lawyer's job has barely begun, for
there remain some pitfalls that should be guarded against
through planning and action at the time of election. The
problems arise mainly because there are numerous acts and
events listed in the Code that will cause abrupt termination
See Reg. 1.1373-1(g) (Example (3)). One-fifth (10,000/50,000) of the
property distribution (% times $40,000 = $8,000) is treated as a distribution of current earnings, which would be taxed to T anyway under I.R.C.
§ 1373 as a constructive distribution. The balance ($40,000 minus $8,000 =
$32,000) is treated as a reduction in the basis of T's stock in his Subchapter

S corporation under I.R.C. § 301(c) (2). Moreover, if the S corporation sold
this stock itself, rather than distributing it as a dividend in kind, it would
be likely to lose its Subchapter S tax status in view of I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5).
See Wright & Libin, supra, n. 46, 1160.
See generally Mintz and Plumb, Dividends in Kind - The Thunderbolts
and The New Look, 10 Tax L. Rev. 41, 44 (1955).
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of the Subchapter S election. 6 Some of these acts are within the unfettered control of a single shareholder, such as
the transfer of stock owned by him to a trust, partnership,
or corporation, or to an individual who refuses to consent
to Subchapter S tax treatment. A disgruntled minority
shareholder can, by causing the termination of the election,
seriously prejudice the tax situations of the other shareholders. On such a termination, not only will the majority
lose the tax treatment of the business income that they
prefer, but a termination has a retroactive effect that can
cause considerable loss to the other shareholders. For instance, the shareholders may lose their chance to withdraw
as a return of capital previous years' earnings on which
individual taxes have already been paid. Moreover, when
dividends have been paid over early in the year on the
assumption that Subchapter S treatment will apply to the
year, the unexpected termination of the election will result
in the imposition of a corporation tax in addition to the individual tax on the business earnings distributed during
the year.5 7 There are also numerous ways in which the
management of the corporation can cause the termination
of the election, providing a fertile source of controversy
between majority and minority interests.
Before detailed planning to meet these problems can
begin, a fundamental policy decision must be made. Are
changes in Subchapter S status to be determined by a
majority of the shareholders, or is unanimous approval of
the shareholders to be required? It is almost axiomatic
that rule by a majority, in most business situations, is the
only practical way to govern corporate affairs. Subchapter
S status, however, is not an issue that affects the well-being
of the corporate entity as such, but it is a question that
directly affects the well-being of each individual shareholder and the attitude of each shareholder as to Subchapter S status is likely to be determined chiefly by the
individual's income tax bracket. It is unlikely, however,
that the majority shareholders, as the controlling group,
will want Subchapter S decisions to require either unanimous shareholder consent, on the one hand, or to be left to
the whim of a single shareholder, on the other. In most
business situations, the majority probably will have enough
power and influence, either formal or informal, to force the
minority shareholders to accept majority rule for Subchapter S questions as well as for ordinary business deI.R.C. § 1372(e).
Note, Practitioners'experiences with Subehapter S reveal many doubts,
fears; use is limited, 10 J. Taxation 130, 133 (1959).
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cisions. Certainly a majority would be wise to try to
achieve such an arrangement.
There are some businesses, however, that must be
organized, or already have been established, on the basis
of unanimous consent of the shareholders for all important
decisions, the so-called "incorporated partnership". In such
cases, it is likely that the only feasible way to handle Subchapter S questions will be on the same basis. Also, there
may be situations where a majority-run corporation can
obtain the consent of all to a Subchapter S election only by
agreeing to a rule of unanimity for Subchapter S questions.
If no control arrangements as to Subchapter S questions are worked out at the time of elections, the control
situation will vary depending on what Subchapter S question is in issue; a rule of unanimity will apply to election
and formal revocation while termination of the election
will be within the power of the corporate management and
also within the power of each individual shareholder. Thus,
the tax law breeds a control situation that is not only unsound in theory but likely to be chaotic in operation. The
differing tax brackets of the shareholders of a Subchapter
S corporation will often lead them to antagonistic positions
on Subchapter S questions. Therefore, unless a Subchapter
S corporation is so closely held that it is safe to assume that
antagonistic positions among the shareholders will not develop in the future, it is important not to leave the control
situation unresolved, but to adopt some definite control
arrangement for Subchapter S questions.
So that the difficulties involved in devising control
arrangements can be appreciated, the various ways in
which the Subchapter S election can be terminated will be
set out in some detail. There are a number of events causing termination that are within the absolute control of a
single shareholder. Perhaps the simplest device of all is
for a shareholder to transfer stock to a trust; such a trust
may be a short-term revocable trust that, in reality, may
be little more than a sham.5" Transfer of some stock to a
partnership, or to another corporation, or to an individual
who would constitute the eleventh shareholder of the Subchapter S corporation would also terminate the election.
A method of termination often available involves the transfer of some shares to an individual that the transferor has
ascertained in advance would refuse to consent to a continuance of the election. The most painful termination
method available to an individual shareholder is to move
" See Reg. 1.1371-1(e) and Reg. 1.1372-4.
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his residence to a foreign country and renounce U. S.
citizenship. 9
In those instances where an act of the individual shareholder was deliberately done to destroy the Subchapter S
election, the question arises whether the courts will disregard such deliberate act as one made "in bad faith", or
without proper "business purpose", and therefore rule that
the attempted termination of the election was ineffective.
The decision may turn on whether the deliberate act was
the sole idea of a single shareholder against the wishes of
the majority, or whether the act was instigated by the
majority. It seems probable, though, that in either case
such acts will be effective to terminate the election, for the
Code, itself, spells out the "penalty" for termination, 0 i.e.,
the corporation loses its right to Subchapter S treatment
for five years. Moreover, in the Regulations, both types of
termination are covered; the distinction is made between
terminations caused by an individual maverick shareholder and terminations instigated by shareholders having
a substantial interest. In the latter situation the five year
penalty is imposed while in the former the Commissioner
can shorten the five year penalty period." Since the problem of deliberate termination is covered so explicitly by
statute, legislative history, and regulations, it is unlikely
that a court would nullify a termination on the general
theory of improper tax motive. After all, Subchapter S is
an optional tax treatment. It seems odd to look on a return
to normal tax treatment as improper tax avoidance. The
Government would seem on firmer ground in attacking an
initial election as beyond the purpose and intent of the
Subchapter than in attacking
merely the termination of an
62
election on such grounds.
In addition to the various deliberate acts of termination,
an individual shareholder can involuntarily cause termination by dying, followed by the failure of his executor or
administrator to consent to Subchapter S treatment within 30 days after such representative has been appointed. 8
This termination possibility presents serious difficulties for
the planner seeking to guard against its occurrence. These
difficulties stem from the fact that normally it will be
59 A "non-resident alien" shareholder would disqualify the corporation;
I.R.C. § 1371(a).
I.R.C. § 1372(f).
Reg. 1.1372-5 (a).
Note, 33 St. John's L. Rev. 187, 207 (1958).
Moreover, the consent can not be filed later than 30 days following
the close of the corporation's taxable year in which the estate became a
shareholder, Reg. 1.1372-3(b).
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against the interest of the estate and its legal representative to consent to a continuance of the election, since, under
Subchapter S rules, the estate will have to include its share
of the whole year's income of the corporation as a "constructive dividend" even though the estate has owned the
stock for only a part of the year.64 A particularly troublesome problem arises if a shareholder dies just before the
end of the corporation's taxable year and no legal representative is appointed within the period of 30 days following the end of the corporation's taxable year. 5
The corporate management has even more ways to
terminate the Subchapter S election than does the individual shareholder. One comparatively simple method is
for corporate management to so conduct the corporation's
business that more than 20% of the gross receipts of the
business constitute personal holding company type income,
as defined in the Code and regulations. 6 Rents, dividends,
interest and gains from stock sales are the principal types
of income so classified. Similarly, termination ensues if
more than 80% of the corporation's gross receipts are derived from sources outside the United States.07 Under a

1959 amendment of the Code, the acquisition of 80% or
more of the stock of another corporation will result in
termination of the election." Also, termination results if
the corporation issues a second class of stock.09
In addition to the four methods just described, the corporate management has most of the methods available to
the individual shareholder; that is, it can issue stock or
sell treasury stock to the persons prohibited from owning
"An executor may feel obligated to refuse consent, unless he gets court
approval for such consent (there may not be time for this), or unless the
shareholder in his will has explicitly authorized him to consent, or unless
a shareholders' agreement has imposed on the estate a duty to consent
(see, e.g., the draft agreement, infra, p. 221). Anthoine, Federal Tax
Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amcndment,
58 Colum. L. Rev. 1146, 1169 (1958) ; Hoffman, Let's Go Slow With Tax
Option Corporations, 37 Taxes 21, 22 (1959).
', As a last resort, the person likely to be executor should file a consent
within the time limit in the hope that his subsequent appointment will
retroactively validate his action. Also, under Reg. 1.1372-4(b) (iii), the
district director may excuse the failure to file a timely consent. See also,
Comment, 7 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 523, 528 (1959). If heirs of a deceased
shareholder deliberately refuse to take out administration in order to force
the termination of the election in disregard of a contractual obligation to
consent, other shareholders may be able to take out administration and
consent for the estate; see 8 Mo. COD (1957), Art. 93, §§ 34 and 67.
"I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5) and Reg. 1.1372-4(b) (5).
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (4).
"I.R.C. § 1371(a) and § 1372(e) (3) in combination with the amendment
to § 1,504 enacted by P.L. 86-376, § 2(c), effective September 24, 1959.
, I.R.C. § 1371(a) and § 1372(e) (3).
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Subchapter S corporation stock, or to an individual who
refuses to consent to a continuance of the election.
With the numerous ways a Subchapter S election can
be terminated in mind, we can turn to the problems involved in devising control arrangements for determining
Subchapter S questions. As has been indicated, a control
arrangement based on majority rule is the desirable one
for most business situations. At the outset, we run into
the difficulty that a majority control arrangement seems to
run counter to the policy of Subchapter S, in view of its
requirement of unanimous consent of the shareholders for
both election and formal revocation. What was the purpose
behind these Code requirements? At first blush, it may
appear that Congress was concerned with constitutional
difficulties in imposing on individual shareholders taxes on
undistributed corporate business income without their consent. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Subchapter S regulations7" indicate certain shareholders will be
subject to Subchapter S without any consent on their part to
the election and thus provide some indication that constitutional worries were not the reason for the unanimous consent requirement.7 ' The requirement of unanimous consent
may have been used to facilitate tax administration. Requiring the signature of each shareholder to the election would
avoid the contention by a shareholder that he was unaware
of the election and did not, therefore, realize his duty to
report his share of the corporate business income on his individual return. On the other hand, Congress may have felt
that the minority shareholders needed the protection given
by this requirement of unanimous consent to prevent imposition upon them by the majority shareholders. But, even
assuming that the Code's provisions were designed in some
part to protect minority shareholders, it now seems generally accepted by most courts, at least in corporation law,
that an individual can waive statutory provisions enacted
for his benefit, unless such waiver itself would violate
public policy.72 Therefore, although in all dealings with
Reg. 1.1372-1(b) (2) (N.B. the final sentence of this subsection).
An individual tax on undistributed corporate profits would seem constitutional under Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wallace (79 U.S.) 1, 18 (1870),
where the court held that it is ". . . as competent for Congress to tax
annual gains and profits before they are divided among the holders of the
stock as afterwards .. " See also I.R.C. § 551 (a) where the undistributed
income of a foreign personal holding corporation is taxed directly to United
States shareholders, without any consent on their part.
1 See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1958), §§ 5.06
and 5.07. In Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829, 837,
159 A.L.R. 280 (1945) Conway. J. (dissenting), said: "[shareholders] . . .
may by agreement waive or relinquish as between themselves statutory
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the Internal Revenue Service there must be "formal"
unanimity to elect and to revoke Subchapter S tax treatment, there is legal precedent to sustain contractual
arrangements between the shareholders binding themselves to act with respect to Subchapter S questions in
accordance with the will of the majority.
In designing such a control arrangement predicated on
majority rule, there are two sources of trouble the majority will want to neutralize: (1) the power of each individual shareholder to sabotage the majority's plan to continue the Subchapter S election, and (2) the potential liability of the majority for action on Subchapter S questions
contrary to the best interests of the minority shareholders.
Unless the power of the individual shareholder to terminate the election is checked, a disgruntled minority shareholder will have a cudgel that can do considerable damage
to the other shareholders and that can be a means of obtaining from the majority unwarranted favors.
The potential liability of the corporate management (or
the majority shareholders) for causing termination of the
Subchapter S election presents particularly difficult problems. In the first place, this is a new area and what the
attitude of the courts will be is unknown. To illustrate
some of the difficulties, it is convenient to use a hypothetical situation: A, B, and C incorporate a business, each taking a third of the stock and, as employees, withdrawing
most of the profits in the form of salary. Then C dies leaving his shares to his widow. In order to pay over business
profits to the widow without having to pay a "double" tax
on the dividend distributions, Subchapter S tax treatment
is elected. The business prospers and the tax brackets of
A and B exceed the corporate tax rate. Moreover, A and B
want to expand the business operations and want to build
up cash resources within the corporation by retaining most
of the business profits. Now, they feel it would be advantageous to terminate the Subchapter S election. The widow
of C disagrees; her individual tax rates are lower than A's
and B's. In addition, the Subchapter S election tends to
result in the distribution of more money as dividends than
otherwise would be true, since the business profits are
taxed whether distributed or not and the shareholders need
cash to pay their individual taxes. Without Subchapter S,
the widow, as a minority shareholder, would have difficulty
in getting dividends out of the corporation. At this point,
rights where such waiver or abandonment is not contrary to the public
interest." In accord, Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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A and B decide to cause terminaton of the election, without
the widow's consent, by having the corporation's rent income exceed 20% of its gross receipts, by issuing a second
class of stock, or by any of the numerous other ways the
election can be terminated by corporate action. On such
facts, can the widow successfully maintain an action against
A and B for manipulating corporate action for their advantage and to the widow's detriment? In the accumulated
earnings tax area, we have a closely analogous situation.
There have been indications that the corporate management will be liable to the corporate entity for causing the
corporation to incur the I.R.C. § 531 penalty tax, at least
where the corporate management has deliberately caused
the corporation to incur this penalty tax and the corporate
management has been controlled by shareholders who have
preferred the penalty tax to individual taxes at high rates
on dividend distributions while the minority have preferred dividend distributions to the penalty tax.73 Similarly, in our hypothetical situation, the widow may assert
that A and B should be held liable to the corporation for
the amount of corporate tax that had to be paid as a result
of A and B's deliberate termination of the Subchapter S
election. Certainly the full corporate tax would be an unrealistic measure of damages. Termination of the election
has a double aspect; though the corporation incurs the corporate tax, the shareholders are relieved of an individual
tax on undistributed business earnings. Thus, a damage
computation, to be fair, must involve offsetting the decreased individual taxes against the increase in corporate
taxes. Developing a sensible measure of damages, or even
a sound theory of liability, in such situations is a hard
task.74 For our present purposes, all that is important is
that suits by minority shareholders against the majority for
either negligent or deliberate termination of the Sub71See Note, Derivative actions arising from payment of penalty taxes
under Section 102, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 394 (1949), and Note. Corporations Personal Liability of Shareholder-Directors for
Duties of Directors Accumulating Earnings Which Led to Subjection of the Corporation to

Section 102 Taxcs, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1058 (1948).
71Treating this problem as one calling for a derivative suit runs into both
theoretical and practical difficulties. Although the injury arises out of improper corporation action, it is not realistic to look upon the injury as
involving harm to the corporate entity. Only the minority is actually
harmed; moreover, the injury varies as to each minority shareholder depending on his individual tax bracket. Therefore, an individual action by
the minority shareholder (or a class action by the minority shareholders)
against the majority shareholders would seem a more appropriate remedy
than a derivative suit, where the damages are awarded to the corporate
entity. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F. 2d 36 (Cir. 1947); see
generally, BALLANTINE oN CoRPoRATONS (1946), § 143.
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chapter S election are dangers that the majority should not
lightly dismiss.
Protection against these various dangers can be obtained, most effectively, through use of a shareholders'
agreement. An important part of such an agreement involves restricting the transfer of the corporation's shares.7 5
Thereby, the majority can obtain protection against the
minority shareholder who seeks to cause termination of
the election by the sale or transfer of his stock. That is,
the restrictions would be used as a means of policing all
proposed transfers. Under a first option type of restriction,
the corporation would exercise its option to buy the shares,
unless it was satisfied that the transfer would not cause
termination. If the proposed transfer involved a sale or
gift to a new shareholder, necessitating consent by such
new shareholder to avoid termination, the corporate management would insist on getting the consent of the new
shareholder in advance before permitting the transfer to
take place.
Unless the term "shareholder" under the relevant Subchapter S provisions" means "shareholder of record", restrictions on transfer, alone, may not be completely effective as a means of preventing termination of the election
by individual shareholders. If an individual becomes a
"new shareholder" within the provisions of Subchapter S
the day he receives a certificate of stock duly indorsed, it
would seem possible for a determined minority shareholder
to terminate the election despite the agreement's restrictions on transfer. True, he would thereby violate the restrictions, and equity would come to the aid of the majority and require a rescission of the transaction, or a transfer to the corporation under the option provision, but the
damage may already have been done. Before the majority
may be aware of the actual transfer of the stock certificate,
or, perhaps, before remedial action could be taken, the 30
day period in which the new shareholder must consent may
have run and the election terminated. Although the Committee Reports on Subchapter S refer at one point to shareholders "of record",77 it seems likely that the courts will
' Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 713 (1959) ; Moore and Sorlien, Adventures
in Subchapter S and Section 124, 14 Tax L. Rev. 453, 487 (1959). See, as
to the validity of stock restrictions in general, O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA'TIONS:
LAW AND PRACTCE (1958), Chapter VII.
7
HI.R.C. § 1372(e) (1) and (3) in combination with § 1371(a).
In discussing who must consent to the original election, the phrase
"shareholders of record" is used, Senate Finance Committee Report No.
19&3, 1958 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm. News 4791, 4877; but cf. at 5005. See Comment, 7 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 523, 527 (1959).
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hold that the actual transfer of the stock certificate, rather
than the recording of the transfer on the corporate books,
is the crucial event.7 8 On the assumption that the actual
transfer of the certificate is controlling, the effectiveness of
the restrictions on transfer may still be preserved by requiring all shareholders to deposit their stock certificates
with an escrow agent. If held in escrow, the certificates
could not be transferred in violation of the provisions of
the shareholders' agreement.7 9
The time a person becomes a shareholder within the
meaning of Subchapter S may even antedate the transfer
of the stock certificate in some situations where equitable
interests are created. In establishing revocable trusts, for
example, it is frequently provided that the grantor may
retain the stock certificates in his own name instead of
making a formal transfer to himself as trustee.8 ° If such a
disposition of stock is deemed sufficient to create a new
shareholder or shareholders for purposes of Subchapter S,
then stock restrictions, even when coupled with an escrow
arrangement, may prove inadequate. Perhaps a clause in
the shareholders' agreement dating the beneficial interest
of the corporation under its option from the time of any
such trust disposition would successfully meet this problem. If all the above techniques are used, then there is
some assurance that the majority will be protected from
termination of the election by an individual shareholder,
no matter how the term "shareholder" is finally defined.
" The Senate Committee Report did not use the term "shareholder of
record" in discussing termination of the election, ibid, 5006; nor does the
applicable regulation, Reg. 1.1372-4(b)(1). Moreover, Reg. 1.1371-1(d)
defines shareholder as follows: "Ordinarily, the persons who would have to
include in gross income dividends distributed with respect to the stock of
the corporation are considered to be the shareholders of the corporation."
Even though a corporation may properly pay a dividend to a stockholder
of record despite the fact his certificate of stock has been transferred to
another, as between transferor !and transferee the transferee would be the
one beneficially entitled to the dividend and consequently the one required
to report the dividend for tax purposes (see BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS
(1946), § 240). Policy considerations lead to the same conclusion. Unless
the actual beneficial owner of stock, as distinguished from the stockholder
of record, is deemed the "shareholder" for purposes of Subchapter S, the
rules against corporations, partnerships or trusts being shareholders of
Subchapter S corporations could be circumvented merely by neglecting to
have stock transferred on the books of the corporation.
19The escrow agent should not be a trustee, or even loosely called one,
in view of the prohibition against a trust's owning shares of a Subchalter S
corporation, Reg. 1.1371-1(e).
80See generally ScoTT, TILE LAW OF TRUSTS (2nd Ed. 1956), § 32.
SHAT-ruCK and FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK (1953) 445, refers
to the ". . . somewhat common custom of executing the trust and then
waiting until sometime later to round up the property . . ."
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A shareholders' agreement also can establish majority
rule for revocation and re-election of Subchapter S tax
treatment in place of the rule of unanimity set out in the
Code."l Such arrangements do not attempt to alter the
formal requirements of Subchapter S; they merely add a
contractual duty on the part of all the shareholders to
comply with these formal requirements whenever the majority determines that revocation or re-election is desirable.
The risk that the majority may be held liable to the
minority as a result of corporate action instigated by the
majority resulting in Subchapter S termination can be
minimized by a provision in the shareholders' agreement
specifically releasing the majority from such potential liability. This is, however, a rather delicate matter. As previously pointed out, the majority's liability, if any, would
be based on a violation of fiduciary duty. Exculpatory
clauses relieving fiduciaries from their normal liabilities
are looked upon with disfavor by the courts.8 " This attitude
stems from the fact that the exculpatory clause is usually
too broad and, if upheld, would provide a shield for the
fiduciary with respect to acts that never were contemplated
by the parties when they created the fiduciary relationship.
It does not seem too dangerous from a public policy standpoint to give the majority absolute power, as long as such
power is confined to making decisions on Subchapter S
questions. The shareholders in a closely held corporation
should be able, by contract, to make their own rules as to
their mutual rights and duties, at least in dealing with this
Subchapter S area.83
To indicate the form that a shareholders' agreement
covering the above points might take, a draft of such an
agreement is presented below: 4
AGREEMENT made this ............ day of .........................
1960, between Arthur Able, Brian Baker, and Charles
Carr (hereinafter referred to as the Stockholders),
and Green, Inc., a Maryland corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the Corporation).
WHEREAs the Corporation has elected and the Stockholders have consented under Section 1372 (a) of the
I.R.C. § 1372(e) (2) and § 1372(f).
SCOTT, op. cit. supra, n. 80, § 222.
"See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1958), § 3.66.
" This draft is presented as an aid and not as the answer. Not only will
each situation require its own modifications (integration with existing
agreements will often be necessary) but this Subchapter S area is so new
and many of its problems so novel that one hesitates to suggest that any
specific solution, or draft of an agreement, will work out satisfactorily.
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Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to tax treatment under
the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as Subchapter S);
and
WHEREAS the Stockholders desire that the will of
holders of a majority of the shares of the Corporation's stock outstanding from time to time should
control matters related to the continuance, termination, revocation, and re-election of Subchapter S tax
treatment;
Now

THERFORE,

it is mutually agreed as follows:

1. Simultaneously with the execution of this agreement, all the certificates of the Corporation's stock
owned by the Stockholders shall be deposited with the
Treasurer of the Corporation, as Escrow Agent. Said
Treasurer (and his successors in said office) shall hold
the certificates in accordance with the terms of this
agreement and for the purpose of assuring that this
agreement is performed by all parties hereto. Any
certificates of the Corporation's stock hereafter acquired by parties to this agreement shall be deposited
forthwith with said Treasurer to be held by him as
aforesaid.
2. In the event that any party hereto desires to sell,
transfer, or encumber any part or all of his shares of
the Corporation's stock (including any disposition of
stock, or of an interest in stock, that could cause the
termination of Subchapter S tax treatment),85 he shall
first offer such shares of stock for purchase by the Corporation at the book value8 6 of such shares as of the
close of the month next preceding such offer, said book
value to be determined by the Board of Directors of
the Corporation. Such determination, including the
method thereof and the matters considered therein,
shall be final and conclusive. If said offer is not accepted by the Corporation within thirty days of the
"The parenthetical phrase, supplemented 'by the last sentence of this section, is designed to protect against termination of the election as a result
of a shareholder's creation of a revocable trust without any actual transfer
of the stock certificates. See sitpra, n. 80.
Generally, the use of "book value" to determine the option price is one
of the worst methods of valuation; see O'NKAL, supra, n. 83, § 7.24. The
use of "book value" will tend to increase the deterrent effect of the agreement, since "book value" is usually less than "fair value". Thus, the use
of "book value" may be justified where the primary purpose of the agreement is to prevent termination of the election.
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receipt thereof, said offeror shall be free to dispose of
said shares of the Corporation's stock as he may desire.
Should any shares be disposed of in violation of this
provision, the equitable interest of the Corporation
under this provision in such shares shall date from the
date of such disposition.8 7
3. In the event of the death of any party hereto,
the executor or administrator of such party shall execute a consent to Subchapter S tax treatment in accordance with and within the time limits provided for
in Subchapter S and the regulations thereunder, and
shall take such further action and execute such other
documents as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this agreement. 8
4. In the event that holders of a majority of the
shares of the Corporation's stock then outstanding file
a written notice with the Treasurer of the Corporation
that they desire to revoke Subchapter S tax treatment
pursuant to Section 1372(e) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, each party hereto shall execute such
consents to such revocation and take such further action and execute such other documents as may be
necessary to effectuate such revocation.
5. In the event that Subchapter S tax treatment
has been revoked or terminated, and in the further
event that holders of a majority of the shares of the
Corporation's stock then outstanding file a written
notice with the Treasurer of the Corporation that they
desire to re-elect Subchapter S tax treatment, each
party hereto shall execute such consents to such reelection and take such further action and execute such
other documents as may be necessary to effectuate
such re-election.
6. No party hereto, no director, and no officer of
the Corporation shall be liable in damages or otherwise, or in any other way be held responsible, for the
termination of Subchapter S tax treatment where such
termination results from action taken (or by reason of
failure to act) by the Corporation and where such ac"'This section does not prevent a shareholder from terminating the election by becoming a non-resident alien. Normally this possibility can be
safely ignored. It would seem wise to include these restrictions also in the
charter of the corporation; O'NEAL, supra, n. 83, §§ 3.79 and 7.14; see also
2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 4(b) (7).
1 This section should avoid the difficulties discussed, supra, n. 64.
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tion, or non-action, as the case may be, has the approval of the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
7. At any time, by the filing of a written notice
signed by the holders of a majority of the shares of the
Corporation's stock then outstanding with the Treasurer of the Corporation, this agreement may be terminated, or any provision of this agreement may be
waived.
8. This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of all
parties to this agreement, and the terms "party" or
"parties", as used in this agreement shall include the
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the named parties and the heirs, executors,
and administrators of assigns of such named parties.
All parties bound by this agreement shall execute and
deliver any and all documents necessary to carry out
the purposes of this agreement.8 9
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

we, the undersigned, have

executed and sealed this agreement.
Accepted:
Treasurer of Green, Inc.,
as Escrow Agent.
As an alternative to a shareholders' agreement, a charter
provision for the redemption of stock may sometimes be
used as a means of discouraging minority shareholders
from terminating the Subchapter S election. Under such a
redemption provision the corporation would be given a
right to redeem shares whenever a transfer of such shares
has caused the termination of the Subchapter S election.
Although a disgruntled shareholder can still terminate the
election, such a provision enables the majority to cause the
immediate redemption of the shares he has transferred,
and thereby puts the majority in a good position to re-elect
the Subchapter S tax treatment for the next year.9 With'9 Adequate reference to this agreement should be made on the stock
certificates to make sure that any transferee will be bound by it; see
O'NE.AL, supra, n. 83, § 7.16, and 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 2.3, § 114. Before
allowing any transfer under § 2 of the agreement, the corporation should
require the written consent of the prospective transferee to the Subchapter S election.
10Under Reg. 1.1372-5 (a), the Commissioner will probably be lenient in
allowing a re-election for the next year where a disgruntled minority shareholder has caused termination of the election.
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out such a redemption clause, the disgruntled shareholder
(or his transferee) can permanently block any attempt by
the majority to re-elect Subchapter S treatment. Moreover, if the redemption price set in the charter is less than
the current fair value of the shares (which will often be
true if "book value" is used as the redemption price), the
redemption provision will tend to deter minority shareholders from acts causing termination of the election.
The chief advantage of such a redemption provision
over a shareholders' agreement is that it would be less cumbersome to establish and operate. Also, it might be convenient to use where a buy-and-sell agreement between the
shareholders has already been established, since the addition of a charter redemption provision may avoid elaborate
revision of existing agreements. On the other hand, such a
redemption provision provides for a less comprehensive
treatment of the problems involved; specifically, it would
not establish "majority rule" as to formal revocation and
re-election, nor would it explicitly relieve the majority
from potential liability for corporate acts causing termination of the election. This redemption provision technique
would seem most suitable for use where, because of the particular circumstances, the majority does not consider the
risks of revolt by individual shareholders serious, and, thus,
are content with half-way measures.
Such a redemption provision can only be used in states
permitting redeemable common stock. In a number of
states, this point is as yet unsettled. 1 As far as Maryland
is concerned, the statute itself explicitly permits redemption provisions as to common stock. 2 Of course, it is still
too early to be confident that a redemption provision of the
type described (and with such a purpose) will withstand
attack in the courts. Not only is redeemable common somewhat novel in itself, but to use a right of redemption to
provide majority rule for Subchapter S questions is to take
an excursion even further into the unknown. As long as all
shareholders consent to a charter amendment creating such
a redemption provision, and the local corporation law is
not adverse, the chances of judicial approval seem good.9 3
To illustrate such a redemption provision, a tentative draft
is presented below:
8upra, n. 83, § 7.11.
2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 18(a) (5) and § 32.
" Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E. 2d 850 (1954),
would seem to support such a use of a redemption provision. See Note,
Callable Common Stock, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1240 (1955) ; cf. Case Comment,
Unqualified Redemption of Common Stock: A Question of Public Policy,
50 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 558 (1955).
IONiL.
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Redemption of Common Stock.

In the event that any shares are transferred to a
person who fails to consent to tax treatment under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(hereinafter referred to as Subchapter S) in accordance with and within the time limits provided for in
Subchapter S and the regulations thereunder; or, with
respect to shares owned by the estate of any deceased
shareholder, in the event that Subchapter S tax treatment is not consented to by an executor or administrator of such estate in accordance with and within the
time limits provided for in Subchapter S and the regulations thereunder; 94 or, in the event that any shares
are transferred or any interest in shares is disposed of
in such a way as to cause the termination of Subchapter S tax treatment; then, any or all of such shares
referred to above as may be designated by the Board of
Directors may be called by the Board of Directors in
such manner as they determine at their book value,
as determined by the Board of Directors as of the close
of the month next preceding such call. Such determination of book value, including the method thereof
and the matters considered therein, shall be final and
conclusive. 95
Could a redemption provision be used, also, as a means
of forcing recalcitrant shareholders to consent to the original election of Subchapter S tax treatment? This is an intriguing possibility, for, otherwise, there seems no way to
elect Subchapter S treatment over the objection of even a
single shareholder. A corporate charter is usually amendable by two-thirds of the shareholders. If such two-thirds
could amend the charter to include a redemption provision
permitting redemption of the stock of anyone who refused
to consent to a Subchapter S election,97 there would be a
method to force the election on the minority. What can be
accomplished through charter amendment varies from
state to state. The Maryland law gives a virtually unlimited power of amendment to the shareholders. 98 But

4 The shares owned by the estate would be subject to redemption where
no executor ,or administrator has been appointed in time as well as where
an executor or administrator refuses to consent.
11Cf. draft set out in O'NAL, supra, n. 83, § 10.14(2).
"2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 11(c) (3).
0The redemption clause draft, supra, would have to be modified to make
refusal to consent to the election an additional ground for redemption.
"2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 10. See BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE (1953), §§ 115 and 122.

19601

SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS

even though such a charter provision were technically permissible under the statute, there is always the risk that
such action would run afoul of equitable limitations on
changes that can be imposed by the shareholders in control
through charter amendment."
Having considered majority control arrangements for
Subchapter S questions, let us turn briefly to the problems
involved in establishing a rule of unanimity for such questions. As has been pointed out, 100 a rule of unanimity in this
area will usually be impractical and unsatisfactory. Yet
there may be situations where an arrangement based on
unanimous consent of the sharehloders is the only one
feasible. For instance, the corporation may have been originally organized on the understanding that all corporate
action would require unanimous consent. Or, some shareholders may condition their original consent to the Subchapter S election on the adoption of a rule of unanimity
for all subsequent Subchapter S decisions.
Designing an arrangement based on a rule of unanimity,
as compared with a majority control arrangement, involves
some new problems, while others remain the same, and
still others are eliminated. Since Subchapter S itself requires formal consent by all shareholders to both election
and revocation, a rule of unanimity is already established;
but contractual arrangements are still needed to protect
against termination of the election by individual shareholder action as well as by corporate action. Protection
from individual shareholder action can be obtained by the
same means used in majority control arrangements; that is,
through imposing restrictions on the transfer of shares.
Establishing a rule of unanimity, however, also requires
giving protection to the minority shareholders from termination of the election by the corporate management. In
theory, at least, equitable relief may be available to the
minority shareholders where the corporate management
has caused the termination of the election and it can be
See generally LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1959), 507-515.
Using a fairer pricing formula under the redemption provision than "ook
value" would improve the chances of the charter amendment withstanding
attack in a court of equity. In view of 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 10, the
argument can be made that as long as a minority can get "fair value" for
its stock, the minority should not be able successfully to challenge on
equitable grounds any charter amendment adopted by the majority. Against
the validity of a redemption provision so used, it may be argued that it
violates the "policy" of Subchapter S itself with its requirement of unanimous consent to a Subchapter S election (see text, supra, n. 72), and that
such an unusual amendment should not be sustained without the unanimous consent of the shareholders (see O'Nwu,
8upra, n. 83, § 3.77).
10 -See text, 8upra, p. 210.
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shown that they did so in flagrant disregard of the interests
of the minority. But the use of such a remedy is fraught
with difficulties.'
One relatively simple way to protect the minority from
the majority is to give each shareholder a veto power as a
part of the corporate structure itself. This can be achieved
by having the charter require unanimous consent for
both shareholder action and director action (each shareholder would also be a director) .102 A less severe approach
would be to require unanimity only with respect to actions
that could result in termination of the election. This would
entail requiring unanimity as to issues of stock, transfers
of treasury stock, waiver of stock restrictions, and charter
amendment, combined with charter restrictions as to the
type of business activity so as to prevent termination because the gross receipts of the business are of an improper
type or source." 3 Either of these approaches, however, involves putting a straight-jacket on the majority shareholders and the corporate management that would usually
cost more in loss of operating efficiency than the protection
given to the minority would be worth.
A more feasible way, perhaps, to guard against action
causing termination of the election instigated by the majority either as corporate managers or as individuals is
through use of a liquidated damage provision. Even though
a shareholders' agreement prohibited all the acts that
would cause termination of the election, still the equitable
remedies of specific performance and injunction would not
be effective, because there would be no way for the equity
court to nullify retroactively an act that caused the termination. Moreover, damages for breach of such a shareholders' agreement would be virtually impossible to compute. For example, suppose a minority shareholder were in
a 20% federal income tax bracket and the corporation
would have to pay a 52% corporate tax in the event of
termination of the election. Certainly termination in such
a situation significantly increases the tax burden on the
minority shareholder's share of the business profits. But
this example over-simplifies the problems involved in measuring the injury to the minority shareholder. An accurate
measure of damages would involve not only the current
year but the indefinite future; and a number of factors
would be involved, all highly speculative, including the
'01 'See text, supra, p. 216.
'0 See Roland Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Hendler, 206 Md. 10, 14,
109 A. 2d 753 (1954).
0 See 8upra, n. 13.
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future incomes of the shareholder and the corporation,
changes in the salary and distribution practices of the corporation, and changes in the tax law itself. In view of the
difficulty of ascertaining damages, it would seem that a
liquidated damage provision that sought to make a reasonable estimate of the damages would be sustained by the
courts, and not held to be a penalty. °4 Of course, the parties would use such a provision in a shareholders' agreement not in the expectation that it would have to be invoked, but in the hope that it would be a deterrent to acts
terminating the election. With these thoughts in mind, a
draft of a shareholders' agreement to establish a rule of
unanimity for Subchapter S questions is presented below:'
AGREEWENT m ade this ............ day of .......................... ,
1960, between Daniel Doe, Edward Engle, and Fred
Frame (hereinafter referred to as the Stockholders),
and Green, Inc., a Maryland corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the Corporation).
WHEREAS the Corporation has elected and the Stockholders have consented under Section 1372(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to tax treatment under
the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as Subchapter S);
and
WHEREAs the Stockholders desire that Subchapter S
tax treatment should not be terminated except with
the unanimous consent of the stockholders of the Corporation;

Now
1.

THEREFORE,

it is mutually agreed as follows:

2.

(Same as section 1 of agreement on page 220)
(Same as section 2 of agreement on page 220)

3.

(Same as section 3 of agreement on page 221)

4. No party hereto, either in his individual capacity, or as director, officer, or employee of the Corporation, shall do, vote for, or assent to any act causing
the termination of Subchapter S tax treatment, unless
there is unanimous stockholder approval of such act
and termination. The failure to take action, reasonable
in the circumstances, that would have prevented a
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932),
ON TI E LAW OF DAMAGES

103See supra, n. 84.

(1935), Ch. 24.

§ 339; MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
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termination of Subchapter S tax treatment shall be
deemed assent to an act causing termination within
the meaning of the preceding sentence. 10 6
5. Inasmuch as the remedy at law would be inadequate and inasmuch as it would be extremely difficult
to determine the actual damages resulting to parties
hereto should Subchapter S tax treatment be terminated without unanimous consent of the stockholders,
any party hereto who fails to comply with the terms of
this agreement where such failure results in termination of Subchapter S tax treatment hereby agrees to
pay to each of those stockholders of the Corporation
who are not in default under this agreement (hereinafter referred to as complying stockholders) as liquidated damages ten dollars ($10) times the number of
shares then owned by each such complying stockholder. If more than one party hereto fails to comply
with the terms of this agreement and thereby contributes to the improper termination of Subchapter S
tax treatment, all such defaulting parties shall be
jointly and severally liable for the amount of liquidated damages above specified. As between themselves, such defaulting parties shall contribute to the
satisfaction of such liability in proportion to the
maximum number of shares owned by each during the
six months period preceding the default.0 7
'0 Under
this clause breach of the agreement results from acts of a
party taken in a corporate capacity as well as in an individual capacity,
and also from a failure to act to prevent termination in either capacities.
Thus, assenting to a failure of the corporation to exercise its option to
purchase stock when a transfer would result in termination, or negligently
allowing the corporation to exceed the 20% limit on personal holding company type income would be conduct constituting a breach of the agreement.
'0 As an illustration of how this clause is meant -to operate, assume A,
B, C, and D own 100 shares each in a Subchapter S corporation. B transfers
his 100 shares to E, and E fails to consent to the election. A and B are
directors and they fail to cause the corporation to exercise its right to
purchase B's shares. A, B, and E would be "defaulting parties" under this
clause, while C and D would be "complying stockholders". C and D would
be entitled to liquidated damages of $1,000 each. A, B, and E would each
be liable for the full $2,000 in damages, -and would each contribute $666.67
to the satisfaction of the liability. The $2,000 damage figure is, admittedly,
only a rough attempt to compensate the complying stockholders for their
loss resulting from termination of the election. In working out a proper
measure of damages, the chief factor is the difference between a stockholder's individual 'tax rate and the corporate tax rate. But even this is
just a beginning, for many imponderables are involved, such as the length
of time the corporation will be foreclosed from re-electing Subchapter S
tax treatment, the future changes in both the corporate and individual
tax rates, the future dividend policy of the corporation, and the possibility
of eventual liquidation. The formula used makes no attempt to relate the
amount of damages due each complying stockholder to his individual tax
situation, for the complexities are too formidable. One way to arrive at a
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6.

(Same as section 8 of agreement on page 222)
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, the undersigned, have
executed and sealed this agreement.
CONCLUSION

The enactment of Subchapter S, presumably with the
best of intentions to aid small businesses with their tax
problems, has, it is true, given the tax planner a helpful new
tool to use in certain relatively rare situations. But it has
also created a myriad of opportunities for abuse and a host
of difficult problems for the lawyer who seeks to mold the
relationships of the business owners so that they can live
peaceably within the framework of this new creature, the
Subchapter S corporation.
dollar amount per share to be used in the formula is to ascertain the difference between the average tax bracket of stockholders and the average
tax bracket of the corporation, and then multiply this difference (expressed
in terms of percentage) by the dollar value of a share of stock. For
example, if the average individual tax bracket were 30% and the average
corporate tax bracket were 50%, the corporate business income would be
worth 20% less to the average stockholder after termination of the election than before; consequently his damage is roughly 20% of the value of
his stock. If, in this instance, the stock was worth $50 a share on the eve
of the execution of the agreement, liquidated damages of 20% times $50,
i.e., $10 per share, would be a suitable measure of damages to use. This
liquidated damage clause is, admittedly, a monstrosity, but at least it indicates one possible approach to a very difficult problem.
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THE MARYLAND LAW OF STRIKES, BOYCOTTS,
AND PICKETING
By LEONARD E. COHEN*
Maryland labor lawyers are sometimes faced with the
situation in which a relatively small business is being
struck, boycotted, or picketed by a labor union, or is threatened with such measures. The question immediately arises
whether such activity is permissible. If the business is
engaged in or affects interstate commerce, then there is
a large body of federal labor law which is applicable.
The National Labor Relations Act 1 (hereinafter called
"NLRA"), provides that some types of strikes, boycotts,
and picketing are unfair labor practices and, therefore,
illegal. For example, the NLRA prohibits picketing which
has as its object the forcing of an employer to recognize a
union as the representative of his employees when another
union has been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter called "NLRB") as the representative
of such employees.' The problems existing under federal
labor law have been thoroughly discussed by other writers,
and it is not the intention of this article to repeat such discussions. Rather, the purpose of this article is to consider
the legality of strikes, boycotts, and picketing in situations
where federal labor law does not apply. Such a situation
would occur if the business involved did not engage in or
affect interstate commerce. Also, under a recent amendment to the NLRA, it seems that federal labor law would
not apply when the business affected interstate commerce
to such a small extent that the NLRB refused to take
jurisdiction over it.3 In either situation, the question would
be primarily one of state law, and this article will attempt
to describe the rather skimpy Maryland law which does
exist in this area.
As an illustration of the type of problem which will be
discussed, assume that a tavern located within Baltimore
City employs three bartenders. Everything sold in the
tavern is purchased from distributors which are themselves
* A.B. 1953, Johns Hopkins University, LL.B. 1958, Harvard Law School;
Member, Baltimore City Bar.
129 U.S.C.A. (1956) §§ 151-168. Another federal statute in the labor field
is the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. (1954) §§ 151-63, 181-88. However,
this act will not be discussed since its application is limited to railroads
and airlines.
229 U.S.C.A. (1956)
§ 158(b) (4) (C).
I See discussion, infra, circa, n. 14.
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located within Baltimore City. The tavern makes no purchases or sales directly outside of Maryland. A union
claims to represent all of the employees of the tavern, but
the union refuses to submit proof of its authority. When
the owner of the tavern refuses to recognize the union, a
picket line appears in front of his establishment. As another illustration, assume that a trucking company serves
small retail stores within Baltimore City. The company
employs five truck drivers, who are not members of any
union. In an attempt to organize the employees of the company, a union calls a strike of its members who are employed at several of the retail stores served by the company. In both of the above illustrations, it is reasonable to
assume that only intrastate commerce is involved, or that
the NLRB would refuse to take jurisdiction. Thus, the
question would be whether the employer in such cases is
entitled to relief under Maryland law.
Before the relevant Maryland law in this area can be
discussed, it will be necessary to mention very briefly two
issues which could determine whether Maryland law would
even apply. These two issues are whether federal law has
preempted the area, and whether there is a constitutional
right to picket which could not be abridged by the state.
PREEMPTION OF STATE'S LABOR JURISDICTION
BY NLRA

In a series of decisions the Supreme Court of the United
States has indicated that when federal labor law controls
a situation, the states have no authority to act in the
matter.' The typical case involved an attempt by an employer to obtain relief from a state court or board against
union activity which violated the NLRA and thus was subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. In such a situation,
the Court ruled that the federal law had preempted the
field, and that the employer's only recourse would be
the NLRB.
Until recently it was believed that states might have
greater authority to award damages than to grant injunctions in this area. This belief was fostered by several cases
which contained language supporting such a conclusion.'
However, in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, the Supreme
'E.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957): Weber v. AnhenserBusch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955)
Garner v. Teamsters Union, ,346 U.S. 485
(1953).
'E.g., Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United
Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
6359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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Court recently held that such is not the case, that a state
court cannot award damages in a situation where it could
not grant an injunction. The Court distinguished the earlier
cases, which had permitted state courts to award damages,
on the ground that those cases involved violence and imminent threats to the public order, which were legitimate
matters of state concern.
In discussing whether strikes, boycotts, and picketing
are controlled by federal law, it is necessary to distinguish
between three types of activity: (1) that which is protected by federal law; (2) that which is prohibited by
federal law; and (3) that which is neither protected nor
prohibited by federal law. For example, Section 7 of the
NLRA provides that "employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. . . . " It is clear, therefore, that strikes,
boycotts, and picketing are protected by federal law to
some extent. For example, if an employer engaged in
interstate commerce refused to grant a wage increase during negotiations with a union, and the union subsequently
called a strike and peacefully picketed the employer, such
activity would clearly be protected by federal law.
On the other hand, the NLRA prohibits various types of
union activity. For example, Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the
Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce
employees of any employer to engage in a strike where an
object thereof is "forcing or requiring any person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....-I Thus, if in the above-described situation, the
picketing was extended to companies dealing with the company with which the union had the dispute, with the purpose of causing strikes at such companies, such picketing
would be a violation of the NLRA.
Suppose, however, that the union put pressure on the
company by calling intermittent and unannounced work
stoppages. In such a case, the activity would not be a violation of the NLRA. On the other hand, such tactics are
considered improper and therefore not within the protec7

29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 157.
129 U.S.C.A. (Cum. Supp. 1959) § 158(b) (4) (B).
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tion of federal law.sa Thus, the activity would be neither
protected nor prohibited by federal law.
The Supreme Court decisions state rather clearly that
when activity is either protected or prohibited by federal
law, the states cannot regulate it. San Diego Unions v.
Garmon' also states that when the NLRB has not determined the legality of conduct under federal law, and the
conduct arguably falls within the compass of federal law,
the states may not regulate the conduct. But, if it appears
that the activity is neither protected nor prohibited by
federal law, it is not clear whether the states may regulate
it. One Supreme Court case suggests that they may.10 However, the following quotation from the Garmon case shows
that the issue is not yet settled:
"If the Board decides, subject to appropriate federal
judicial review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or
prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the
States are ousted of all jurisdiction. Or, the Board may
decide that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether such
activity may be regulated by the States. * * *"

In the above discussion, it has been assumed that when
the NLRA governs a situation, the NLRB, which enforces
that law, will take jurisdiction over the matter. However,
such an assumption is not always correct. The NLRB has
formulated standards to govern its jurisdiction, and such
standards fall short of encompassing all of the businesses
which engage in or affect interstate commerce. 2 This situation results from the NLRB's belief that its budget does
not enable it to handle all of the cases which fall within
its jurisdiction under the NLRA, and that therefore it must
refase to exercise jurisdiction over businesses which have
only a slight effect on interstate commerce. Thus, there
arose what was known as a "no-man's land" in which the
states did not have jurisdiction and in which the NLRB
refused to take jurisdiction. This phenomenon resulted
from the decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Board.3 A union
81See Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Labor Board v.
Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
0 Supra, n. 6.
10Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, supra, n. 8a.
11Supra, n. 6, 245. In ,this case, at p. 245, n. 4, the Court also stated that
Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), "has not been followed
in later decisions, and is no longer of general application."
2 See 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1959), 1 CCH LABOR LAW REPoRTER
1610.
-8353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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charged a small Utah company with engaging in activities
that were unfair labor practices under both the NLRA
and the Utah Labor Relations Act. The company's dealings
outside of the state were very limited; and under its jurisdictional standards effective at that time, the NLRB refused to take jurisdiction over the company. When the
NLRB refused to act upon the union's charges, the union
filed the same charges with the Utah Labor Relations
Board. The Utah Board found that it had jurisdiction and
concluded on the merits that the company had engaged in
unfair labor practices under the Utah Act. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the Utah Board did
not have jurisdiction in the case since the company was
engaged in interstate commerce to some extent. The Court
felt that federal law had completely preempted the field
even though the NLRB refused to exercise its jurisdiction.
The Guss case produced a paradoxical situation whereas some types of activity were prohibited by both
federal and state law, the NLRB would not, and the states
could not, enforce the prohibitions. This situation has been
remedied in two ways. First, in 1958 the NLRB revised its
jurisdictional standards drastically to include many more
businesses. ,a Also, a recent amendment to the NLRA
permits the states to exercise jurisdiction in cases where
the NLRB has jurisdiction but declines to exercise it. 4
Although the recent statute is not absolutely clear, its
legislative history seems to indicate that the states may
apply their own law, and need not follow federal law in
such cases. 5 Apparently, when the NLRB refuses to take
jurisdiction over a business, the business is treated as if
it did not engage in or affect interstate commerce. It is
conceivable that this amendment could be interpreted to
mean that states may take jurisdiction over such cases but
that the applicable law is to be federal; however, such an
interpretation seems unlikely.
In all of its preemption decisions the Supreme Court
has recognized the right of the states to regulate violence
13,See

supra, n. 12.
1 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A.
(Cum. Supp. 1959) § 164(c) (2).
15105 Cong. Rec. 14206, 14214, 14221. Such a conclusion is also supported
by the fact that the Senate bill provided that state agencies could exercise
jurisdiction over companies when the NLRB refused to exercise ilts jurisdiction, providing that such agencies applied federal law. This provision
was eliminated by the conference committee. Conference Rep. 1147, U.S.C.
Cong. & Ad. News (1959) 2503, 2509. See also, Cox, The Landrum-Griffn
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257,
261-262 (1959).
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and threats of violence.16 Thus, there is no question that
the states can enjoin fights, destruction of property, and
other conduct of this type under the police powers of the
state. It often becomes difficult, nevertheless, to decide
whether a state may also prohibit peaceful activity which
seems to be governed by federal law, when such activity
has resulted in instances of violence. This problem usually
arises in connection with picketing, where strikers and nonstrikers often meet fact to face and tempers grow short.
A recent Supreme Court case, Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc.,17 presents a good illustration of this problem. A company in a small community had just over a hundred employees, about one-third of whom engaged in a strike and
picketing to compel the company to recognize a union.
Various acts of violence and threats of violence resulted,
such as puncturing automobile tires, threatening the plant
manager, name-calling as the non-striking employees came
to and left work, and breaking a window in the plant. The
Court held that the state court could enjoin future violence
or threats of violence, but that it could not prohibit picketing per se since the pattern of violence was not so connected with the picketing that an injunction against violence would be ineffective if the picketing were permitted
to continue.
In reaching this decision, the Court expressly distinguished an earlier case in which it had permitted a state
court to enjoin all picketing because of the threat of violence. In Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co.,"8 a labor dispute resulted in picketing accompanied by various forms
of violence, such as smashing windows, exploding bombs in
plants, wrecking trucks, and beatings. The state court reasoned, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the unusual
amount of violence had created an atmosphere of fear and
intimidation, and that further picketing, even though peaceful, would perpetuate this atmosphere. The Supreme Court
did not frame the issue in the Meadowmoor case as being
whether federal law had preempted state law; rather, it
asked whether the United States Constitution prevented a
state court from enjoining picketing (a problem which is
discussed below' 9 ). Nevertheless, the issues in the Youngdahl and Meadowmoor cases are similar, and a comparison
"1E.g., San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; United Workers
v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ; Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin
Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
7355 U.S. 131 (1957).
18312 U.S. 287 (1941).
"See infra, circa, ps. 236-238.
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of the two cases is very helpful in understanding the
Supreme Court view in this area.
In summary, the doctrine of preemption at the present
time seems to have the following effect on the applicability
of Maryland labor law to Maryland businesses: If a business does not engage in or affect interstate commerce,
Maryland has jurisdiction over union activity concerning
the business and may apply Maryland law. If the NLRB
refuses to take jurisdiction over a business, Maryland has
jurisdiction and probably may apply Maryland law. If the
NLRB takes jurisdiction over a business, and the union
activity is either prohibited or protected by federal law
(or if the NLRB has not determined the status of the
activity under federal law but it arguably is prohibited
or protected), Maryland has no jurisdiction over such activity. If the NLRB takes jurisdiction over a business, and
the union activity is neither prohibited nor protected by
federal law, it is not settled whether Maryland has jurisdiction. In any situation involving violence or public disorder, Maryland may act to regulate such breaches of
the peace.
PICKETING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

It is settled law that picketing is to some extent a means
of expression and as such is protected by the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment as incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
It is also recognized that picketing is a form of coercion
and thus is in a different category from other means of
expression. The problem of reconciling the free speech
aspect with the coercion aspect of picketing has proved
very difficult. There is no question that violent types of
picketing, such as mass picketing which blocks ingress and
egress, or picketing accompanied by harm to persons or
property, is not protected by the Constitution and may be
regulated by the states.2" As discussed above, in some instances violence becomes so closely connected with picketing that even the peaceful aspects of the picketing may be
prohibited.2 1 A problem also arises when picketing is conducted peacefully but the object of the picketing seems to
conflict with the public policy of a state, so that the picketing appears to be a means of coercion for an illegal end. It
can be argued that such picketing is no more protected
1 See Hotel Employees' Local v. Wis. Board, 315 U.S. 437 (1942) ; Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 8upra, n. 18.
21 See supra, ps. 234-230.
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than verbal threats for the purpose of extortion. The main
problem has been how far the states can go in enforcing
their public policy as a means of regulating picketing.
Two of the early leading cases in this area are Thornhill
v. Alabama2 2 and A.F. of L. v. Swing". The Thornhill case
settles beyond doubt that peaceful picketing enjoys some
constitutional protection. In this case the Supreme Court
of the United States held unconstitutional an Alabama statute which prohibited all picketing for the purpose of inducing persons not to trade or deal with a business. The
statute as interpreted was not limited to picketing with
an unlawful object or conducted in an unlawful manner.
In the Swing case the Court went farther than in the
Thornhill case by holding that a state court could not
enjoin peaceful organizational picketing. A union had tried
to organize the employees of a beauty parlor, and when
its efforts failed, the union picketed the shop. The Supreme
Court of Illinois had held that such picketing might be
enjoined since it was a violation of the common law policy
of the state for a union to picket when there was no dispute
between the company and its employees.
In a series of subsequent cases the United States
Supreme Court has withdrawn from the position enunciated in the Thornhill and Swing cases, and apparently
has overruled the Swing case sub silentio. In Giboney v.
Empire Storage Co.,2 4 the Court held that a Missouri court
could enjoin a union, which was attempting to organize
peddlers, from picketing a wholesale dealer to force him
to agree to stop dealing with non-union peddlers. Under
the law of Missouri, such an agreement would have constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of
the state anti-trust laws. In Building Service Union v.
Gazzam,25 a union unsuccessfully attempted to organize a
small hotel, and the owner refused to sign a contract with
the union as the bargaining agent for his employees. When
the union began to picket the hotel in an attempt to gain
recognition, a state court enjoined the picketing on the
ground that the object of the picketing was in violation
of the state statute prohibiting employer coercion of employees in their choice of a bargaining representative. The
Supreme Court held that the injunction was valid.2 6
"310 U.S. 88 (1940).
-312 U.S. 321 (1941).
-336 U.S. 490 (1949).
2339

U.S. 532 (1950).

See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Teamsters
Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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In a recent case, Teamsters Union v. Vogt., Inc.,"' a
union unsuccessfully sought to organize the employees of
a company operating a gravel pit in Wisconsin. The union
began to picket the entrance of the company's place of
business with signs reading that the men on the job were
not affiliated with the A. F. of L. Drivers of several trucking companies refused to deliver to the company and
thereby caused substantial damage to the company. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the picketing could
be enjoined on the ground that the objective of the picketing was to coerce the employer to interfere with the right
of its employees to join or refuse to join the union, which
action by the employer would have been in violation of
a Wisconsin statute. The United States Supreme Court
held that the picketing could be enjoined without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter examines the history of the
picketing cases and demonstrates that the Court has
changed its viewpoint greatly since the earlier cases. While
the Court did not overrule A. F. of L. v. Swing, the facts
of the Vogt and Swing cases are substantially identical, and
it would be difficult to discover a meaningful distinction
between them.
The decisions regarding the constitutional right to
picket have followed a serpentine course, and it is difficult
to predict with certainty what the future holds. The present law seems to be that the Constitution prevents a state
from prohibiting peaceful picketing per se,25 but does not
prevent a state from prohibiting picketing for an objective
which violates state policy even though such picketing is
entirely peaceful.
MARYLAND LABOR LEGISLATION

The public policy of Maryland in regard to strikes,
boycotts, and picketing is almost entirely a creation of the
Maryland judiciary. While some of the other states have
detailed labor legislation, the Maryland statutes regulating labor relations are very few and of limited importance. Many states have labor boards which exercise
functions similar to those of the NLRB in the federal
sphere. Although Maryland has a Commissioner of Labor,
his authority is very limited. In general, his chief func- 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
'The Supreme Court recently relied solely on the Thornhill case in
reversing per curiam a Kansas decision; Chauffeurs Local Union 795 v.
Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958).
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tions are to seek mediation and arbitration of labor disputes which may result in strikes or lockouts, to investigate
and publish a report on disputes when he has failed to
secure mediation or arbitration, and to conduct elections
for the selection of labor representatives when the parties
consent to such an election. The only sanction available to
him is to publish in newspapers his findings in labor disputes, which findings may designate the party at fault.2 9
Such adverse publicity may be harmful to many businesses, but in general this sanction seems to have little
effect. Thus, the Commissioner provides services when the
parties desire them, but he has almost no authority to
regulate labor disputes when the parties elect self-help.
The Maryland statute of most importance in this area
is the Anti-Injunction Act,3" which is patterned after the
federal Norris-La Guardia Act."l This statute declares the
policy of Maryland to be that employees should have full
freedom to organize and to negotiate the terms and condition of their employment through representatives of their
own choosing.3 2 The purpose of the act is to place restrictions upon the power of courts of equity to grant injunctions in labor disputes. This purpose reflects the
feeling in this country during the 1930's that courts of
equity were unduly hampering the labor movement by
enjoining necessary and proper union activities, especially
by means of ex parte injunctions.3 3
The act implements its purpose in two ways. First, it
prevents a court from prohibiting, by means of a restraining
order or a temporary or permanent injunction, inter alia,
the following types of activity:
(1) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment regardless of any
promise or agreement to the contrary.
(2) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization regardless of any promise to the contrary.
(3) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, a labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, or picketing, so long as such activity is not coercive,
violent, or otherwise unlawful.
(4) Ceasing to patronize or employ any person.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 89, §§ 1-13.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, §§ 63-75.
-129 U.S.C.A. (1956) §§ 101-10, 113-15.

'0

"8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 63.
See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THIE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 24-46, 53-60,

64-66.
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(5) Assembling peaceably to do or to organize any of
the above acts.
(6) Advising any person of the intention to do any of
the above acts.
. (7) Agreeing with other persons to do any of the above
acts.
(8) Advising, urging or inducing without fraud, violence, or threat thereof, others to do the above acts.
(9) Doing in concert any or all of the above acts on the
ground that the persons engaged3 4therein constitute an unlawful conbination or conspiracy.
Second, the act sets forth specific procedural requirements which must be met before a court may issue a
temporary or permanent injunction in a labor dispute.
Preliminarily to the granting of an injunction, the court
must hear the testimony of witnesses opposing the injunction, and make the following findings:
(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be executed or continued unless restrained.
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury will follow.
(3) That greater injury will result from the denial of
an injunction than will be inflicted by the granting of an
injunction.
(4) That the activity in question is not protected from
an injunction by another provision of the act.
(5) That the complainant has no adequate remedy at
law.
(6) That the police have failed or are unable to furnish
adequate protection to the complainant's property. 5
However, the statute provides that a court may issue
a temporary restraining order before a hearing is held if
the complainant alleges that substantial and irreparable injury will be unavoidable. A court may issue such a restraining order only upon testimony or, in the discretion of
the court, upon affidavits which would support a temporary
injunction if a hearing were held. Before granting such
a restraining order, the court must allow a reasonable time,
but not less than forty-eight hours, for the parties sought
to be restrained to show cause why the restraining order
should not issue. Generally, the restraining order is effective for only five days. There is the further provision
that no restraining order or injunction may issue unless
the complainant has made every reasonable effort to settle
the dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 65.
"8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100,

§ 68.
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available method of mediation or arbitration, unless delay
would cause irreparable injury."
As shown by the above description, one part of the AntiInjunction Act protects certain types of union activity
from a court injunction, while another part of the act sets
forth the procedure which must be followed before a court
may issue a labor injunction. Although these two parts do
not fit together as nicely as possible, the intent seems to be
that activities described in the first part of the act may
never be enjoined and that other activities resulting from
labor disputes may be enjoined, if at all, only after the
statutory procedures have been followed. In general, it
seems that the first part of the act is concerned with peaceful conduct while the second part presupposes the existence of violence.
The Anti-Injunction Act applies only to cases involving
"labor disputes," and its definition of such cases seems to
include almost every conceivable labor dispute:
"(a) What constitutes labor dispute. - A case
shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged
in a single industry, trade or craft, or occupation; or
who are employees of one employer . . . or when the
case involves any conflicting or competing interest
in a 'labor dispute' * * *
"(c) Labor dispute defined. - The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representations of person [sic] in negotiation,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations or any other controversy arising out
of the respective interests of employer or employee,
regardless of whether or not the stand disputants in the
proximate relation of employer or employee.''"
Nevertheless, the Maryland courts have held that the
act was not intended to apply in many situations apparently covered by its language. The cases raising this question are discussed below.3
The following Maryland statute provides that not all
union activity is to be considered a criminal conspiracy:
S8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 69.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 74.
"See infra, circa, ps. 250-258.
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"An agreement or combination by two or more
persons to do or procure to be done an act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen, shall not be indictable as a
conspiracy, if such act, committed by one person,
would not be punishable as an offense; nothing in this
section shall affect the law relating to riot, unlawful
assembly, breach of the peace, or
any offense against
'39
any person or against property.
However, this statute, which originated in 1884, has not
been relied on as an analogy in civil litigation and therefore
seems of minor importance to our problem.
Another Maryland statute sets forth the usual prohibition of sit-down strikes. Violation thereof, by either
the employees involved or by any union directing their
actions, constitutes a criminal offense.4"
EARLY LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE COURTS

Since the labor law of Maryland is largely a result of
judicial decisions, it seems appropriate to provide a brief
background of the judicial approach to labor law in this
country.4 When unionism was in its infancy, and employers challenged the right of unions to cause injury to
businesses by means of strikes, boycotts, and picketing,
the courts turned to the law of conspiracy, which seemed
to apply to the collective harm involved. That law prohibited persons from acting in concert for an illegal or
perhaps immoral aim. It also prohibited persons from
using unlawful means to achieve a legitimate aim. From
this background, the courts generally applied two tests in
determining the legality of union activity: (1) Were the
objectives lawful? (2) Were the means lawful?4 2 However, it was often difficult to apply such general tests to the
variety of situations which developed. Violence was
clearly unlawful, but what about peaceful picketing which
had the effect of ruining a valuable business? Was it
""3 MD.CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 37.
'03 MD.CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 552. At one time there was a Maryland

statute regulating labor disputes involving public utilities; however, the
sta'tute expired by its own terms in 1957 ,and was not re-enacted. 8 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 89, §§ 14-24.
41For an excellent discussion of this subject, with special emphasis on
Maryland law, see LAUCHH IMER, THE LABOR LAW OF MARYLAND (1919)
19-45.
42 See e.g.,
Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912 (8th Cir. 1897) ; Central
Metal Products Oorporation v. O'Brien, 278 F. 827 (N.D. Ohio 1922) ; Plant
v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ; and Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
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lawful to strike Employer A, with whom the union had no
dispute, to cause him to stop dealing with Employer B,
with whom the union had a dispute, in an attempt to put
pressure on Employer B?
Questions of this type - the ones posed represent only
a few of the problems which arose - are not always susceptible of clear and obvious answers. For example, one
question which arose early, and which sometimes still
creates uncertainty today,4 3 is whether it is against public
policy for a union to try to force employees of a company
to join the union against their will by picketing the company, secondary pressure on the customers of the company,
appeals to the public not to patronize the company, and the
like. At first glance such an objective seems against the
American tradition of freedom of choice, and many states,4 4
including Maryland,4 5 today condemn tactics with such
a purpose. However, unions which were struggling for
a foothold in American industry claimed that it should
be permissible for them to force unionization of a
company. They argued that if Employer A was unionized,
and Employer B, his direct competitor, was not, it would be
impossible for the union employees of Employer A to
enjoy wages and benefits much in excess of those given
by Employer B. Employer A would not be able to afford
labor costs much greater than those paid by his competitor,
and in effect Employer B would be governing to a great
extent the. wages and benefits of the employees of Employer A. Therefore, they argued, a union should be permitted to force the employees of Employer B to join the.
union to protect the union members. The success of labor's
position on this issue is shown by the fact that the NLRA,
as interpreted by the NLRB and the courts, has never
forbidden per se picketing with such an object.46
With this brief background of the history of labor relations, we now turn to the Maryland judicial decisions.
In discussing them, it seems practical to divide the cases
" For an illustration of the problem of organizational picketing in recent
years, see the discussion in Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 639,
119 N.L.R.B. 232, 239 (1957) (the Curtis Brothers case).
" See e.g., Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N.E. 2d 1 (1938)
Silkworth v. Local No. 575 of American Fed. of Labor, 309 Mich. 746, 16
N.W. 2d 145 (1944) ; Vogt, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W. 2d 749 (1956), aff'd. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
45 See infra, ps. 250-253, passim.
"See the discussion in Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 639, 119
N.L.R.B. 232, 239 (1957) (the Curtis Brothers case). For the most recent
congressional view on this subject, see § 8(b) (7) of the NLRA, added by
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A.
(Cum.Supp. 1959) § 158(b) (7).
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into two classes - decisions of the Court of Appeals, and
decisions of the circuit courts. Only the first class of
decisions are controlling throughout the state, and since
the circuit court cases often concern issues not yet determined by the decisions of the Court of Appeals, it will be
helpful to have clearly in mind which court rendered the
decision under discussion.
DECISIONS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

The first important Court of Appeals case was Lucke
v. Clothing C't'rs' Assembly."
An employee was discharged by his employer at the insistence of a union because the employee was not a member of the union. The
union had implied that it would induce members of the
union to withhold their patronage, and possibly call a
strike, if the employee was not discharged. The employee
had applied for membership in the union, but had been
rejected. The Court held that the employee had the right
to sue the union for damages. It stated that although the
union had the right to seek favorable conditions for its
members, it did not have the right to interfere with the
rights and privileges of non-union labor. The Court noticed the fact that the union had denied membership to
the employee but said that this point was not crucial to its
decision.
The age of the Lucke case - it was decided in 1893 causes doubt as to whether the case still represents the
public policy of Maryland. If it does, then any labor agreement which makes union membership a condition of employment may violate Maryland law, although such agreements are very common today. Perhaps the Lucke case
may be interpreted to mean that a union may not force an
employer to discharge a non-union employee, but that an
employer may voluntarily agree to a contractual provision
which would require such action. However, such a distinction would often be dubious, since the threat of economic force on the part of a union, either expressed or assumed, usually underlies such a provision.
The Lucke case was decided at a time when courts
often held that while it was lawful for a union to use economic force to achieve immediate advantages for its members, such as a wage increase, it was unlawful for a union
to use such force to achieve conditions which would only
benefit the members indirectly, such as the complete
777 Md. 396, 26 A. 505 (1893).
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unionization of an industry.4 8 This view probably affected
the Court's decision to some extent.
It is also possible to explain the case on the ground that
the union's rejection of the employee's application for
membership was a vital factor in the case even though the
Court stated that it was not. Other states have held that
it is contrary to their public policy for a union to demand
the discharge of an employee, to whom it has denied membership, because he is not a union member.4 9 This view
stems from the belief that it is unfair for a union to put an
employee in such a helpless position.
A very important Court of Appeals case is My Maryland Lodge v. Adt. 50 The company was engaged in the
manufacture of machinery, especially machinery used by
the brewing companies of Baltimore. The union demanded
that the company grant to its employees a wage increase
of ten percent. When the company refused, but offered to
grant an increase of three percent, the union called a strike
of the company's machinists. The union also told the company that if the demands of the employees were not met,
the company would be placed on the union's unfair list,
and the union would prevent any person from accepting
employment with the company. Later the union attempted
to force the company to meet its demand by establishing a
boycott of the company's products, and by threatening to
boycott any business which used the machinery of the
company. Several customers which continued to use the
company's machinery were also placed on the unfair list
and made a part of the boycott. The company alleged
that its business had dwindled from $18,000 a year to less
than $3,500 as a consequence of the acts of the union.
The Court of Appeals held that it was proper to issue
an injunction enjoining the union from continuing its boycott activities. In reaching this decision, the Court attempted to formulate a basic theory of lawful and unlawful union activity. It stated that the company was engaged in a lawful business and that the law protects the
right of an employer to employ whom he pleases at prices
which he and his employees can agree upon. Also, an
employer has the further right to discharge his employees
at the expiration of their term of service, or for violation
of their contract. On the other hand, the employees have
4See,
e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176
Local No. 500, U.B. of Carpenters
"ISee, e.g., James v. Marinship
(1944) : Dorrington v. Manning,

"100

Md. 238, 59 A. 721 (1905).

Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ; Purvis v.
and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348, 63 A. 585 (1906).
Corporation, 25 Col. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329
135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. 2d 886 (1939).
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a legal right to fix a price for their labor, and to refuse to
work unless that price is obtained. They have that right
both as individuals and in combination, and they may
organize to improve their conditions and to secure better
wages. They may even use persuasion to have others join
their organization and may present their cause to the
public in newspapers or circulars in a peaceful way, but
with no attempt at coercion. If ruin to the employer results from their peaceful assertion of these rights, it is
damage without a remedy; but the law does not permit
either employer or employee to use or threaten to use
force, violence, or coercive tactics.
Although it is clear that the Court of Appeals in the
Adt case thought that the union activity as a whole
amounted to unlawful coercion, it is uncertain whether the
Court would not have condoned some of the activity
standing by itself. The Court stated that the union had the
right to present its cause to the public even though such
action was intended to induce the public to cease using the
products of the company and thus to exert economic pressure on the company. However, the Court also said that
the union could not use coercion, which statement seems
contrary to its prior assertion. This possible contradiction can probably be explained by the fact that the case
involved economic pressure on neutral companies which
were customers of the company involved in the dispute.
Thus, the Court was probably condemning the boycott
of the customers

-

a secondary boycott -

and not the

boycott of the company itself - a primary boycott. Such
a position would be in accord with the general view of
lawful and unlawful boycotts. A later Court of Appeals
case confirms this conclusion by stating that the Court
held in the Adt case that it was illegal for a union to boycott the customers of a company in order to put pressure
on the company."
In Pocketbook Workers v. Orlove,5" the Court of Ap-

peals held that peaceful picketing for a lawful object was
permissible, but that violent and coercive picketing was
unlawful regardless of its purpose. Two companies had
open shops and employed workers without regard to their
membership in a union. A union, which was attempting
to organize the employees of the firms, called a strike because of dissatisfaction over wages and working conditions
and because of the refusal of the firms to deal with the
Blandford v. Duthie, 147 Md. 388, 128 A. 138 (1925).
-158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826 (1930).
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union. The employees who refused to work tried to persuade other employees not to report for work, and pickets
wearing placards announcing the strike walked on the
sidewalk in front of the shops. There was a dispute as to
whether employees who refused to strike were threatened
and whether there were other forms of violence. The
Court of Appeals held that the strike and picketing were
not enjoinable except insofar as there was violence. It
reasoned that the employees had the right to organize a
union, to quit work and strike, and to persuade others to
join them. Such persuasion, so long as it was peaceful,
could be carried on by pickets outside the places of employment. However, the Court also recognized that it was
often difficult to draw a line between coercion and mere
persuasion. It stated that many pickets might just by their
numbers and crowding give occasion to some coercion.
In a series of three cases the Court of Appeals discussed
the problem of the secondary strike - a strike or a threat
to strike Employer A in an attempt to exert pressure on
Employer B. 53 In the first case, Blandford v. Duthie,5 4 a
union had attempted in vain for many years to get a company which did roofing work of various kinds for general
contractors, to employ only union men. In order to injure
the company economically, the union threatened to strike
general contractors who used the company and, in fact,
did strike one general contractor, who after a few weeks
was forced to rescind its contract with the company. The
Court upheld an injunction enjoining such conduct by
the union. It stated that this case was not simply one
of union men exercising their right to refuse to work on
a job on which non-union men were employed. Nothing
showed that the employees of the struck general contractor objected to working on the job; rather, the union
called the strike itself. Such action was unlawful because there was no dispute between the general contractor
and its employees, and thus no justification for interference with the contract between the general contractor and
the company. It is interesting to note that the Court
expressly recognized the right of the union men to refuse
to work with non-union men of their own volition, but
condemned the union's part in instigating the strike. Such
a view accords with the policy of the NLRA which makes
In the language of labor law this type of activity is usually referred
to as a secondary boycott even though there is no "boycott" In the normal
sense. However, for purposes of clarity of thinking this article will use
the term "secondary strike" to describe such activity.
Supra, n. 51.
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it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce employees
to strike in various situations, but which does not prohibit
employees from stopping work on their own initiative.5
The rationale of the Blandford case was followed in
Bricklayers' Etc. Union v. Ruff. 56 A company engaged in
the business of stonemasonry entered into a written contract with a general contractor to do all of the stonemasonry work connected with the erection of a church.
The company began the work and employed only union
labor; however, the general contractor employed nonunion labor, and the union ordered all of the union men
working for the company to quit work so long as the
general contractor continued to employ non-union men.
When the company was unable to finish the work, the
general contractor cancelled the contract and employed
others to finish the work at the risk and expense of the
company. The Court of Appeals held that the union was
liable to the company for causing a breach of the contract
with the general contractor which resulted in substantial
damages. The Court stated that if the non-union men had
been working for the company, it would have been proper
for the union men to refuse to work on the same job with
the non-union men, and thus force the company to grant
all work to union men. In such case, the dispute would
have been directly with the party against whom the strike
was ordered. But here, injury was inflicted upon an innocent party in order to compel it to coerce the general contractor. The company had no power to coerce the general
contractor into employing only union men, and even if it
had such power, it had the undoubted right to elect not
to do so. Organized labor's right of coercion and compulsion was thus judically limited to strikes against those
employers directly involved in a trade dispute.
A later decision involving the same parties as the last
case confused this area considerably. Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers' Union 7 arose out of the union's maneuver to avoid
the effect of the earlier decision against it. It changed its
constitution to provide that no member of the union could
work for a subcontractor who took a contract from a general contractor employing non-union labor. The union then
advised the company that no members of the union would
work for the company if it continued to enter into contracts with non-union general contractors. The Court of
Appeals held that the action of the union was not enjoinSee, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, 123 N.L.R.B. 20 (1959).
160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931).
163 Md. 687, 164 A. 752 (1933).
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able, since the facts in this case were different from those
in the earlier Ruff case. In the former case, a strike was
called not to discipline the company with whom there was
no controversy, but to induce a breach of the contract
between the company and a general contractor in an effort
to compel the latter to discontinue the employment of
non-union labor. In this case, there was no existing contract, so the company would not be injured by the refusal
of its employees to work. Nor was there a third party involved in the controversy, which involved only the company and the union.
The reasoning of the Court in this case seems contrary
to its position in the earlier secondary-strike cases, and
the attempt to distinguish the earlier cases is perplexing.
It seems to be mere verbiage to say that in the earlier Ruff
case the controversy was with the general contractor but
that in the present case the controversy was with the company itself. The facts in the two cases are identical in substance. In both cases the union would not allow union men
employed by the company to work with non-union men
employed by the general contractor. In both cases the
only purpose of the union action was to force the general
contractor to use union labor - the company was already
using union labor and its employment practices apparently
were acceptable to the union. The Court also mentioned
the fact that in the earlier Ruff case there was a contract
in existence while in the later case there was not. However, it is not clear why this difference should be important.
By analogy to tort law, it may be a tort to force a person
to breach his contract with another; but it also may be a
tort to interfere with an advantageous relationship not yet
consummated by a contract.5 8 As far as the harm to a company is concerned, it may be far more harmful to be
threatened with loss of all future contracts with non-union
companies than to be faced with the breach of one contract already in existence.
A possible way to support the Court's distinction in
these cases is to say that the earlier cases involved actual
strikes while the later case involved only a threat to
strike. The Court might have believed that a court of
equity should not intervene until something more than
mere threats has occurred. In Lucke v. Clothing C't'rs'
Assembly,59 the union had also merely threatened to strike
or boycott the employer, but the employer had taken the
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) 49, § 766.
77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505 (1893). See supra,ps. 244-245.
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further step of discharging the employee who was the
object of the union's attack. Therefore, the harm intended
by the union's threats actually occurred, and perhaps this
distinction explains why the Court allowed damages in
the Lucke case but refused an injunction in the second
Ruff case. On the other hand, courts of equity have often
enjoined threatened harm,6" and on final analysis it seems
that these cases are fundamentally irreconcilable.
DECISIONS OF THE MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURTS

Several reported Maryland circuit court decisions in
this area date from after the passage of the Maryland AntiInjunction Act6 1 and therefore are affected by the Act. As
discussed more fully above,6 2 this act completely prevents
Maryland courts from enjoining some types of union
activity and requires detailed procedural steps before any
union activity may be enjoined. However, the act applies
only to cases involving labor disputes, and the chief issue
in these circuit court cases was whether they involved a
labor dispute as defined in the statute. If they did not, then
the statutory restrictions on the equity power of the courts
would not apply, and the courts could deal with the union
activity involved on general equitable principles.
In deciding whether a labor dispute was involved, the
Maryland circuit courts, like many other state courts interpreting similar anti-injunction acts of their respective
states, 63 used the means and objectives test which had
existed prior to the passage of the act. 4 If the type of
union activity in question, or the objective of such activity,
was prohibited by prior judicial decisions or by the public
policy of the state, then no labor dispute was involved and
the statute did not apply. By adopting such a flexible
view, the Maryland courts were able to remove many cases
from the seemingly broad statutory definition of a labor
dispute when the courts believed that such cases were not
intended to fall under the act.
Wischhusen v. Griffin65 involved a tavern which had
several coin-operated machines. The owner of a music
machine employed two non-union employees to service this
0 See,

e.g., Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 64 A. 2d 547 (1949).

8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, §§ 63-75.

- See supra, ps. 239-241.
See, e.g., Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 N.Y. 2d 40, 152
N.E. 2d 505 (1958) ; Bonwit Teller & Co. of Phila. v. District 65, Etc., 393
Pa. 324, 142 A. 2d 193 (1958).
See supra, ps. 242-243.
S23 CCH Labor Cases
67,683 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1953).
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machine and other machines owned by him. The owner of
two pinball machines personally serviced these machines
and other machines owned by him. A union was attempting to organize the owners and operators of coin
machines and their employees in Maryland and the District of Columbia. The union attempted to get the owner
of the pinball machines to sign a contract governing his
services, and it tried to get the owner of the music machine to sign a contract governing the services of his
employees, as well as himself, even though the employees
had specifically stated that they did not want to be represented by the union. When both men refused to sign the
contracts, or to join the union, the union started to picket
the tavern with signs asking patrons not to use the machines because they were not serviced by members of the
union. Most of the patrons belonged to some union, and as
a result of the picketing, some patrons refused to enter the
tavern, although the exact loss of business could not be
ascertained. The court held that the picketing was enjoinable on several grounds. First, the picketing was an attempt to bring pressure upon the owners of the machines
by forcing the tavern owner to stop dealing with them and
therefore constituted an unlawful secondary boycott. It
was also held to be unlawful as an attempt to bring pressure upon a self-employer to force him to join a union.
Further, picketing to compel an employer to force his employees to be represented by a union against the employees'
will violated the Maryland Anti-Injunction Act in that the
union was attempting to deny the employees involved
the right to be represented by representatives of their own
choice. Thus, there was no legitimate labor dispute and
the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply.
The first point mentioned by the court was clearly supported by the Court of Appeals decisions discussed above
which prohibit secondary pressure.6 6 The second point that it was unlawful to force a self-employer to join a
union - is not directly supported by any decision of the
Court of Appeals. However, it seems basic to the general
view of labor relations in this country that unions, which
serve to represent employees in their relations with employers, have no right to represent employers against their
will. Since 1947 it has been an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA for a union to induce a strike to force an employer or a self-employed person to join any labor or" See supra, ps. 247-248, passim.
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ganization 7 In 1959 the act was amended to prohibit a
union from threatening, coercing, or restraining any person
to achieve such an objective. 8 Thus the amendment seems
to make unlawful in the federal sphere the kind of activity
involved in the Wischhusen case. The third point - that
it was unlawful to force an employer to interfere with his
employees' choice of a bargaining representative - also has
no support in a Court of Appeals decision, but seems to
accord with Maryland policy as set forth in the AntiInjunction Act. The act declares the policy of the state
to be that:
"....

it is necessary that the individual workman have

full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing . ..
and that he shall be free from interference, restraint or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization ..."69

It would be clearly violative of this policy for an employer,
on his own initiative, to interfere with his employees'
selection of a bargaining representative, and it seems
equally violative for a union to force an employer to do so.
The third principle of the Wischhusen case - that it
is unlawful for a union to seek to represent employees
against their will - was followed in a later case which also
was decided in Baltimore. In Goldstein v. Bartenders
Union, Local No. 36,70 five of the eighteen or nineteen
employees of a tavern joined a union. Representatives of
the union told the owner of the tavern that the union
represented a majority of his employees. The owner asked
to see the names of the members and stated that if the
union did represent a majority, he would negotiate a contract with it. The union refused on the ground that the
owner might discriminate against the union members and
started to picket in front of and in the rear of the tavern.
Several days later, five employees who had joined the
union returned to work and stated that they did not want
the union to represent them. However, the picket line
continued. After finding that the business did not so affect
interstate commerce as to fall under the NLRA, the court
held that an injunction should issue. It stated that the
-29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 158(b) (4) (A).
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A.
(Curn. Supp. 1959) § 158(b) (4) (A).
S8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 100, § 63.
71,020 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1957).
3.3CCH Labor Cases
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Maryland Anti-Injunction Act applies only if there is a
labor dispute, and that under the facts of the case, there
was no labor dispute since the purpose of the picketing to require the employer to recognize the union although the
union did not represent his employees - violated the
public policy of the state.
It is important to note that the two cases just discussed
both represented situations in which a union sought recognition as the bargaining representative of employees who
had renounced the union. In Cox DistributingCo. v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107,71 the position of the union
was stronger. Eight of the nine truck drivers of a company
became members of the union, which requested the company to recognize it as the bargaining representative of the
drivers. The company refused, and the eight union drivers
went on strike. They also picketed the company with the
help of two union organizers and other unidentified persons. The company replaced the eight drivers and leased
two tractor-trailer units to deliver its products to its customers. During the strike and picketing, various acts of
violence were performed by unknown persons. The court
held that the peaceful union activity could not be enjoined.
It stated that a strike and picketing for recognition was
clearly a labor dispute within the meaning of the Maryland Anti-Injunction Act and that therefore no injunction
could issue unless the court found that the police had failed
or were unable to furnish adequate protection, and that
notice of hearing had been given to all known persons
against whom relief was sought. In the instant case, failure
of police protection was not alleged and notice of hearing
was not given. Because of such procedural defects, an
injunction would have been improper. The court also discussed the rule set forth in the Supreme Court cases, that
while a state court is not preempted from enjoining violence connected with picketing, it may not enjoin peaceful
picketing itself unless the picketing is so enmeshed with
the violence and the threat of violence that the two activities are inseparable. 72 It held that in this case the violence
was separable from the peaceful picketing and thus that all
picketing could not be enjoined.
Although there are only a few reported Maryland cases
dealing with recognitional picketing, the three cases just
discussed, and Pocketbook Workers v. Orlove 8 in the Court
of Appeals, present a pattern, although a sketchy one. The
35 CCH Labor Cases
71,646 (Cir. Ct. of Talbot 0o., 1958).
71See supra, Ps. 234-236.
158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826 (1930).

254

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

Wischhusen and Goldstein cases hold that it is against the
public policy of Maryland for a union to force a company
to recognize it as the representative of the company's employees when all of the employees have rejected the union.
On the other hand, the Cox case holds that it is not against
the policy of the state for a union which represents a
majority of a company's employees to picket for recognition. Thus far the Maryland decisions accord with the
principles of the NLRA, which basically provide for a system of majority rule in representation cases."4 In the
Orlove case the Court of Appeals condoned picketing for
recognition by a union which represented some of the employees of a company without questioning whether the
union represented a majority of the employees. Thus,
while the Court necessarily held that recognitional picketing was not unlawful per se, it did not consider the question whether a union engaging in such picketing must have
the support of a majority of the employees whom the
union seeks to represent. In fact, there does not seem to
be any Maryland case which decides the legality of recognitional picketing by a union which has the support of
some, but not a majority, of the employees of a company.
In deciding such a question, a court may reach different
results depending upon whether the union wants to represent all of the employees of the company, the employees
of certain departments, or only those employees who support the union. In any event, this problem, which has
proved very troublesome in federal law, 4a remains open in
Maryland law.
One other Maryland case should be mentioned, even
though the opinion was apparently given orally and contains no citation of authority. In Standard Wholesale
Phosphate and Acid Works v. CIO,75 the company refused
to sign a contract containing a closed-shop provision. The
union called a strike, in which only a small part of the
employees participated, and established a picket line at
the entrance to the company. Another company, a neutral
party, suffered because it shared the same entrance, and
union men, such as truck drivers, often would not cross the
picket line to reach the company. Also, a ship which unloaded behind the picket line was struck by another union,
apparently in sympathy for the strikers. The court held
that the picketing was lawful since it was peaceful and
that the sympathetic strike was also lawful since it was
§ 159(a).
See, e.g., Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
,5Daily Record, Dec. 1, 1939 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1939).
•'29 U.S.C.A. (1956)
7f
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only an application of the principle that union men will
not work behind a picket line. This case is interesting because it raises difficult problems regarding the legality of
two different types of union pressure on neutral employers.
First, the refusal of union men to cross the picket line
affected two companies at the same location, one involved
in the labor dispute and the other neutral. To the lawyer
practicing federal labor law such a situation raises familiar,
although difficult, questions of common situs picketing.
Such picketing must meet very specific standards to be
legal under federal law - such as clear indication of the
company involved in the dispute and minimization of the
effects of the picketing on other companies. 6 This case,
however, appears to permit such picketing without restriction. Second, the sympathetic strike brings to mind
the secondary strike cases in the Court of Appeals."' This
case differs from those cases in that here two unions were
involved, whereas in the Court of Appeals cases the union
which called the strike at the neutral company was also
the union involved at the primary company. It is not clear
whether this difference should be important. However, the
court assumed that the sympathetic strike was proper
without discussion of the Court of Appeals cases.
UNIONIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN MARYLAND

Thus far the cases discussed have dealt with union
activity directed against private employers. One series of
Maryland cases, which may have far-reaching consequences
in the future, deals with the attempt of a union to organize
and bargain for the employees of a government agency.
During the early 1940's there was a history of labor
troubles among the street-cleaning and trash-and-garbage
collection employees of the Department of Public Works
of Baltimore City. Frequent work stoppages, which
threatened to paralyze the important services of the Department, resulted from the attempt of a union to gain
recognition as the representative of these employees.
Finally the Department recognized the union and signed
several collective bargaining agreements with it. The
cases now under discussion dealt with the legality of these
agreements.
See, e.g., Piezonki v. National Labor Relations Board, 219 F. 2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1955); Sailors' Union of the Pacific (the Moore Dry Dock case), 92
N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
77See supra, ps. 247-250, pas8im.
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Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore8 involved a taxpayer's suit that was filed to enjoin the enforcement of one of these contracts, which provided for
union recognition, hours of work, rates of pay, overtime
and holiday pay, vacations, sick pay, seniority rules, a
grievance procedure, and arbitration. The contract expressly provided that there would be no strike under any
circumstances. In holding that the contract was illegal, the
court distinguished between public and private employment on the ground that public officers, who are not
governed by a profit motive, do not have the same incentive
to exploit employees. It also stated that public officers do
not have the same freedom of action which private employers enjoy, since their authority derives from public
law and may not be delegated to others. Governmental
authority may not discriminate in favor of union labor,
and the right to hire non-union labor, to fire union members, and to hear and consider the grievances of all employees must be preserved. Also, there must be no strikes
against the government. On the other hand, the court said
that every agreement between a labor union and municipal
officers is not unlawful since no law forbids city employees
to join an association, nor denies to such an association the
privilege of fair hearing in the matter of working conditions and terms of employment.
Having decided that the agreement was illegal, the
court next had to decide whether it had the power to
grant an injunction in face of the Maryland Anti-Injunction
Act. It held that it did have such power since the act was
not intended to apply to public officials.
While this case was pending, the city and the union
entered into a new agreement, which was similarly attacked in a taxpayer's suit as being unlawful. The new
case was also entitled Mugford v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore.7 9 The agreement provided that the Department of Public Works recognized the union as the bargaining representative for the employees of the Department and that the Department would not recognize or
deal with any other union as regards such employees. The
court held that this provision was unlawful in that it
established the union in a preferential position expressly
denied to any other organization, and that such preferences
are forbidden in the public service. It said that the contract
would not have been objectionable if it merely had given
CCH Labor Cases
9 CCH Labor Cases

788

62,137 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1944).
62,424 (Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore, 1944).
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the union the right to act as bargaining representative for
its members employed in the Department, saving to the
other employees of the Department the right to deal with
the Department on their own behalf either singly or collectively. The court also stated, however, that the provisions for holidays, vacations, sick leave, overtime pay,
and the deduction of union dues on a voluntary basis were
lawful.
In its decree the court enjoined the city from carrying
out the agreement and from collecting union dues unless
the collection and remittance of such dues was on a purely
voluntary basis terminable by any employee at any time.
Neither the city nor the union appealed from this decree;
however, the taxpayer appealed on the ground that the
part of the injunction permitting voluntary deduction of
dues was unlawful. The Court of Appeals held ° that if the
city made dues deductions at the request of the union, even
though the deductions were terminable by the employees,
the arrangement would be objectionable as a delegation of
governmental power and as a preference to the union.
However, if a city employee voluntarily requested the
deduction of union dues, reserving to himself the right to
discontinue such payments in the future, such an arrangement would be lawful if the city consented to it, but it
could not be imposed without the city's consent.
Although the Court of Appeals was not asked to review
the remainder of the decree, it nevertheless did so to some
extent. It stated that insofar as matters such as hours,
wages, or working conditions of city employees are covered
by the provisions of the City Charter, those provisions are
controlling. To the extent that they are left to the discretion of any city agency, the city authorities cannot
delegate or abdicate their continuing discretion. However,
employees may designate a representative or spokesman to
present grievances. The court also mentioned that a
municipality cannot discriminate in favor of members of
a labor union, and that a citizen who is not a member of
a union cannot, by that fact alone, be barred from a position in the public service.
At first glance the series of Mugford cases does not
seem too important since it is a fairly well-established
principle in this country that union activity directed
against government agencies should be restricted in some
.8 Mugford v. City of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A. 2d 745 (1945).
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manner."' However, these cases may have an influence
outside of the area of government agencies. First, the
Court of Appeals apparently concurred in the view of the
lower court that the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to
public bodies, and that therefore an injunction was permissible. Otherwise the Court would not have taken the
trouble to define the scope of the injunction in regard to
the deduction of union dues. Thus the Court of Appeals
seems to recognize that the broad statutory definition of
a case involving a labor dispute is subject to exceptions
when required by the public policy of the state. Such a
principle would be relevant in any labor injunction case,
not only in those involving government agencies.
Second, it is arguable that these cases stand for the
proposition that it is against the public policy of Maryland
for a union to attempt to force its wishes on employers
who have some of the characteristics of a public body. The
scope of the "public body" concept may possibly be extended to include organizations which are not strictly
government agencies but which perform governmental
functions, such as hospitals which include among their
patients indigent persons referred by the state or one of
its subdivisions. 2 Also, as regards non-profit hospitals
serving the general public, it would seem that such institutions serve the general welfare without regard to profit
in a manner akin to a government agency, and that therefore the rationale of the Mugford cases may apply equally
to them. 3 At the present time, however, it is impossible to
predict with any certainty how the Maryland law will
develop in this area.
PICKETING IN A SHOPPING CENTER

In recent years the growth of shopping centers has
created difficult questions regarding the right of a union to
picket. The basic problem has been whether the owners of
shopping centers may lawfully prohibit picketing on their
private property. There is very little authority on this
See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269,
83 A. 2d 482 (1951) ; Benson v. School District No. 1 of Silver Bow County,
344 P. 2d 117 (Mont., 1959).
12Cf. Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc. v. Davis, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 338 (1959);
Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N.Y.S. 111.1
(M17).

" For

a discussion of the question of union activity affecting hospitals, see

Zachary and Strauss, The Non-profit Hospital and the Union, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 255 (1960).
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point at the present time, 4 and one of the few reported
cases was decided in 1959 by the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. In State v. Williams,15 a union business agent
was charged with criminal trespass for picketing on the
walkways of a Baltimore shopping center outside of a
store with which the union had a dispute. Although the
picketing was peaceful and did not interfere with customers in the shopping center, it was conducted in disregard of a posted sign prohibiting any type of solicitation,
including picketing. The business agent was convicted
before a police magistrate but was found not guilty on
appeal to the Criminal Court.
The court based its decision generally on two grounds:
(1) Because the shopping center had been opened to the
public, the constitutional and statutory right to picket
took precedence over the normal rights of the owners of
private property; (2) Federal law regarding picketing had
preempted the jurisdiction of the state court. On the first
point, the court recognized the constitutional right to
picket and cited Thornhill v. Alabama," discussed above. 7
It next cited federal cases which contained language to
the effect that in some instances the rights of an employer
as to his property must yield to the rights of employees
under federal statutes.8 The court stated that the controlling case was Marsh v. Alabama,89 where the United
States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for
a state to convict a person for distributing religious literature on the streets and sidewalks of a town in which all of
the property, including the streets and sidewalks, was
owned by a private corporation. The court emphasized the
"See Nahas v. Local 905, Retail Clerks, 144 Cal. App. 2d 808, 301 P. 2d
9W2, rehearing den. 144 Cal. App. 2d 820, 302 P. 2d 829 (2d Dist. 1956)
(decided on the ground that the picketing was not a trespass as regarded
the plaintiff, who was only a lessee) ; People v. Mazo, 38 CCH Labor Cases
65,83 (Cir. Ct. Ill., 1959); Hearn Dep't. Stores v. Livingston, 23 CCH
Labor Cases
67,654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1953) (picketing by employees who
had an easement to use a private street) ; People v. Barisi, 15 CCH Labor
Cases
64,890 (N.Y.C. Mag. Ct., 1948) ; Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union
Local No. 1207, 38 CCH Labor Cases 66,037 (Sup. Ct. Wash., 1959). -But
cf. Spohrer v. Cohen, 3 Misc. 2d 248, 149 N.Y.S. 2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(involving a farmers market). See also, Note, Shopping Centers and Labor
Relations Law, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 694 (1958).
"137 CCH Labor Cases
65,708 (Crim. Ct. of Baltimore, 1959), noted 73
Harv, L. Rev. 1216 (1900).
-310 U.S. 88 (1940).
87 See supra, circa, ps. 237-238.
'The court cited Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956) ; Labor Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949) ; Republic
Aviation Corp. v. Board, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ; National Labor R. Board v.
Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
"326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Supreme Court's language in the Marsh case that "the
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it." 9 The purpose of this language
in the Marsh case was to show that the company town was
in effect indistinguishable from a municipal corporation
and consequently was bound by the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment regarding freedom of religion and
speech. Thus it is possible to distinguish a shopping center
case from the Marsh case on the ground that a shopping
center is not comparable to a municipal corporation and is
therefore not as limited in its actions. On the other hand,
the Marsh case does support to some extent the court's
view that when property is opened to the public, the property rights of the owner are more limited than in the usual
case.
On the second point, the court noted the line of Supreme
Court cases, discussed above, 91 holding that a state court
may not regulate union activity which is either protected
or prohibited by federal law unless violence is involved.
The court pointed out that one case indicates that a union
may have a federal right to picket in a shopping center.
92
In Marshall Field & Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd.,
the Seventh Circuit held that under the NLRA a company
could not prohibit solicitation by non-employee union organizers on a private street which was owned by the company and which bisected the main store of the company
at street level. It is possible to distinguish this case from a
case involving a shopping center. In the Williams case it
was argued to the court that since the union's dispute was
not with the owner of the shopping center but with one of
the lessees, the owner had no duty under federal law to
permit union activity on its property. However, the court
stated that such a view would nullify the union's federal
rights and added that the owner might be found to have
been acting as an agent of the lessee. The agency question
is certainly a difficult one, especially in view of the close
economic relationship which exists between lessor and
lessee in a shopping center as a result of the prevalence of
percentage leases. The Marshall Field case is also distinguishable on the ground that picketing in a shopping center
-Ibid., 505-506.
See supra,ps. 231-236.
2200
F. 2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
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is far more disruptive of business than is solicitation of
individual employees on a private street.
The court, however, concluded that it did not have to
decide whether the picketing actually enjoyed federal
protection, for under the recent Supreme Court decision in
San Diego Unions v. Garmon,93 discussed above,94 a state
court is preempted whenever it is doubtful whether activity
is so protected and the NLRB has not passed on the issue.
Although the ramifications of the Garmon case are not yet
completely clear, the court's cautious attitude is understandable considering the tenor of the Garmon opinion.
As shown by the previous discussion, the issues raised
by picketing in a shopping center are extremely close.
Several other courts have decided cases similar to the
Williams case in the same manner as the Maryland court.9 5
Nevertheless, until these issues are determined by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, or at least until the federal law
questions are determinea by the NLRB or the federal
courts, the legality of picketing in a shopping center will
remain an open question.9 6
CONCLUSION

As shown by the cases discussed above, the Maryland
judicial decisions provide only the outlines of a law
of strikes, boycotts, and picketing. Combined with the
sparsity of state legislation in this area, this situation poses
a difficult problem for the Maryland labor lawyer. The
problem is made even more complicated by the fact that
the latest Court of Appeals decision concerning private
employers dates from 1933. It is difficult to predict whether
the Court of Appeals would follow these decisions today
since labor law in general has undergone various changes
in policy through the years in accordance with the changes
in the labor movement. The infant raised by Samuel
Gompers and Eugene V. Debs has grown into the giant
guided by George Meany, Walter Reuther, and many
others.
w359 U.S. 236 (1959).
supra, ps. 231-233.
9People v. Mazo, 38 CCH Labor Cases
65,835 (Cir. Ct. of Ill., 1959)
People v. Barisi, 15 CCH Labor Cases
64,890 (N.Y.C. Mag. Ct. 1948)
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1207, 38 CCH Labor Cases
66,037 (Super. Ct. of Wash., 1959).
"The issues considered by the court in the Williams case, although difficult enough in themselves, do not exhaust the questions involved in this
area. One obvious problem which arises whenever there is picketing in a
shopping center is whether such activity violates the secondary boycott
restrictions of the NLRA.
"See
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The Court of Appeals itself recognized that the judicial
view of union activity may vary according to the times,
when it stated:
"The main question, heretofore stated, requires a
decision as to the powers of organized labor to compel
or coerce action for the benefit of its members. Courts,
in deciding cases involving this question, recognizing
the possible far-reaching effect of any rule or principle
enunciated, should and do approach the question with
caution, and have generally refrained from doing more
than deciding the case upon its peculiar facts, leaving
each succeeding case to be determined in like manner,
and giving effect to the development of the law as
illustrated by the decisions, and also permitting the
court to take cognizance of general conditions as they
may exist at the time of the decision; thus enabling
the courts to maintain an even balance between the
rights of workmen, either individually or in combination, and equal rights guaranteed to all individuals
under the law. The line of demarcation where one
man's rights, natural or legal, may end, because in
conflict with the exercise of some right by others, is
shadowy, and'97is not the subject of definement by any
general rule.
Taking the course of the federal labor law as an illustration of the change in labor law over the years, the federal
courts during the early part of this century were very
restrictive of the rights of labor, and even questioned its
right to form unions in face of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.98 The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 191499 ended this
specific problem by expressly sanctioning the right of labor
to organize. Nevertheless, the courts continued to hamper
the activities of unions by means of injunctions issued
under a strict view of the means and objectives test.' °
Again in 1933 Congress limited the power of the judiciary
by enacting the Norris-La Guardia Act, 10' which greatly
restricted the jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant
labor injunctions. In 1935 the NLRA gave employees the

IRuff

& Sons v.

Bricklayers

Union, 160 Md. 483, 492-93, 154 A.

52,

56 (1931).

Is See e.g., United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill., 1894), aff'd.

on other grounds, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
-15

U.S.C.A. (1951) § 17.

100See. e.g., Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Inter-

national Organization, United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Oonsol. Coal &
Coke Co., 18 F. 2' 839 (4th Cir.), cert. den. 275 U.S. 536 (1927).
129 U.S.C.A. (1956) §§ 101-10, 113-15.
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right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to act in concert for their welfare; at the same time, Congress made
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with this right. ' The effect of this series of statutes was
to give the labor movement federal encouragement. However, labor became guilty of various excesses as it became
more powerful, and in 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act'013 made
many union practices unlawful. The most recent federal
legislation has again restricted the actions of unions in
regard to both union members and employers.' 4
This brief description of the course of federal labor law
shows that because of the various changes in national
sentiment toward labor through the years, the Court of
Appeals will probably have to re-examine its former labor
decisions when and if the occasion arises. It may take a more
restrictive view of union activity, a less restrictive view, or
it may decide to affirm its former view. In any event, the
Maryland labor lawyer will be forced to cope with the uncertainty of the state's labor law until the legislature or the
Court of Appeals provides some clarification.
- 29 U.S.C.A. (1956)

§§ 157, 158(a).

10329 U.S.C.A. (1956)

§ 158(b).

101Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519
t1959), 29 U.S.C.A. (Cum. Supp. 1959).
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The REvIEw is proud to present two timely and interesting articles in its Summer Issue: Professor William P.
Cunningham's "Subehapter S Corporations: Uses, Abuses
and Some Pitfalls" and Mr. Leonard E. Cohen's "The Maryland Law of Strikes, Boycotts, and Picketing." Professor
Cunningham, who teaches Corporations, Taxation, and conducts a Taxation Seminar at the University of Maryland
School of Law, and who has previously contributed to the
REvlmw, acutely analyzes the advantages and disadvantages
of the relatively new tax device of Subchapter S. His
article should prove to be extremely valuable to those attorneys engaged in corporate practice and should be of considerable interest and great assistance to those not specializing in this field. Mr. Cohen is a newcomer to our pages,
being a recent graduate of the Harvard Law School, where

he was a member of the

HARVARD LAW

REV w. His article

1960]

EDITORIAL

265

points out "the uncertainty of the state's labor law,"
especially in regard to two areas of increasing importance,
unionization of governmental employees and picketing in
shopping centers.
At this time, the Editor is pleased to announce the
Editors for 1960-61, who have, as has been customary, been
largely responsible for the Summer Issue: Editor, Robert
J. Carson; Casenote Editor, Howard S. Chasanow; Recent
Decisions Editor, Frank J. Vecella; and Assistant Editors,
Herbert J. Belgrad, William G. Kolodner, and Joseph A.
Matera.

Comments and Casenotes
Liquidating Dividends Under the Maryland
Income Tax
By P. McEvoy CROMWELL*
The Maryland tax treatment of liquidating dividends
has furnished grist for discussion and debate ever since
the Maryland Income Tax was enacted in 1937. A 1959
ruling by the Maryland Attorney General' has generated
new interest in this area of our tax law.
Certain stockholders had purchased shares in a corporation for $30.00 a share. Several years later the corporation sold all its assets and made a final liquidating distribution to its shareholders in the amount of $22.00 per
share. The corporation apparently had an original paid-in
capital of $1.00 per share. The Attorney General ruled
that $21.00 out of the $22.00 received in redemption of each
share were taxable under the Maryland Income Tax as
a "dividend," even though it was perfectly clear that the
stockholders in question had suffered a net loss of $8.00
per share from their investment. It is our purpose to
scrutinize this result in the light of the relevant sections
of the Maryland Tax Law with particular regard to a
determination of its validity when subjected to attack
on constitutional grounds under our State and Federal
Constitutions.
I.
A brief general look at the relevant statutory sections
and the various opinions of the Attorney General will be
useful in setting up the background for our consideration
of this problem.
The taxable status of liquidating dividends is controlled
by a combination of several sections of Article 81 of the
Maryland Code.' Section 288 imposes a tax on the taxable
net income of individuals or corporations. Section 285
specifies that "taxable net income" is the gross income of
the taxpayer less certain deductions and exemptions.
* A.B. 1952, Princeton University, LL.B. 1957, University of Maryland
Law School; Member of the Baltimore City Bar.
Daily Record, April 7, 1959.
2All
section references to the Maryland Code will be to the 1957
Edition, unless otherwise indicated.
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"Gross income" is defined in Section 280 to include dividends.' And Section 279(j) defines "dividend" as follows:
"'Dividend' means any distribution made by a corporation (domestic or foreign) out of its net profits,
whenever earned, to its stockholders or members,
whether such distribution be made in cash or other
property, except stock of the same class in the corporation. Amounts paid in liquidation or dissolution of
a corporation shall be treated as dividends to the ex4
tent that they represent earnings of the corporation."
(Emphasis added).
In 28 Opinions 254 (1943), the Attorney General of
Maryland had occasion to analyze the nature of the "earnings" of a corporation out of which a distribution must be
made in order to be taxable as a "dividend". In the case
before him, liquidating distributions had been made by a
corporation of the proceeds realized by the corporation
from the sale of certain of its capital assets. The taxpayers
argued that since under the Maryland Income Tax no
taxable income results from the realization of capital
gains,' the corporation had realized no "earnings" from the
sale of its capital assets, and hence the distributions to
the stockholders necessarily were not out of its "earnings".
The Attorney General ruled that for this purpose, the
earnings of a corporation include profits from the sale of
capital assets, even though such profits are not taxable
to the corporation. He concluded, therefore, that the distributions to the stockholders were taxable as dividends
to them, having been made out of the corporation's earnings.
"The fact that the corporation is excused from
paying income tax on it does not prevent accretion to
net worth resulting from realized appreciation of
assets from being net profits or earnings to the corpo, 'Gross income' means income from whatever source derived, including salaries, wages or compensaition for personal services of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid; alimony received, interest, dividends,
rents, royalties and annuity income; and gains, profits and income derived from professions, vocations, trades, business and commerce." [Emph'asis added].
'The italic!7ed last sentence was inserted by MD. LAWs 1939, Ch. 277,
§ 12. Prior to that time, the following sentence had served in its place: "It (dividend) includes such portion of the assets of a corporation distributed at the time of dissolution as are in effect a distribution of
earnings." MD. LAws 1937 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 11, § 8(i).
IArt. 81, § 280(a).
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ration, so as to make taxable dividends paid from that
source."6
A subsequent ruling7 held that distributions of property that was either contributed as original capital or was
purchased by the corporation out of its original capital
funds and which had appreciated considerably prior to the
distribution could not be taxed as a dividend to the distributee shareholders because the appreciation in value did
not result in income to the corporation and hence the
distribution was not out of earnings but out of capital.'
The Attorney General reasoned that the corporation had
never realized income from this property because it had
never sold it. The additional value which had attached to
the property had never been converted into income to the
corporation. No mention was made in this opinion of the
presence or absence of an earned surplus derived independently of the distributed property. It might be inferred
that the taxable status of a distribution was to be determined by referring to the actual property distributed in
order to ascertain whether it constituted a part of the
capital of the corporation as distinguished from corporate
property that was purchased out of the corporate earnings. 9
However, a 1956 ruling"° indicated that all distributions,
including property that was part of the original corporate
capital, will be considered as taxable dividends to the
stockholders so long as, after the distribution the corporation still retains assets "properly valued at the amount
of its paid-in capital."" The opinion states that "faIll
0 28

Op. Atty. Gen. 254, 257 (1943).
Op. Atty. Gen. 308 (1953).
8 See Sears, et al v. Commissioner, 322 Mass. 446, 78 N.E. 2d 89
(1948) cited by the Attorney General to support this sound conclusion.
But cf. Collins v. Kentucky Tax Commission, 261 S.W. 2d 303 (Ky. 1953),
holding to the contrary.
9 Such a determination could involve formidable prOblems of "tracing"
to discover whether the distributed property was a part of or was acquired out of corporate capital or, on the other hand, was purchased with
corporate earnings. Under the federal tax scheme, reference to the
corporate source of the distribution Is not necessary, since all distributions
(no matter of what property) are considered to be out of earnings to the
extent that an earned surplus exists, or to the extent the corporation
has earnings in the year of distribution. Internal Revenue Code 1954, § 316.
10 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 343.
738

n Some cases refer 'to the possibility that property originally attributable
to earned surplus may be subsequently "dedicated" to capital uses
so as to thence forth be considered as corporate capital for purposes of determining whether dividend distributions are out of corporate
capital or earnings. See e.g. -Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 262 Mass. 1, 159 N.E. 536 (1928) and Moore v. Tax Commissioner, 237 Mass. 574, 130 N.E. 59 (1921).
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distributions are presumed to be from earnings and profits
as such existed (on the date of distribution)."12
The statutory definition of a dividend makes it clear
that the entire earned surplus at the time of distrubution
(whether or not part or all of this surplus was accumulated
prior to the passage of the Income Tax Act of 1937) is to
be taken into account in ascertaining whether the distribution is out of "earnings". 3
II.
It has been suggested occasionally that despite the
statutory definition of a dividend, the intent of the legislature was to tax distributions as dividends only to the extent
that they result in "income" to the shareholder, and that
I It should be noted that It is possible that after a distribution of
property having a fair market value less than the corporate earned
surplus there would remain in the corporation's hands property worth
less than its paid in capital, although carried on the books at higher
figures. In such a case, not all of the distributed property would
constitute a dividend, if by the phrase "properly valued" the Attorney
General was referring to fair market value. If this interpretation is
correct, It is theoretically possible that a distribution worth less than
accumulated earned surplus would be taxed only in part as a dividend
with the remaining portion being regarded as a payment out of corporate
capital. The Attorney General concluded that if capital was "unimpaired"
immediately after the distribution, it should be regarded as a taxable
dividend In its entirety. In analyzing the remaining corporate assets to
discover whether capital is "unimpaired", the ruling is silent as to
whether book values or market values should be used.
I See the definition of a dividend contained in Art. 81, § 279(j), supra.
The key phrase whenever earned was added by MD. LAws 1939, Ch. 277,
§ 12. The constitutionality of taxing, as Income to shareholders, ordinary dividend distributions made out of surplus accumulated before
the passage of the Federal Income Tax Act of 1913 was sustained in
Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918). However, in Lynch v. Turrish,
247 U. S. 221 (1918), a companion case involving the same Income
Tax Act, it was held that liquidating proceeds paid out of earned surplus resulting from the pre-1913 appreciation of corporate assets which
were sold immediately before the liquidation in 1914 could not be taxed
as dividends to the stockholders. The distributee shareholders had held
their stock prior to the passage of the 1913 Tax Law. The Court decided
that this distribution simply was not "Income". The two decisions, both
handed down on the same day, are difficult to reconcile. One might
argue that the Turrish case casts a cloud on the constitutional capacity
of the State of Maryland to tax liquidation proceeds as income to the
extent they represent earned surplus accumulated before 1937, the year
the Maryland Income Tax was enacted, but it appears that decision
was based principally on a construction of the relevant language of the
taxing act. Moreover, liquidating distributions out of earned surplus
accumulated before the enactment of the controlling taxing act have been
taxed elsewhere as dividends. See, e.g., Follett v. Commissioner, 267 Mass.
115, 166 N.E. 575 (1929); Modore v. Commissioner, 237 Mass. 574, 130
N.E. 59 (1921) ; Reeves v. Turner, 289 Ky. 426, 158 S.W. 2d 978 (1942).
See 'also Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 262 Mass. 1,
159 N.E. 536 (1928); Trefry v. Putman, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904
(1917).
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in order for "income" to be realized to the stockholder,
the liquidating proceeds must be in excess of the cost basis
of his shares. All proceeds received which do not exceed
this cost basis are not "income," but simply a return of
capital not intended to be subjected to tax. This theory
has on its face a certain degree of plausibility. 4 And were
it now being advanced for the first time, it would appear
to hold considerable merit. Such, however, is not the case.
When the Maryland Income Tax was enacted in 1937,1"
the provisions governing the treatment of liquidating
dividends were adopted in substantially the same form in
which they persist to the present day. And at the date of
enactment these provisions, though new in Maryland, had
already experienced an extensive history elsewhere, particularly in the early Federal Income Tax Laws, 6 which
established a statutory framework for taxing dividends
very similar to Maryland's. Income was defined broadly
to include dividends, and a dividend was described as any
14Proceeds of life insurance contracts received other than by reason
of death are treated in this manner. Only that sum which exceeds the
amount of the total premiums paid Is taxed as income to the taxpayer
who turns in his policy for its cash surrender value. This treatment,
however, is specially prescribed by Art. 81, § 280(c), which excludes an
amount equal to the total premiums paid from "gross income". An intent to tax the entire proceeds as income might be inferred in the
absence of this provision. See Tawes v. Strouse, 182 Md. 508, 512, 35 A. 2d
233 (1943), where the Court said:
"It is thus clear that the [entire] proceeds of the surrendered
life policy involved in the instant case is included within gross inThe next question for determination is to what extent the
come. . .
proceeds are exempted from taxation by the subsequent provisions
[of the Code].
"The Maryland Legislature has seen fit to exempt from gross
income only a sum 'equal to the total ambunt of the premiums paid
therefor'."
'5Mu). LAws 1937 (Spec. Sess.), Ch. 11, § 8.
" § II of the Act of 1913, Subsection B, 38 'Stat. 167, defined as not income
subject to tax "gains profit and income derived from . . . dividends . . ."
but did not conitain any definition of "dividend". The Act of 1916,
§ 2(a), 39 Stat. 757 went on to define a dividend in the following manner:
• . . any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation, joint stock company, association, or insurance company, out of
its earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred
and thirteen, and payable to its shareholders ......
The Act of 1917, § 1211, 40 Stat. 337, 338 contained this same definition
of a dividend. The Act of 1918, § 201, 40 Stat. 1059 defined a dividend
in the same manner but added a provision stating that liquidation proceeds were to be treated as payments in exchange for the stock. The
Act of 1921, § 201, 42 Stat. 228, dropped this provision to return to the
same status as under the 1916 and 1917 Acts. Finally in 1924, Congress
reverted back to the treatment of liquidation proceeds as receipts from
the sale of stock. Acts of 1924, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255. This theory has
remained intact since 'then in the Federal Tax Law. It is presently embodied in I.R.C. 1954, § 331. But cf. the present § 333 which allows
a stockholder to elect to be taxed as under the 1916 and 1917 Acts with
certain limitations and conditions.
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distribution out of corporate earnings and profits. It was
quite clear that liquidating distributions were intended to
be included in the general statutory definition of a dividend, and the courts consistently sustained the taxation of
liquidation proceeds under these early laws. Often, the
taxpayer realized income and loss from the same liquidating distribution. Income resulted from that portion of
the proceeds which did not exceed the earned surplus of
the corporation; a capital loss resulted to the extent the
taxpayer's cost basis for the shares exceeded that part of
the liquidation distribution not taxed as a dividend, i.e.,
that part of the proceeds which was regarded as a return
of capital. 7 The income tax cases dealing with liquidating
dividends under the early federal tax law are particularly
significant in view of Maryland's express statutory direction that the Comptroller "shall apply as far as practicable the administrative and judicial interpretations of the
federal income tax law."'18
Tax statutes similar to Maryland's have been construed
in other states to require that all liquidating proceeds
not in excess of the corporation's earned surplus be subjected to tax as dividend distributions. The great weight
of authority makes it clear that in determining whether
a liquidating distribution is a return of "capital" to the
stockholder, reference must be made to the corporation's
affairs, - not the stockholder's. "Capital" means corporate capital. The price at which the shareholder purchased his stock is irrelevant as is the fact that this
purchase price was partly attributable to earnings accumulated at that time.'9
"Appeal of James Dobson, 1 B.T.A. 1082 (1925), construing the Acts
of 1916 and 1917; Frank D. Darrow v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 276 (1927),
construing the Act of 1921; Philetus W. Gates v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A.
1133 (1928), construing the Act of 1921; Eric A. Pearson v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1405 (1929), construing the Act of 1921; Haystone
Securities Corporation, 19 B.T.A. 954 (1930), construing the Act of
1921; Hamilton Woolen Oo. v. Commissioner, 21 'B.T.A. 334 (1930),
construing the Act of 1921; McOaugn v. McGahan, 39 F. 2d 3 (3rd Cir.
1930), construing the Act of 1921; Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. 2d .931
(2d Cir. 1932), construing the Act of 1921. See also Darrell, Corporate
Liquidations and The Federal Income Tax Law, 89 Univ. of Pa. L.
Rev. 907 (1941); Magill, Realization of Income through Corporate Distributions, 36 Col. L. Rev. 519 (1936) ; Note, Stock Redemption or Cancellation Taxable as Dividend, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1344 (1936); Note,
Income Taxation of Liquidating Dividends, 47 Yale L. J. 1146 (1938);
Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 363 (1922) ;
Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Dividends in Liquidation, 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 565 (1925).
SArt. 81, § 304, cited and applied in Tawes v. Strouse, 182 Md. 508,
35 A. 2d 233 (1943) ; Fleischmann v. Lacy, 191 Md. 648, 62 A. 2d 561
(1948).
10In Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 262 Mass. 1,
159 N.E. 536, 538 (1928), the Court said:
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There is, however, one Iowa decision 0 holding that
liquidation proceeds did not constitute dividends but were
instead the proceeds of a sale or exchange of the stock
and were exempt under a provision of the Iowa law excluding capital gains from income. The Court reached this
conclusion in spite of the statutory definition of a dividend
as any distribution made by a corporation out of its
earnings as profits. The case seems patently unsound.2
In view of the cases interpreting the early Federal
tax laws, and those out of state decisions construing
statutes very similar to Maryland's and of the Maryland
Attorney General's opinion already discussed, it is very
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Maryland Legislature intended by its statutory definition of "dividend" to
tax as income liquidation proceeds to the extent they
represent earned surplus, without regard to the cost basis
of the shares in the hands of the distributee shareholder.
Let us turn now to the constitutionality of this result.
III.
The only constitutional challenges possible under the
Maryland Constitution would appear to emanate from
Articles 15 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights. The first
establishes a requirement of uniformity with respect to the
levy of property taxes. The latter is our so-called "due
process" article. It is settled that the Maryland Income
Tax is not a property tax and therefore is without the
scope of Article 15.22 Since the rights protected by Article
"In the light of [the statute] . . . plainly it is an immaterial
circumstance whether the stockholder made an investment of his
own capital in the hope of receiving a dividend of accumulated
profits. The Legislature, acting within its power, has stamped such
dividend of accumulated profits as income and taxable as such."
See also Follett v. Commissioner, 267 Mass. 115, 166 N.E. 575 (1929);
Falk v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 218 Wis. 130, 259 N.W. 624 (1935);
Reeves v. Turner, 289 Ky. 426, 158 S.W. 2d 978 (1942); Annotation,
Liquidation Dividends as Taxable Income, 65 A.L.R. 148; Lockyer,
Kentucky Income Tax Compared with Federal Income Tax, 42 Ky. L. J.
368, 381; Note, Virginia Taxation- Deductibility of Earning Received as
Liquidation Distribution, 40 Va. L. Rev. 519, 525 et seq. (1954).
10Lynch v. State Board, 228 Iowa 1000, 291 N.W. 161 (1940).
2'The Court leaned, heavily on Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (1918),
supra, n. 13, which held only that that part of the corporation's earned
surplus which was attributable to the appreciation of its assets occurring before the enactment of the Income Tax Act was not to be regarded
as Income when distributed as a liquidating dividend. Properly interpreted, Turrish is not authority for the proposition that no part of any
liquidating dividend is to be regarded as income.
2Oursler
v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 481, 485, 486, 13 A. 2d 763 (1940);
Harmon v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 197, 55 A. 2d 491
(1947). See Kelly, Maryland Clasified Income Tax of 1939, 5 Md. L.
Rev. 77, 87 et seq. (1940) ; Cairns, History and Constitutionality of the
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23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights have been construed to be identical with those embodied in the "due
process of law" clause in the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution," we will at this point direct
our attention to the 14th Amendment. Whatever conclusions we are able to reach will be applicable equally to
Maryland's Article 23.
Is it violative of due process to tax as income to a shareholder those liquidation proceeds which are attributable to
earned surplus accumulated by the corporation prior to the
date the shareholder purchased his shares? In such a case,
is not the tax unlawfully measured and imposed on income
which is attributable to predecessor shareholders, and
which, if taxed at all, should have been taxed to them?
Is it within the bounds of due process to tax as income
liquidation proceeds receipt of which results in no gain
or profit to the shareholder on his original investment?
Can one have income without gain consistently with due
process?
The case which sheds most light on these questions is
United States v. Phellis,2 4 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1921. In 1915, a New Jersey corporation underwent a
reorganization pursuant to which most of its properties
were transferred to a newly formed Delaware corporation,
in return for which stock and securities of the new corporation were issued to the old corporation. This stock in turn
was passed on to the stockholders of the New Jersey corporation which continued in existence. The government
taxed the entire value of the stock distributed to the New
Jersey corporation shareholders as a dividend to them
under the Federal Income Tax Act of 1913. It was conceded that the accumulated surplus of the New Jersey
corporation exceeded the value of the new Delaware stock
distributed. The taxpayers' brief contained the following
argument:
"As an illustration: An investor bought on September 25, 1915, one share of the New Jersey company for
$795.00, its then alleged market value. This stockholder's income from other sources was such that if
the present law had then been in effect he would have
Maryland Income Tao Law, 2 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1937) ; Lewis, Tam Articles
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 13 Md. L. Rev. 83 (1953).
1 County Commissioners of Anne Arundel Oounty v. English, 182 Md.
514, 35 A. 2d 135 (1943); Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. 2d
763 (1940) ; Home Utilities Oo., Inc. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209
Md. 610, 122 A. 2d 109 (1956).
24257 U. S. 156 (1921).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

been required to pay fifty per cent of the income
received as a tax. On October 1, 1915, there were
issued to him two shares of the Delaware company
worth at the time $347.50 per share, and he still held
his one share in the New Jersey company of the par
and market value of $100.00; the result of which was
that he had three certificates representing his investment worth exactly the same amount as he had paid
for the one certificate in the New Jersey company.
The Government's contention now is that both shares
of the Delaware company are income, and that one
share must be sold and the $347.50 realized therein
must be paid to the Government as income tax, and
then the stockholder would have left one share of
the New Jersey company worth $100.00, and one of
the Delaware company worth $347.50, a total of
$447.50, in place of the $795.00, which he had paid for
the share of the New Jersey company. Yet the Government urges that this stockholder has received in
the calendar year by this transaction a gain or profit on
his investment."2 5
Despite the common-sense appeal of this argument,
the Court held in favor of the Government. The opinion
(Justice Pitney) stated:
"The possibility of occasional instances of apparent
hardship in the incidence of the tax may be conceded.
Where, as in this case, the dividend constitutes a distribution of profits accumulated during an extended
period and bears a large proportion to the par value
of the stock, if an investor happened to buy stock
shortly before the dividend, paying a price enhanced
by an estimate of the capital plus the surplus of the
company, and after distribution of the surplus, with
corresponding reduction in the intrinsic and market
value of the shares, he were called upon to pay tax
upon the dividend, it might look in his case like a tax
upon his capital. But it is only apparently so. In buying at a price that reflected the accumulated profits,
he of course acquired as a part of the valuable rights
purchased the prospect of a dividend from the accumulations; - brought 'dividend on' as the phrase goes
- and necessarily took subject to the burden of the
income tax properly to be assessed against him by
reason of the dividend if and when made. He simply
Ibid, 163, 164.
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stepped into the shoes, in this as in other respects, of
the stockholder whose shares he acquired, and presumably the prospect of a dividend influenced the
price paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an
income tax to be paid thereon. In short, the question
whether a dividend made out of company profits constitutes income of the stockholder is not affected by
antecedent transfers of the stock from hand to hand."2 6
The constitutionality of the requirement that a succeeding owner of stock be compelled to assume the place occupied by his predecessor for purposes of taxation was
reaffirmed in Taft v. Bower,27 which sustained a federal
statute assigning to the donee of certain shares their basis
in the hands of the donor, for purposes of computing the
gain to be taxed to the donee upon the sale by him of the
shares. Other cases have affirmed the application of the
income tax transactions which have produced "income"
without gain.2"
It would appear that the 14th Amendment imposes no
bar to the taxation of liquidation proceeds as dividends to
the extent attributable to corporate earned surplus, without regard to the cost basis of the redeemed shares in
the hands of the distributee stockholders; but however
justifiable this result may be from a constitutional point
of view, it is indefensible from the standpoint of sound tax
policy. To require a taxpayer to return as income upon
liquidation sums which are in excess of the actual gain
realized by him on his stock investment is patently unfair and inequitable. It cannot fail to produce the conviction in the taxpayer that he has been wronged. It
breeds disrespect (and, perhaps, disregard) for the Tax
Law in its entirety. It should be changed.2"
-Ibid, 171, 172. This case has aptly been referred to as "the miracle
of income without gain". Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends, 35
Harv. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1922).
27278 U. S. 470 (1929).
28,See e.g. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co, 300 U. S.
216 (1937) ; Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931). But
cf. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926); and Parker
v. United 'States, 88 F. 2d 907 (7th Cir. 1937).
2Probably
the simplest change would be to amend Art. 81, § 279(j) to
read somewhat as follows:
"Amount paid in liquidation or dissolution of a corporation shall
be treated as dividends only to the extent that they represent
earnings of the corporation and are in excess of the stockholder's
basis for the shares with respect to which the dissolution is being
made. For purposes of this subsection, the stockholder's basis for
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Inheritance By And From Illegitimnates Under
Maryland Intestacy Law
Penman v. Ayers'

The appellee, who was a legitimate brother of the
intestate claimed an exclusive right to inherit the real
and personal estate of his intestate brother. The only other
survivor was the appellant, whose claim was predicated on
his status as the illegitimate half-brother of the intestate
with the common ancestor being their mother. In affirming
the lower court's decision in favor of the appellee, the
Court of Appeals held that under Maryland intestacy
statutes, an illegitimate brother cannot inherit real and
personal property from his legitimate half brother who
had died intestate.
The Civil Law 2 recognized the concubine, and its laws

were much more indulgent to bastard children than the
English Common Law, which was strongly in favor of
marriage. Under the English system the bastard was considered the son of nobody, nullius filius. This complete
bar to inheritance was ingrafted into the Common Law
of every American jurisdiction except Connecticut.'
Hence, in England, if there were no legitimate heirs, the
land escheated to the crown instead of passing to the
illegitimates. Likewise, they could have no heirs but those
of their own bodies. Collateral heirs were derived from a
common ancestor, and since at Common Law an illegitimate had no legal ancestors, he could have no collateral
kindred. Hence, if he died without issue and intestate, any
land of which he was seized escheated to the lord of the
fee.4
these shares shall be the same basis that Is attributed to them
under the Federal income tax law."
Another possibility would be the deletion of the present language in
§ 279(j) and the Insertion of a clause prioviding that amounts paid in
liquidaition on dissolution of a corporation shall be treated as amounts paid
for the sale or exchange of its stock. Such an amendment would be
consistent with the theory that liquidation and sales of stock are
similar in substance and should be treated alike under the tax laws.
Other states, Including Massachusetts and Kentucky have so amended
their tax statutes. Under present Maryland law, however, an amendment
of this nature would render these distributions completely non-taxable,
because of our present policy not to tax capital gains or allow the
deduction of capital losses. Art. 81, §§ 280(a), 283(a).
1221 Md. 154, 156 A. 2d 638 (1959).
2 GAviT, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTAIIES ON THE LAW
(1941), 368.
8Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 191, 194 (1914); Vernier and
Churchill, Inheritance by and from Bastards, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 216 (1935).
' Loc. cit. supra, n. 2.
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The only significant relief from the rigors and harshness
of the Common Law doctrine of nulius fihus has been the
result of remedial legislation.' While there are certain
basic similarities in the statutes, there is no uniform
scheme in the removal of the Common Law disabilities
in the American states. Under present Maryland legislation, illegitimates can inherit from their mother, each
other, and the descendants of each other;6 and they are
placed in the bloodstream of their natural parents for
purposes of inheritance if the father subsequently marries and acknowledges the child as his.'
In view of such remedial legislation, the Court of
Appeals has been faced with the problem of determining
whether the Legislature intended to include illegitimate
children within the definitions of "children" or its equivalent as the word appears in various other statutes in the
Annotated Code of Maryland. In Article 93, Section 329,1
it is provided that, if the surviving spouse of a testator
elects to renounce the provisions made for his benefit by
the will, he shall take dower in the lands plus one-half of
the personal estate, so long as the testator has not left
other descendants surviving. However, he only takes
dower plus one-third if the deceased is survived by other
descendants. The testatrix's husband in Rowe v. Cullen9
renounced the will and elected to take, in lieu thereof, his
legal share in the wife's estate. His contention that the
wife's illegitimate son was not a "descendant" within the
meaning of the above statute was rejected by the Court.
In referring to the statute, the Court indicated the intent
of the legislature was unmistakable and it refused to give
the word "descendant" a forced and unnatural meaning in
order to gratify a harsh common law policy that has been
repudiated for more than a century. Following the same
general concept, the Court of Appeals in Reese v. Starner °
held that the mother of an illegitimate child was a "parent"
within the meaning of Article 93, Section 135,11 and she was
therefore entitled to share equally with the widow in the
estate of her illegitimate son.
5 Note, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimate8, 84 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 531, 540 (1936).
64 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 7.
74 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 6.
" 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 329.
9 177 Md. 357, 9 A. 2d 585 (1939).
o106 Md. 50, 66 A. 443 (1907).
"MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 135, provides that if the intestate leaves
surviving a husband or widow, no child, parent, grandchild, brother, or
sister of the intestate, the surviving husband or widow, as the case may
be, shall be entitled to the whole.
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While there are reasons for not allowing an adulterous
or unwed parent to inherit from an illegitimate child, there
seems to be no logical reason for not allowing the illegitimate to share in his natural parent's estate. In the Rowe 2
case the Court indicated that the:
"... trend of the law has been to give illegitimate
children the status and privileges of legitimate children, except where that policy would affect the permance and dignity of the institution of marriage, or
the traditional rights
and privileges of children born
' 13
in lawful wedlock.
In 1919, an illegitimate dependent child was denied the
right to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act
for the accidental death of her father. 4 The Court in so
holding reasoned that if the Legislature had intended
illegitimate children to receive the benefit of the statute,
it would have included them in the definition of "child"
inasmuch as it was careful to define the word to include
posthumous and adopted children. 5 Apparently as a result
of this case, the Legislature, in 1920, enacted an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act to permit an
award for the benefit of an illegitimate child under similar
circumstances. 6 An illegitimate daughter of the deceased was not allowed to maintain an action under the
Wrongful Death Statute in W. B. & A. R. Co. v. State. 7
The Court indicated therein that:
"It is a rule of construction that prima facie the
word 'child' or 'children' when used in a statute, will
or deed means legitimate child or children. In other
words bastards are not within the term 'child' or
'children'."'
In the same manner as with the Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Wrongful Death Statute was amended, in 1937, to
permit an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful
death of the mother and vice versa, but significantly, no
mention was made as to recovery for the death of a father
of an illegitimate child.19
12 Supra, n. 9.
Ibid., 362.

14 Scott

v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 A. 117 (1919).
"Ibid., 350. In accord, Bell v. Terry and Tench Co., 177 App. Div. 123,
163 N.Y:S. 733 (1917).
"221 Md. 154, 160, 156 A. 2d 638 (1959).
136 Md. 103, 111 A. 164 (1920).
"Ibid., 119.
S"u pra, n. 16, 160.
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As an indication of its policy on the definition of the
word "child," the General Assembly of the Maryland Legislature in 1937 provided that:
"The word child or its equivalent shall be construed
to include any illegitimate child, except in matters of
inheritance, descent or distribution of real and personal property,20 unless such a construction would be
unreasonable."
The specific exception in matters of inheritance, descent
or distribution seems to preclude the courts from expanding the definition of "child" to include illegitimate children
in such statutes, even though there seemed to be no
tendency on the part of the Court of Appeals to do so prior
to the legislative clarification.
An illegitimate child can become legitimate only if
the father subsequently marries the mother and acknowledeges the child as his own.21 He is thereby made capable
of inheriting and transmitting inheritance as if born in
lawful wedlock. If for any reason the parents never
marry, the child remains illegitimate and has no right to
inherit from his father or other paternal relatives.2 2 This
conclusion is non sequitur when viewed in relation to the
reasons advanced for the position. The first reason, i.e.,
the uncertainty of paternity and resultant fear of fraudulent claims, seems illogical since paternity involves nothing
more than a question of proof.23 Besides, disinheritance
by will can be resorted to in all jurisdictions except
Louisiana.2 4 The second reason, i.e., inflicting a penalty
for the wrong done, the indulgence in illicit sexual intercourse, has the effect of punishing the innocent child, but
not the erring parents.2" The father and paternal relatives
cannot inherit
from an illegitimate as he is the "son of
'26
nobody.
°MD. LAWS (1937), Ch. 74; Rowe v. Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 363, 9 A. 2d
5S5 (1939).
214 Mo. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 6.
2 Ibid. "This section sets out the only right of inheritance from the
father given an illegitimate child by Maryland Statutes." The annotation
cites Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 A. 117 (1919), but
as pointed out in the principal case on page 160 the Workmen's Compensation Law was amended in 1920 to allow the illegitimate children who are
dependent to recover Workmen's Compensation for the accidental death of
their putative father.
27
C.J. 959; Trout v. Burnett, 99 S.C. 276, 83 S.E. 684 (1914).
"ATKINSON, WrLLs (2nd ed. 1953) 138.
Note, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimates, 84 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 531, 5.38 (1936) ; In Re Vincent's Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.
2d 165 (1947).
mNote, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimates. ibid. In a few
states the legislatures have stipulated that the father may succeed his
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The Maryland Legislature has gone much further in
relaxing the Common Law disabilities of inheritance by
and from the mother and maternal relatives of the illegitimate. The Legislature in 182527 provided for inheritance of both real and personal property by illegitimate
children and their descendants from their mother, or from
each other, or from the descendants of each other, as the
case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock.
The Court was presented in Miller et al. v. Stewart et al.8
with the converse of the situation provided for by this
statute. In deciding that the surviving mother and her
three legitimate children could not inherit from an illegitimate son who died intestate and without issue, the
Court indicated that thp Act of 1845, Chapter 120, only removed the disqualification so as to enable an illegitimate
to inherit from the mother and from other illegitimate
brothers and sisters. There was no reciprocity intended
between the legitimate and illegitimate, and the Act recognized no relationship between them as brother and sister.
The illegitimate was still in contemplation of the statute
nullius filius except as to those situations specifically set
forth therein. The Court referred in its opinion to the unreported case of Medcalf v. Daley and Jones, 29 which proved
to be a direct precedent for the holding in the principal
case, i.e., that an illegitimate child cannot inherit from a
legitimate brother.
However, in Barron v. Zimmerman,0 the Court allowed
an illegitimate child to inherit by representation from his
deceased mother's sister, reasoning that:
it**one who is in the position of a lawful begotten
child for the purpose of inheriting from his mother
should be regarded as a 'child' of the mother, within
the intent of the law, for the purpose of succeeding to
the estate which she would have inherited if she would
have survived."3 1
When a party takes by representation, the size of the share
alone is determined by what the deceased parent's share
would have been had he survived, but the right to inherit
vests directly in the claimant; who in effect is taking in
place of the deceased parent and not through him. It
illegitimate child if there has been mutual recognition or acknowledgment
by the father of the relationship.
2MD.LAWS (1825), Ch. 156; Penman v. Ayers, 221 Md. 154, 156, 156 A.
2d 638 (1959).
-8 Gill 129 (Md. 1849).
-Ibid., 133.
M117 Md. 296, 83 A. 258 (1912).
SIbid., 300.
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would therefore seem that the Court intended to place
the illegitimate child in the bloodstream of his mother for
purposes of inheritance even though the taking was by
representation and not in his own right.
As pointed out earlier, the Act of 1825, Chapter 15632 provided for inheritance of both real and personal property by
illegitimate children and their descendants from their
mother, or from each other, or from the descendants of
each other, as the case may be, in like manner as if born in
lawful wedlock. In 1868,11 the phrase "as if born in lawful
wedlock" was deleted and it was further provided that if
the illegitimate die without descendants, brothers, or sisters, or their descendants, his mother, if living, and her
heirs at law, if she be dead, should inherit from the illegitimate in the same manner as if such illegitimate child had
been born in lawful wedlock. The appellant in the principle case contended that, since the above statute allowed
the legitimate to inherit from the illegitimate, by reciprocity the illegitimate child should be allowed to inherit from
his legitimate half-brother. The Court was quick to point
out that the legislature had not undertaken a wholesale
removal of the Common Law obstacles to inheritance. The
Court of Appeals has adopted and continues to adhere to
strict rules of statutory construction to the effect that Common Law disabilities of illegitimates are to be removed
only to the extent that the legislature has seen fit. 34 It,
therefore, seems clear that if any further relaxation is to
come about in Maryland, it will have to be the result of
remedial legislation. However, a contrary position is taken
by the courts in a majority of the American states. Those
states generally apply liberal rules of construction reasoning that the preferable rule of construction is that the statute be construed as broadly as possible in order to remedy
a gross and manifest injustice of the Common Law.3 5
In summation, Maryland allows the illegitimate to inherit from (1) his mother, her other illegitimate children,
Supra, n. 27. 156.
MD. LAWS (1868), Ch. 199; ibid., 159. Other than minor changes in text
and punctuation In 1888, the Act. of 1868 has continued unchanged and is
now 4 Mb. Conn (1957) Art. 46, § 7.
11McKeon v. State, Use of Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 443, 127 A. 2d 635 (1956).
defines strict construction to mean that a statute will not be construed
beyond its natural meaning as the primary purpose In construing and
interpreting a statute Is to ascertain and to carry out the true Intention
of the legislature.
In Re Klingaman's Estate, 128 A. 2d 311 (Del. 1957). See also Morin
v. Holliday, 39 Ind. App. 201, 77 N.E. 861 (1906); Matter of Hoagland's
Estate, 125 Misc. 376, 211 N.Y.S. 629 (1925); Goodman v. Goodman, 150
Va. 42, 142 S.E. 412 (1928).
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and their descendants; (2) his lineal and collateral maternal relatives by representation; and (3) his natural
parents and everyone in their bloodstream on the contingency that the father subsequently marries and acknowledges the illegitimate as his own. The following
parties are allowed to inherit from the illegitimate:
(1) his mother or her heirs at law, including legitimate children, if she be dead, providing the illegitimate
has died without issue or collateral heirs, i.e., other
illegitimates and their descendants; (2) other illegitimates
of the same mother and their descendants.
The real question is how far the legislature in each
particular jurisdiction should go in the removal of the
Common Law disabilities on inheritance by and from
bastards? There seems no valid reason for cutting off his
rights of inheritance at the mother, or maternal relatives,
or at the father if he subsequently marries the child's
mother and acknowledges the child as his own. This
writer recommends that they be completely removed and
the illegitimate child, for purposes of inheritance, be
placed in the bloodstream of his natural parents. All recent legislation tends in this direction, but few states have
been willing to go this far. The erring parents could still
protect their estates since in all jurisdictions but
Louisiana they possess a complete right to disinherit even
legitimate children by testamentary disposition.
The real evil is the illicit intercourse of the parents, not
the birth of the bastard. The doctrine of nullius filius punishes the only innocent party to the whole affair, and the
placing of a stigma on him has certainly had small deterrent effect on illegitimacy. Any punitive measures
should in fairness fall upon the wrongdoing parents, not
the illegitimate.
DxNIEL

W. MOYLAN

Sufficiency Of Description In A
Chattel Mortgage
Phillipsv. J. F. Johnson Lumber Company'
In August 1955, one Glover executed and recorded a
chattel mortgage to the appellee, Johnson, covering several
passenger motor vehicles and motor trucks, as well as
sundry equipment, including the subject of the present
suit, "l-Terratrac Bulldozer loader - Model 30", the only
such piece of equipment which Glover owned. All of the
1218 Md. 531, 147 A. 2d 843 (1959).
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vehicles except the loader were described by year and
serial number, as well as by make and type. In May, 1956,
Glover bought an International Crawler Tractor under a
conditional sales contract and gave Edward P. Phillips,
the vendor, his Terratrac loader, Model 30, in part payment.
Phillips made no examination of the chattel records to
determine whether there was a lien upon the loader. Johnson Lumber Company sued the appellants, trading as
Phillips Machinery and Tractor Company, for conversion
of the loader in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
and obtained a verdict and judgment of $1,200.00. Upon
stipulation by the parties, the sole question to be decided
was whether the loader was sufficiently identified by the
description in the recorded chattel mortgage to charge a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value with constructive
notice of the mortgagee's lien.
Phillips contended that the description of a piece of
mass-produced machinery must contain the serial number.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court, held
that the description as given was sufficient to enable a third
party to identify the loader, where it was the only one of its
kind owned by the mortgagor.
The pertinent sections of the Annotated Code of Maryland are not particularly helpful in dealing with the
problem of sufficiency of description. Under Article 21,
Section 46 thereof, 2 a mortgage of personal property shall
be executed in the same manner as bills of sale; and
under Section 42 "any bill of sale 'of personal property shall
be sufficient in form if it contains the names of the parties,
the consideration, a description of the property conveyed,
and be signed and sealed by the vendor and dated."3
A somewhat more explicit Code section is Article 21,
Section 5 dealing with requirements of a valid deed conveying real estate, one ,of which is that it should contain
"a description of the real estate sufficient to identify -the
same with reasonable certainty."4 The most detailed
description required, however, is to be found in a statute
(not a recording statute) ,' which requires the serial number
of a motor vehicle to be stated in an application 6for a certificate of title thereon or for registration thereof.
12 MD. CODE (1957).
'Ibid. § 42.
'2 MD. CODE (1957).
16 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66%, § 24(a) (2).
"This section does not appear applicable to the kind of equipment
here involved. See Art. 66Y2, §§ 2(55) and 23. Perhaps the reason for
the more detailed description of motor vehicles than of the bulldozer in
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The prevalent rule as to :sufficiency of description laid
down by text writers, and apparently by judicial authority,
is that a mortgage conveying chattels, when recorded, in
constructive notice of a lien to third persons if the description in the instrument is such as will enable them to identify
the property together with inquiries which the mortgage
itself suggests and directs. A less certain description would
appear adequate as between the mortgagor and mortgagee,
alone.7
The description should be certain enough that the chattel
can be distinguished from other like property. In short,
as the legal maxim advises: "That is certain, which is
capable of being made certain."8 If the description is made
specific by extrinsic facts, it will be satisfactory to give
notice.
In State for Use of Horsey v. Maryland Casualty Company9 it was held that a description of sundry chattels"
in a bill of sale was insufficient as to pass title even between
the immediate parties thereto because it was general in
nature. The Maryland Court held in Fersner v. Bradley1
a bill of sale conveying a "one-half interest in 8 horses,
one-half interest in five single buggies, one-half interest in
six double rigs, one-half interest in 3 sets double harness.
'12
was insufficient to pass title against a judgment
creditor of the vendor, noting that no description was given
which would enable other interested -persons to form an
Johnson's mortgage may have been the ready availability of such description on the registration cards pertaining to those vehicles. See the
instant case, supra, n. 1, 540. See also 2 MD. CODi (1957) Art. 21, § 66 relating to conditional sales contracts.
I First National Bank v. Maxwell, 200 N.W. 401, 198 Iowa 813 (1924);
United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. Ill. 1943) ; Security
State Bank v. Jones, 247 P. 862, 121 Kan. 396 (1926) ; In re Oliver C.
Putney Granite Corp., 14 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Md. 1936) ; Salabes v. Castelberg, 98 Md. 645, 57 A. 20 (1904) ; U. S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Merrick,
171 Md. 476, 190 A. 355 (1937); Jackson City Bank and Trust Co. 53
N.W. 2d 493, 333 Mich. 399, 32 A.L.R. 2d 920 (1952); Tilton v. Wade,
2 F. 2d 358 (4th Cir. 1924); Elgin v. Dehart; 144 Va. 311, 132 S.E. 323
(1926) ; 10 Am. JuR., Chattel Mortgages, § 55; JoNES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AND COND TOAL SALES, (1933 ed. and 1956 Supplement) §§ 54, 55.

'14 C.J.S. 57, Chattel Mortgages. See also 10 Am. Jur., Chattel Mortgages, §§. 53, 55; Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Kaufman
v. Howell, 268 S.W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
p164 Md. 69, 163 A. 856 (1933).
10The bill of sale merely bargained and sold "8 Lupton Steel Bins and
parts; 1 Lupton steel show case, 1 desk, 2 chairs, 1 National Cash
Register, 1 Ohio generator test stand, 1 Jefferson Coil tester, 1 Tunger
Blattery charger, 25 fenders; 7 wheels, 2 truck wheels; 3 tractors; 3 sets
tractor fenders; 1 Oakland Touring Car; 1 Ford Touring car; 1'Ford
coupe; 1 rolling jack." Ibid., 75-76.
"87 Md. 488, 40 A. 58 (1898).
Ibid., 489.
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idea as to what particular vehicles were intended to be
included.
The scarcity or plentitude of chattels of a similar kind
is important to consider. The non-existence of other property to which the terms of the mortgage could apply
frequently renders valid a description in a mortgage which
otherwise would be too indefinite. In a number of cases
the fact that an implement or vehicle was the only one
of its kind owned by the mortgagor has been 'held to support
the sufficiency of a description, even though clarification
of the description was partly dependent upon extrinsic
evidence.'4 in which a
A poignant example is U.S. v. Christensen"
chattel mortgage describing the property as "one tractor,
Moline, 10-20 Farmall, condition good, year of manufacture 1937" was held by the Illinois district court to be
adequate to put third parties on inquiry where the tractor
was the only implement of its kind owned by the mortgagor.' 5 However, in Hayes v. Wilcox," an earlier Iowa
case, the court held the description in a chattel mortgage
"one Oscillation thresher, size 6, 30 inch cylinder, and also
one Chicago Pitts ten-horse power" to be too indefinite to
be sustained.
Another factor of importance is the location of the
mortgaged chattels. The rule here set out is basic and
comprehensive:
"A statement of the exact situs of mortgaged property is of great service in identifying it, and it is
enough that the location of the property may be determined by fair inferences drawn from the entire
instrument. Although it is generally not a sufficient
location to say that chattels are in a certain county, or
in a certain city or town, with nothing more, in agricultural communities a statement that the mortgaged
property is in the mortgagor's possession in a certain
county seems to be sufficient.""
"See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages, § 59, and cases cited.
,50 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. Ill. 1943).
Note the similarity of the description and result in the Christensen
case and the principal case. Also see Jackson City Bank and Trust Co.
v. Blair, 53 N.W. 2d 493, 333 Mich. 399, 32 A.L.R. 2d 920 (1952), and
Osborne v. McAllister, 19 N.W. 510, 15 Neb. 428 (1884) in which like
descriptions were upheld.
1117 N.W. 110, 61 Iowa 732 (1883). See also Plano Mfg. Co. v. Griflith,
39 N.W 213, 75 Iowa 102 (1888) In which a description: "one six y2 foot
cut Plano harvester and binder" was held too indefinite.
17 6 CycOLroiiA or LAW AND PROCEURE (1903 ed.) 1024, 1025.
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In In re Oliver C. Putney Granite Corporation8 Judge
Chesnut relied heavily upon the fact that the location of
certain mortgaged chattels was set out; 9 and was able to
distinguish this case from the Horsey case, 0 wherein the
2
location of the chattels was not specifically stated. '
In general, although chattels should be specifically
described, something less than the best possible description may be sufficient.22 The Court of Appeals held in
Salabes v. J. Castelberg and Sons,21 that a description. which
referred to a diamond ring by the name of the jeweler and
the number of carats was sufficient. In so holding the court
said:
"... in this case, as the only description that could
reasonably be expected was given, and that was ample
to put persons dealing with the ring on2 inquiry, the
mortgagees should not be made to suffer." '
It seems fair to say that although a description may
be meager, if it gives a fair clue to the identity of the
property so that a third person by reasonable investigation
may ascertain the property which the parties intended
to include in the mortgage, the instrument may be regarded
as creating a valid lien.
DONALD NEDLE
S14 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Md. 1936).
description In the chattel mortgage read:
.. . all the tools, machinery, appliances[,] and other personal property now used by the mortgagor in the 'operation of its stone-cuttting
plant located upon the real estate hereinbefore described, including
specifically one Electric Crane[,] one Electrically driven Compressor[,]
one Gang Saw[,] Carborundum 'Saw[,] Polishing Mill[,] Surfacing
machine and Pneumatic tools." Ibid., p. 33.
s°164 Md. 69, 163 A. 856 (1933).
14 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D.C. Md., 1936). ;See also Bowman-Boyer Co. v.
Burgett, 192 N.W. 795, 195 Iowa 674 (1923) in which a description of
a chattel was upheld where the mortgage not only gave the township and
county and state where the property was situated, but also the location
of ,the farm on which the property was kept. See Elgin v. Dehart, 144 Va.
'The

311, 132 S.E. 323 (1937).

wSee Fire Insurance Co. v. Merrick, 171 Md. 476, 487, 190 A. 335,
340 (1937).

298 Md. G45, 57 A. 20, (1904).
-Ibid., 654.
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Scope Of The President's Power To Secure 80-Day
Injunction Against Continuation of Steel
Strike Under Labor Management
Relations Act, Section 208
United Steelworkers of America v. United States'

After a strike of more than three months by the United
Steelworkers of America (hereafter called the Union),
affecting plants representing 85 % of the nation's basic steel
production capability, the President appointed a board of
inquiry to report to him on the state of negotiations between the Union and the steel industry.2 The Board's subsequent report stated that no early settlement of the strike
could be foreseen.' Thereupon, the President ordered the
Attorney General to seek an 80-day injunction against the
Union's continuance of the strike,4 pursuant to Section 208
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which gives a
district court "jurisdiction to enjoin any ...strike or lock-

out" in interstate commerce which "affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof" and "if permitted...
to continue, will imperil the national health or safety."5
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the injunction upon fact-findings that the
strike would produce an irreparable time-lag in the nation's military and research programs, and upon a further
fact-finding that the strike would adversely affect the nation's economic health because of the large number of
layoffs which would occur in related industries due to disappearing steel reserves.' The Court of Appeals affirmed,
Judge Hastie dissenting, 7 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.'
In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgments of the lower federal courts, Mr. Justice Douglas
dissenting.9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
'361
U.S. 39,80 S.Ct. 1 (1959).
2
Exec. Order 10843, 24 F.R. 8289 (1959), amended by Exec. Order 10848,
24 F.R. 8401 (1959).
8United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 178 F. Supp. 297,
300 (D.C. Pa., 1959).
' Ibid., 299.
561 STAT. 155, Ch. 120, § 208 (1947), U.S.C.A. 178.
United tates v. United Steelworkers of America, 178 F. Supp. 297
(D.C. Pa., 1959).
1 United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 271 F. 2d 676 (3rd
Cir., 1959).
'United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 878, 80
S.Ct. 143 (1959).
'Supra, n. 1.
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Harlan later filed a concurring opinion.' ° The Court found
that the District Court's findings that the strike affected
85% of the nation's basic steel production capability and
imperiled four military or quasi-military programs, fulfilled the statutory requirements for the injunction. Thus
it was unnecessary to decide whether the "national health"
included the nation's economic health as well as the physical health of the citizenry. The Court further determined
that the statute conferred a judicial task of finding whether
the conditions required for granting an injunction were
present, and not a legislative or executive one, since Congress had predetermined what the injunctive conditions
were to be.
Judge Hastie's dissent in the Court of Appeals had been
predicated upon the view that an injunction should not
issue unless the government made a positive showing that
the injunction would facilitate a settlement of the dispute."
The Supreme Court denied the validity of this reasoning,
emphatically stating that the "basic purpose" of Section
208 was "to see that vital production should be resumed or
continued for a time while further efforts were made to
settle the dispute."' 2 The Court further stated that Congress did not intend the issuance of a Section 208 injunction to depend upon inquiries into such matters as the
availability of other remedies, the effect of an injunction on
the collective bargaining process, the merits of the parties'
positions, or the conduct of the parties in their negotiations. It would seem that the removal of the abovementioned factors for equitable consideration has severely
modified or entirely eliminated any equitable discretion
with respect to the propriety of granting an injunction,
once the statutory bases for the injunction have been
found. Hence, by inference from the majority opinion and
as clearly stated by the concurring opinion, 3 Congress has
10United Steelworkers
S.Ct. 177 (1959).
SSupra, n. 7, 960.

of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 80

'361 U.S. 39, 80 S.Ct. 1 (1959).
Supra, n. 10. The opinion states, at p. 183:
"* * * We conclude that under the national emergency provisions of
the Labor Management Relations Act it is not for the judiciary to
exercise conventional 'discretion' to withhold an 'eighty-day' Injunction upon a balancing of conveniences.
"'Discretionary' jurisdiction is exercised when a given injunctive
remedy is not commanded as a matter of policy by Congress, but is,
as a presupposition of judge-made law, left to judicial discretion.
Such is not the case under this statute. The purpose of Congress
expressed by the scheme of this statute precludes ordinary equitable
discretion. * * *"
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made it mandatory that an injunction be granted after the
requisite fact-findings are made.
Section 208 says, that if the district court finds the
statutory requisites, "it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin
such strikes. . . ." It does not say, "it shall enjoin such
strikes ... ." This language of the Act could reasonably be
construed as permissive rather than mandatory. If Congress had meant to deviate from the traditional principle
regarding equity, that the chancellor has discretion to act
rather than an absolute duty to act, it seems appropriate
that it would have used words expressly conferring such a
duty. 4 It is submitted that perhaps Congress did intend
to give the district court only a narrow discretion to decline
to grant the injunction if the statutory bases for it were
present, but did not intend to completely abolish the
court's equitable discretion. 5 This contention stems from
the fact that Section 208 was intended, when the Act was
passed, to apply mainly to the bituminous coal industry
rather than to the basic steel industry. 6 Indeed, the first
use of the Section 208 injunction was against the International Union, United Mine Workers." Strikes in the
bituminous coal industry had long threatened the physical
14Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), which was distinguished
from the noted case in the concurring opinion, supra, n. 10, 184-185. See
also Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229 (1929), where the Supreme
Court held an act of Congress requiring the consideration of applications
for interlocutory injunctions in certain cases by three judges and allowing
appeal to the Supreme Court, had in no way modified the well-established
doctrine that such applications are addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. The Court reasoned, 230, that traditional equitable principles were applicable since "there was nothing in the legislation to suggest that in the exercise of judicial power In respect of such writs
pertinent principles of equity as heretofore understood, are to be disregarded or modified." Beach, Extent of Discretion Exercised by District
Courts in Issuing Temporary Injunctions Against Alleged Unfair Labor
Practices, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 102 (1958), provides an excellent comment on
the same problem within a labor area closely related to the Sec. 208 Injunction.
"Equity courts often narrow their discretion where a public interest
is involved. See Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552
(1937), where the Supreme Court said, "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief In furtherance
of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved."
"eCox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 274, 286 (1948), citing Senate Report No. 105, 80th Congress.
1st Session, 14 (1947), as relevant to this opinion. Note, The Injunction
Under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 2 Rutgers L. Rev.
240 (1948), emphasizes the litigation regarding bituminous coal strikes
which immediately preceded the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act. Teller, The Taft-Hartley Act and "Government by Injunction,"
35 Va. L. Rev. 50 (1949), discusses in detail the labor cases and legislation
which led up to the Labor Management Relations Act.
"United States v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 77 F.
Supp. 563 (D.C.D.C., 1948).
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health of a large segment of the nation's citizenry; but as
dangerous as these strike conditions were, the remedy
necessary to abate them would not seem to require the
same degree of emergency as the remedy required to maintain defense production essential to the country's survival
in today's rocket age. But, although historically the above
approach may be correct, it could very plausibly be argued
that the Supreme Court has ruled otherwise - and an
injunction will accordingly issue henceforth whenever the
statutory requisites are met, without regard for the effect
such an injunction will have on the collective bargaining
between the union and industry involved.
Justice Douglas' dissent was founded on the ground that
less than 1% of the nation's steel production was needed
for defense; therefore a selective reopening of the plants
might be had upon remand to the District Court."8 Such
a result would have avoided sending the entire Union back
to work and would in part have retained the efficaciousness of the strike as a coercive weapon against the basic
steel industry. The majority opinion looked upon Section
208, however, as "a public remedy in times of emergency"
and refused to find any Congressional intent for "reorganization of the affected industry" in such times. 9
As of today, it is entirely foreseeable that the factual
situation present in the instant case, or an equivalent
factual situation, will also occur in any future steel strike,
due to the Cold War and the nation's attendant demand
upon the steel industry for defense production. Therefore,
the practical effect of the dominant opinion, although not
mentioned by the Court, will be to give the President the
power to use the Section 208 injunction shortly after the
onset of any steel strike, if not before its inception.
Those companies in the basic steel industry either having defense contracts or supplying steel to related industries with defense contracts, could avoid the Section 208
injunction for a time at least by stockpiling large steel reserves so that defense production would not be immediately curtailed by a strike. This seems unlikely. In the
first place, the related industries are the more logical
choice to stockpile steel rather than the steel producers
themselves. Secondly, the creation of such reserves in
either the basic steel industry or related industries would
seem prohibitive from an economic standpoint because of
the large storage cost of the reserves and the taxation
"United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 80
S.Ct. 1, 5 (1959).
19Ibid., 3.
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which would be levied upon them in many cases. Finally,
so far as the Union is concerned, an injunctive delay caused
by stockpiling is fortuitous since it depends upon the act
of management; and it is the Union, not industry, which is
really harmed by the injunction.
One of the principal criticisms of the Section 208 injunction is that it forces the Union involved back to work
under pre-strike conditions.2 0 President Harry S. Truman,
in his message to Congress vetoing the Labor Management
Relations Act, stated:
"Furthermore, a fundamental inequity runs through
these provisions. The bill provides for injunctions to
prohibit workers from striking, even against terms
dictated by employers after contracts have expired.
There is no provision assuring the protection of the
rights of the employees during the period they are
deprived of the
right to protect themselves by eco'21
nomic action."
The injunction, being against the Union, also tends to throw
public opinion toward industry and away from the Union.2 2
Moreover, Section 209 of the Act expresses the undesirable
Congressional recognition of a dichotomy between the
Union leadership and the striking workers by providing
the workers with an opportunity to vote against a strike's
inception or continuance, as the case may be, before the
end of the injunctive period. The threat of such a vote is
quite likely to make the Union leadership more amenable
to settlement: a result adverse to their strike order could
mean the virtual end of power for the leadership, and for
the Union itself. 4
The writers believe that the inequities of the Section
208 injunction could be substantially decreased by the
adoption of flexible federal controls, as opposed to the
0 See law review articles, supra, n. 16.
mU.S.C. Cong. Svc., 80th Oongress, 1st 'Session, 1851, 1857 (1947).
2Note,
The Labor Management Relations Act and the Revivai of the
Labor Injunction, 48 Col. L. Rev. 759, 772 (1948), says, ". . . as in the
case of injunctions generally, the labor injunction tends to throw public
opinion on the side of management, the strikers being regarded as law
breakers."
'61 STAT. 155, Ch. 120, § 209 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 179, states:
. . . the National Labor Relations Board, within the succeeding
fifteen days [after the injunction has been in effect 0 daysi, shall
take a secret ballot of the employees of each employer involved in
the dispute on the question of whether they wish to accept the final
offer of settlement made by their employer as stated by him and shall
certify the results thereof to the Attorney General within five days
thereafter."
Cox. op. cit., supra,n. 16, stresses this point.
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single remedy of injunction. Federal seizure of the affected industry seems a proper alternative to the injunction, seizure being somewhat detrimental to industry just
as the injunction is somewhat detrimental to labor, in so
far as ultimate settlement is concerned as well as the conditions of the temporary strike cessation. Changes in
wages and working conditions of the workers could, if
appropriate, be effected through seizure. More importantly, the choice of alternative remedies in the President's
power would evoke an apprehension in both parties to
the dispute, rather than in the Union alone, as to the
remedy which would be used, and would therefore tend
to encourage an early settlement on fair terms.
ROBERT J. CARSON
HOWARD S.

CHASANOW

Governmental Records Of Investigatory Nature
Not Open To Public Inspection
Whittle v. Munshower'
Petitioner's decedent had been employed at an aircraft
factory in Baltimore County for about three months prior
to his death on July 7, 1942. Although the cause of death
was officially listed as accidental drowning by the Maryland State Police, petitioner alleged that fellow employees
at the aircraft factory had conspired against the deceased
by claiming he "made a defective piece of material,"
thereby causing false charges of sabotage to be filed by
the FBI and Army Intelligence Personnel, and that such
charges "led to" the death of the deceased. In a writ of
mandamus filed against the Maryland State Police, the
petitioner alleged that the state police possessed information showing that the deceased had been officially charged
with making this "material"; but that, in addition, they possessed information which tended to clear the deceased of
this charge. Petitioner, therefore, sought the release of all
such information.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the petition
without leave to amend. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
held that, since the record showed no entry of a final judgment, the appeal must be dismissed as being premature,
but took occasion, nevertheless, to express an opinion on
1221 Md. 258, 155 A. 2d 670 (1959).
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the merits,2 and in so doing, indicated that the demurrer to
the petition was properly sustained, since in the absence of
statutory requirements police records are confidential and
not a proper subject of inspection.
The right to inspect public records, or the certain classes
of records kept by a public official as a necessary part of
his duties, has been held a right guaranteed at common
law, the common law principle being that any public
record was open to an unqualified inspection.8 Mandamus
is considered to be an appropriate course of action to enforce the production of public records for inspection,4 and
private persons may avail themselves of this power without the need for intervention by a government law officer.'
The question of an individual's right to inspect governmental records depends upon two basic requirements:
first, that the individual have a sufficient interest in the
records or information; and second, that the records not
be of such a nature that disclosure might violate the law
or public policy.
A person applying for a writ of mandamus must show
a clear legal right in himself as well as a corresponding
duty on the part of the defendant.6 The requirement of
showing a clear legal right, or some sort of special interest, has been upheld in numerous decisions as a necessary
limitation that must be imposed upon the original common
law principle of unqualified right of inspection. 7 In a situation where the party seeking the writ is a litigant in a
matter to which the records sought could be considered
relevant, the requirement of special interest to show a clear
legal right would be satisfied.' In many instances, however, it appears that practically any interest the petitioner
Following the rule of Penny v. Department of Maryland State Police,
186 Md. 10, 45 A. 2d 741 (1946); and Walter v. Board of County Commissioners
of Montgomery County, 179 Md. 665, 22 A. 2d 472 (1941).
8
McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F. 2d 760 (1st Cir., 1951);
Butcher v. Civil Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 163 Pa.
Super. 343, 61 A. 2d 367 (1948) ; Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 219
N.W. 749, 60 A.L.R. 1351 (1928).
' Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 50 A. 2d 560, 169 A.L.R. 646 (1947);
Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948 (1903).
5 Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hall et al, 91 U.S. 343 (1875).
OPressman v. Elgin, 8upra, n. 4; Buchholtz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 13 A.
2d 348 (1940) ; Jones v. House of Reformation, 176 Md. 43, 3 A. 2d 728
(1969).
State ex rel Donahue v. Holbrook, 136 Conn. 691, 73 A. 2d 924 (1950);
State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 246, 43 S.E. 2d' 214 (1947) ; Fayette County
v. Martin, 279 Ky. 387, 130 S.W. 2d 838 (1939) ; Holcombe v. State ex rel.
Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 go. 739 (1941) ; Logan v. Mississippi Abstract
Co.,
190 Miss. 479, 200 S. 716 (1941).
8
Nolan v. McCoy, 77 R.I. 96, 73 A. 2d 693 (1950) ; People ex rel Stenstrom v. Harnett, 226 N.Y.S. 338, 131 Misc. 75 (1927).
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might be able to show above a mere idle curiousity would
be held sufficient to constitute a legal right.9
The principal difficulty in obtaining records in the possession of the government for inspection lies not in the
status of the person seeking such right, but in the nature of
the records themselves, and the discretion allowed the
official charged with their care and safekeeping. The general records kept by a city, state or the federal government
are for the most part considered public records and are,
therefore, open to public inspection. ° But records and reports made in connection with or as a result of investigation by a governmental agency or official, such as police
or FBI reports, grand jury records, and records of penal
institutions, are generally considered to be of a confidential
nature, either by law or by reason of public policy. 1
Because of the likelihood that the release of such confidential information to the general public would produce
results which would be detrimental to the interests of the
public, any request to a court for access to or inspection of
such records is either automatically denied, 2 or left to the
discretion of the agency or officer charged with the keeping
of such records.13 The theory that public policy demands
that certain types of information possessed by the government be kept secret has been adopted by state courts
throughout the country as a basis for holding investigatory
records confidential. 4 In Runyon v. Board of PrisonTerms
& Paroles,5 the District Court of Appeals of California
demonstrated this underlying policy concept in the following manner:
9 It has been held that there is no right of inspection of a public record
when the inspection is sought to satisfy a mere whim or fancy; there
must be a legitimate interest. State v. Harrison, 8upra, n. 7; however, in

Appeal of Simon, 353 Pa. 514, 46 A. 2d 243

(1946),

it

was held "Any

Citizen" may inspect such records as have been made public records by
law. In State v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490, 67 P. 2d 838 (1937), It is
pointed out that the requirement to show interest cannot be imposed
arbitrarily.
10Supra, n. 3.
n Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P. 2d 893 (1952) ; Cherkis
v. Impellitteri, 307 N.Y. 132, 120 N.E. 2d 530 (1954) ; Greff v. Havens, 66
N.Y.S. 2d 124, 186 Misc. 914 (1946) ; Lee v. Beach Pub. Co., 127 Fla. 600,

173 S. 440 (1937).
1Mathews
v. Pyle, ibid.; Lee v. Beath Pub. Co., ibid.; Peopl& v. Wilkins,
135 Cal. App. 2d 371, 287 P. 2d 555 (1955).
Chytracek v. United States, 60 F. 2d 325 (D.C. Minn. 1932) ; Laydon v.
Maltbie, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (1940); Hale v. City of New York, 251 App.
Div. 826, 296 N.Y.S. 443 (1937).
"Mathews v. Pyle, 8upra, n. 11; Lee v. Beach Pub. Co., supra, n. 11;
People v. Wilkins, 8upra, n. 12; People v. Pearson, 111 Cal. App. 2d 9,
244 P. 2d 35 (1952) ; Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26
Cal. App. 2d 18.3, 79 P. 2d 101 (1938).
Supra, n. 14.
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"[P] ublic policy demands that certain communications
and documents shall be treated as confidential and
therefore are not open to indiscriminate inspection,
notwithstanding that they are in the custody of a
public officer ... Included in this class are ... the files
in the offices of those charged with the execution of
the laws relating to the apprehension, prosecution,
and punishment of criminals."'"
Federal criminal investigatory records are likewise considered inaccessible because of the great harm that could
result to our national security as well as to any persons
involved with the records, should these records reach the
wrong hands. 17 Only by means of the Jencks Act" can an
individual, as a defendant under a criminal prosecution,
gain access to such records, should the government decide
to allow the requested inspection in order to maintain its
criminal action against that individual."9 In addition the
trial court must find such requested records to be relevant
to the particular case.2" However, in matters where the
government is not a party, requests to inspect federal records are not enforceable against the government by law
as in criminal cases, but rather the matter is left to the
discretion of the department head, who by law is "authorized to prescribe regulations ... for the custody, use, and
preservation of records [and] papers ..... ,11 The right of
the department heads to so regulate the production of
records has been upheld in numerous cases.2 2
The possibility of obtaining the release of such confidential information, where such has been left to the discretion of an official charged with their keeping, would
appear slight, since a person applying for a writ of
mandamus must show a clear legal duty on the part of
the official, and should such duty be merely discretionary,
the writ will not be granted.2 3 As in the instant case, the
courts of this country have denied granting writs to examine governmental papers and records unless they are
- 0 Ibid., 101.
11Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
Is
18 U.S.C.A. (1947) § 3500.
19 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2o 18 U.S.C.A.
(1947) § 3500, as interpreted in Rosenberg v. United States,
360 U.S. 367 (1959); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 360 U.S. 395
(1959) ; Palerm o v. United States, 8upra, n. 17.
"5 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1959) § 22.
2Touhy
v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5
F.R.D. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4
F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
Upshur v. Baltimore City, 94 Md. 743, 51 A. 953 (1902).
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clearly of a public nature.24 It is noted that the policy behind the refusal to release investigatory records has caused
several states to enact statutes expressly forbidding the
release of any such investigatory records for public inspection,25 2with
numerous decisions upholding the laws in6
volved.
Grand jury records and minutes are generally considered similar in nature to investigatory records for the
purpose of holding them confidential. Federal grand jury
records are covered under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure where it is provided that disclosure of grand
jury proceedings may be made only to government attorneys, or where directed by the court, if the defendant can
show that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand
2
jury. 8
Maryland grand jury records are likewise not subject
to inspection by individuals, in that by statute the disclosure of such records is forbidden to anyone but the State's
Attorney unless disclosure is made in compliance with an
order of a court.29 A recent decision by the Criminal Court
of Baltimore City held that a defendant in a criminal action had no right to inspect grand jury records prior to
trial, but that the trial court in the exercise of its discretion, apart from any statute or rule on the matter, could
grant such a right in the interests of justice.3" The element
of necessity, therefore, is a basic requirement for the release of any grand jury records for inspection on the
federal as well as the state level, as compared to a requirement of mere relevancy for other investigatory records.
In a criminal proceeding, a defendant may avail himself of Maryland Rule 728, which allows pre-trial discovery and inspection of records and evidence upon a
showing that the items sought may be material to the
24Clay v. Wickins, 7 Misc. 2d 84, 166 N.Y.S. 2d 534
(1957); People
v. Prendergast, 89 Misc. 584, 153 N.Y.S. 699 (1915).

' New York: 46 MOKENNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED § 66A; GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW §. 51; GREATER NEW YORK
CHARTER § 1545. Louisiana: 24 LOUISIANA STATUTES ANNOTATED § 44:3;

also Louisiana Attorney General's Opinion (1933).
mJordan v. Loos, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 447, 204 Misc. 814 (1953); People v.
Harnett, 226 N.Y.S. 338, 131 Misc. 75 (1927) ; State v. Vallery, 214 La.
495, 38 S. 2d 148 (1948); State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 S. 2d 801
(1947).
21Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., supra,n. 20.
18 U.S.C.A. (1947) Rule 6 (e).
2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 26, § 41.
"State v. Forrester, Criminal Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record,
March 20, 1958 (Md. 1958).
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preparation of a defense, in order to gain access to investigatory records.3 1 However, this rule is considered an
exception to the general rule throughout the country,32
and it should be kept in mind that the matter of inspection
being left to the discretion of the trial court prevents such
inspection from being a matter of right. It appears, therefore, that Maryland follows the federal rule in allowing
a defendant in a criminal action access to investigatory
records only under the discretion of the trial court in that
the records must prove to be relevant to the case.
Since the instant case did not involve a criminal proceeding, nor was the State a party to any proceedings
for which the records were sought, the State was under
no express obligation to disclose investigatory records as
might have been imposed otherwise. Thus the decision that
police records are confidential in nature by reason of public policy, and therefore not open to inspection, has placed
Maryland among the great majority of states holding that
investigatory reports do not fall within the general class
of those open to public inspection. This does not automatically bar all types of police records from inspection,
in that the Maryland Code provides that accident reports
made by the Maryland State Police are available for public
inspection. 3 In addition, accident reports filed with the
Department of Motor Vehicles, by the motorists involved,
are likewise subject to inspection by interested parties. 4
However, because of a desire to keep certain investigatory
records from inspection by the general public in that such
an inspection could have results more detrimental than
beneficial, with respect to the interests of the public as a
whole, the Court of Appeals has properly held that such
police records are not a proper subject of inspection in absence of statutory authority.
HARRY

E.

SILVERWOOD, JR.

m MD. RULE 728.

SState v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A. 2d 647 (1947).
38 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 88B, § 47.
' Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 50 A. 2d 560, 169 A.L.R. 646
(1947).

Recent Decisions
Bankruptcy Act - Creditor Can Obtain Review Of Referee's Decision On Trustee's Objection Where Trustee Fails
To Seek Review. In re Madway, 179 F. Supp. 400 (D.C. Pa.
1959). The Federal District Court, in affirming the referee's decision to discharge bankrupt, approved an individual creditor's right to have the referee's decision reviewed when the trustee failed to appeal. The referee had
discharged the voluntary bankrupts from their debts and
the trustee filed objections on the grounds that the bankrupts had failed to explain satisfactorily their loss of assets,
11 U.S.C.A. (1953) Sec. 32 (c) (7). A hearing was held
and the referee affirmed the discharge. A Certificate of
Review was taken by a creditor to the District Court,
seeking reversal of the referee's decision. The Court held
that although the Bankruptcy Act authorizes a trustee to
object, 11 U.S.C.A. (1953) Sec. 32 (b), this does not take
away the right of an individual creditor independently to
oppose the discharge before the referee or to obtain a Certificate of Review. Although there has been no case specifically granting review to a creditor where only the trustee
had protested originally and failed to appeal, this Court
construed the trustee's power of objection as not intending
to limit the jurisdiction of the District Court, but rather to
provide a means for speedy review in addition to the
creditor's right.
In similar circumstances the Courts have reviewed
charges of fraud made by a petitioning creditor. In In re
Fergus Falls Woolen Mills Co., 41 F. Supp. 355, 359 (D.C.
Minn., 1941), the Court said:
"Where the trustee fails to contest doubtful claims, or
apparently invalid claims, the creditors are not compelled to sit idly by and do nothing about it. It is the
privilege and right of creditors who have filed claims
in the proceeding to petition the Court for a review
of a referee's order, where it is apparent that there is
grave question as to the validity of such order, and
the creditors may do this, even though no request has
been made upon the trustee to do so."

2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th Ed., 1959 Supp.) Sec. 39.19
cites the Fergus Falls case, and maintains that it is contra
better authority.
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Conflict Of Laws - Effect Of Foreign Ex Parte Divorce
On Prior Maryland Separation Alimony Decree. Gregg
v. Gregg, 220 Md. 578, 155 A. 2d 500 (1959). Wife obtained
a judicial separation in Maryland in 1951, and husband
was ordered to pay $38 per month permanent alimony. In
wife's instant suit to recover accrued alimony, husband
contended he was under no duty to pay until a divorce
ex parte obtained by him in Nevada in 1953 was declared
invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals, after finding the
Nevada divorce decree invalid due to the lack of jurisdiction over husband, held that defendant was liable for
past alimony and declared him to be in contempt of the
1951 alimony order.
In Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 114 A. 2d 53
(1954), the Maryland Court of Appeals allowed a wife to
recover for past due alimony after finding an Arkansas
a vinculo divorce decree obtained ex parte by husband
to be invalid due to lack of jurisdiction of the Arkansas
court. The Court stated that a Maryland court may inquire into the question of domicile where the recognition of
a foreign divorce, obtained without personal appearance
of the adverse party, is involved. Maryland courts will
recognize ex parte divorces obtained in foreign courts
where the plaintiff's spouse has complied with the domicile
requirements of the other state, but such foreign decree
will be subject to collateral attack in Maryland if the
former court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff.
It would appear from the language of the Court that if
the Nevada decree had been valid, the husband would not
have been in contempt of the Maryland alimony decree.
In Johnson v. Johnson, 202 Md. 547, 97 A. 2d 330 (1952),
certiorari denied 346 U. S. 874 (1952), a divorce a vinculo
obtained by the husband in Florida, in which wife appeared, ended husband's duty to pay alimony under a
Maryland decree a mensa granted to wife prior to the
Florida divorce. For further discussion, see Note, And Now
That You Have Your Divorce, Where Do You Stand? 10
Md.L.Rev.256 (1949).
Criminal Law - Involuntary Manslaughter Conviction
Affirmed Against Joy Racer. Commonwealth v:. Root, 156
A. 2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959). Defendant's conviction
of involuntary manslaughter by automobile arose out
of a race between defendant and decedent where decedent, in trying to pass defendant, collided head-on with a
truck. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in affirming
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the conviction, held that defendant's racing was the proximate cause of decedent's death despite the absence of contact between the defendant's car and either of the colliding
vehicles. Regardless of decedent's own recklessness, if the
defendant's act was one of the substantial causes of decedent's death the defendant would be guilty
In State v. Fair,209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E. 2d 634, 636 (1946)
in circumstances similar to the principal case, the Court
held that if the defendant and another motorist were
racing, "the act of each ... is, in legal contemplation, the
act of both" so as to warrant the defendant's conviction of
manslaughter. Although no Maryland case in point has
been found, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Duren v.
State, 203 Md. 584, 102 A. 2d 277 (1954), indicated that
speed and lack of control are sufficient grounds to sustain
the proximate cause requirement for the defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter by automobile even
if the victim's negligence is a concurrent cause. But Maryland has not resolved the question whether one driver's
speed can be the proximate cause of another driver's death
where there is no contact between them.
See 99 A.L.R. 756; 8 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTomOwILE LAW AND PRACTICE

(Perm. ed. 1951), Sec. 5351. Also

Note, Manslaughter by Automobile, 18 Md. L. Rev. 144
(1958).
Estoppel - Corporate Officer Estopped From Claiming
Ownership Of Property In Himself When By His Conduct
He Has Represented It As Corporate Property. Solomon's
Marina Inc., et al v. Rogers, 221 Md. 194, 156 A. 2d 432
(1959). The defendant, a major stockholder, director, and
officer of the plaintiff corporation, sold the corporation a
boat on credit, with no date set for payment of the purchase
price. Four years later, the purchase price being still unpaid, the defendant repossessed the boat. Thereupon the
corporation brought an action of replevin to recover the
boat from the defendant. By authorization of the defendant and the other directors the boat had been listed as an
asset and the unpaid purchase price as a liability on the
corporation's balance sheets which were made part of circulars offering common stock and convertible debentures
for sale to the public, the corporation realizing approximately $400,000 from these sales. In reversing the trial
court's decision that passage of title was conditioned upon
payment of the purchase price, the Court of Appeals held
that one who has induced another to deal with a corpora-
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tion of which he is a stockholder, director and officer by
representing that the corporation is the owner of certain
property, is precluded from denying the truth of the representation and from setting up ownership in himself when
the other has relied on this inducement to his detriment.
Where purchasers of stock and debentures of the corporation relied on the representation they were entitled to have
the boat be part of the corporate assets.
The Court, in so holding, followed a long line of Maryland decisions, beginning with Rodgers v. John, 131 Md.
455, 105 A. 549 (1917), which have applied the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. For recent cases following this doctrine,
see Fitch v. Double "U" Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 128 A. 2d
427 (1957), Johnson Lumber Co. v. Magruder, 220 Md.
440, 147 A. 2d 208 (1958), and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 220 Md. 497,
154 A. 2d 826 (1959). See generally 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS (5th Ed.) Sec. 854, and 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (5th Ed.) Sec. 804.
Evidence - A Wife's Statement To Fellow Conspirator
Is Admissible At Trial Of Conspirator-Husband. Commonwealth v. Garrison, 157 A. 2d 75 (Pa. 1959). Defendant,
his wife and three others joined in a burglary conspiracy
which resulted in the death of the burglary victim. At defendant's trial one of the conspirators was allowed to testify
that defendant's wife had suggested to him that the victim's
house was a good place for a burglary. Defendant contended on appeal that this testimony violated the Pennsylvania statute:
"Nor shall husband and wife be competent or permitted to testify against each other. .. ." 28 PURDON'S
PENNA. STAT. ANNOTATED § 317.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held (5-2), that the
testimony was properly admitted, in spite of the statute,
since the wife did not testify and the information she
gave the testifying conspirator did not refer to the husband. A dissent claimed the majority allowed the very
thing the statute prohibited because the statutory prohibition extends beyond testimony in court to extra-judicial
admissions "from the mouth of the wife" (79).
Wigmore is in accord with the dissent:
"... it would seem that the hearsay declarations by
the wife or husband, such as would be receivable under
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some exception to the Hearsay Rule, should be excluded when offered against the other spouse." 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 2233.
Cases in accord with the dissent are, Taylor v. State, 220
Ark. 953, 251 S.W. 2d 588 (1952) and Seymour v. State, 210
Ga. 21, 77 S.E. 2d 519 (1953).
Allied with the majority is United States v. Winfree,
170 F. Supp. 659 (D.C. 1959), where extra-judicial statements made to Internal Revenue officers by defendant's
wife were admissible even though the wife would not have
been allowed to testify in court against the husband.
A witness-spouse is competent to testify in Maryland,
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, Sec. 4, but the statute contains
no words of compulsion and the power to compel a spouse
to testify is open to question. See Moser, Compellability of
One Spouse to Testify Against the Other In CriminalCases,
15 Md. L. Rev. 16 (1955).
Evidence - Maryland Statute On Admissibility Of
Criminal Conviction Limited In Scope. Gray v. State, 221
Md. 286, 157 A. 2d 261 (1960). Defendant and two others
were convicted of armed robbery. Defendant alone appealed and upon his conviction being reversed, a new trial
was granted. In the second trial, the State produced testimony to the effect that one of defendant's co-indictees was
sentenced to confinement for ten years for the armed
robbery. The lower court, in convicting defendant, allowed
this testimony on the basis of 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35,
Sec. 11, which states: "If any person . . . charged with
committing any crime is found guilty thereof, such fact
shall be admissible . . . in any proceeding . . .in which
another person . . .shall be charged with committing the
same crime. .. ." The Court of Appeals, in reversing the
lower court, held the admission of this evidence was improper since the statute was intended to apply only where
a person is convicted of a crime which is predicated on the
act of a single person, and subsequently another person
is charged with the same crime. The purpose of such a
statute is to prevent the possibility of two persons being
convicted for a crime that only one could have committed.
In the instant case, however, the crime was predicated on
an offense by joint actors, and the disputed evidence tended
to establish defendant's guilt on the basis of his coindictee's conviction.
The instant case is the first construction of this unique
Maryland statute. No other jurisdiction appears to have a
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similar one. The Court recognized the general rule that
where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the
same crime and are tried separately, the conviction or
acquittal of one is inadmissible against the other. 2
WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (12th Ed.) § 439; Hunter v.
State, 193 Md. 596, 603, 69 A. 2d 505 (1949). The Court
then applied the reasoning in Rogan v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 188
Md. 44, 53, 52 A. 2d 261 (1947), ". . . if the language of a
statute is open to either of two constructions, the court
should adopt that construction which will best tend to
make the statute effectual and produce the most beneficial
results."
See 48 A.L.R. 2d 1016 and 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd
Ed.), Sec. 142.
Mechanic's Lien - Notice To Resident Agent Of Corporation Effective. Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard, 221 Md. 46,
155 A. 2d 661 (1959). Where a mechanics' lien claimant
mailed a registered letter to the corporation containing
notice of intention to claim a lien, the letter being returned
unclaimed, and subsequently he mailed a registered letter
containing the same notice to the resident agent of the
corporation, the Court of Appeals held that the notice to
the resident agent was effective.
The defendant corporation contended that the only
authority of a resident agent is to accept service of process.
The court disagreed, relying on 2 Md. Code (1957) Art.
23, Sec. 99, which provides in part: "Any notice required
by law to be served upon any corporation.., by personal
service upon a resident agent or other agent or officer of
such corporation, may be served upon such corporation
in the manner provided in § 97 of this article.. ." Sec. 97
provides for substituted service upon the State Department
of Assessments and Taxation (successor of the State Tax
Commission). The Court drew the implication from Sec.
99 that under Maryland law a resident agent has authority
to receive statutory notices as well as legal process.
Taxation - A Church Parking Lot Is Not Exempt.
Second Church of Christ Scien. v. City of Philadelphia,
157 A. 2d 54 (Pa. 1959). City real estate taxes were levied
on parking lots of two churches, contiguous to the church
buildings, and used by the congregations attending services. Claiming that a parking lot is necessary in this
modern age for the fulfillment of the church's purpose as
a place of worship, the churches sought relief under the

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

Pennsylvania tax exemption to churches and the grounds
"thereto annexed for the occupancy and enjoyment of the
same." In denying relief the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the exemption extends only to the actual place
of worship and the grounds required for ingress, egress,
light and air, and that parking is an adjunctive use of the
grounds having no actual connection with the worship.
Although demanding that the exemptions be strictly
construed, Maryland grants tax immunity to places of public worship, parsonages, and "the grounds appurtenant"
thereto and "necessary for the respective uses thereof." 7
MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, Sec. 9(4). The Maryland Court of
Appeals, while stressing the "necessary" proviso, has
granted immunity to thirty-five acres on which a tabernacle, parsonage, and living facilities for communicants
were constructed to sustain an annual ten-week summer
religious program. Morning Cheer v. Co. Com'rs., 194 Md.
441, 71 A. 2d 255 (1950). In contrast, a similar Pennsylvania
case exempted only the chapel and other sites consecrated to
worship. Layman's Week-End Retreat League v. Butler,
83 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 134 A.L.R. 1185 (1924).
While noting that Maryland gives a less stringent interpretation to its exemption statute than Pennsylvania,
and recognizing that some courts frown upon the strict
interpretation clauses of tax exemption statutes favoring
religious and charitable groups, Kemp v. Pillar of Fire,
94 Colo. 41, 27 P. 2d 1036, 1037 (1933); Trustees of Phillips
Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A. 2d 569
(1940), apparently a distinction is properly drawn between
what is convenient for the congregation and what is neccessary for religious worship. See CongregationalUnion of
Cleveland v. Zangerle, 138 Ohio St. 246, 34 N.E. 2d 201,
202 (1941). A church parking lot is immune where the
statute exempts property required for "convenient" use.
Immanuel PresbyterianChurch v. Payne, 90 Cal. App. 176,
265 P. 547 (1928). The cases are collected in 168 A.L.R.
1222, 1253.

Book Reviews
Law And Authority In Early Massachusetts. A Study
in Tradition and Design. George Lee Haskins. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1960. 231 pages, with appendices and notes. $5.00.
"In a small quarter of the Western World, in the
year 1630, a small Puritan community was established
along the shores and tidewater in the general vicinity
of what is today Boston Harbor. This was the colony
of Massachusetts Bay, which within a short time became one of the most renowned of the British settlements in North America. Founded by men dedicated
to ideals as exalted as any that have ever inspired
those of the Christian faith, the colony began a record
of accomplishments which the passing of time has
never obliterated. Few others equaled its contributions
to theology, letters, and education; none paralleled its
early achievements in government and law. Building
upon and purifying its English heritage, the colony
constructed within less than two decades a commonwealth in which the religious and social goals that had
inspired its founding were achieved. * * "'
With this volume Professor Haskins, of the University
of Pennsylvania, has attempted to begin a new approach
to American legal history. His purpose is to relate legal
growth to the social and economic conditions within which
that development had evolved. To make such an investigation meaningful it must be limited in scope, and accordingly the present volume is modestly described as an introduction to the history of Massachusetts' law in the colonial
period. In explaining why his analysis is restricted to the
twenty year period from 1630 to 1650, the author explains
that it is during this short period of time that the structure
of the civil government was completed and the laws of the
colony were shaped and compiled into the Code of 1648
which was to become the basis of all subsequent seventeenth century legislation. After this period the economic
structure of the colony changed, and the political-legal
problems shifted from the resolution of problems by legislation to enforcement of the laws embodied in the Code
through court decision.
1 Ch. 1, "Their Highest Inheritance" p. 1.
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As is to be expected in any study of Massachusetts, Mr.
Haskins first explains the religious and social ethics of the
Puritans and Winthrop's view of the "social compact" as
a covenant by which men renounce their absolute liberty
and bind themselves not to do anything but that which
had been agreed to, and that this duty obtained not only in
the field of moral law but was also the basis of the political
authority in the state. It was this thesis that served as
the foundation upon which the paternalistic government
of the colonial magistrates was built.
He relates the means by which traditional English
political ideas continued to be important in the emerging
government, showing how the treatment afforded Roger
Williams and Anne Hutchinson was no more harsh than
would have been afforded them in England. The development of township government is shown to be the logical
consequence of geography, the land allotment system, and
the memory of the English parish and the manors. The
townships were sustained by the cohesiveness of the family
for the promotion of which the colony's leader was particularly solicitous; numerous laws governed the relationships
among the members of the family, those of primary improtance relating to husband and wife, children, and servants
and apprentices. Even these laws, however were only modifications of those of England.
The relationship of the church to the government is
particularly important to an intelligent understanding of
the Massachusetts colony and this important subject is
comprehensively treated.
Having prepared the reader by a full study of the religious and social theories underlying the colony, and the
extent to which English opinions were altered by them, he
is well prepared to follow the path of the legal evolution.
The remainder of the book is devoted to an exposition of
particular laws regulating the important aspects of colonial
life.
The most important compilation of laws was issued in
1648. Taken out of context many of these laws have seemed
medieval and crude, but when read as the culmination of
eighteen years of colonial experience, and as statutory embodiments of Biblical precepts, the Code of 1648 is seen to
be an extremely important historical document. Far from
being the mere compilation of English common-law or
unthinking enactment of Old Testament customs as it so
often has been painted by less thoughtful or accurate
authors, it was a new and carefully prepared attempt to
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establish principles suitable to the conditions of a new
civilization. It mirrors clearly those problems which the
colonists believed solvable through legal rules, defining
not only civil liberties but civil responsibilities as well.
The Puritan's belief that man's conduct could be persuaded
or enjoined in accordance with exacting moral and ethical
standards is discernable throughout. It was the desire to
reform - not merely church doctrine, but every human
activity - which is so clearly manifested in the Code. The
idealistic element in the colonial law is shown, with examples, and explanations, in the number of enactments the
aim of which was to give positive guidance rather than the
English methods of prohibition and punishment.
This is a rewarding, readable book, which should be of
interest to legal historians, lawyers, and anyone wishing
to know more facts about the beginning of American law.
It is to be hoped that this type of broad analysis of the legal
infancy of one of the colonies is only the first in a series of
such works. The scholarly effort which made the problems
of the Puritans come to life on these pages might well and
profitably be devoted to each of the colonies; for, in each,
the religious and social forces which shape and are reflected in statutory law differed. Each such study could
make an equally fascinating book.
NELSON RED KmR, JR.

From Tin Foil To Stereo: Evolution Of The Phonograph.
Oliver Read and Walter L. Welch. Howard W. Sams & Co.,
Inc. Indianapolis and Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., New
York, 1959. 438 pages plus appendix. Illustrated. $9.95.
At first blush this seems scarcely an appropriate volume
for review in the pages of a legal journal, and yet there is
much within its pages to interest not only the high-fidelity
enthusiast but the attorney as well.
This book is a comprehensive history of an industry,
from its invention by Thomas A. Edison (accompanied by a
copy of the Edison patent and some of his laboratory notebooks) to a description of the latest RCA Victor magazineloading cartridge offering twin-trick stereo at 33 i.p.s.
However, the book is not devoted solely to mechanical artistry, for however interesting that might be, four hundred pages would be rather tedious. This is a history of
an industry in the fullest sense and the reader is led swiftly
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through its pages by such interesting matters as the great
patent litigation between Edison and Bell and Tainter
(telling the tactics of opposing counsel and revealing errors
on the part of the courts), of the local distributing companies and the mergers which led to the formation of the
companies so well-known today. The reader will learn
that the recent problems of compatability (monauralstereophonic) were encountered as long ago as 1908 (disc
and cylinder records), of the development of the coinoperated phonograph, and a most interesting chapter is
devoted to the post war competition in record speeds.
This is a book in which all interested in music, phonographs, industrial history and patent litigation will find
something entertaining, something informing.
NELSON RED KERR, JR.
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POST-MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING,
OR
THE MARYLAND EXECUTOR'S
EIGHT TAX RETURNSt

By G.

VAN VELSOR WOLF*

In Maryland the executor (or administrator) of a decedent's estate normally has eight returns or reports which he
must file relating to the tax responsibilities of the estate
itself. This list includes the "inventory,"' which is technically not a tax return but amounts, in effect, to one of the
more important tax reports since it is the basis of several
tax calculations.
The preparation of these various documents requires
of the executor a careful analysis not only of the obligations of the estate, but also of the charges against, and the
expenses of, the administration. If this is done with a
thorough understanding of the applicable income, estate,
and inheritance tax principles involved, the net result will
often produce a very substantial monetary savings to the
members of the decedent's family.
WITHIN Two MoNTHs

The executor's first responsibility, tax-wise, comes two
months after his qualification as executor. He must give
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B. Yale University, 1930; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 193.3.
t Table of Contents and Time Table:
Within Two Months ............................ 309
Within Three Months ..........................
310
W ithin Six Months .............................
313
At Usual Income Tax Time .....................
314
From Four to Fifteen Months ...................
316
At the Expiration of Fifteen Months ...........
321
Thereafter ....................................
324
Tax Traps ....................................
326
Moral Responsibility and/or 'Personal Liability..
328
Conclusion ..............................
'Actually there are two inventories which must be filed In the usual
case, namely, the inventory of the personal or probate estate, and the
inventory of the real property which does not pass through the executor's
hands but as to which he must account tax-wise.
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notice to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that there
is an estate, and that he is the executor. If the decedent
was a citizen or resident of the United States, and if his
estate appears to exceed $60,000, a "preliminary report"
must be filed. If, on the other hand, the decedent was
neither a citizen nor a resident of the United States, then
the responsibility to file such a report exists if his assets in
the United States exceed $2,000 in the aggregate.2 Although the report need not be filed until two months after
the qualification of the executor or administrator, if no
one qualifies as such within two months of the date of the
decedent's death, a report must be filed within this period
by "every person in actual or constructive possession of any
property of the decedent at or after the time of the decedent's death."'
It makes no difference whether the expected exemptions
or deductions of the estate are great or small; the responsibility exists to file such a return if the gross estate
itself, without consideration of exemptions or deductions,
may exceed $60,000 or $2,000, as the case may be, as
valued "at the date of death." If there is any question, the
return should be filed to be on the safe side.
The return of a resident and domiciliary of the United
States should be filed with the District Director of Internal
Revenue in the District in which the decedent died domiciled. In other cases it is not quite so clear.' However,
it should be filed in some proper manner since failure to do
so can subject the executor personally to a civil penalty of
up to $500,' and possibly even to a severe criminal penalty.6
WrrmN Tm= MONTHs
Within three months of the date of the granting of his
letters, the executor must make two returns to the State of
2Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (herein referred to as I.R.C.) sees.
6036 and 6071; Regs. § 20.6036-1 and § 20.6071-1; Form 704 for the
estates of citizens or residents of the United States, and Form 705 for
nonresidents not citizens.
DReg. § 20.6036-1 (b).
'Reg. § 20.6091-1 provides that if the decedent was a "resident" then
the notice must be filed where the decedent had his "domicile." If a
nonresident, whether or not a citizen, the notice must be filed with the
Director of International Operations in Washington or with such other
office as the Commissioner may designate. If the decedent was a resident,
but was domiciled outside any revenue district, perhaps the notice should
be filed both in the district of residence and in Washington to be on the
safe side.
5I.R.C.
sec. 7269.
a I.R.C. see. 7203. There does not seem to be any penalty which could be
imposed on the decedent's estate for a delinquency or failure on the part
of the executor to file, in spite of the implication in the "Instructions" on

the form.
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Maryland. First, he must file a report with the Register
of Wills listing (1) the property, if any, in which the
decedent had an interest as joint tenant at the time of his
death; and (2) all transfers of "a material part" of his
property given away by the decedent within two years
prior to his death.7 In considering the latter part of this
report, relating to gifts in contemplation of death, it should
be noted that the Maryland law is the same as that which
formerly applied for Federal tax purposes, namely, that
if the gift was made within two years of death there is a
presumption that it was made in contemplation of death,
and if the gift was made earlier than two years prior to
death it can still he held to have been made in contemplation
of death if that fact is proved.8 This report, like the
Federal preliminary report, is primarily only a general
notice, having no tax or other estate obligation based on its
specific figures. It usually contains only good guesses of
assets and the values thereof. Nevertheless, it must be
filed on time or the executor will be subject to having his
administration revoked.
The executor's second responsibility within this three
month interval is the filing of inventories, of the decedent's
entire estate, both real and personal, with the Register
of Wills.' ° By this time the executor must have obtained
appraisals on all of the decedent's property, with certain
minor exceptions." If this is not done his letters may be
revoked," and, he could be attached personally, with a fine
of $30 assessed against him." Incidentally, the executor
14
must also file an inventory of money and' a list of debts,
but these are, in practice, usually combined with the personal inventory.
With the filing of these inventories the first opportunity
is presented for what is known as post-mortem estate
planning, that is, the arranging or the handling of the
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 155.
87 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 151.
97 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 165.
108 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 239 and §§ 251, 253. Note that the same

appraisers "shall" be appointed to value the real estate as were appointed
for the personal estate.
11Not included, and therefore exempt from the Maryland taxes on in-

heritance and executors' commissions are "heirlooms and the ornaments
and Jewels of a widow proper to her station, and the clothing of the
family," 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 244. In addition, § 241 exempts

"wearing apparel," and § 242 exempts provisions laid up for consumption
by the family.
" 8 MtD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 239 and § 253.
108 MD. CODE (1957) Art.. 93, § 234 and § 253.
"8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 245.
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decedent's estate during administration in ways that will
most benefit the decedent's surviving spouse, his children,
and any other beneficiaries of the estate. One of the chief
purposes of this planning is to reduce the tax burdens of
all concerned. And it is the necessity of having to value
all of the assets in the inventories which provides this
first opportunity.
The valuation of such things as stocks and bonds quoted
on national exchanges is nearly automatic. However, it is
not infrequent to find fine jewelry, or a good painting, or
perhaps real estate, in a decedent's estate. Before filing
an inventory and committing all hands to the value thereof,
it is important to stop and consider to what use any such
property is to be put.
If a diamond ring, is it to be kept by the beneficiary,
or will it be sold? Will the decedent's home, or some other
piece of real estate, be used by the beneficiary, or be put
up for sale? If either is to be kept, it might be better to
use a figure on the low side of the reasonable valuation
spread of such asset, since the inheritance tax 5 would then
be lower, as well as the Federal estate tax. On the other
hand, if such property is to be sold, it might be more satisfactory to use a figure on the high side, so that the capital
gain tax, which might in the end prove to be a greater
burden than the inheritance and estate taxes combined,
could be kept at as low a figure as possible.
The beneficiary of a painting might wish to keep it,
or he might prefer to donate it to an art gallery. If it
is to be kept, the lower valuation would be preferable. If,
on the other hand, it is ultimately to be given to a charitable institution, the donor will undoubtedly wish to obtain as high an income tax deduction therefor as possible.
Thus, for him at least, it would be preferable to have a
high valuation recorded in the inventory.
Consider also the matter of depreciation on business
real estate or equipment. The higher the valuation for
inventory and estate tax purposes the higher the basis for
depreciation. Very often the income tax benefit from these
annual deductions is greater than the benefit that would be
taken on the lower inventory and estate tax valuation.
Of course, valuations cannot be placed at high or low
figures arbitrarily. But who knows the precise value of
a diamond ring, or of an old master, or of a piece of real
estate? Where there is no exact neasure of worth there
"A widow's diamond ring would presumably not be subject to the
inheritance tax, see supra, n. 11.
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is necessarily a substantial area of latitude, of which good
use can be made in careful post-mortem estate planning.
And this is important, for when an income tax return is
being audited the Federal Internal Revenue Agent will
almost invariably check Orphans' Court records, as well
as estate and gift tax returns. If the properly supporting
figure does not appear on the inventory in the Orphans'
Court appraisal, the tax benefit which the beneficiary had
expected to obtain can well be seriously prejudiced.
WITMN Six MOMNHS

Six months after the date of the decedent's death an
income tax return is due to the State of Maryland. This
is the time to report the decedent's income during his last
taxable year prior to the date of his death. 16 Whether or
not the decedent himself was on a cash or accrual basis,
for this return his income is accrued to the date of death,
and all deductions are similarly accrued. 7 However, there
is an interesting conflict here in two separate provisions of
the Maryland income tax law.
At one place, as indicated above," it is stated that "the
net income for the taxable period in which falls the date
of" the decedent's death shall include "amounts accrued
up to the date of his death." At another place it is stated
that there shall be excluded from taxable income any
amount "received by an executor ...during the period of
administration ... which is subject to estate, inheritance
or succession taxes payable to the State of Maryland."' 9
So, what happens to a dividend which is declared to stockholders as of a record date prior to decedent's death, but
is not actually payable until after his death? It is an accrued amount which should, therefore, be included in the
decedent's last return. However, it must also be included
in the administration account; and an inheritance tax will
be payable thereon. This writer has been advised by the
Maryland taxing authorities that the conflict has been resolved in favor of the inheritance tax. If the accrued
income is subject to that tax on distribution, it will not
be required to be included as taxable income in the final
return of the decedent.
Incidentally, an important thing to remember in connection with the filing of this Maryland income tax return
167
1

MD.CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 305.
'7 MD.CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 284(b).
'8Ibid.
"7 MD. CODE (195T) Art. 81, § 280(1).
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is that the personal exemptions and dependency credits,
to which the decedent would have been entitled had' he
survived, must be prorated to the date of death. Thus, if
the decedent was on a calendar year basis and died on
June 30, the executor would only be entitled to take onehalf of the personal exemption, one-half of the over sixtyfive additional exemption, and one-half of the dependency
credit for providing for his needy aunt. 0
AT USUAL INCOmE TAx TImE
The executor's fifth tax responsibility is the Federal
income tax return, in which must be reported, for Federal
purposes, the income received by the decedent during his
last taxable year prior to his death. It is filed at the same
time that the decedent would have filed it had he survived.2 ' There is no acceleration of the time requirement
because of his death during the taxable year, and there is
no proration of exemptions to the date of decedent's death
as there is for the Maryland return. If the decedent was
on the calendar year basis, the return would be filed on
the 15th day of April in the year following the year of
his death, even though this could amount to a delay of
more than fifteen months. In addition, there is no responsibility on the executor for the making of payments of
estimated tax after the decedent's death, although if the
decedent had filed a joint estimated return with his wife,
she will be personally liable for the payment of the remaining instalments unless she files an amended declaration setting forth her separate estimated tax.2 2
Usually of considerable benefit in the way of tax savings is the fact that this return can be filed as a joint return with the surviving spouse unless she remarries during
the taxable year.23 Thus, in) the return for the year in
which the decedent's death occurs, the income received by
him during the taxable year prior to his death, together
with income received by the spouse during the entire year
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 286(c). Of interest here is the fact that
the Maryland Comptroller, in a departmental memorandum (3/1/60), has
ruled that for administration purposes a deceased spouse will 'be considered a deceased "dependent," if she had no taxable income in the
taxable year. Thus, no matter when a spouse (without taxable income)
dies, the surviving spouse (the itaxpayer) can take a full exemption on
his or her return, without proration. This is the converse of the situation
discussed in the text, namely, the death of the taxpayer rather than
the dependent.
'21 Reg. § 1.6072-1 (b).
2Reg. § 1.6015 (b)-1 (c) (2).
I.R.C. sec. 6013 (a) (2).
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(including the period after the decedent's death until the
close of the accounting year), can be reported together on
a joint return for the two.
This return is signed by the surviving spouse and by the
executor on behalf of the decedent. If no personal representative has been appointed for the decedent's estate by
the time the surviving spouse must file a return on her
own behalf, she can file a joint return with respect to
both herself and the decedent. However, a personal representative subsequently appointed can disaffirm such act on
behalf of the estate within one year after the last day for
-filing the return of the surviving spouse.24
Only the income that would actually have been reported
by the decedent had his normal tax accounting period
ended on the date of his death, together with the deductions
for expenses on the same basis, are included as the decedent's income for this period prior to death. That is, there
is no bunching of his income because of death. If the decedent was on a cash basis, only the income actually received
by him prior to death and the expenses incurred by him
and paid (with one exception) are reported on this return.
The income to which the decedent had become entitled
prior to death, but to which he had not become entitled to
be paid prior to his death, is no longer to be considered
as his income prior to death. Such income is given special
treatment under the Federal tax law and is known as "income in respect of a decedent." It must be valued and
included for estate tax purposes. It must also be reported
for income tax purposes. However, a credit is allowed
against this income, the credit being based upon the estate
tax to which such income was subjected
when included in
25
the taxable estate of the decedent.
As indicated above, there is one place where income
deductions can be taken on the last return of the decedent
even though payments had not been made prior to his
death. Medical expenses incurred by the decedent during
his last taxable year, provided, they are paid out of the
estate within one year after his death, may 'be taken
either as an income tax deduction on his last return or
as an estate tax deduction, but not as both.2 It is up to
the executor, in considering not only taxes but also the
relative interests of the affected life tenant and remainderI.R.C. see. 6013 (a) (a).
SI.R.C. see. 691 (c).
I.R.C. sec. 213 (d).
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men, to determine whether or not it would be better to
take such medical deductions as an income tax benefit
rather than as an estate tax benefit.
In making these calculations it is important to remember
that if the decedent had not attained the age of sixty-five
years at the time of his death, then only the medical
expenses in excess of 3% of his adjusted gross income will
be deductible. Thus, although the higher income tax rates
might indicate the taking of the deduction for income tax
purposes, nevertheless the 3% rule could substantially
reduce the amount actually available. Also, the use of
medical expenses as an itemized deduction will eliminate
the availability of the optional standard deduction, and
perhaps, with all things considered, it might be preferable
to take the optional standard deduction on the income tax
return and leave the medical expenses to the estate tax
return.
One procedural fact should be noticed here. In order to
take such an income tax deduction it is necessary that there
be filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a statement and waiver in writing to the effect that the deduction
has not been taken on the estate tax return and will not be.
Once the statement and waiver are filed no change can be
made. Yet it is often difficult to make any final decision on
the subject by the time the income tax return must be
filed. It is therefore suggested that the income tax deduction be taken, but that no waiver be filed at that time.
Then, on audit, when the Agent requires that the statement and waiver be filed in order to permit the deduction,
the decision can be made more intelligently.
FROM FoUR TO FiFTEEN

MoNms

The tax report in which there is, perhaps, the greatest
comparative opportunity for tax money saving is the
Federal income tax return for the estate (the executor
does not ever file an income tax return to the State of
Maryland for income which becomes payable during the
period of administration).27 This Federal return must be
filed annually, beginning some time within 15 months of
the date of death (plus a few days if death occurred early
in the month), but the executor has complete latitude
within that period as to the actual date. He is not bound
by the decedent's accounting period. Although the dece7 MD. CoDE (1957) Art 81, § 280 (1).
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dent may have been on a calendar year basis, the executor
can switch the estate to a fiscal year basis, ending on the
last day of any month within one year of the date of death
that he may feel most opportune. His only responsibility
is that if he does use a fiscal period he must keep a set of
books on the basis of such accounting period. They do
not have to be elaborate, but they must show that the
executor is in fact carrying his account on a fiscal year
basis.
As an example of what benefit this can be, take the
case of a decedent who dies on May 15. A considerable
amount of income may be received during the next two
and one-half months which actually accrued to the decedent prior to his death. It may be non-recurrent, and it
may actually represent a very substantial part of the aggregate income which will eventually be received by the
estate during the entire period of administration, Under
the circumstances the executor might well file for the
estate on the basis of a fiscal accounting period ending July
31, thereby placing this heavy income for the two and onehalf months in the first accounting period by itself. If it
should equal the amount of income Which is received during the subsequent twelve month period, the tax rate would
be held as low as possible on the entire income during the
administration. At the same time, if there is no need, to
make any distribution until after the fifteen month period,
when the estate might be closed, no beneficiary would have
to pay any tax on any of the income during the entire
period, since there would have been no distribution of
anything that could be attributed to income until after
the close of the second fiscal year. As there is no proration
of exemptions, the estate would get the full $600 exemption
during the short fiscal period just as if it had been a full
year. If the decedent was engaged in several businesses,
each business could have its own separate fiscal year.
Incidentally, the executor does not have to pay the
Federal tax on the income of the decedent's estate all at
once. He is entitled to make the payments over four equal
instalments, the first being due on the date for the income
tax return, with each of the other three following at threemonth intervals. 8
However, the most important estate plarining facet in
this post-mortem area is the choice between the estate or
the income tax deduction that is available insofar as administration expenses and casualty and theft losses are conSI.R.C.

see. 6152 (a) (2) and (b) (1).
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cerned. For example, executors' commissions and attorneys' fees are administration expenses. Yet they can be
taken as deductions either on the estate tax return or on
the return reporting the income of the estate. This is true
of all administration expenses, although not of funeral
expenses.
Thus, it is important for the executor to determine
whether it would be more beneficial to take these deductions on one return rather than on the other. Actually, if
his calculations of comparative tax effects so indicate, he
can take part on each. But, if any are used as an income
tax deduction the same statement and waiver considered
above would have to be filed. However, this latter problem
could be handled in the same way, by taking the deduction
on the income tax return and holding up on the statement
and waiver until audit, when the final decision can be
made.
It is interesting to note that there are a couple of -rules
of thumb which illustrate, in the normal case, when to take
and when not to take these deductions for income tax purposes. For instance, in a situation where there is no marital
deduction, where the estate does not exceed $100,000 and
where there is adequate taxable income, it would always
be preferable to take these items as income tax deductions,
since the lowest income tax rate is 20% and the estate tax
rate does not attain the 20% rate until the taxable estate exceeds $100,000. In larger estates, with no marital deduction, the reverse might be true.
More dramatic is the situation, where the marital
deduction is to be included in the determination. Here,
if either of the usual marital deduction formula clauses
(or something else which permits the maximum marital
deduction to be taken) were used, it would still be more
beneficial tax-wise in the normal situation to take such
deductions on the income tax return, rather than on the
estate tax return, even though the estate assets are valued
as high as $1,250,000! This is because the top-bracket gross
estate tax at that level amounts to 39%. And, since only
one-half of any deduction on the estate tax return would
enjoy any tax benefit under these circumstances, 9 the ef1 Each deduction reduces the adjusted gross estate. But, if the maximum
marital deduction is taken (through the application of a formula) then,
as 'the adjusted gross estate is reduced, one-half of each available deduction that comes off Is automatically applied to the marital deduction
portion (one-half of the adjusted gross estate, which is already exempt),
and only the other one-half of such additional deduction will have any
tax reduction effeot.
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fective 'estate tax rate on a $1,250,000 estate would obviously not 3amount
to as much as 20%, the lowest income
tax bracket. 0
As indicated, these conclusions depend upon the assumption that there is taxable income in the estate against
which deductions can be taken. On the other hand, even
if an estate has substantially more than $1,250,000 in
principal, its income is probably so great that no matter
how much principal there is, it would always be more
beneficial - where the marital deduction is a factor - to
take such deductions for income tax rather than for estate tax purposes.
But, if this is done, some thought should be given to
making appropriate adjustments. If administration expenses, or casualty or theft losses, are paid out of the estate,
and yet are taken as an income tax deduction, the benefit
to the income legatee and the prejudice to the corpus remainderman can be very substantial. The payments would
be made out of the principal, so the remainderman will
ultimately receive that much less than he would have
otherwise. At the same time the estate tax will be higher,
without the benefit of these deductions, thereby causing an
even greater loss to the remainderman; and, by the same
token, those entitled to the income will be receiving a
greater net amount than would normally be the case.
With the deductions being allowed for income tax purposes (although not paid from the income), the tax on the
income would be thereby reduced and the net spendable
balance would be greater.
The obvious unfairness of this situation has been recognized in the few states where the problem has been presented."' In these cases the courts 'have required the income beneficiary, or any others benefiting from this election, to reimburse the principal of the estate to the extent
that the estate taxes are increased by this maneuver. The
balance of the benefit, which represents the reason why
the deductions are taken for income tax purposes rather
than for estate tax purposes, may be retained by the in81Actually, in this example, the effective estate tax rate is only 19%.
The Maryland inheritance tax of 1% Is allowable as a credit against
the Federal tax. Since it is payable anyway the Federal tax itself thus
really only amounts to 38%. Where the remaindermen are collaterals
(7y/,% inheritance tax), the area in which the effective estate tax rate
is still under 20% may be much higher.
1
1n re Bixby's Estate, 140 Cal. App. 2d 236, 295 P. 2d 68, 75 (1956);
In re Levy's Estate, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 16, 18 (1957); In re Warms' Estate,
140 N.Y.S. 2d 169 (1955).
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come beneficiary. Therefore, some specific provision should
be made in the will to avoid any contention in this area.2
Would treating these expenses as income tax deductions have the effect of increasing the surviving spouse's
maximum allowable marital deduction? This deduction
is limited by the statute to one-half of the "adjusted gross
estate" which, in turn, is defined as the gross estate less
the deductions "allowed by" sections 2053 and 2054.8 These
are the sections which permit the very deductions for estate
taxes that we are considering taking on the income tax
return. So, if the administration expenses are not taken
as a deduction in the estate tax return, is the adjusted gross
estate thereby increased, and is a maximum, marital deduction legacy to the surviving spouse thereby automatically increased. in an amount equal to one-half of this
difference?
The Treasury seems to have said "yes" to this proposition on at least two occasions - and very clearly "yes"."
It has held that the words "allowed by" should be construed to mean "actually claimed" as estate tax deductions,
and thus, by taking them as income tax deductions the
wife's marital gift is increased - and the overall tax
burdens further decreased to the extent of this additional
tax free gift. And one would think that would be the end
of the case. But, in view of the Treasury's position and
the opinion of the Tax Court in a recent decision, there
35
seems to have been thrown some doubt on this conclusion.
81The following is a suggested will provision to resolve, at least in part,
these possible areas of contention:
"My executors, in their sole and absolute discretion, shall have
full power and authority, as well as the direct responsibility, to make
such decisions during the administration of my estate as they may
deem necessary, appropriate, or desirable in connection with the
determination of (a) whether any alternate valuation date or dates
shall be used for estate and/or inheritance tax purposes, (b) which of
the assets constituting my residuary estate shall be allocated to the
marital deduction gift to my wife, and (c) whether any deductions
avail-able for estate tax purposes shall be used instead as income
tax deductions either on the last return filed on my behalf individually, or on any of the returns filed in respect of income reported
by my estate. All such decisions shall be final and binding on all
persons interested therein, and my executors shall have the power,
but shall be under no duty, obligation, or requirement whatsoever, to
make any adjustments among the interests of the various persons
entitled to share in my residuary estate because any such decision
may increase or reduce the amount of such interest."
8I.R.C. sec. 2056 (c) (1) and (2) (A).
84
Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 460; Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 Cum.
Bull. 386.
Estate of Roney, 33 T.C. 801 (1960); Estate of Luehrmann, 33 T.C.
277 (1959).
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Therefore, until the apparent confusion on this point
has been cleared up, allowance should be made in the will
to permit the executor to so increase these tax savings. 6
The point is that if the surviving spouse has an interest
only in the marital trust, and the remainder of the estate
is left for the benefit of her step-children, or other inimical
interests, there could indeed be a very severe difference of
opinion as to how these deductions should be handled. The
legatees of the residue might well object to increasing
the wife's share at their expense.
AT

THE EXPIRATION OF FIFTEEN

MoNTHs

The last two returns to be made by the executor,
namely, the Federal estate tax return and the Maryland
estate tax return, must be submitted to the proper authorities within fifteen months of the date of the decedent's
death;"T but the executor has some more good post-mortem
estate planning tax opportunities in their preparation.
Taking first the Federal estate tax return, the executor
can elect whether to have the estate valued (1) as of the
date of death, or (2) as of the date of disposition or one
year after the date of death, whichever is earlier. That is,
it is up to him to decide whether it would be more beneficial to take lower values because property will be kept,
or obtain higher values in order to reduce the capital gain
taxes in the event of sale. However, the election is only
available when the value of the estate at the moment of
the decedent's death exceeds $60,000. Also, the election
must be made within the time for filing the return; and
thereafter no change will be permitted. 8
If the decedent owned at the time of 'his death an
interest in one or more closely held businesses, there are
two things which the executor should keep in mind, and
perhaps take advantage of. The first is the privilege to sell
to such a corporation its own stock without running any
risk of having the proceeds considered as a dividend
distribution. This rule provides that if the stock of any
corporation represents more than 35% of the decedent's
gross estate, or more than 50% of his taxable estate, the
See suggested draft, supra, n. 32.
Extensions of time for filing a Federal estate tax return will not be
granted for more than six months in the aggregate under any circumstances, unless the executor is abroad. I.R.C. see. 6081 (a). And failure
to file on time, without reasonable cause, will subject the estate to a
penalty of from 5 to 25%. I.R.C. sec. 6651.
Reg. § 20.2032-1 (b).
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corporation can redeem an amount of the stock equal in
value to the sum of the estate and inheritance taxes paid
by the estate plus the funeral and allowable administration
expenses, without any income tax consequences.8 9 The
same privilege is available if two or more corporations, are
involved, and if the decedent owned at least 75% in value
of the outstanding stock of each of the corporations whose
stock is added together to satisfy the 35 or 50% requirements.
The executor also has the right to pay at least a portion of the estate tax in instalments over a period of from
two to ten years, with only a 4% interest charge.4" The
"closely held business" to which this option applies is that
which represents the same 35 or 50% of the estate, but
either the decedent must have been one of no more than
ten stockholders, or at least 20% of the voting stock must
have been included in determining his gross estate. If
more than one corporation is involved then the decedent
must have owned more than 501% of the total value of each.
However, if this privilege is to be availed of, the statutory
provision should be carefully studied as there are some
quite technical limitations and restrictions on the continuation or termination of the payments.
Another significant post-mortem estate planning opportunity arises from the preparation of the Federal estate
tax return based, as it must be, on the adhinistration account. It is then that the executor must allocate the various
distributable assets between the marital share and the
residue of the estate.
In this connection it should be stated that the estate
tax is only paid upon the assets constituting the residuary
share.4 And since these assets will not be taxable again
in the surviving spouse's estate (if placed in an appropriate
trust), it will make little difference how much larger the
value of that share may become during the balance of the
spouse's lifetime. On the other hand, the marital deduction share, not having been taxed at the time of the
decedent's death, will be taxed at the time of the surviving spouse's death to the extent of the assets constituting
the same at the time of her death.
I.R.C. sec. 303.
0I.R.C. secs. 6166 and 6601 (b).
41And only the assets constituting the residuary share should be liable
therefor. If the marital share must contribute thereto, the allowable
marital deduction will be thereby decreased. I.R.C. see. 2056 (b) (4).
Thus, the draftsman should specifically provide in the will that Federal
estate taxes are to be paid only from the balance of the estate after
providing for the maximum exempt share to the surviving spouse.
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Thus, if the estate is composed of two types of assets,
one a good, income producing asset whose market value
varies little over the years, and the other an asset of considerable dynamic growth, it would normally be better to
allocate the non-growing assets to the marital deduction
share for taxation at a later period and to place the dynamic
growing asset into the residuary share.42 Then, when the
decedent's spouse dies, and these growth assets have indeed
appreciated greatly in value, this appreciation will not be
taxed.
The executor's eighth report4 3 is the Maryland estate tax
return, likewise filed at the end of fifteen months. It simply picks up the difference between the amount of allowable credit for State taxes under the Federal estate tax
and the actual
amount paid for Maryland inheritance tax
44
purposes.
In addition, there are two other points to remember as
this fifteen month period draws to a close. First of all, it
is the last chance for a reappraisal of the estate assets for
Maryland tax purposes. Thus, if the estate has gone down
considerably in value, and it is desired to have the inheritance taxes reduced, a reappraisal can be authorized
at anytime up until the expiration of the fifteen month
period. The inheritance tax will then be charged on the
value as reappraised, rather than on the original appraisal.45 Secondly, the Maryland inheritance taxes must
be paid prior to the expiration of fifteen months from the
date of qualification of the executor. If this is not done
the mandatory provisions of the Code are that the executor
shall forfeit his commissions.4"
In connection with the Maryland inheritance tax responsibilities of the executor, it should be remembered
that the duty is imposed upon every executor or other
person "making distribution -of any property passing sub4
2 It must be remembered, however, that in order to qualify a gift for
the marital deduction the surviving spouse must be entitled to receive the
income or "beneficial enjoyment" ef such property, or its equivalent,
during her lifetime. Thus, care must be exercised to make sure that if
unproductive (non-income producing) property, other than a home, can
be allocated to the marital deduction share, the wife has an effective
right to have such property made productive, or be converted. Reg. §
20.2056 (b)-5 (f)(4) and (5).

"Actually

there will probably be at least one more Federal fiduciary

income tax return, but it would follow along in the usual way one year
after the filing of the first income tax return for the estate, previously
discussed.
"5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 62A, § 2.
"7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 153.
"7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 154. See also § 165 as to revocation of
administration.
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ject to" Maryland inheritance taxes to collect from each
beneficiary the amount of such tax owed by him.47 The
executor can deduct it first from what he is distributing,4 8
or he can sell the property to pay the tax." But apparently
this liability does not extend to jointly owned property,
joint bank accounts, "payable on death" Government
bonds, or the like.
It should be noted that the time for collecting and
paying the tax on real estate is less than for the personalty - thirteen months. If a beneficiary does not pay
up by the date designated by the statute, the executor
must sell.5"
THEREAFTER

After all of the executor's responsibilities have been
satisfied in the filing of the eight tax reports hereinabove
discussed, the question remains as to when the estate
should be distributed. Here, again, this is very often exclusively a matter of tax planning.
As far as the State of Maryland is concerned, we know
that the State income tax on unearned income is 5%. We
also know that there is no Maryland income tax as far
as the estate is concerned, and that any income received by
the estate is simply taxable under the inheritance tax
provisions. 51 Thus, if the beneficiaries of the income under
the will can escape the income tax and be subject only to
the direct inheritance tax thereon, that is, if they are either
parent, spouse, or descendants, their tax burden on,such
income will only be at the rate of 1%, thereby saving 4%
as long as the estate is held open." Of course, the reverse
is true where the beneficiaries are colaterals. Here the
tax burden would be heavier the longer the estate is held
open, since the collateral inheritance tax of 7 % would be
payable instead of the income tax at the lesser 5%.
Calculations should also be made as to the Federal income tax. If the estate is ultimately to be held for the
benefit of the spouse alone, with her to receive all the
income, it would normally be more beneficial tax-wise to
have the estate file its own return on the estate income,
and have the spouse file a separate return on whatever
"77 MD.CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 152; and § 156 as to real estate.
"Aged People's Home v. Hospital, 170 Md. 128, 183 A. 247 (1936).
"7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 153.
m7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 158.
617 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 280 (1).
52
This may not be applicable to beneficiaries who are non-residents of
Maryland. In some states this Income would be taxable as such ro them
when received, regardless of the Maryland inheritance tax payment.
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other income she may have in addition. In this way a split
tax arrangement is obtained, dividing the tax into two
paying entities, with lower tax brackets as to each. This
assumes, of course, that the income from the estate is to
be accumulated, and not paid out to the wife during the
taxable year. On the other hand, if there are to be several
beneficiaries of the estate income, all of whom are in low
income tax brackets, it might be preferable to terminate
the estate as promptly as possible so that they would have
this income split among them for a lower aggregate tax
cost; although the same result could be accomplished, with
the estate remaining undistributed, by simply paying out
the income to these beneficiaries during the taxable year.
In either event, the important thing to remember is
that the aggregate burden of the income tax can usually
be reduced by splitting income among estate and beneficiaries. Thus, it is a good idea before the close of each
taxable year to see whether such a benefit can be obtained
by making at least some distribution from the estate to
minimize this aggregate tax burden.
Finally, in this area, there is the question of what property to transfer, and what to hold, where the legatees are
clamoring for at least some sort of a partial distribution, of
the estate, or where the executor 'has completed the administration but feels that he should nevertheless retain an
adequate sum to cover any possible additional income or
estate tax deficiencies which might subsequently be assessed on audit. For example, if there are in the estate
tax-exempt municipal bonds (of the State of Maryland,
any county, etc., or instrumentality thereof), national bank
stocks, the stock of any bank incorporated in Maryland, or
a Maryland utility stock such as the Baltimore Gas and
Electric Company, all of which produce income that is
wholly exempt from Maryland income tax in the hands of
a Maryland resident, it would probably be preferable in the
normal case to include these assets among those to be distributed. In this way the tax exemptions would not be
wasted by keeping these securities in the estate where no
income tax would be payable anyway, but would be made
available to the distributees who would be in a position to
use and enjoy them.5"
I This tax benefit would also be applicable to the distribution, rather
than the holding, 'by the executor of obligations of the United States.
However, in most cases when he Is simply holding back a sum to protect him in the event of a later assessed income or estate tax deficiency,
the executor would normally invest, nevertheless, in U.S. Treasury 'Bills
in order to have the money earning, safely, some income in the meantime,
regardless of the tax aspects.
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TAX TRAPS
In discussing post-mortem estate tax planning it is
necessary to give some attention to possible tax traps.
Perhaps the first thing to remember is that the holding
period for assets in the estate begins with the decedent's
death. If there are to be sales made during the period of
the administration, the profits therefrom will be taxable
at ordinary income tax rates rather than as capital gains
unless, at the time of sale, six months have expired since
the death of the decedent.
Another, and very serious, tax trap relates to principal
payments to legatees during administration. It is quite
possible for the executor to make what he thinks are
principal payments to beneficiaries, only to find later that
these payments are subject to income taxes in the hands
of the beneficiaries, at ordinary rates and to their full
extent.
Under existing law a beneficiary of an estate must
pay an income tax on all amounts (with two special
exceptions) received by him which, under the will, must
be distributed currently or which are in fact properly paid
or credited during the taxable year.5" And, to be taxable,
these payments do not necessarily have to be paid from
income. As long as the estate had distributable net income,
and a distribution is made, the recipient 'has taxable net
income even though the payment is made from corpus.
The two special exceptions to the foregoing rule are a
gift or bequest of a specific sum of money and a gift or
bequest of specific property, which in either case is paid
or credited in not more than three instalments.5 5
An illustration of this problem would be a will in
which it is provided that everything is to go to A and, B
equally. Assume that the estate has $10,000 of distributable net income, that during the taxable year the executor
distributes 500 shares of XYZ stock to each of the residuary
legatees from the corpus of the estate, retaining all the
cash income to pay bills, and that the stock had a value of
$10 a share on the date of distribution,. Although a corpus
payment, the tax law would consider the stock distributions
as payments of $5,000 of income to each of the beneficiaries,
since there was that much distributable net income, and
since payments in that amount had been made to legatees
named in the will.
14I.R.C. sec.

662.
1I.R.C. sec. 663 (a) (1).
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Suppose, instead, that the executor had divided the
decedent's furniture, jewelry and household effects between A and B in equal shares. These distributions would
likewise be taxable to A and B at ordinary income tax rates
since they were not specifically bequeathed.5" Thus, it is
important to provide separately in a will for the distribution of tangible personal property, so that the beneficiaries
can take immediate possession without running any risk of
income tax liability. For the same reason it is often a good
idea to provide in a will for a pecuniary legacy to the surviving spouse, in addition to the marital deduction formula
interest. She can then, receive this amount of cash diring
the administration without having to pay any income tax
thereon.
A third trap to avoid is in the payment of pecuniary
legacies in kind. If John Smith is left a legacy of $10,000
and the executor pays it by transferring to him XYZ stock
having a value of $10,000 at the time of transfer, the
executor would have a capital gain or loss problem to consider. This is true because he has satisfied an obligation of
the estate in a fixed amount by the use of property having a
cost basis to the executor probably quite different from its
value when used to satisfy the pecuniary legacy.
This particular trap becomes even more important
where there is a formula clause marital deduction provided
in the will. Thus, if the testator leaves to his surviving
spouse an amount equal to one-half of his adjusted gross
estate - a pecuniary legacy - the payment thereof
through the transfer of various assets constituting the
decedent's estate at the time of death presents to the executor a series of capital gain and loss calculations.5 7 It seems
to be the generally accepted opinion, however, that this
problem can be completely eliminated if there is a provision in the will stating that for all purposes the values
of the various items of property constituting the decedent's
estate shall always be those finally accepted for Federal
estate tax purposes, and that all divisions and distributions
of the estate shall be made on that basis. With such a provision it would then be unnecessary to use the somewhat
unpopular "fractional part of the residue" formula clause,
which provides for the wife's gift as a complicated fraction
or percentage of the value of the residuary estate."
§ 1.663 (a)-1 (c) (1) (1).
I"Rev. Rul. 60-89, 1960-10 Cum. Bull. 18.
3 A drafting suggestion as to how to provide for this might be as
follows:
"If my wife survives me there shall be paid over to her a portion
of my residuary estate equal in value to (a) one-half of the value
51Reg.
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MORAL RESPONSIBILrTY AND/OR PERSONAL LIABILITY

The responsibility of the executor to protect fully the
estate and beneficiaries in the various areas of post-mortem
estate planning discussed above has not yet been tested to
any substantial degree in the courts. But if an executor
is going to accept the appointment - and the sometimes
substantial fees involved - it is quite possible that he will
be expected to handle his job with the special competence
demanded of a professional in any other field; and if
he is not fully alert to the various possibilities, he may
well be surcharged for his negligence, or lack of knowledge.
There are also two other questions in this field which
should be discussed, namely: (1) What is the executor's responsibility to investigate the extent to which the decedent
may have negligently or intentionally, even though innocently, understated or failed to report past income or gift
tax liability, including gifts in contemplation of death?
(2) Should an estate tax be paid on assets discovered, or
learned of, by the executor long after the estate tax return
has been filed, audited and approved, and the estate has
been closed?
These are serious questions for, if there are assets on
which the law requires the payment of a tax, and one is
not paid, the Government will hold the executor to account therefor personally. If, on the other hand, the executor pays where he need not, such as waiving the defense of
the statute of limitations where applicable, he may be surcharged, personally, with any loss thereby suffered by the
beneficiaries. 9 Thus, the problem is not really a moral
issue as far as the executor is concerned. He is normally
motivated entirely by the question of his personal liability
to one side or the other.
The Internal Revenue Code states that the "tax imposed
by this chapter shall be paid by the executor."6 But it is
of my adjusted gross estate as that term is defined under the Federal
estate tax laws applicable to my estate, less (b) the value of all interests in property which pass or have passed to my wife under other
provisions of this will or otherwise than under this will, but only to
the extent that such interests are included in determining the value
of my gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes and qualify as a
marital deduction thereunder.
In all matters relating to the administration of my estate the
values of the several assets constituting my residuary estate, including the valuations of any assets which may be distributed by my
executors in satisfaction of the foregoing gift, shall be those finally
determined for Federal estate tax purposes. I direct that in establishing this gift there shall not be allocated thereto any assets which
would not qualify for said marital deduction."
See infra, n. 74.
60I.R.C. sec. 2002.
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improbable that this provision was intended to impose any
personal liability on him. In its context it presumably
means that the payment shall be made from the estate by
the executor in his fiduciary capacity.
Actually, the only place that any personal liability of
an executor appears to be mentioned in applicable federal
legislation is in a Revised Statute adopted more than a
century and a half ago. This law was originally designed
primarily to protect the Treasury from distributions in
certain insolvency situations, before there was a national
bankruptcy law." Thus, it is not surprising that there are
still substantially divergent views as to its application, to
an executor's personal responsibility under the modern
estate tax law. But it seems to be all that the Commissioner needs in most cases.
This ancient Revised Statute provides, in substance,
that taxes (including income, gift, and estate) due the
United States shall have priority over all other debts of,
or claims against, the estate, with minor exceptions, and
that any executor who pays a debt or distributes the estate
without first satisfying all such taxes, shall be held personally accountable, to the extent of such payment.
Recognizing, then, that the executor has a personal,
as well as a fiduciary, liability, the next question is, How
far must he go as a detective or super-sleuth in searching
out and disclosing his decedent's frailties, or worse, for
the purpose of protecting himself against personal liability
for unpaid taxes? Although by no means thoroughly settled as a rule, it might be said generally that liability will
not be imposed under the statute unless the executor was
"chargeable with knowledge" of the existence of the particular unpaid tax obligation. That is, although he must
bear the burden of proof, an executor will not be liable
if he can show that he had "no notice which would put a
reasonably prudent man upon inquiry." But there would
be "enough" to sustain his personal liability if he were "in
possession of such facts as that a faithful and fair discharge
of his duty would put him on inquiry." 2
On the other hand, there is no reason for him to assume that the decedent was not thoroughly and completely
honest. An executor certainly should not have to observe
every past act of the deceased with suspicion. But, if he
knows of a failure to report or pay a tax, or if the facts
0IR.S. § 3467, 31 U.S.C.A. (1954) § 192, which is read in pari materia
with R.S. § 3466, 31 U.S.C.A. (1954) § 191.
e Irving Trust Co., 36 B.T.A. 146 (1937).
quiesced in this decision.

The Commissioner has ac-
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which have come to his attention pretty clearly indicate
an omission somewhere, he must pursue the matter until
reasonably satisfied.
Take, as an example, the oft-repeated situation where
a prospective testator, in discussing his estate plans with
an attorney or trust officer, will quite innocently relate
facts clearly showing that he has failed to report taxable
income in a transaction where he should have; or that he
has placed a great deal of personal property in joint names
without filing a gift tax return,; or that he has transferred
property to a trust, retaining in himself no right to receive income or principal, and on which he has paid a
gift tax, but where he has not added the income of the
trust to his own for income tax purposes since he had not
realized that in retaining certain powers over the administration of the trust the annual income was taxable to
him.6 3
Of course, neither the attorney nor the trust officer
would participate in any further current revision of his
estate unless he brings his tax reporting picture up to date.
But suppose the man dies and these same persons are his
executors. Do they now have to make good these omissions? In such a case it would seem clear that they, as
executors, would have to disclose the facts and pay on
behalf of the estate whatever taxes, interest, and penalties
there were which were not barred by lapse of time.
However, it must be remembered that the executor
was selected because the decedent felt he would exert
every effort to protect the estate, even against the ravages
of the taxing statutes if necessary. So, perhaps the best
thing for the executor to do would be to disclose what is
known, inquire into what is evident or apparently obvious, resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the estate
where nothing more than an undocumented, suspicion
exists, and seek what protections the law provides. The
following procedure is suggested.
(1) Protectionfrom liability for current obligations.
(a) The executor's first act should probably be to give
written notice to the District Director of his appointment,
enclosing therewith a certified copy of his letters. 4 He will
thereafter be treated as standing in the place of the decedent; and if the Commissioner has any deficiencies he wants
to assert, or other problems he wants to discuss, notice will
0 See I.R.C. sees. 671 through 675, inclusive.
" I.R.C. see. 6903, Reg. § 301.6903-1 (b).
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go straight to the executor, and neither the estate nor the
executor will be prejudiced because of any failure of proper
communication.
(b) He should then request a prompt assessment by
the Commissioner of all past income and gift tax liabilities
of the decedent.6 5 In this way he will be apprised of any
errors which are in the returns which could cause him
trouble later, and the Commissioner has to give him an
answer within the time allotted therefor. After the expiration of 18 months from the receipt by the District Director
of such a request, if no assessment shall have been made,
limitations will have run in favor of the estate. But, it
should be remembered that such protection is not afforded
when no return has been filed, or when the return was
false or fraudulent with intent to evade tax. Also, for such
a request to be effective, it must be sent to the District
Director in a separate envelope, without any other document being included therein."
(c) The executor's next step would be to make as
thorough an investigation as the circumstances seem to
indicate with regard to those activities of the decedent
which might have involved him in unreported tax liability.
Thus, the executor should review carefully the decedent's
last three income tax returns to see if they disclose any
indications of unpaid taxes. Although this would not take
care of fraud, or the decedent's liability for having failed to
file any return at all in a prior year, in the normal case it
should be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of reasonable
diligence. He should inquire of the surviving spouse and
children about joint bank accounts, life insurance, jointly
held property, and particularly gifts of any sort, so that
he will be able to report accurately the decedent's taxable
estate, as well as learn of possible unpaid gift tax liabilities.
He should then inquire of the bank where the decedent
kept his account, as well as of the members of the family,
about the existence of any trusts that the decedent may
have created, and whether or not the decedent retained any
right to income or principal, so that past income or gift
tax liabilities in this area could be provided for without incurring additional penalties. The executor should also
review all documents under which the decedent's income
tax returns indicate that he had an interest as a life
beneficiary, or the like, to see if there was also a taxable
power of appointment.
I.R.C. sec. 6501 (d).
Reg. § 301.6501(d)-1 (b).
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(d) Next, as he files income or other tax returns on behalf of the estate, the executor should request prompt
assessments thereof, as he did for the decedent's returns
discussed above. It should be remembered, however, that
although such a request will relieve the estate of any further liability after the shortened time limit, any possible
liability of the executor for such deficiency is not affected
thereby; it will continue for the full period as discussed
below.
(e) When he has filed the estate tax return the executor
should request of the Commissioner a determination of
the amount of the estate tax, and a discharge from personal liability therefor." And here the converse is true,
namely, that although such a request will not reduce the
time within which a deficiency assessment can be made
against the estate, it will release the executor of any
personal liability after the expiration, of one year. It
should also be noted here that although a request for early
audit and discharge from estate tax liability, which can
only be made in respect of the estate tax and not for
either income or gift taxes, can be made before the estate
tax return is actually filed, the one year period will not
expire until one year after the receipt of the application,
or the filing of the return, whichever is later; whereas the
request for a prompt assessment of income or gift tax
liability, which cannot be made in respect of estate tax
liability, can only be made after the actual filing of the
return in question.
(f) Unless the testator has otherwise directed in the
will, the executor should collect whatever contributions
there are to the Federal estate tax actually paid by him
which should be made by life insurance beneficiaries and
remaindermen of trusts over which the testator had a
"general" power of appointment, as provided under the
Federal statutes. 6 He should also collect the contributions
to such tax for whicl provision is made under the Maryland statute.6 9
(g) Since an assessment could still be made against the
executor personally for the decedent's unpaid income or
gift taxes, and against the estate for unpaid estate taxes,
the executor should retain, undistributed, a portion of the
estate to satisfy any reasonably possible deficiencies which
may be assessed in the future. And, the remaining quesI.R.C. sec. 2204; Reg. § 20.2204-1.
I.R.C. sees. 2206 and 2207.
7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, § 162.
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tion would then be, How long should this reserve be held
before it is distributed to the residuary legatees? The
answer would normally be - until the estate tax and all
other returns have been accepted in writing" or all claimed
deficiencies have been, negotiated and paid as assessed, or
upon the expiration of three years from the date for the
filing of the estate tax return, whichever is later. The general rule is that limitations will run on any tax after the
expiration of three years from the time for filing the return, or after the date of filing if filed late,7 ' unless items
are omitted (and no reference is made thereto) which
in the aggregate would exceed 25% of the gross amount
reported in the return,72 and then the time would not expire for six years thereafter.
(2)

Later discovery of estate assets.

Now, suppose that all of the foregoing problems have
been settled, and that the estate has been audited, and
closed, when months or years later the executor first learns
of some assets which belong in the estate but which were
theretofore completely unknown to him. There would be
three possible sources to which the Government would
look for payment. And it would depend upon the circumstances as to which, if any, of the three would, have any
liability therefor.
(a) The estate, through the executor as its fiduciary,
would be the first place to look. But if three years have
expired since the filing of the return,7" and if the newly
discovered assets do not exceed in value 25% of the gross
estate stated in the return, as discussed above, it would
be too late for the Government to proceed against the
estate. And here, again, the lack of any moral issue becomes apparent. Since the statute of limitations has run,
and since the beneficiaries are entitled to its protection,
it is submitted that if the executor makes a "voluntary"
payment of tax to the Government he may well subject
himself to personal liability to the beneficiaries. Perhaps
these assets should have been included in the return, and
"0The District Director will acknowledge in writing when he has reviewed and accepted a return as filed.
n I.R.C. sec. 6501(a) and (ib); unless, of course, there is no return
or It is false, id. (c).
T2 I.R.C.
sec. 6501(e)(1) and (2). And this extension of time for
assessment would probably supersede the 18 month limitation under a
prom)t assessment. Id. (d).
Which means the last day permitted for filing, if filed early, I.R.C.
see. 6501(b) (1).
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as such they should have been subjected to the tax. But
as they were not, it would appear that the executor has
no authority now to waive the protection of the statute
of limitations. If he7 4 does so he might well be proceeding
at considerable risk.
(b) The personal liability of the executor for the tax
would still be governed solely by the Revised Statute
discussed above,7 5 and the procedure for collection would
be similar to that which would be employed against the
estate.76 The period for assessment against him, however,
could be somewhat longer before limitations would be
available to bar the claim since, in respect of a fiduciary,
the assessment can be made at any time not later than, the
date for collection from the estate or "not later than 1 year
after the liability arises," whichever is later.77 As liability
under the Revised Statute does not arise until the executor
has made a distribution of the estate without paying a
tax that is due, it is true that if limitations have run as
far as the estate is concerned he should be subject to no
personal liability 7s if he proceeds to make distribution of
the new assets. But, if he distributes before limitations
have run, his liability will continue for another year. And,
note also that, if an assessment has been made against the
estate within the period of limitations, the collection
thereof may be commenced at any time within the next
six years. 79 Thus, if an assessment is made in time and the
executor distributes in the sixth year thereafter, his personal liability could extend for a period of nearly ten years.
(c) The third source for the payment of the tax would
be the beneficiary to whom distribution has been made,
7' It is true that 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 106 provides that it

"shall not be considered the duty" of an executor to avail himself "of
the act of limitations" if he deems a claim just. Thus, he can in such
cases waive the statute of limitations without personal liability. 'But
there is considerable doubt as to whether § 106 would apply to a claim
of the United -States. It is quite possible that the "act of limitations"
mentioned in § 106 has reference only to the statutory limitations con-

tained in Article 57 of 5 MD. CODE (1957) which, in turn, have no application to claims of the United States, since "the United States is not bound
by state statutes of limitation." United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414
(1939) ; United States v. Thompson, 98 U.'S. 486 (1879) ; United States v.
Schaefer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (Md. 1940). As the Maryland statutes probably
have no effect on the enforcement of Federal claims, it might be presumed
that a reference therein to "the act of limitations" would not contemplate
the inclusion of any matter relating to Federal claims; and so an executor,
perhaps, cannot waive any defense to a Federal tax claim and hope for
protection under § 106 of Art. 93.
" See 8upra, n. 61.
"I.R.C. sec. 6901 (a) (1) (B).
I.R.C. sec. 6901 (c) (3).
,As to criminal liability see the discussion in text, infra, n. 83.
"I.R.C. see. 6502 (a).
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or his transferee. The period of limitations here would
run as to the beneficiary one year after it does as, to the
estate, with one more year for his transferee."
Incidentally, and not to be forgotten if tax liability is
assessed in any of these situations, is the fact that the tax
should be paid only on the value of the assets on the
valuation date.81 Thus, if the estate only had a claim to
assets, either vested or contingent, which, as of the date of
valuation, still had to be judicially determined, this factor
should be taken into account.8 2
This leaves for determination the following three situations: where the executor learns of the existence of the
assets before the three year limitation period has run for
the estate, but after he has obtained his personal release
from liability on the basis of his application for determination within 1 year; where he has no release and learns
of the assets before the expiration of the three year period,
but then does not distribute the new assets until after the
statute has run both against the estate and himself; and
where he first learns of the assets after limitations have
run in favor of the estate and himself, but if he distributes
promptly the legatees would still be subject to transferee
liability.
To disclose such assets in any of those situations might
sound like a voluntary act, for which he would have no
authority without the consent of competent legatees. But
that is probably not true. One or more of the criminal
provisions of the Code relating to attempts to evade or
defeat a tax, failure to pay over a tax, and failure to
file a return or supply information"3 might well be applicable to the first two, if not all three, of those situations,
and the resulting penalties up to a $10,000 fine and one
year in prison for the executor, present a consideration
to be conjured with.
Finally, as for the collection of the tax itself, it is
provided that, with certain exceptions irrelevant to this
discussion, the estate tax remains a lien on the decedent's
10I.R.C. sec. 6901(c) (1) and (2). It is probable that a beneficiary would
be an "Initial transferee," since the definition of transferee in paragraph
(h) apparently does not include an executor, although it includes persons
who hold or receive a part of the taxable estate outside the operation
of the will. There is no definition of the term "transferor"; but it apparently includes an executor in his fiduciary, and not his personal, capacity.
I I.R.C. sec. 2001 Imposes the tax as determined under sec. 2051, which
bases its calculation on the value of the gross estate, which in turn
is defined in secs. 2031 and 2032 as the value of the estate at the time
of death, or on the alternate valuation date, if elected.
12Duffield v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
I.R.C. secs. 7201, 7202, and 7203.
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gross estate for 10 years;84 although the District Director
can give a release from this lien for any part of the estate,
if he is satisfied that what is retained has a value of at least
double the amount of the unpaid tax."M Also, any person
holding or receiving property includable in the taxable
estate, but not includable in the probate estate, can be held
personally liable for the tax, 6 and will be treated as a
transferee for the purpose of determining when limitations
will run."
In summary, then, it might be said that the executor
has a responsibility to the decedent to keep the tax burden
as low as possible. He also has a responsibility to the
Federal and State governments to see that all proper taxes
are paid. But there is also a third consideration - himself.
To the extent that he errs in either of the first two, he may
have to answer with his own personal assets.

CONCLUSION

The inescapable moral, if one can properly be drawn
from the above, is that the job of executor is no sinecure.
In anything but the simplest of estates it is difficult,
tricky - and risky. For these serious responsibilities,
which have been brought on in recent years more by the
high tax rates than anything else, a professional is needed,
a trained specialist in the field, be he a lawyer or trust
officer, or perhaps both.
It is submitted that the time-honored custom of appointing a member of the family, or a friend, as a gesture
of confidence or gratitude, could bring substantial evaporation in gross asset value through unknowing handling
of the tax and administration problems, as well as unsuspected personal liability and loss for the executor -himself.
Skill should be the order of the day, not sentimentality.
The executors' fees are no gift. If the right executor is
selected they are well, albeit hard, earned.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

see.
sec.
see.
sec.

6324
6325
6324
6901

(a) (1)
(b) (1) ; Reg. § 301.6325-1(b).
(a) (2).
(h).
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THE EDITOR'S PAGE
Our article for this issue, "Post-Mortem Estate Planning,
or The Executor's Eight Tax Returns," by G. Van Velsor
Wolf, Esq., delineates the complex of problems which the
federal and Maryland tax law present to the Maryland
executor or administrator, and suggests some timely and
practical solutions. Mr. Wolf has been a past contributor
to the REvImw (14 Md. L. Rev. 3), and we welcome his
return to our pages.
The School of Law is pleased to announce the appointment of two Assistant Professors, Mr. John W. Ester and
Mr. Robert Whitman. Mr. Ester received his A.B. in 1956
from Pasadena College, his J.D. in 1959 from Willamette
University, his LL.M. in 1960 from the University of Illinois,
and was a Teaching Assistant at the University of Illinois
College of Law in 1959-60. He will teach courses in Equity,
Domestic Relations, Mortgages, Testamentary Law, and
Trade Regulation. Mr. Whitman received his B.B.A. in 1956
from City College of New York, his LL.B. in 1959 from
Columbia University (where he was a Harlan Fiske Stone
Scholar and an Editor of the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW), and

was a Teaching Associate at the Columbia Law School in
1959-60. He will teach courses in Contracts and Negotiable
Instruments, and will conduct the Legal Problems Seminar.
This fall the total enrollment of the School is 462, representing 136 colleges and universities; 183 students entered
the first year classes.

Comments and Casenotes
Civilian Dependents And Employees At Overseas
'Bases Not 'Subject To Court Martial Jurisdiction
Kinsella v. United States'
McElroy v. United States2
Grisham v. Hagan3
The instant cases involve an expansion of the principle enunciated earlier in the companion, cases of Reid v.
Covert4 and Kinsella v. Krueger.5 In those cases, the
Supreme Court held that civilian dependents of servicemen stationed at overseas bases could not constitutionally
be tried by courts-martial for capital offenses committed
while overseas during peacetime. The majority of the
Court in the Covert case intimated, however, that this
should apply to any offense, regardless of its gravity. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan, in separate
concurring opinions, restricted their concurrences to the
facts of the Covert case, namely capital offenses. Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Burton dissented. Because
of those divergent viewpoints, and the factor of a possible
shift in the balance of the Court due to the non-participation of Mr. Justice Whittaker in the Covert case, and the
anticipated retirement of Mr. Justice Burton, there was
some doubt as to how the court would treat extensions of
court-martial jurisdiction to civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas in cases involving
noncapital offenses, or to civilian employees serving with
the armed forces overseas.
The instant three cases, decided by opinions handed
down on the same day, resolve these open questions.
In the Kinsella case,6 the defendant, wife of a member of
the United States Army stationed in Germany, was convicted in Germany by a court-martial of the noncapital
offense of involuntary manslaughter of her one year old
son. The jurisdiction of the court-martial was based on
Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military JusticeJ
1361 U.S. 234 (190).
p361 U.S. 281 (1960).
a 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
4354 U.S. 1 (1957), noted 17 Md. L. Rev. 335 (1957).
Ibid.
6 Supra, n. 1.
710 U.S.C.A. § 802 (11), which reads: "The following persons are
subject to this chapter:
'(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States
Is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law,
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in conjunction with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.8 The United States Court of Military Appeals upheld
the conviction, and the defendant was returned to the
United States to serve her sentence in the Federal Reformatory for Women. Petitioner, the mother of the defendant, contending that her daughter was deprived of the
safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, secured her discharge from
custody by a petition for habeas corpus filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia.' The Government appealed to the Supreme
Court, which, in affirming the action of the District Court,
held that the defendant as the wife of a soldier stationed
overseas was not amenable to prosecution by a courtmartial for a noncapital offense committed while overseas
during peacetime.
In the McElroy case," ° the Court held that two civilian
employees of overseas military forces were not amenable
to prosecution, by courts-martial for noncapital offenses.
In the Grisham case," the Court held, a fortiori, that a
civilian employee of an overseas military force was not
amenable to prosecution by a court-martial for a capital
offense.
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority in the
instant cases analyzed them in two aspects: (1) in terms
of Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution which
gives Congress the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" and
(2) in terms of the "Necessary and Proper" Clause.' 2
As to Article I, section 8, clause 14, the Court said the
question is one of status, rather than one of offense, and
consequently, civilian dependents and employees cannot be
considered as falling within the term "land and naval
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
outside the United States and outside the following: that part of
Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main
group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.' "
8 63 STAT. 2241 (1949); 4 UNITED STATES TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (hereinafter cited T.I.A.S.) (1953), pt. 2, 1794.

, 164 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. W. Va. 1958).
10Supra, n. 2. The decision involved two separate cases. In one, a
civilian electrical lineman, employed by the Air Force, was convicted by
a court-martial near Casablanca, Morocco, of larceny and conspiracy to
commit larceny of government property. In the other, a civilian auditor,
employed by the Army and stationed In Berlin, was convicted by a courtmartial of sodomy.
n Supra, n. 3. Petitioner, a civilian employee of the United States Army
in France, was tried by a court-martial for the capital offense of unpremeditated murder.
"Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Forces."'" The Court alluded to the recognized textual
authority on court-martial jurisdiction, 4 which was later
quoted from in the McElroy case:
"That a civilian, entitled as he is, by Art. VI of the
Amendments to the Constitution, to trial by jury, cannot be made liable to the military law and,jurisdiction,
in time of peace, is a fundamental principle of our
public law .... -"I
In fortification of the status approach, the Court discussed, the landmark case of United States ex. rel.
Toth v. Quarles," in which it was held that a soldier who
had committed an offense while in the service could not be
tried by a court-martial for this offense after his discharge
from such service. In the instant case, the language of the
Toth case was applied, namely, "... the power granted
Congress 'to make Rules' to regulate 'the land and naval
Forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction, to
persons who are actually members or part of the armed,
forces.' 7 In the McElroy case, the Court said, "... as to all
civilians serving with the armed forces today, we believe
the Toth doctrine,.. . that we must limit the coverage of
Clause 14 to 'the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed,'... to be controlling."' 8
As to the effect of the "Necessary and Proper" Clause,"
the Court stressed the propriety of limiting Article I, section 8, clause 14 by use of the "Necessary and Proper"
Clause, rather than expanding clause 14, as the Government strongly urged. The Court, in echoing James
Madison, said:
"That clause fNecessary and Proper Clausel is not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress
possesses all of the means necessary to carry out the
specifically granted 'foregoing' powers of sec. 8 'and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution'."2 0
Then the Court rationalized by saying that as the "Necessary and Proper" Clause did not expand clause 14 in the
Covert case, it cannot expand it to include prosecution of
u1 4 Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.

WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND -PREUoMNTS (2d ed. 1896).
" Ibid., 143, cited in McElroy v. United States, supra, n. 2, 284.
350 U.S. 11 (195), noted, 16 Md. L. Rev. 143 (1956).
Ibid., 15.
Supra, n. 2, 286.

Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
'361 U.S. 234, 247 (190).
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civilian dependents for noncapital offenses. This idea was
followed in the McElroy and Grisham cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissented in the Kinsella case and in the McElroy case,
but concurred in the Grisham case. He attacked the
status rationale of the majority, and emphasized that the
distinction, between capital and noncapital offenses should
be maintained, in view of the awesomeness of the death
penalty. In addition, he urged that the "Necessary and
Proper" Clause should be applicable to allow the military
to subject these noncapitaloffenders to court-martial jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Whittaker, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurred in the Kinsella case, but dissented in the
McElroy and Grisham cases. He would draw no distinction
between capital and noncapital offenses committed by
civilian dependents, but he felt that the distinction between
civilian dependents and civilian employees should be the
criterion. This reasoning would subject all civilian employees to court-martial jurisdiction, regardless of the
gravity of the offense.
This series of cases completes the orbit of adjudication
in this area of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying or serving with the armed forces overseas in
peacetime. Any previous doubts 'have been resolved in
clear cut fashion. Now, no civilian, whether dependent
or employee, accompanying or serving with the armed
forces overseas in peacetime, may be deprived of his
constitutional right to trial by jury by being subjected to
trial by court-martial.
The conclusiveness of the instant cases is far less awesome than the problems which they create. The immediate
reaction to these decisions is that unless Congress can
operate quickly, perpetrators of these offenses will con
tinue to go unpunished. Senator Hennings, Chairman, of
the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, has indicated several solutions:
"The United States has several alternatives: (1)
Let foreign countries try these American civilians the
way they would try any other American civilians
under their local laws in their own courts; (2) bring
the civilians back for trial in courts in the United
States; (3) enact legislation placing such civilians in
a military status so they could be covered, by courtsmartial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice."'"
'Oongressional

Record, vol. 106, no. 8, 646, January 19, 1960.
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The Court in the instant cases suggested various alternatives in dealing with these civilians. Of those alternatives, the following appear to be the most feasible: 2 2
First. Congress might provide for the replacement of
civilian employees by servicemen currently in the specialist program of the Department of the Army.2 3 This has
some merit, but has the obvious obstacle of shortage of
manpower. It is conceivable, however, that these specialists could be used to fill at least a portion of the overseas jobs. Of course, such an alternative could, not include
civilian dependents.
Second. Congress might grant greater concessions to
foreign governments to try these American, civilians than
those provided for in the existing Status of Forces Agreement.2 4 This is an undesirable approach from the standpoint of morale and international relations, and the great
diversity among foreign judicial systems would undoubtedly produce conflicting standards of fairness. However, due to the vast difficulties in bringing civilians back
to the United States for trial, greater resort to prosecution
by foreign countries might be feasible.2 5
Third. Congress might provide for the prosecution of
these civilians in Federal District Courts in the United
States. This appears to be a sound approach, although
admittedly not devoid of complications. For one thing,
foreign witnesses cannot be subpoenaed by the federal
courts. There would also be much interference with service duties if military witnesses were shuttled back and
forth. There is a possible conflict with the Sixth Amendment which commands that a trial shall take place in
"the State and district" where the crime was committed.26
In addition, the apparent expense in transporting the neces2 The other alternatives suggested by the Court were: the Institution of
a procedure similar to that used by the Navy in regard to paymasters'
clerks, who served aboard ship and whose trials were sanctioned in
Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) and Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109
(1895) ; the compulsory induction or voluntary enlistment Into the armed
forces of those civilian employees slated for overseas positions; the
voluntary enlistment of specialists similar to the procedure used with the
Seabees during World War II.
1 See Army Regulation 600-201, 20 June 1956, as changed 15 March 1957,
and Army Regulation 624-200, 19 May 1958, as changed 1 July 1959.
2163 STAT. 2241 (1949) ; 4 T.I.A.S. (1953), pt. 2, 1794.
2 The Court did not list this explicitly, but It may be inferred from the
opinion.
1 However, Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181-183 (1891) Indicates that the sixth amendment has reference only to crimes committed
within a state; see also United States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467, 487 (U.S.
1853).
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sary persons back and forth might be imposing. These are
only a few of the many obstacles."
It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss detailed
proposals for such legislation, but this writer believes that
suitable legislation should incorporate three broad ideas:
First. Congress should provide for the prosecution, of
these civilian dependents and employees in Federal District Courts sitting in the United States, accepting the
Court's earlier construction that Article III, Section, 2 of
the Constitution empowers Congress to provide for the
place of trial for federal crimes occurring outside the
boundaries of the States, and restricting the Sixth Amendment's application to federal crimes committed within a
State.2" A special federal court could be created with concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with courts-martial
of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or
the existing federal courts could be used, provided they
were granted this concurrent jurisdiction. If the latter is
adopted, the individual should be brought back to the
United States and tried in the federal district in which the
home port of his overseas unit is located. This would
produce uniformity, leave little doubt as to venue, and
facilitate the knotty problem of arranging for overseas
witnesses. As to the establishment of roving Article III
courts in foreign lands, it is extremely doubtful that any
foreign country would acquiesce in such a proposal.2 9
Second. Congress should implement the above suggested legislation with a provision for a waiver of jury
trial, whereby a civilian accused of a crime could waive
his constitutional right to be tried in an Article III court
and thus voluntarily submit himself to court-martial jurisdiction.30 In criminal cases a defendant may waive a jury
trial, so by analogy it would seem that he could waive his
federal prosecution in the United States, assuming Congress authorized such prosecution: "As a practical matter, then, it seems that anyone overseas could, with the
27EvERETT,

MrILITARY

.TUSTICE

IN

THE

ARMED

FORCES

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES (1st ed. 1956), Ch. III; for an exhaustive discussion, see Comment.

CriminalJurisdictionOver Civilians Accompanying American Armed Forces
Overseas, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 712 (1958).
2 Supra. n. 26: and see 71 Harv. L. Rev.. ibid., 723.
21 See Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying
American Armed Forces Overseas, sutpra, n. 27.

soThis waiver would also extend to ,the constitutional guarantee of indictment by grand jury. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269 (1942); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)
Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. den. 332 U.S.
816 (1947) ; see also 71 Harv. L. Rev. 712 (1958) ; 107 U. of 'Pa. L. Rev. 270
(1958) ; 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 245 (1958).
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cooperation of military authorities, subject himself to
their jurisdiction."' This might appeal to the individual in
many cases because of a desire to maintain anonymity,
the impractibility of retaining suitable counsel in the
United States, or the firm belief that the military court
will be more lenient than the federal court. There appears
to be nothing in the instant cases which would prohibit
the use of such a waiver provision.
Third. Congress should amend the jurisdictional provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement to allow the
foreign countries greater primary concurrent jurisdiction
than they have at present under the treaty.2 At the same
time, there should be instituted a policy which would
limit the number of demands made by the United States
upon foreign countries to turn over American civilians
held by foreign courts for violations of foreign law. Such a
policy would allow cases with very serious charges to be
sent to the United States, but for expediency would allow
the less serious cases to be tried in foreign courts, as they
would be if no Status of Forces Agreement existed.
Mr. Justice Clark, who criticized the majority in the
8 case for failing to provide any authoritative
Covert"
guidance as to what Congress might do by way of legislation, has supplied much of this needed guidance in the
m EvERET,

MIITARY

JUSTICE IN

THE ARMED

FORCES

Or THE UNITED

STATES (1st ed. 1956), Ch. III, 24.
12Ibid., 41. Everett has summed up Article VII of the Status of Forces
Agreement, which deals with jurisdiction, in this manner:
"Under the Status of Forces Treaty, the United States reserves
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to its military law with
respect to offenses punishable under that law, but not under the
law of the host country where the offense is committed. Conversely,
as to crimes punishable under the law of the host country, but not
under American law, that country reserves exclusive jurisdiction.
This jurisdiction embraces American military personnel, their dependents, and civilians 'accompanying' an American armed force 'who are
in 'the employ of an Armed Service of' the United States. . . . It is
clear, however, that the most typical case will be one where the
offense committed would be punishable under both American law and
the foreign law concerned. Here there is concurrent jurisdiction.
One nation, nevertheless, is considered to have primary jurisdiction;
the other, only secondary jurisdiction. The United States would
have primary jurisdiction of an offense solely against the security or
property of the United States, or against the person or property of
American personnel, as well as of offenses arising out of actions 'in
the performance of official duty.' In other instances of concurrent
jurisdiction, the host country has the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction. It is agreed, however, that that country will give
'sympathetic consideration' to any request by the United States for
waiver of jurisdiction If the United States thinks such waiver 'to
be of particular importance.'"
-354 U.S. 1 (1957), noted 17 Md. L. Rev. 335 (1957).
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instant cases. The burden is now upon Congress. 4 By
effecting the three ideas of federal prosecutions in the
United States, waiver of jury trial, and revampment of
the jurisdictional provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement, the constitutional rights of the individual will be
adequately safeguarded, and our relations with foreign
countries should not be any more strained than they are
at present.
FRANK J. VECELLA

Health Inspections Of Private Homes
Frank v. Maryland'
Because of a large quantity of debris and rat droppings
outside Frank's decaying house, a Baltimore health inspector searching for the source of a neighborhood rat
infestation demanded to examine Frank's basement. Frank
refused to admit the inspector until he obtained a search
warrant. Subsequently Frank was tried and convicted before a Police Justice for violating Article 12, Section 120,
of the Baltimore City Code, which imposes a fine on any
homeowner who refuses to admit a health inspector having
reason to suspect a nuisance exists in the house. Failing
to gain acquittal on appeal to the Criminal Court of Baltimore and certiorari being denied, by the Maryland Court
of Appeals, Frank appealed his case to the Supreme Court.
Since Wolf v. Colorado3 settled that the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth
Amendment4 to the Constitution of the United States ex",Senator Keating, on January 19, 1960, Introduced Senate Resolution
235, which proposed a select committee to investigate and recommend
new legislation in this area relating to the jurisdiction of federal courts
over civilians employed by or accompanying our armed forces overseas. At
this writing, the resolution is in the hands of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
1359 U.S. 360 (1959).
2 (Flack, 1950) :
"Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may
demand entry therein in the day time, and if 'the owner or occupier
shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination,
he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty
Dollars."
'338 U.S. 25 (1949), noted 38 Calif. L. Rev. 498 (1950).
' "The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
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tends to the States through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' the precise issue presented to the
Supreme Court was whether a State health inspection of
a private home at a reasonable time without a search warrant constituted a prohibited search. The Court, in a five
to four decision, held that it did not.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
analyzed the background and implementation of the
Fourth Amendment and concluded that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
arose historically as a safeguard against the police search
for evidence of crime; and, although it may be used to
protect more broadly than its history indicates, it nevertheless does not pertain to health inspections made to
protect the general welfare as distinguished from enforcing
the criminal law, if the intrusion on privacy is slight and
conducted within reasonable limits." Finally, the Court
concluded that if search warrants, were required for health
inspections, the rigorous constitutional requirements for
their issue would prevent the making of many needed inspections.7
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Black and Brennan, dissented on the ground that
any search of a private home without a search warrant is
unreasonable, absent exceptional circumstances such as
fire, or police observation of the entry of a fugitive. The
dissent also maintained that requiring search warrants for
health inspections would not interfere with enforcement
of modern health standards.
The question of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a health inspection, of a private home by a Federal
officer without a warrant was considered for the first time
in 1949 by the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in District of Columbia v. Little.! The Court held that
"No. State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
By holding that the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not extend to such health inspections, the Court did not
have to decide whether an inspection Is a search. District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13, 13 A.L.R. 2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1949), noted 38
Geo. L.J. 139 (1949), held that it is. Contra, Sunderman v. Warnken,
251 Wis. 471, 29 N.W. 2d 496 (1947).
1Mr. Justice Whittaker, one of the majority Justices, filed a separate
one paragraph opinion stating that he concurred in the Court's opinion
with the understanding It held the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that in the instant case the search was reasonable.
8178 F. 2d 13, 13 A.L.R. 2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1949), noted 38 Geo. L.J.
139 (1949).
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the protection of the Fourth Amendment applies to health
inspections made by Federal officers to protect the general
welfare and, applying the exceptional circumstances test
as a test of reasonableness, concluded that health inspections of private homes without a warrant were unreasonable.'
In the Frank case, the first case construing the applicability of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to health inspections of private homes without a
warrant, the Court refused to adopt the holding of the
Little case. This refusal was based, in part, on a belief that
the history behind the Fourth Amendment established that
although it was, intended both to protect privacy and afford self-protection, it was the self-protection, the right to
be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions, that inspired the struggles against unrestricted searches. The protection the Fourth Amendment
gives to privacy was held to be outweighed by the need
of the community for health inspections.
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches can be traced back to the English case of
Entick v. Carrington,"0 on which the Court in the Frank
case relied heavily. In that case, officers of the Crown
broke into Entick's home under authority of a general
executive warrant to search for evidence of utterance of
libel, a criminal offense. The Court, in a landmark decision in English constitutional development, held the search
unlawful. The precise holding of the Entick case was
thus limited to criminal actions, but the basis for the decision was the common law right of a man to privacy in
his home. That the Court would have been equally willing
to apply its holding to searches for evidence to be used in
civil actions is indicated by Lord Camden's opinion, for he
stated that there was no way for the processes of a court
to be used in civil cases to force evidence out of the owner's
custody.1 ' Certainly if processes could not be used in a
civil case to require the production of evidence known to
be in a person's possession, a search of his home could
not be based upon cause to believe that such evidence
might be discovered. The truth of the matter is that Lord
Camden apparently never contemplated the possibility
9 The decision was affirmed on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
1019 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (1765).
'1 "There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has often been
tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or
fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to
get it back but by action." Ibid., 1073.
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that a search could be made other than for evidence for
use in a criminal prosecution. Yet the principles and reasoning of the Entick case are applicable to all searches,
no matter what the motive. It is a distortion of the Entick
case to regard it, as did the Court, as authority for the
proposition that special warrants for searches need not be
required when the search is not for evidence to be used
in a criminal prosecution.
Equal difficulties attend the Court's reliance on Boyd
v. United States. 2 The Court quoted an excerpt from the
Boyd decision to the effect that the unreasonable searches
against which the Fourth Amendment gives protection are
almost always made in criminal cases."3 That factual
statement made in 1886 reflected the situation theretofore
prevailing and should not be regarded as an authoritative
guide on the applicability of the Amendment to the vastly
different and more complex situation existing today. Moreover, the qualification that the searches covered by the
protection are "almost always" made in criminal cases
is itself an explicit recognition, that at least some other
searches are also covered. Careful use of the Boyd case
thus calls for an examination to determine whether the
general statement or the exception is applicable. The
Boyd case itself involved a civil action. The Court there
held that compulsory production of papers under civil
process to forfeit property is the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure. The opinion regarded the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as extending primarily to criminal cases, but civil proceedings of a quasicriminal nature were held to be within its ambit. It would
have been consonant with such application to civil proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature to include inspections
of private homes where refusal to admit an inspector or
to abate a nuisance as directed by an inspector after admission constitutes a crime and can lead to a fine or imprisonment.
The Court cited no other cases in support of its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to health
inspections. The dissent cited the Little case 4 and Federal
Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.'5 in support
of the wide application of the Fourth Amendment to civil
cases. In the American Tobacco case, the Court narrowly
1"116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Ibid., 634.
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13, 13 A.L.R. 2d 954 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), noted 38 Geo. L.J. 139 (1949).
"264 U.S. 298, 32 A.L.R. 786 (1924).
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construed, the statutory powers of the Federal Trade Commission in order to avoid having to decide whether any of
its powers conflicted with the Fourth Amendment. This
avoidance of the constitutional issue is not authority for
application of the Fourth Amendment to civil cases generally. Not only is it not authority, but there has been
a long and extensive line of cases 'holding the Fourth
Amendment not applicable to particular types of civil
cases, such as the issue of warrants in certain revenue
cases, 6 attachments under the Food and Drug Act, 7 and
seizures under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," but
none of these are comparable to a search of a private
home. Reliance should be placed on interpretation, of the
intent behind the Amendment, not on cases. The Court
chose to interpret the intent as conterminous with the
evils prompting the Amendment, while the dissent chose
to interpret the intent as the general one to protect privacy which motivated the fight leading to the constitutional protections. Historically and analytically, the position of the dissent that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment should reach health inspections, even though
made only to protect the general welfare, is sound.
Having concluded that the social need for health inspections had to be balanced only against a restricted
right of privacy, the extent of the infringement of Frank's
privacy was considered by the Court. Frank, of course,
had asked only that the inspector return with a search
warrant. The Court construed this request to be not
"admissible self-protection" but a "denial of any official
justification" for an inspection and an assertion of an
"absolute right to refuse consent for an inspection." How
a request that an inspector have a search warrant is a
denial of "any official justification" for an inspection is
difficult to see. A lesser claim to privacy would be hard to
imagine. In effect the Court held that assertions of a right
to privacy are unjustifiable in an area in which the community has an interest even though the right is constitutionally protected.
In upholding the reasonableness of health inspections
made without a warrant, the Court also relied on the fact
that Maryland has sanctioned such inspections for over
200 years. However, the early Maryland statutes authoriz16In

re Meador, 16 Fed. Cas. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1869).
'17United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish, 5 F. 2d 979 (W.D. Va.

1925).
IsUnited States v. 62 Packages, TEtc., 48 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1943),
aff'd., 142 F. 2d 107 (7th Cir. 1944).
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ing entry upon or inspection of ships, carriages, stores,
etc. without a warrant are not in point. The Baltimore
City Code provision under challenge itself derives from
an 1801 ordinance. 9 Thousands of inspections without
warrants were made under this ordinance and its successors, most of them being after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the Supreme Court in Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 20 called
for repeated judicial acceptance before long practice would
indicate compatibility with due process, and Maryland has
no body of judicial opinion sanctioning health inspections
of private homes without a warrant. Without judicial approval, Maryland's history may not indicate common acceptance or compatibility with due process.
Analysis of the Court's opinion indicates that the controlling factor was the imperative modern need for health
inspections. With modern knowledge of how diseases and
infections are spread, it is incontestable that adequate
control is impossible if inspections are delayed until there
are complaints or positive grounds for suspicion that a
nuisance exists.2 We are not faced, though, as the Court
seemed to feel, with the sole alternatives of allowing inspections without warrants or requiring warrants to issue
in all cases where needed. As the dissent pointed out, the
test of "probable cause" could even include the lapse of a
set period without a premise being inspected. This would
not, as the Court charged, represent use of "synthetic
search warrants." The requirement for a search warrant
in criminal cases is not designed to shield criminals or to
protect illegal activities, but to interpose an objective mind
between a possibly power-heavy official and individual
privacy.2 2 That need would seem to exist as much in relation to health inspections as in detection of crime. A
magistrate, for example, could ensure that health inspections were not used to harass or as a means for looking for
evidence of crime without the need to meet the probable
cause test for a search warrant." There is a vast difference
BALTIMORE ORDINANCES,

1801-1802, No. 23, § 6.

18S How. 272 (U.S. 1855).
For an excellent discussion of the issue, see Stahl and Kuhn, Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 256 (1950).
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), noted 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1229 (1949) ; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), noted 37 Geo.
L.J. 270 (1949).
13 See State v. Pettiford, Daily Record,
December 16, 1959 (Md. 1959).
A police officer assigned to make sanitation Inspections gained entry to
a private home under the guise of making a health inspection. His actual
purpose was to look for evidence of a lottery violation without having
to obtain *a search warrant. Lottery slips were found and seized. Sub-
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between broadening the grounds upon which a magistrate
may find probable cause to issue a warrant and dispensing
with a warrant altogether. Administrative agencies and
officers are constantly playing a larger and larger role in
our lives. It would appear sagacious not to unnecessarily
loosen constitutional restrictions on them at this date when
the full impact on our lives is yet to be seen.
Due to the reliance on Maryland history and to Mr.
Justice Whittaker's concurrence on the basis that the instant search was reasonable, the Frank case does not
clarify the position the Court may take in deciding where
the Court will draw the line between allowed and prohibited inspections without a warrant in future cases.
Indeed, just five weeks after the Frank decision, the Court
to four vote noted probable jurisdiction in Ohio
by a four
v. Price2 4 to review on the merits an Ohio case sustaining
the constitutionality of health inspections of private homes
without a warrant. Mr. Justice Stewart excused himself
because his father had participated in the decision on the
Ohio Supreme Court. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
and Whittaker recorded their votes against noting jurisdiction to make clear that they thought the case was
clearly controlled by the Frank case and that there was
no retreat from the Frank decision. Mr. Justice Brennan
noted his view that plenary consideration might disclose
a fact situation so that the Frank case would not be controlling.
In the Ohio case, Taylor refused to admit housing
inspectors to his home until they obtained a search warrant. Taylor was thereafter charged with violating Section 806-30(a) of the Dayton, Ohio, Code of General Ordinances and, in the absence of bail, held in jail awaiting
trial. Section 806-30(a) authorizes health inspections
without any requirement that the inspector even suspect
the existence of a proscribed condition.25 Acting on a
sequently the defendant was convicted of a lottery violation in a trial
in which the lottery slips were introduced as evidence. The Supreme
Bench granted a new trial on the grounds that a principal purpose of
'the entry of the health inspector was to search for evidence of a crime
without obtaining a warrant and that health inspections were not to be
used as a cover for such searches. A requirement of a warrant from a
magistrate could have prevented this abuse of health inspections and,
incidentally, saved the community from the expense of an invalid trial.
24360 U.S. 246 (1959).
2 "The Housing Inspector is hereby authorized and directed to make
inspections to determine the condition of dwellings . . . located within
the City of Dayton in order that he may perform his duty 'of safeguarding the healith and safety of the occupants of dwellings and
of the general public. For the purpose of making such inspections
and upon showing appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is
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petition for habeas corpus filed on Taylor's behalf, the
State Common Pleas Court found the ordinance unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, and- this
reversal was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court. The jurisdictional statement, filed in February, 1959, stated the case was similar
to the Frank case and involved substantially the same
problems. The case was therefore held awaiting the decision
of the Frank case. Following that decision, jurisdiction, was
noted on June 8, 1959. Three memorandums were filed
with the order noting probable jurisdiction, one in support
of the order and two opposing the order. The supporting
memorandum indicated the justices voting to note probable jurisdiction thought a factual situation might be involved that varied sufficiently from the situation in the
Frank case as to make the latter inapplicable, while the
opposing memorandums maintained that the court was
being asked in effect to reconsider its decision, in the Frank
case. This unusual filing of memorandums in connection
with an order setting an appeal for argument demonstrated the sharp and bitter division of the Court.
Subsequently, the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
was affirmed by an equally divided, Court.2" Mr. Justice
Brennan was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black
and Douglas in a dissenting opinion which sought to distinguish the Ohio case on the facts. Specifically, the
opinion pointed out that in the Ohio case there was no
obvious unsanitary condition such as existed in the Frank
case. There was no showing, either, of suspicion or of
probable cause to believe a proscribed condition existed or
of a desire by the inspectors to make either a spot check or
a blanket check of homes in the vicinity. Thus it remains
to be seen whether the Frank case marks out a new area in
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or whether
it will be distinguished and limited in application.
JOHN MICixEMM
hereby authorized, to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable
hour all dwellings.... The owner or occupant of every dwelling ...
or the person in charge thereof, shall give the Housing Inspector free
access to such dwelling... at any reasonable hour for the purpose of
such inspection, examination and survey." *
Ohio v. Price .... U.S.
80 S. Ct. 1463 (1960).
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Liability Of Municipal Corporations Under The
State's Statutory Waiver Of Tort Immunity
Schusterv. City of New York'
Plaintiff's intestate supplied information to the Police
Department which led to the arrest and imprisonment of
a dangerous and notorious criminal. His part in the
arrest was widely publicized, and he immediately received
numerous anonymous threats to his life. The police were
notified of the threats and for a short while provided for
his protection. The protection was then withdrawn although plaintiff's intestate protested that the threats continued. Three weeks after the criminal's arrest, plaintiff's
intestate was shot and killed on a street near his home.2
In a suit to recover damages, the complaint alleged, inter
alia, that the city negliigently failed to protect plaintiff's
intestate after it "requirod and exacted" his services as an
informer and had "actual and constructive knowledge"
that his life was endangered.3
The trial court granted a motion by the city to dismiss
the complaint as failing to state a cause of action.' The
intermediate appellate court affirmed, 4-1. 5 The Court of
Appeals divided 3-3 and, after appointing a justice to sit
on the case, ordered reargument. The Court of Appeals
then reversed the judgment of the lower court 4-3, holding
that the complaint stated a cause of action based on the
breach of duty by the municipality to exercise reasonable
care for the protection of a person in decedent's position.,
The Schuster case presents the problem of a municipal
corporation's liability for negligence under the statutory
waiver of governmental immunity from tort liability in
New York State.7 After exhaustively examining the history and status of governmental immunity from tort lia180 N.Y.S. 2d 265, 5 N.Y. 2d 75,154 N.E. 2d 534 (1958).
'For details of the crime, see the N.Y. Times, March 9, 1953, p. 1,
col. 8. The criminal in question was the celebrated Willie Sutton. Plaintiff's intestate was Arnold Schuster, of whom the Court, at page 268 said:
"There is no suggestion that Schuster was an underworld character. On the contrary, he appears to have been a public spirited young
man who had studied Sutton's picture on an FBI flyer that had been
posted in his father's dry-goods store . ..."
Newsweek Magazine, Vol. 39:38, March 24, 1952, reported that the killing
"aroused the most public feling since the Lindberg kidnapping".
' 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (1953). The complaint alleged that
Sutton and his associates had "a special reputation for violence".
'Ibid.
'286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778 (1955).
'Supra, n. 1.
For an explanation and discussion of the statute, see infra, circa, n. 21.
1
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bility, Professor Borchard, a most influential writer on the
subject," concluded in 1924 that ". . . the law governing the
redress of the individual against the public authorities,
national, State, or municipal, for injuries sustained in the
exercise of governmental powers, is in a state of incongruity and confusion unique in history."9 The issues in the
Schuster case have their origin in this discord.
Governmental immunity from tort liability originated
in the English common-law maxim that "the King can do
no wrong". By way of "one of the mysteries of legal
evolution",1" this doctrine took democratic roots in the
theory that neither the United States nor one of the
several States could be sued without its consent. While
such consent has been, given in varying forms in all jurisdictions, suit against the government for its torts has not
generally been permitted.1 '
Much of the "incongruity and confusion" which has
followed this retention of governmental immunity is found
in the municipal area.'" The tort immunity of the States
8
.See, generally, 'Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J.
1, 129, 229 (1924) ; ]Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36
Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1927), 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928) ; Blachly and
Oatman. Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative
Survey, 9 L. & C.]P. 181 (1942) ;David, Tort Liability of Local Government:
Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1
(1959). See also PRossER, THE LAW op TORTS (2d ed., 1955), Ch. 24, § 109.
Borchard, op. cit., ibid, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 3.
1
oIbid, 4.
A recent notable exception is the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
1291 (1949), §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680, which
provides for substantial federal liability. See Gellhorn and Schenk, Tort
Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Col. L. Rev. 722 (1947).
"It is quite obvious that the states ... do not even approach the position of the national government . . ." - Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1363, 1407 (1954). The authors,
at 1364, offer three reasons for the prevalence of immunity:
"(1) an amorphous mass of cumbrous language about sovereignity
and the nature of law which is usually contradictory within Itself and
is always contracdicted by such modern legal facts as the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the laws of most civilized nations other than our own,
the New York law, and lesser reforms in most of the other American
states;
(2) legislative and judicial inertia, which is probably the most potent
single explanation that anyone can give as to why the American law
is what it is; and
(3) financial fears, that the states and their sub-divisions actually
cannot afford, In the face of other more urgent demands upon their
treasuries, to pay out what they would be required to pay if tort
liability were accepted."
See also ,Schumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 L. & C.P. 242
(1942).
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 131, 60 A.L.R.
12 In Hargrove
2d 1193 (Fla., 1957), the Court commented that "since 1900 well over
two hundred law review articles have been written on the subject." See
generally, Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
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was extended to their sub-divisions upon the tenets of an
early English case, Russell v. Devon.'8 However, legal
writers and the Maryland Court of Appeals 11 have pointed
out that the county in question in, the English case, which
was held non-liable for a breach of duty resulting in injury to a citizen, was unincorporated and without corporate funds, while municipalities and county commissioners
in this country are, without exception, incorporated and
possessed of corporate funds.
Nevertheless, municipal corporations, in the exercise of
governmental duties, as distinguished from proprietary
duties, enjoy tort immunity. The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated the general distinction: "Where the act...
is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument
enuring to the municipality... and has in it no element of
private interest, it is governmental in its nature."' 5 Conversely, where the act is for the private benefit of the
municipality, the function is proprietary. 6
As a practical matter, however, this distinction has
often been distorted, by judicial efforts to effect a compromise between the rights of the injured individual and
the financial risk to the municipality: "When one reads
H'arv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the
Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 L. & C.P. 214 (1942); Smith,
Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich L. Rev. 41 (1949) ; and Miller, Recent
Substantive Developments Affecting Municipal Tort Liability, 21 Cinn. L.
Rev. 31 (1952). Text sources are 18 MOQUILLIN, THE LAW OP MUNICIPAL
CORPOaATIONS (3d ed., 1950), ch. 53, §§ 23-59; and 2 ANTrIAU, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW (1958), chs. 11-13.
2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
"County Oommr's of A.A. Co. v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468, 479 (1864).
15Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 276, 195 A. 571 (1937).
16Mr. Clarke, infra, n. 19, examines with completeness and clarity the
classification of functions In Maryland. Parks, schools, police and fire
departments, and public buildings are the primary governmental functions;
and markets, removal of ashes and household refuse, streets, highways,
waterworks, and sewers are the predominent proprietary ones. Maryland
law in this area represents the great weight of authority. See Doddridge,
Distinction Between Governmental and ProprietaryFunctions of Municipal
Corporations,23 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925) ; and Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 Va.
L. Rev. 910 (1936).
Florida is the only state which has judicially toppled the governmental
proprietary distinction. In Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, supra, n. 12, the
Court said, 133:
"The modern city Is, In substantial measure a large business Institution. While it enjoys many of the basic powers of government, it
nonetheless is an incorporated organization which exercises those
powers primarily for the benefit of the people within the municipal
limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant to the powers. To
continue ,to endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity
appears to us to predicate the law of the Twentieth Century upon
an Eighteenth Century anachronism."
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any opinion, it is usually appropriate to inquire whether
the city is immune because the function is governmental
or whether the function is governmental because the city
should be immune."'1 7 The inconsistent results of this
process have been uniformly criticized as "absurd and
unjust,"'" and there has been a persistent outcry for
remedial legislation. In Municipal Responsibility in Tort
in Maryland,9 George L. Clarke, taking a "critical view"
of that body of law, said that in this era of increasing social
consciousness and governmental activity, municipal immunity is "somewhat startling" since ". . . [the government's] purpose is not achieved when an individual member of the community, himself without fault, is made to
bear the entire cost
of the injury done him by a servant of
' 20
the community.
New York State took a singular step in 1929 when it
passed the Court of Claims Act, Section, 12a, waiving the
State's immunity from liability and consenting to have the
same "determined in accordance with the same rules of
law as applied to actions in the Supreme Court against
individuals and corporations".2 ' In Bernardine v. City of
New York, 22 this waiver was held to extend to municipal
corporations, thereby eliminating the governmental-proprietary distinction. Under familiar tort principles, the
city, like the individual and private corporation, would
be liable for negligence wherever it owed a duty to the
injured plaintiff.2 8
Less than six months after the Bernardine case, in
Steitz v. City of Beacon,24 the New York Court of Appeals,
1?Smith, 8upra, n. 12, 44.
Seasongood, supra, n. 16, 910. In Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128,
173 A. 56 (1934), the Court of Appeals found 'that the removal by the
municipality of a tree limb which protruded over a public footway involved the proprietary duty of keeping its streets safe, and that it would
be "illogical and unreasonable" to term it a governmental duty although
the same act, by the same employees, involved the governmental function
of maintaining a public park.
"3 Md. L. Rev. 159 (1939).
Ibid, 174. At 159, Mr. Clarke states:

"Legal writers everywhere have sensed the anomaly involved and,
almost uniformly have leveled shafts of criticism at the existing
situation. Each analysis and subsequent complaint recognizes the
omnipotence of atare deciala and the cry is for remedial legislation."
"NEW YORK LAWS 1939, ch. 360.
= 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 2d 604, 161 A.L.R. 364 (1945).
"In
Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S. 2d
485, 490 (1953), the Court said:
. . iIn each case the test now is whether an individual or private
corporation, assuming that he or it were obligated to discharge the
governmental duty involved, would be liable to the injured person
for a 'breach of that duty."
295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. 2d 704, 163 A.L.R. 342 (1945).
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in dismissing a complaint charging the city with negligently failing to keep in repair fire department water
pipes, stated that:
"Such enactments [i.e. those in the city charter
defining governmental powers] do not import intention
to protect the interests of any individual except as
they secure to all members of the community the
enjoyment of rights and privileges to which they are
entitled only as members of the public. Neglect in
the performance of such requirementscreates no civil
liability to individuals. * * * There was indeed a
public duty to maintain a fire department, but that
was all, and there was no suggestion that for any
omission ... the people of '25
the city could recover fire
damages to their property.
The Court reasoned that "[a]n intention to impose upon
the city the crushing burden of such an obligation should
not be imputed to the Legislature in the absence
of lan'26
guage clearly designed to have that effect.
In Murrain v. Wilson Line,27 where the police were
charged with failing to provide adequate protection to
people on a public pier, the Court, in dismissing the complaint, stated:
"The law is established that a municipality is answerable for the negligence of its agents in exercising
a proprietary function, and at least for their negligence
of commission in exercising a governmental function.., but a municipality is not liable for its failure
to exercise a governmental
function such as to provide
'28
police or fire protection.
Upon the distinctions drawn in the Steitz and Murrain
cases, it was held that where a village omitted the posting
of safeguards at the scene of an accident," and where the
police refused protection to a woman whose husband
previously made an attempt to take her life, 0 there was
IIbid.,

706. Emphasis supplied.
Supra, n. 24, 705.
270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 750 (1946), aff'd. 296 N.Y. 845, 72
N.E. 2d 29 (1947).
2Ibid,
753. Emphasis supplied.
Landby v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 199 Misc. 73, 105 N.Y. 2d 836
(1950), aff'd. 278 App. Div. 965, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 839 (1950), motion for
leave to appeal denied 303 N.Y. 1014, 102 N.E. 2d 840 (1951).
1Rocco v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 1012, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 198
(1953).
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no liability for injuries caused by the failure of police
protection.
However, where the city omitted to enforce a statute
prohibiting dangerous structures or public nuisances facing
the highway, " and where the state omitted to maintain
traffic control lights upon the highway as it was bound by
statute to do, "2 there was liability for the omission of a
governmental duty upon the determination of the court that
the intent of the statutes involved was to create a governmental duty to the individual.
Where a policeman negligently shot an intoxicated
tavern patron;" where three policeman negligently placed
an armed intoxicated fourth policeman into a taxi and
the fourth policeman shot the taxi driver;3 4 where a policeman negligently injured the plaintiff with a shot aimed at
a fleeing third person;35 and where the police negligently
returned a pistol to a man who subsequently killed himself and injured his wife;3" the commission of a wrong
(malfeasance) was the basis for liability.
In McCrink v. City of New York, 7 liability was founded
upon an allegation that the city "negligently failed to
discharge" a chronically incompetent policeman who,
while off-duty, shot plaintiff's intestate with the police
revolver he was required to carry with him at all times.
However, the Court implied that there was the commission
of a wrong in the "retention" of the policeman.
Manifestly, the effect of the Steitz and Murrain cases
was to reimpose municipal immunity, notwithstanding
the statutory waiver, where (1) the function was governmental, not proprietary; and (2) the duty was owing to
the general public, not to the individual; and (3) the
breach was one of omission, not commission. This tripartite test 38 of the municipality's liability was at the
center of the dispute in the Schuster case.
Supra, n. 23.
Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E. 2d 69 (1945).
Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 2d 838 (1955).
"Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y. 2d 455, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 302
(1958).
"Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E. 2d 338 (1954).
Benway v. City of Watertown, 1 App. Div. 2d 465, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 485
(1956).
8T296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E. 2d 419 (1947).
See Lloyd, Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi! (Municipal Tort Liability
in New York Sequel), 24 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 38 (1949); ANTIKU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW (1958), § 12.05; Notes and Comment, Tort
Liability of Municipal Corporationsin New York, 23 St. Johns L. Rev. 117
(1948).
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The trial court, in dismissing the complaint, said, that,
at the most, there was an, omission of police protection,
for which no liability could lie. 9 The intermediate appellate court affirmed on other grounds, but, by obiter dictum,
said that if there was a duty to protect an informer, such
a duty was court-created.4 0 Judge Beldock, in dissenting,
found a duty to plaintiff's intestate based upon the foreseeability of injury.4
The Court of Appeals,42 in reversing the judgment, advised that there could be no liability to the general public
from the failure of police protection. But, the Court said,
there is a ". . special duty to use reasonable care for the
protection of persons who have collaborated with it in the
arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration."4
The Court offered two bases for this "special duty". First,
plaintiff's intestate's enforceable duty to aid in law enforcement, a duty "as old as history", created a reciprocalduty
on the part of the city to reasonably protect one who had
come to its assistance in this manner. Second, a "special
duty" arose from the active use made of plaintiff's intestate
by the city. The Court said that where the city has called
upon and used the citizen in aiding law enforcement: "'If
conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction
[in furnishing police protection to such persons] would
commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a
benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury,
there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go
forward'." 44 In effect, having "gone forward", the city's
subsequent omission to act becomes the commission of
a wrong.
The dissenting judges maintained that an enforceable
duty upon the individual to aid in law enforcement was
without statutory or judicial precedent, and that, therefore, there could be no reciprocal duty on the part of the
government. The "crushing" effects of the Court's holding were also feared. For example, Chief Justice Conway
said that to entitle the informer to "special" police protection would subject the municipality to "an unreasonable
"207 Misc. 2d 1102, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (1953).
10286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778 (1955).
Judge Beldock's opinion is discussed in detail, infra, circa n. 51.
"180 N.Y.S. 2d 265, 5 N.Y. 2d 75, 154 N.E. 21 534 (1958). Two opinions,
concurred in by each of the four justices voting for reversal, were written.
Each of the three dissenting justices wrote a separate opinion, concurred
in by the others.
Ibid, 537.
Supra, n. 42, 538.
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burden . . . which would incapacitate the entire police
force and leave the general public without police protection", and Justice Froessel said that "the cost ... of such
protection would be incalculable".
In analyzing the effect of the holding in the Schuster
case, the weakness of the rationale behind the governmental duty to protect informers becomes apparent. First,
the legal structure of the reciprocal duty is unsound.
While the early common law of England recognized the
crime of misprision of felony, doubts have been expressed
45
whether mere nondisclosure ever constituted an offense.
6
In this country, with limited exception, misprision of
felony has not been recognized as a common law offense.416
The Supreme Court of the United States has said: "It may
be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to
proclaim every offence which comes to his knowledge; but
the law which would punish him in every'47case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for man.
Second, no more persuasive is the Court's holding that
the city's active use of the citizen creates a relationship
whereby the omission in not affording police protection
becomes the commisson of a wrong. Elementary tort
principles - and New York case law48 - include the outlines of the principle involved, but the "obvious elusiveness
of [the] magic point"49 at which an omission becomes a
commission leaves its substance undefined and uncertain.
However, it is not suggested that the Court was unaware of the shakiness of its bases for liability. In fact, the
Court restricted the existence of the duty to those situations
where "it reasonably appears that they [the informers]
are in danger due to their collaboration". 0 This qualification, in the light of the special facts in the Schuster case,
clearly opens the way for future courts to distinguish
the degree of danger to future informers and reintroduce
non-liability. Plainly this was the intent of the Court "See PERKMNS, CEIMINIAL LAw (1957), ch. 5, § 3, 440.
"State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
'0'PERKINS, op. cit., supra, n. 45.
'"Marbury v. Brooks, 7 Wheat. 556, 575-6 (U.S. 1822).
Although the
United States Code (18 U.S.C.A. (1950) § 4) punishes whoever "conceals
and does not . . . make known" the commission of a felony, affirmative

concealment and suppression have been held to constitute the offense
and not mere nondisclosure. See Neal v. United States, 102 F. 2d 643
(8th Cir. 1939) ;and Bratton v. United .States, 73 F. 2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
8The Court relied heavily upon H. R. Moch. Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199 (1928). See also Dunham
v. Village of Cantsteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 NB. 2d 872 (1952).
10Lloyd, supra, n. 38, 46.
10Supra, n. 42, 537.
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to find liability in the instant circumstances without surrendering the limitations on liability raised by the Steitz
and Murrain cases. By contriving a "special duty" to informers, and then emasculating its future applicability,
the Court managed its purpose. The broad extension of
liability, envisioned, in the dissents, would, appear to be
illusory. Judge Beldock, in his dissent in the intermediate
appellate court, had similarly reasoned that:
". .. the city's obligation to the intestate is not to
be measured by the requirement of 'special' police
protection.... Rather, under the circumstances ...
the city's obligation simply was to furnish the intestate
with such protection as would be adequate in view of
his known status as an informer upon a criminal who,
as a matter of common knowledge was extremely
dangerous. ** *51
"It is on this ground - the absence of knowledge of
the risk or danger to any particular individual - that
a municipality has been held not to be liable to a
person who is damaged by its negligence in the discharge of a statutory duty owing to the general public ... "52
Where the municipality has injured an, individual by
its failure to perform a governmental function, Judge
Beldock would, find liability wherever the injury was foreseeable. The Court found liability where the injury was
foreseeable and a "special duty" was owed the individual.
In rejecting Judge Beldock's reasoning and substituting a
"special duty", the Court, rather than engendering any
substantive change in municipal liability, reaffirmed the
Steitz and Murrain principles and brought into sharper
focus the practice of the Court under the tri-partite test.
In principle, the Court's unequivocal position is that
there can be no liability for the omission of a governmental duty owing to the general public. In practice, the
Court has demonstrated that it is able and inclined to use
the predicates of that position (i.e. the governmentalproprietary, general duty-individual duty, and omissioncommission distinctions) as it used, prior to the Bernardine
case,53 the bare governmental-proprietary distinction.
Where the facts allow any leeway, it appears that the
286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778, 782 (1955). Emphasis supplied.
Ibid., 786. Steitz and Murrain cases cited.
"294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 2d 604, 161 A.L.R. 364 (1945).
2
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Court will weigh the interests involved and then fit a
finding of liability or non-liability into the tri-partite test.54
The history of municipal tort liability suggests that, as
a practical matter, the real dispute in the Shuster case was
over the degree of financial risk to the defendant municipality. The Court was convinced that the injury to plaintiff's intestate, together with the public policy interest in
encouraging the citizenry to aid in law enforcement, outweighed the financial risk to the city. To the dissenters,
the scale was balanced in the opposite direction.
The writer believes that the Schuster case, in ultimately
delineating the principles and practice of the Court in
determining municipal liability, invites criticism. In the
face of the unqualified legislative waiver of government
tort immunity, the Court's tenacious limitations on liability appear unjustified. While the financial feasibility of
complete liability is a cognizable and serious problem, 5
the presumption here must be that the New York legislature appreciated and assumed the risks implicit in its57
waiver. 6 The reappearance of an "artificial formula
(i.e. the tri-partite test) under which the Court will continue to juggle immunity and liability on a case by case
basis is an additional objection to the Court's position.
In Maryland, the Schuster case and New York's experiences with a statutory waiver of governmental tort immunity are only of academic significance. Municipal
"Lloyd, supra, n. 38, 50, describes the general duty-individual duty
and omission-commission distinctions as ". . . two generalized solving
formulae so indefinite and uncertain as to constitute fresh, untrammeled
Instruments of policy determination". The strategems of the Court in the
Schuster case, viz., the Individual or "special" duty to informers and the
omission of protection becoming the commission of -a wrong, seem to
illustrate the point.
mEven the most outspoken critics of governmental immunity recognize
that comprehensive statistical studies uncovering actual areas of financial
danger, if any, must precede remedial legislation. On the basis of studies
already undertaken, legal writers are confident that the risks are minimal.
In addition, many ways of obviating possible risks (e.g. insurance and
maximum recovery limits) have been suggested and discussed. See David,
Tort Liability of Local Government: -Alternatives to Immunity from
Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1959) ; Fuller and Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation,54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941) : French, Research
in Public Tort Liability, 9 L. & C.P. 234; MacDonald, The Administration
of a Tort Liability Law in New York, 9 L. & C.P. 262; fBorchard, Proposed
State and Local Statutes Imposing Public Liability in Tort, 9 L. & C.P.
282. Cf., Brown, Municipal Tort Liability, Some Observations, 30 N.Y.
State Bar Bulletin 433 (1958).
SANTiau, Op. cit. supra, n. 38, 119, observes that:
.. . If the determination of municipal responsibility In tort is for
the legislatures (as the courts continually Insist) then determination of
whether civic responsibility in a particular group of cases will constitute 'a crushing burden' is not for the conjecture of the courts."
SLloyd, Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Rai!, 24 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 38, 50 (1949).
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liability in Maryland follows a hardened path."s In a
recent case, State v. Baltimore County, 9 where plaintiff's
intestate was negligently killed by a policeman, the Court
of Appeals, in upholding the conventional governmentalproprietary distinction, stated:
"... the point was settled in the case of Wynkoop
v. Hagerstown, 159 Md. 594. * * * If, as the appellants
argue, the rule ought to be changed so as to enlarge
the liability of municipal corporations, it must be
done by the Legislature and not by this Court."6
If the Maryland Legislature should respond to a call for
remedial legislation, the Schuster case and New York's
experience with a statutory waiver of tort immunity will
serve as a timely warning that the courts will look for a
definite and clear statement of the extent of liability
undertaken.
KALMAN R. HrrLmAN

Unemployment Compensation -

Recovery Of

Benefits Paid
Waters v. State1
Appellant, who was employed by a radiator company,
was discharged on October 18, 1956, and promptly filed,
claim under the Unemployment Insurance Act.2 Subsequent to his receiving payments, an arbitrator, pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer
and the union, directed that he be reinstated and "'be
made whole for the time lost by reason of his discharge.' "I
Pursuant to the order, appellant was reinstated and received $1,809.91 in back pay, no deduction being made for
T

See supra, n. 16. 'Statutory liability in Maryland Is confined to three
areas:
1) where employees of the government are Injured while engaged in
extra-hazardous work (Workmen's Compensation Act, 8 MD. CoDE (1957)
Art. 101, § 33) ;
2) where police commandeer a motor vehicle (6 MD. CoDE (1957), Art.
66%, § 180a, b) ;
3) where there Is destruction of property 'by riot or tumultuous assemblage (7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 82, §§ 1-4).
'218 Md. 271, 146 A. 2d' 28 (1958).
Ibid., 273.
S220 Md. 337, 152 A. 2d 81- (1959).
D. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, now codified in 8 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 95A.
Supra, n. 1, 340.
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unemployment benefits. Subsequently, the Unemployment
Insurance Fund, (hereinafter referred to as the Fund),
having made a redetermination of the claim and having
determined that the benefits paid appellant were an overpayment which should be recovered under Section 16(d)
of the Act 4 brought suit to recover these benefits. From a
judgment adverse to the appellant in the Superior Court
of Baltimore City, an appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that the Fund could
not recover the benefits paid to the appellant under either
Section 17(d) or a common law c6unt for unjust enrichment, reasoned that: Appellant had been unemployed
within the meaning of the Act during the period for
which benefits were paid; the payments were not made as
a result of any non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a
material fact by the Appellant; the Appellant had, as a
result, received benefits which were not actually due
him, but Section 16(d) did not provide the necessary
means 'by which the Fund could recoup itself and, since the
statute set up a specific and exclusive remedy, there could
be no other means of recoupment than as provided in the
statute.
The Fund contended that, since the employee was
wrongfully discharged, wages were "payable" to him
throughout the period and that he was, therefore, not "unemployed" within the meaning of the Act. The Court felt,
however, that Section 19(1)' of the Act, defining wages,
meant "wages currently payable" rather than "wages legally due and, payable under a contingency."6 It is quite
evident that the General Assembly in d-afting the Act
meant it to mean such on looking at Sections 5(b) 7 and
(1957)
'MD. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, § 16(d), now codified in 8 MD. CODEM
Art. 95A, § 17(d), states:
"Any person who, by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation by him or by another, of a material fact (irrespective of whether
such non-disclosure or misrepresentation was known or fraudulent)
has received any sum as 'benefits under this article while any conditions for receipt of benefits imposed 'by this article were not fulfilled
in his case, or while he was disqualified from receiving benefits, shall,
in the discretion of the Board either be liable to have such sum
deducted from any future benefits payable to him under this article
or shall be liable to repay to the Executive Director for the Unemployment Insurance Fund, a sum equal to the amount received by
him, and such sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in
sec, 15(f) of this article for the collection of past due contributions."
MD. CoN (1951) Art. 95A, § 19(1), now codified in 8 Mn. CODE (1957)
Art. 95A, § 20(n).
0 Supra, n. 1, 348.
7MD. COnE (1951) Art. 95A, § 5(b), now codified in 8 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 95A, § 6(b).
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5 (c) ,swhich respectively disqualify an employee for benefits when he is discharged for wilful misconduct or as a
disciplinary measure. 9 No mention is made in the Act
as to persons who are wrongfully discharged. It is true
that subsequent to appellant's release an arbitration, proceeding established that such discharge was wrongful, but
it must be taken into account that throughout that period
the employer was insisting that he was discharged for
good cause. Waters was unemployed through no fault of
his own, and the mere fact that the dismissal was wrongful
does not alleviate his financial condition during the jobless period. Such circumstances, it seems, would come
within the intent of the Act as expressed in two earlier
cases, which point out the purpose of the Act as being to
prevent economic insecurity and, involuntary unemployment.'0
The next question to confront the Court was whether
such payment by the Fund was induced by any nondisclosure or misrepresentation on the part of the appellant. As the facts disclosed, the Fund was as aware of the
pending arbitration proceedings as the employee. Section
16(d) provides for recovery where there has been a nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact, although innocent." In construing this section the Court
felt the "material fact", referred to in the section, meant
an existing fact and not merely a contingent event "which
may or many not occur in the future."' 2 Such a construction follows the rule underlying recovery against fraud,
that the misrepresentation must be of an existing fact and
not of some future event or expression of opinion'"
Similar results are to be found in other States. The
Court called attention to Hill v. Review Board of Indiana
'MD. CODE (1951)

§ 6(c).

Art. 95A, § 5(c), now 8 MD. CODE (1957)

Art. 95A,

'See Note, Unemployment Insurance Benefits - Refusal to Answer
"Security" Questions as Wilful Misconduct, 19 Md. L. Rev. 332 (1959).
"'Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 188 Md.
677, 53 A. 2d 579 (1947) ; Maryland Unemployment Board v. Albrecht, 183
Md.87, 36 A. 2d 666 (1944).
1 Supra, n. 4.
12Supra, n. 1, 349.
IsSchnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 132 A. 381 (1926); Boulden v.
Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 552, 60 A. 609 (1905).
Judge Prescott, In writing the dissent, felt that such a construction
would preclude recoupment under all circumstances except as specified
within the section prescribing penalties for "Unlawful Acts." He pointed
out that if payments were made through some mistake of fact, as excessive benefits being paid to a Jobless employee, no recovery would be
forthcoming. This, in his opinion, would be very unfortunate.
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Employment Security Division,4 where it was held, under
a statute analgous to that of Maryland, that the fund could
only recover benefits it had paid when there was a nondisclosure or misrepresentation on the part of the claimant.
The dissent in the present case attempted to distinguish
this case contending that the Indiana statute1 5 conferred
jurisdiction on the Review Board to recoup and not on a
court of general jurisdiction, and, therefore, was not relevant to the problem in point, i.e., whether recoupment can
only be granted by a court of general jurisdiction when
there is non-disclosure or misrepresentation. This distinction seems merely to be grasping at insignificant points
which do not clearly differentiate the cases. Moreover, a
holding similar to that reached in the Maryland and
Indiana cases has, been reached under a statute of like
import in Idaho. 6 Even though such results are viewed
by the dissent as unfortunate, they are nevertheless the
only possibility under our present law.
Admitting the recovery could not be had under Article
95A, the Fund finally maintained that it could ibe had, in
the alternative, under a common law count for money had
and received. The Court, in repudiating this contention,
pointed out that the Unemployment Compensation Act
is a remedial statute and has as its objective protecting
those unemployed through no fault of their own. 1 The
Act plainly sets out the limits upon recovery or recoupment. The Court followed the phrase of expressiounius est
exclusio alterius in determining that since the legislature
specifically set forth one remedy under Section 17(d) it,
by implication, excluded any other.
The dissent was unable to accept such a theory and
instead cited State v. Rucker18 where recovery was allowed against the employer under a count for money had
and received. The fact situation in that case was similar
to the instant case in that the employee was discharged
wrongfully, received unemployment compensation, and
was subsequently reinstated with an award for back pay
less income earned elsewhere (including Unemployment
Compensation benefits). Then the employer withheld an
amount equal to the Unemployment Compensation benefits
14124

Ind. App. 83, 112 N.E. 2d 218 (1953).

BURNS' INDIANA STATUTES (ISupp. 1951)

§ 52-1537.

Claim of Sapp, 75 Idaho 65, 266 P. 2d 1027 (1954), which found that
under the Idaho Statute recovery could be had only if there was a nondisclosure or misrepresentation (even if innocent).
17Supra, n. 10.
Is 211 Md. 153, 126 A. 2d 846 (1956).
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but did not turn it over to the Fund. The Court allowed
a judgment against the employer for the amount withheld
on the theory of unjust enrichment. In its decision the
Court pointed out:
"It is not necessary that we decide whether appellant
can recover from Bethlehem (employer) under the
provisions of that statute (Art. 95A, Sec. 17(d) ). Even
if we should assume without deciding, that recovery
against the employee would not lie under the statute,
we find nothing in the statute that would deny recovery against the employer or third party under
common law principles."1
The Rucker case is distinguishable on the grounds that the
employer was the person who received the payment unjustly, whereas in the instant case it was the employee
to whom the benefit accrued. Under the situation in the
Rucker case a common count recovery will lie since the
statute in no way expresses any intent to benefit employers
or to set up exclusive remedies for recovery against them.
In reviewing the opinion of the Court one can discern
two distinct theories as to the intent of the Unemployment
Compensation Act, Section 16 (d). The majority constantly
strived for strict construction of the provision, whereas
the dissent stressed the necessity for conjunctive application of common law principles. In that the Section is in derogation of the common law and provides
for a separate and distinct remedy in the circumstance
in which it may be used, the possibility of alternative common. law recovery can not be realized. The
result of the case appears to be unfortunate. Undoubtedly
the dissent resorted to its various theories to make up
for the deficiencies of the statute. The Act makes no provision for recovery from employees where benefits are,
through subsequent events, found to amount to unjust enrichment. But the job of the Court is not to legislate; it can
only interpret and apply existing law. Although a court
may interpret a statute in different ways in various situations, it cannot change the obvious meaning and effect of
a statute as the dissent desired to do in the instant case.
The answer to the problem lies with the legislature, which
alone possesses the power to amend existing law.
Steps were taken by the Indiana legislature after the
result of the Hill case. The Indiana statute now allows for
2

Ibid., 157.
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recovery from an employee of payment to which, through
subsequent events, he is no longer entitled." To alleviate
the situation in Maryland it is suggested that the present
Section 17 of Article 95A be amended. The following
provision is, therefore, submitted to broaden Section
17(d) :
Any person who, because of the subsequent receipt of
income deductible from benefits which is allocable to
the time for which benefits were paid, becomes not
entitled to such benefits under this act, shall be liable
to repay such amount to the Executive Director for
the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
WILBERT

H.

SIROTA

Extension Of Absolute Privilege To Executive
Officers Of Government Agencies
Barrv. Matteol
Plaintiffs, employees of the Office of Rent Stabilization,
had sponsored a terminal leave plan in 1950 which became
the subject of congressional criticism in 1953. The defendant, acting director of the agency, had disapproved of
the plan. Without defendant's knowledge, a letter promulgating the plan was drafted by one of the plaintiffs and set
out over the defendant's name, which his secretary signed.
The letter provoked criticism from the Senate which was
reported in the press.2 As the acting director, the defendant
received inquiries as to the agency's position on the matter.
Consequently he issued a press release declaring his intention to suspend the plaintiffs and expressing the opinion
that the plan was against government policy.' Plaintiffs
brought an action for libel, charging that the press release
coupled with the contemporaneous news reports disclosing
senatorial criticism of the plan defamed them and that
the publication had been actuated by malice. The District
Court overruled the defendant's plea that he was protected by either a qualified or absolute privilege. The
Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the District
0BURNS' INDIANA STATUTES (Supp. 1959) § 53-1537(b).
1

360 U.S. 564 (1959).
9 See 99 Gong. Rec. (1953) 868-8T-1.
3 For text of the news release see. 'Barr v. Matteo, 8upra, n. 1, 567-568,
fn. 5.
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Court, held that the defendant was not entitled to an absolute privilege because his explanation to the press "went
entirely outside his line of duty."4 The defendant had
failed to include the defense of qualified privilege in his
brief to the Court of Appeals, but on reconsideration urged
the court to consider it. The court, however, treated the
defense as having been waived by defendant's failure to
raise it properly in his brief as required by the court's
rules. On petition for certiorari on the denial of the defense of absolute privilege, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari but, acting under its supervisory powers, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with a direction to
pass on the claim of qualified privilege. The reasoning
of the Supreme Court was that it should not rule unnecessarily on the defense of absolute privilege, involving the
conflict of private right and public duty, when the record
revealed that the Court of Appeals might have disposed, of
the case on the narrower ground of qualified privilege.5 On
remand, the Court of Appeals held that there was a qualified
privilege. Since there was evidence, however, from which a
jury might conclude that the defendant (1) was motivated
by malice or (2) lacked reasonable grounds for believing
his statement, either of which would have defeated a defense of qualified privilege, the case was remanded to the
District Court for retrial.'
Defendant again sought and was granted certiorari to
determine whether his defense of absolute privilege should7
have barred, the suit despite the allegations of malice.
The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of
this case the defendant, being the head of an administrative
agency, was absolutely privileged in issuing the press
release.' Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
reasoned that the absence of absolute privilege might deter
minor executive officials from the "unflinching discharge of
their duties," and that the publicity and criticism surrounding the policy advocated by the plaintiffs entitled the
',Barr v. Matteo, 244 F. 2d 767, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
8355 U.S. 171 (1957). For a discussion of this point see Comment, Per
Curiam Decisions o1 the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev.
279, 307 (1959); and Recent Case, Supreme Court Will Grant Certiorari
To Remand Ca8e For Determination Of An Issue Not Properly Raised
In The Court Of Appeals, 106 U. 'Pa. L. Rev. 1066 (1958).
*Barr v. Matteo, 256 F. 2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
'858 U.S. 917 (1958).
a360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Ibid., 571. See Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F. 2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 (1950), which is
quoted at length in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion.
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defendant to make a public statement of his position as
head of the agency.
Absolute privilege affords complete protection to a public official without regard to his motive or the reasonableness of his conduct, so long as the publication of the defamatory matter is in the course of -his duties. On the
other hand, a qualified privilege is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.
It may be defeated by a showing of 'either the presence of
malice or a lack of reasonable grounds for believing the
statement." The malice required to defeat a qualified
privilege, however, must be that which is induced by
improper motives and not merely such constructive malice
as can be inferred from the simple fact of publication.."
The history of absolute privilege for the executive
branch is comparatively short 2 when juxtaposed with its
legislative" and judicial 4 antecedents. The absolute
privilege granted an executive officer is based on public
policy - that placing a government official's conduct
before a jury would unduly hamper his performance of
duties and would, therefore, be against the public interest. 5
The executive branch is numerically much larger than the
other two branches of government, and the authority of
its functionaries to frame policies and to hire and fire
personnel is widely varied. As a result, it is more difficult
to establish definite standards under which an executive
employee knows when a statement made in the "line of
duty" is absolutely privileged than it is to establish such
clear standards for legislative and judicial officers.'"
The Court weighed two interests in the principal case:
(1) The protection of the individual citizen against pe10See generally, PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) 60-629 and cases cited
therein.
u See HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS (1956) § 5.27; and RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) §§ 599-605.
12Sutt6n v. Johnson, 1 T.R. 493 (1786) appears to be the earliest case
recognizing the executive privilege. See Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion, Barr v. M'atteo, 360 U.S. 564, 580 (1959).
18See 'Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation: Legislative And
E.Tecutive Proceedings, 10 Col. L. Rev. 131 (1910). The privilege is given
'to Congress by the United States Constitution, Art. I. § 6. The constitutions
of almost all of the states extend the privilege to the state legislatures.
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 (1951). This privilege,
however, has not been extended to inferior deliberative bodies. See 'Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 579, Warren, C.J., dis. op., 579, n. 4.
4See Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation: Judicial Proceedings,
9 Col. L. Rev. 463 (1909). Development of the privilege is traced in
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. (U.S. 1871).
15See Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India, 2 Q.'B. 189 (1895).
10Cf. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion, 'Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, 585-586 (1959).
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crniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action
by a federal official; and (2) The public interest in shieldL
ing responsible government officers against vindictive or
ill-founded damage suits. A third interest, not expressly
set forth by the Court but implicit in the opinion, is that
of public disclosure of matters of vital public interest.
The latter interest, as the basis for granting absolute privilege to a cabinet officer, was propounded by the Court of
7
Appeals for the District of Columbia in,Mellon v. Brewer."
The plaintiff in that case had been conducting an investigation of the Treasury Department for three years and
had submitted unfavorable reports to the President and
the Attorney General which were the basis for a Congressional investigation of the Department. The defendant,
Secretary of the Treasury, issued a press release which
revealed a report made by him to the President that impugned the good faith of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals stressed that the subject of the report was of vital
concern to the public and that the failure of the defendant
to make such a report might have
shaken public confidence
8
in the Treasury Department.
The leading case on the question of absolute privilege
is Spalding v. Vilas,19 in which the Postmaster General was
held absolutely privileged to issue circulars which called
attention to legislation that worked injury to an attorney
employed by claimants to present their claims against the
Post Office. The circular informed the claimants that the
legislation gave them the opportunity to evade payment
of fees which they had agreed to allow the attorney. The
rationale employed by the Court was that the effective
operation of the executive branch would be hampered
if the motives that control a cabinet officer's official conduct could be subject to a civil suit for damages.2"
Following the concept of the Spalding case, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Glass v. Ickes2
that the Secretary of the Interior acted within the scope of
his duties and was entitled to the protection, of an absolute
privilege in issuing a press release warning all operators
that the plaintiff had been barred from practice before
agencies of that Department. The questions of excessive
publication and the appropriateness of using the press
118 F. 2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927), cert. den. 275 U.S. 530 (1927).

19See Comment, Defamation Immunity For Executive Offleers, 20 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 677, 691 (1953).
"161 U.S. 483 (1896).
Ibid., 498-499.
'117 F. 2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. den. 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
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release as the instrumentality of communication for relAying facts which were important to persons dealing with
the Department of the Interior were disregarded by the
Court of Appeals, except for the oblique observation that
there might be circumstances under which an official would
exceed his prerogative in issuing a particular communication to the press. The questions of the necessity for the
publication and the press release as a proper instrumentality of communication had been considered in the
Mellon 22 rationale in determining whether the press release was in the line of duty, and thus must be answered
if this rationale is to be submitted as the basis for an absolute privilege. In the Glass case the failure to answer
these two questions did not escape Chief Judge Groner,
who in a concurring opinion expressed the fear that the
privilege may have been extended beyond the reasons for
its creation.2" One year later the same Court of Appeals
refused an absolute privilege to a United States Marshal
who made a public explanation of the discharge of deputies
on the ground that the defendant had, no duty to inform
the public about the matter.2 4
In the instant case Mr. Justice Harlan adopted both the
rationale of the Spalding2 5 case and that of the Mellon"
case. After quoting from the former he concluded that in
the final balance it would be better to deny relief to a
defamed plaintiff than to subject government officials who
do their duty to the threat of law suits which would
consume time and energies which could otherwise be devoted to government service. And, although he did not
quote from the Mellon case, he stated that the circumstances of the wide publicity and the correspondence sent
out over the defendant's signature, which could have been
read as advocating a position opposite to that which he had
actually taken, made appropriate a public statement by
him as the agency head.
In a companion case, Howard v. Lyons,27 the Court,
applying the same rationale as in the principal case, held
that a commanding officer of a naval shipyard in Massachusetts was absolutely privileged to send members of
that state's delegation in Congress letters explaining his
reasons for withdrawing recognition of a labor organiza3Supra, circa n. 17.
117 F. 2d 273, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
" Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
2 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
M18 F. 2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
M360 U.S. 593 (1959).
2
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tion as the bargaining representative of organized employees in the shipyard."8 Mr. Justice Stewart joined the
majority in this case, whereas in the principal case he dissented on the ground that the press release was not a
proper exercise of discretion in announcing public policy.2"
In the Barr case the Chief Justice, with whom Mr.
Justice Douglas joined in dissent, found the interest of
the individual to be paramount and also observed that the
majority opinion established no standard to guide executive conduct." Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissent,
objected on the grounds that the majority dealt with concepts of public policy and purported to balance interests
could be more efficaciously determined
of society which
8
by Congress.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion appears to be a logical
extension and application of the rationales which traditionally have influenced the Court in this area. The case
ostensibly extends absolute privilege to any executive
official whose duties include the discretionary authority to
issue a press release. Since the power to issue press releases is seldom expressly authorized by Congress, as
pointed out by the Chief Justice,8 2 the Court must determine the perimeter of an official's line of duty and whether
this perimeter encompasses the discretionary authority to
issue a press release. As this area of the law evolves on a
case by case basis, the critical question which will probably
tip the balance between the interest of the individaul and
the interest of the government may be whether the subject matter is of sufficient public interest to justify the
press release by the government official.
JoN F. OsTER
2 The Court also rejected an attempt to hold the defendant liable under
the libel law of Massachusetts and held that the absolute privilege must
be judged by federal standards. Ibid., 597.
360 U.S. 564, 592 (1959).
oIbid., 578.
B' Ibid., 586.
SIbid., 578.

Recent Decisions
Administrative Law - "Equal Time Act" Does Not
Apply To Regular Weathercasts By Political Candidate.
Brigham v. F.C.C., 276 F. 2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960). Petitioner appealed from an F.C.C. ruling that the "equal
time" clause of the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1959) § 315 (a), as amended by Pub. L.
86-274, § 1, 73 STAT. 557 (19,59), did not apply to daily
broadcasts by a radio-television station's regular weathercaster who was the political opponent of petitioner -and
who broadcast under the name "TX Weatherman,". The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the F.C.C.
ruling, held that the weathercaster's appearance was solely
a bona fide effort to present the news and thus exempt from
the "equal time" clause. The Court said that the weathercaster's employment was not something arising out of the
election, campaign, but rather, a regular job.
The instant case is the first appellate court decision
under the "equal time" clause as amended. Prior to the
1959 amendment, § 315 (a) provided that a licensee who
permitted a legally qualified candidate for any political
office to "use" a broadcasting station must also afford
"equal time" to all other such candidates for that office.
After the F.C.C. ruling in the Lar Daly case, February 19,
1959, that the appearance of a candidate in filmed portions of a television news broadcast was within the purview
of § 315 (a), Congress amended the section to exempt
bona -fidenewscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events. It thereby narrowed the scope of "use".
In the only previous appellate decision interpreting
"use", the term had been construed to mean "use" by a
candidate himself, and did not include "use" by those
speaking in his behalf. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio
Stations, 186 F. 2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. den. 341 U.S.
909 (1951). The legislative history indicates that four
different Senate bills proposing an amendnent to § 315
(a) had contemplated the exempting of panel discussions,
debates, and similar programs. At the core of the amended
section is an attempt to preserve network discretion, but
at the same time to eliminate favoritism and to require
equal treatment of candidates. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (1959), 86th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2564. See also
44 Am. Jur., Radio, § 1 et seq.; and 171 A.L.R. 765 (1947).
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Conflict Of Laws - Alienation of Affections. Albert v.
McGrath, 278 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Plaintiff brought
suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to
recover for the alienation of her husband's 'affections, alleging that her husband and, defendant engaged in actionable misconduct in the District of Columbia. Plaintiff and
her husband were residents of Maryland. Since Maryland
has abolished the action for alienation of affections, 7 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 75C, § 1, recovery had to be in the District
of Columbia where such an action still exists. Trenerry
v. Fravel,10 F. 2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The District Court
denied recovery, 165 F. Supp. 461 (D.C. D.C. 1958), discussed in 19 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1959), but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and held that
the Maryland statute abolishing alienation of affections
did not preclude a recovery where the defendant resided in
the District of Columbia and where the place of the wrong
was the said District. The Court noted that the Maryland
statute had no extra-territorial effect since it is expressly
limited to acts committed within Maryland. Moreover,
the Court said that the Maryland statute did not preclude
a remedy in as much as the consortium disturbed by the
acts is not necessarily localized in the married couple's
common, bedroom. It thus rejected the lower court's
rationale that the situs of the domicile is the only place
where injury can be sustained and that the law of the
marital domicile should therefore govern.
For a case reaching the same result see Gordon v.
Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Mass. 1949). See also RESTATmEN,
CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 377; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) § 683; 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife,
§§ 519-534; 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951); 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1065 (1949); 1 Stan. L. Rev. 759 (1,949); 19 Tul. L. Rev. 4
(1944); 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83 (1942). Cf. Adams v. Adams,
101 Md. 506, 61 A. 628 (1905).

Constitutional Law - Maryland Statutes Requiring
Segregation Of Races In State Training Schools For
Juvenile Delinquents Declared Unconstitutional. Myers v.
State Board of Public Welfare, et al., Daily Record, July
11, 1960 (Md. 1960). Plaintiff, a thirteen-year old Negro,
upon being adjudged delinquent in the Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causs, contended
in a later proceeding before the same court that the Maryland statutes segregating the State Training Schools, 3
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(1957) Art. 27, §§ 657, 659-661, violated the Equal
Protection and the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the parties agreed that the tangible
facilities of these separate schools were equal, the Court
held that such segregation violated the constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and due process. The Court
applied the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), which held that segregation in public
education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said that the legislative
intent in founding Maryland's Training Schools, combined
with their present policies of administration, primarily
geared the institutions toward educational objectives rather
than toward custody and thus brought them within the
scope of public education as set forth in the Brown case.
It thus distinguished Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721
(D.C. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed 361 U.S. 6 (1959), which
ruled that the Brown case did not extend to state penal
institutions.
In the instant case it was noted that fourteen southern
states had segregated training schools while of the remaining thirty-six states, only four, including Maryland, still
maintained segregated training schools. For further analysis of this area see 15 Md. L. Rev. 221 (1955); 103 A.L.R.
706 (1936); 38 A.L.R. 2d 1180 (1954).
MD. CODE

Criminal Law - The Diminished Responsibility Doctrine. State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P. 2d 312 (1960).
Defendant, a mental defective, was convicted of first degree murder. This conviction was reversed on appeal, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico holding that a disease of
the mind, short of insanity, can legally prevent a person
from being capable of 'that deliberation and premeditation
necessary to constitute murder in the first degree. The
court applied the much disputed partial or diminished
responsibility doctrine, under which proof of mental disorder short of insanity is admissible to negative specific
intent. Under this doctrine, although the homicide defendant is not classified insane, the offense is reduced from
first to second degree murder.
A majority of states still rely solely upon the M'Naghten
test under which a person is legally sane if at the time of
the offense he had the capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong, and understand the nature and consequences of
his act. Maryland adopted this test in Spencer v. State,
69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888). States which support the
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diminished responsibility doctrine contend that the
M'Naghten test often renders mentally deranged persons
subject to full punishment. The doctrine does not purport
to abolish the recognized legal tests for insanity, but rather
to supplement their application in cases involving a requirement of specific intent. There are two reasons commonly advanced in justification of the doctrine. First,
it is considered unjust to spare the voluntary drunkard on
the basis of incapacity to form a specific intent which is
an element of the offense, as is done in most of the cases,
see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed.
1960) 52-55, and yet to condemn the person suffering from
a mental disorder having the same effect. Second, the
doctrine keeps mentally disordered persons under guard, of
law where they might otherwise be turned loose in borderline cases. Twelve states, including New Mexico, 'have
adopted the diminished responsibility doctrine, while a few
others, although indicating possible adherence to it, have
not taken a clear stand. WEIHOFEN, MENAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954) 174-195. A.L.I., MODEL PENAL
CODE, (Tent. Draft No. 4) § 402(1), adopts the rule. A
related doctrine of diminished responsibility was adopted
for England and Wales in 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 38 (Homicide Act,
1957), s. 101.
Although there were indications in Spencer v. State,
supra, that Maryland would not be adverse to adopting the
diminished responsibility doctrine, later decisions reveal
Maryland's reluctance to supplement the M'Naghten test.
Cole v. State, 212 Md. 55, 128 A. 2d 437 (1957); Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A. 2d 502 (1955); Taylor v. State,
187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d'787 (1946). For further discussion in
this area see Weihofen, PartialInsanity and Criminal Intent, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 505 (1930); and 30 Harv. L. Rev. 535,
552-554 (1917). Generally, See Thomsen, Insanity as a
Defense to Crime, 19 Md. L. Rev. 271 (1959); 17 Md. L.
Rev. 178 (1957); 15 Md. L. Rev. 255 (1955); 15 Md. L. Rev.
44 (1955); 45 A.L.R. 2d- 1447 (1956).
Damages - A Court Sitting Without A Jury May
Choose Between Different Measures Of Ex Contractu
Recovery Where Plaintiff Fails To Make Election. Petropoulos v. Lubienski, 220 Md. 293, 152 A. 2d 801 (1959).
Upon failure of the defendant-landowner to allow plaintiffbuilder to complete work contracted for, defendant's refusal to pay for certain "extras", and defendant's rejection of arbitration award, plaintiff sought damages under
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the theory of breach of contract as well as under claim of
quantum meruit for value of services performed, outlays
for materials furnished, and work done. At the completion
of the testimony plaintiff made no election between his
claims and the trial court, sitting without a jury, allowed
recovery on the basis of quantum meruit. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held, in light of plaintiff's failure to
choose, that there was no reason why the trial eourt could
not select the measure of damages to be applied to arrive
at a judgment according to the evidence so long as only
one measure of damages was used.
Although expressly stating that it was not deciding the
point, the Court noted that the rule permitting joinder
of causes of actions, MD. RuLE 313a, apparently requires
no election between theories at the close of all the evidence
when the court is trier of the facts. The Court of Appeals
spoke similarly in Kirchner v. Allied Contractors,213 Md.
31, 131 A. 2d 251 (1957).
Under FED. RULE 18a, upon which the Maryland joinder
rule is patterned, a plaintiff having two consistent, concurrent, or cumulative theories which can be urged without prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend is not
required to choose between the theories; "... relief must
not be denied through the vehicle of forced election.."
Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Company, 127 F. Supp. 705, 708
(D.C. Colo. 1954). In accord, Griswold v. Dixie Foundry
Co., 79 F. Supp. 79 (D.C. Tenn. 1948).

Domestic Relations - Presumption Against Awarding
Custody Of Minor Child To Adulterous Parent Not Overcome. Parkerv. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A. 2d 607 (1960).
The lower court granted an absolute divorce to the wife on
the ground of three years' voluntary separation and
awarded her custody of their eight year old son. The evidence showed that prior to this action, the wife had lived
in open adultery with her paramour for over a year. The
chancellor felt, however, that the wife was sincerely repentant, that she would be a devoted mother, and that the
welfare of the child would best be served by allowing her
to retain custody. In reversing the ruling of the chancellor as to the custody award, the Court of Appeals held
that the presumption against awarding custody to the wife,
who had lived in open adultery while the child remained
with her in the home, was not overconme -by the evidence.
The fact that the wife had married the paramour after
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the divorce .decree became final was said to be not controlling in deciding the right to custody of the child.
Whatever result is reached in such cases is at least
purportedly based on the overriding consideration - the
best interests of the child. The adultery of a parent seeking
custody is merely one factor in, determining such best interests. The question is whether the presence of such
a factor in a particular case is to be taken as almost conclusively showing that it would not be in the child's best
interest to live with the adulterous parent.
There is a strong tendency in Maryland to refuse to
permit children to be awarded to or remain with a mother
who has been guilty of adultery. Swoyer v. Swoyer, 157
Md. 18, 145 A. 190 (1929). Usually, the courts do not consider an adulterous mother to be a proper person to have
custody, and a strong showing must be made to overcome
the usual presumption against awarding custody to her.
Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A. 2d 442 (1960); 2 NELsON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT (2d ed. 1945) § 15:06. Maryland
reached an unusual result in Oliver v. Oliver, 217 Md. 222,
140 A. 2d 908 (1958), noted in 19 Md. L. Rev. 61 (1959),
where the Court of Appeals, in upholding an award of
custody of a three year old daughter to the adulterous
mother, decided that the mother -had changed her previous
way of living and repented her past indiscretions, and
had thereby become a competent parent. See also Trudeau
v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 103 A. 2d 563 (1954).
In the instant case, the Court relied on the majority
opinion in Hild v. Hild, supra, where on a similar set of
facts it was held (3-2) that the presumption against
awarding custody of a seven year old boy to his adulterous
mother was not overcome. For a discussion of the Maryland cases in this area, see 19 Md. L. Rev. 61 (1959).
Motor Vehicles - Failure To Remove Ignition Key
From Unattended Automobile. Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md.
62, 155 A. 2d 698 (1959). In violation of 6 MD. CoDE (1957)
Art. 66 , § 247, defendant left her car unattended, with
the key in the ignition switch. The vehicle was stolen
shortly thereafter. Five days later, and at a considerable
distance across the city of Baltimore, the car was involved
in an accident with plaintiff's car. The Court of Appeals,
resolving the questions of proximate cause and independent
intervening cause on the basis of proximity in time and
space to the owner's negligent conduct, held, as a matter
of law, that defendant's violation of the motor vehicle
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statute was not the proximate cause of the accident, and
that the subsequent negligence of the thief was an independent intervening cause precluding recovery against defendant. The Court pointed out that while the issues of
foreseeability and proximate cause are normally for the
jury, they may be resolved as a matter of law when reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion.
The case is one of first impression in Maryland. In
Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276, 66 A. 2d
780 (1949), noted 11 Md. L. Rev. 51 (1950), defendant
violated the second clause of Art. 66 , § 247, which requires setting of the brake and turning the front wheels to
the curb whenever a vehicle is left standing on a perceptible grade. This was considered evidence of negligence
rendering defendant liable in tort to the plaintiff, who was
injured by defendant's runaway truck. In Maryland, the
violation of a statute normally creates a prima facie presumption of negligence and is not considered to be negligence per se. Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 125
A. 782 (1924).
The area is analyzed in a Note, Liability for Negligence
in Parking - Effect of Statute, 11 Md. L. Rev. 51 (1950).

See

RESTATmamET,

ToRrs (1934), §§ 447 and 448; M.L.E.

Automobiles §§ 16, 131, 250. Cases are collected in 51 A.L.R.
2d 633 (1957).
Practice - Motion To Vacate Decree Does Not In Itself Toll The Thirty-Day Appeal Period. Monumental
Engineering, Inc. v. Simon, 221 Md. 548, 158 A. 2d 471
(1960). The decree of the equity court was filed on September 25, 1959, and enrolled on October 25, 1959. On
October 19, 1959, appellant filed a motion to vacate the
decree and for a reconsideration thereof. No order to
suspend the operation and effect of the decree was sought
by appellant. The motion to vacate the decree was overruled on November 6, 1959, and this appeal was filed November 30, 1959. Appellant contended that its motion to
vacate the decree tolled the running of the thirty-day
appeal period fixed by Mn. Rui 812a. The Court of Appeals
rejected appellant's contention and held that a motion to
vacate a decree does not in itself toll the running of the
thirty-day appeal period. Since no special order had been
passed by the lower court suspending the operation of the
decree before it became enrolled, the thirty-day period
had expired and the claim was dismissed.
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Prior to MD. RULE 812a there were inconsistencies
within the statutes and rules relating to the time for taking appeals. An interesting discussion may be found in
Invernizzi and Kaiser, A Study - Conflicts Between
Statutes and Rules as to Time for Appeals, 11 Md. L. Rev.
325 (1950). The purpose of MiD. RULE 812a is to harmonize
the rules and statutes and to eliminate the inconsistencies.
The rule provides that whenever an appeal is permitted by
law, the order for appeal shall be filed within thirty days
from the date of the judgment. This makes the time for
appeal uniform in all cases, except where it is from a court
of law to which issues have been sent for trial from an
equity or an Orphans' Court. In those instances, if a
timely motion for a new trial is filed, the order for appeal
shall be filed, within thirty days from the date such motion
is d ided. MID. RuLE 812b. It is to be noted, however,
that in a case at law, a motion for a new trial must be
made within three days of a verdict in a jury case, and in
the case of a trial by the court or of a special verdict,
within three days after the entry of a judgment nisi.
MD. RULE 567a. If no such motion is made within the
time prescribed, a final judgment is entered. Mi. Ru=
567e. The thirty-day appeal period commences to run only
upon the entry of a final judgment.
Other Maryland cases indicating that a petition for
rehearing or a motion to vacate a decree in an,equity proceeding does not in itself toll the thirty-day appeal period
and that a decree may be suspended only by a special
order, include Hanley v. Stulman, 216 Md,. 461, 141 A. 2d
167 (1958); Riviere v. Quinlan, 210 Md. 76, 122 A. 2d 332
(1956); Hancock v.Stull, 199 Md. 434, 86 A. 2d 734 (1952);
Jacobs v. Bealmear, 41 Md. 484 (1874). See also M.L.E.
Appeals §§ 182-184.

Book Reveiws
The Law Of Maritime Personal Injuries. By Martin J.
Norris. New York. Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1959. Pp.
xliii, 553; with appendix and index. $17.50.
The subtitle of this book is "Affecting Harbor Workers,
Passengers and Visitors," a qualification which is extremely important to an understanding of its organization
and content. In THE LAW OF SEAmiEN (2 vols. 1951), the
same author discussed fully the legal rights of the seagoing
man, both in contract and in tort. Recovery for personal
injuries was covered in separate chapters on maintenance
and cure, unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act. The present
volume, a sequel to the earlier text, covers the maritime
rights of the non-seagoing person (a somewhat incongruous statement, which nevertheless accurately reflects
the law today).
Only forty pages of the present volume are devoted to
"Passengers and Visitors," so for all practical purposes this
is a treatise on harbor workers under the maritime law.
By far the most prolific producer of waterfront litigation
is the longshoreman. Numerically at least, shipyard
workers comprise the next most important group, although
the Supreme Court has imposed some limits upon their
rights of recovery.' Also included are ship ceilers, ship
cleaners, and others who service vessels while in port.
2
Had it not been for Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki,
this volume would never have been necessary. It seems
incredible that in thirteen years one decision could have
given rise to a 553-page book, but that is the fact. Sieracki
held that a longshoreman was entitled to recover from a
ship for unseaworthiness causing him injury, a species of
liability without fault. Other categories of harbor workers
(with some limitations as to shipyard workers) were
blanketed-in later on the tenuous theory3 that they were
all doing a seaman's work. Failing to recover, these workers
can still get benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. Consequently the shoreside
worker now has more and greater rights than does the
seaman, for whose protection this branch of the maritime
I West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959).
'328 U.S. 85 (1946).
3 See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and The Rights of Harbor
Workers, 39 Oorn. L. Q. 381 (1954).
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law was developed. This is a topsy-turvy result, which
might be described as "two if by land, one if by sea," exworker actually has four separate and
cept that the harbor
4
distinct remedies.
Whether the harbor worker himself will benefit from
Sieracki in the long run is problematical. The long delays,
great expense, and lump-sum recoveries incident to this
type of litigation are all antithetical to the carefully considered philosophy of the Longshoreman's Act. In addition
Sieracki has promoted claim consciousness, unemployment
pendente lite, and an appalling amount of perjury.
Whatever may be said for the client, Sieracki has been
a bonanza for his attorney. Even counsel for underwriters
(of whom this reviewer is one) have not been heard to
complain about the large amount of business thus brought
their way. Lawyers from both sides of the trial table who
fifteen years ago did not know "port" from "starboard"
now walk with a rolling gait and talk like characters out
of Joseph Conrad.
From the standpoint of the text under the significance
of this situation is that the book is badly needed in port
cities by trial counsel in general practice as well as by
proctors in admiralty. It is a unique contribution to this
rapidly expanding field. By comparison, the most recent
general treatise on admiralty (GiLMoRE AND BLACK, THE
LAW OF ADMIALTY

(1957)), covers in 146 pages the rights

of both seamen and harbor workers, a subject to which
Norris has devoted three volumes.
Above all, the present treatise is an excellent review
of all the leading Supreme Court cases, virtually all the
pertinent decisions of the Courts of Appeals (particularly
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits), and many
important District Court cases, including a number from
the District of Maryland. As an encyclopedia of the law as
it existed, in early 1959 the book is defective only in having
a rather mediocre index. However, there is a valuable
bonus in the 54 page appendix classfying the cases, according to the nature of the accident involved.
Despite the vast amount of recent case law in this field,
numerous important facets of the subject have not as yet
been fully developed by the courts. However, the author,
taking the encyclopedic approach, makes little attempt to
'Judge Thomsen enumerated them in Blankenship v. Ellerman's Wilson
Line, New York, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 479, 483 (D.C. Md. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 F. 2d 455 (4th Cir. 1959), and added, "Longshoremen and
harbor workers have already ,been given a greater variety of rights and
choice of remedies than any other group of workers on land or sea."
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fill in the interstices with original research, or discussion
of how the law will or should develop. GILMoRE AND BLACK,

and the older text by

ROBINSON, (HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1939) ) are somewhat superior

in this respect.
Consider an example. The almost uniform practice of
ship owners who have been sued by harbor workers is to
implead the plaintiff's employer under the 56th ADMIRALTY
RULE

or

FEDERAL RULE

14, as the case may be. The

owner thereby attempts to pass on to the employer any
liability which he may have to the harbor worker. Of
course, to the extent that he is successful in securing such
indemnity, the provision of the Longshoremen's Act that
the employer's liability thereunder shall be "exclusive"'
is circumvented. Nevertheless, this has received, the blessing of the Supreme Court.8
The Court has developed a theory that the indemnity
claim is actually not a claim for tort but for breach of a
contract by the employer company to perform its, work
satisfactorily. In many cases which are successfully prosecuted by harbor workers, there is some evidence of fault
on the part of both owner and employer. This has given
rise to a great deal of litigation involving the delineation
of the circumstances under which the owner should be
precluded by reason of his own fault from securing indemnity. The basic principle, as, enunciated by the Supreme Court,7 is simply that the ship owner may recover
over, "absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude
recovery." The limits of this rule are anything but clear
at the moment. Norris merely states the problem 'and
reviews the cases. A somewhat better discussion, of this
particular subject is contained in Kolius and Cecil,
Indemnity Suits by Vessel Owner Against Stevedoring
Contractor: A Search For the Limits of The Ryan Doctrine, 27 Insurance Counsel Journal 282 (1960).
Take another example. The seaworthy ship or appliance
which is warranted to the seaman and the harbor worker is
a vessel which is "reasonably suitable for her intended
service."8 Once it is determined that reasonable fitness
does not exist, the warranty is absolute. However, the injection of the element of reasonableness shows clearly that
-33 U.S.C.A. (1927) §905.
6Ryan Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956).
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., 355 U.S.

563,567
(1958).
8

Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 361 U.S. 808 (1960).
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the owner is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of
those on board, a principle which 'has been recognized by
the Supreme Court and other courts in general statements
to the effect that the owner is not obligated to furnish "an
accident-free ship."9 What, then, does "reasonably suitable"
mean? The courts have had comparatively little to say on
this fundamental question. Unfortunately the present
volume does not develop the subject.
One of the possible lines in which this part of the law
might develop was suggested by then United States District Judge Bailey Aldrich of Massachusetts in a humorous
speech before the Maritime Law Association several years
ago. Speaking on "The Training of an Admiralty Judge"
he said in part:
"A Judge's job is even easier than that. All he has to
learn, as you know, is to send every seaman's case to
the jury; and in straight admiralty cases, when in
doubt, to divide the damages, and probably neither
side will be sore enough to appeal.
To digress for a moment, in connection with this
matter of always sending a seaman's case to the jury,
there was a time when I thought that somewhere there
might be an exception. Suppose the plaintiff was so
grossly contributorily negligent, and the ship so free
of negligence, that it must be said that the injury was
due solely to plaintiff's own fault. Naturally, I figured a
majority of the Supreme Court would find an answer
to this, but it troubled me for a while to think what
it could be. The inspiration finally came, and I stated
it in a footnote to an opinion last spring. If a seaman
is as negligent as all that, manifestly it makes the
ship unseaworthy to have him aboard. Nor, in this
happy situation, would contributory negligence of the
seaman reduce damages, for the greater his negligence,
the more was the ship unseaworthy. It's very simple,
once you think of it."
Well, stranger doctrines than this have found their way
into the Supreme Court Reports. Take, for example, the
post-Sieracki decision in Alaska Steamship Co., Inc., v.
Petterson.0 There a longshoreman was permitted to recover from a shipowner for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness (without negligence) because of the failure of a
block belonging to the stevedores, brought aboard by the
9

Ibid.

10347 U.S. 396 (1954).
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stevedores, and used exclusively in the stevedores' operations in a part of the ship over which the stevedores had
exclusive control for cargo-handling purposes. It is not
surprising that juries, are sometimes incredulous when
charged that this is the law.
The doctrines with which this book is concerned seem
strange to this reviewer," not just because they are new,
not just because they favor libellants rather than respondents, but because they are so far removed from the
realities of maritime operations and so much at variance
with traditional admiralty principles. The most confusing
elements which have been injected into the general maritime law in the last forty years are the result not of
having "liberal" judges or "conservative" judges on the
Court, but of having judges unfamiliar with 'both maritime
operations and admiralty principles. The present volume
is an example of the large amount of ink which has been
spilt as a consequence.
DAvID

R. OWiN*

Professional Negligence. Edited by Thomas G. Roady,
Jr., and William R. Anderson. Nashville. Vanderbilt University Press, 1960. Pp. 321, with index. $10.00.
This is not just another book on negligence. It is a
series of specialized studies, largely by law professors,
on negligence in the "learned' professions." It includes
within its purview doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, architects and engineers, school teachers, abstracters, public
accountants, and concludes with undertakers, insurance
agents, and artisans and tradesmen. Approximately onehalf of the book is devoted to medical malpractice.
The chapter on the care required of medical practitioners
is a most rewarding and concise study of the subject.
The author has reduced generalizations to a minimum,
emphasizing specific problems such as the missing sponge,
the alleged warranty of recovery (growing in vogue), the
scope of res ipsa loquitur, the use of x-rays, admissibility
of text books, expert testimony, operations beyond the
scope of the original undertaking, experimental techniques,
the obligation of the general practitioner to refer patients
to the specialist, informed consent, and other problems, all
covered with a wealth of citations. In fact, the chapter
1And to much better qualified commentators, as well. See, for example, Chief Justice Stone's blistering dissent in Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 103.
* Of the 'Baltimore City Bar; A.B. 1935, M.A. 1937, LL.B. 1939, University of Virginia.
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is also virtually an encyclopedia of innumerable articles
in medical journals, law reviews, and text books.
This rather dour remark opens the chapter on the liability of hospitals:
"Throughout the common law world.., our generation has been witness to an unmistakable... trend of
increasingly disassociating the administration of accident law from the philosophy of individual fault in
favor of the collectivist principle of loss distribution,
as evidenced in the movement towards stricter liability
in litigation areas with a background of liability insurance. ..."
Generally, it has been well established that since staff
members are not subject to detailed control in the conduct
of their professional duties (as distinguished from their
administrative duties) by the hospital, there exists no
master-servant relationship between them; and therefore
the hospital is not liable for the negligence of its staff
in professional matters. This theory of non-liability is
being supplanted by: (1) a disregard of the conventional
approach that staff niembers must be subject to detailed
control of the hospital, in favor of the approach that the
staff is part of the hospital organization under the control of the hospital and the hospital is liable for its acts;
(2) the concept that the hospital by receiving the patient
for treatment undertakes a duty of care to the patient;
and, (3) a somewhat strained extension of administrative
duties to include professional duties. All of which is a
far cry from the old theory that hospitals were facilities
where patients could meet professional men for the purposes of treatment.
Prepared by the Legal Division of the American Medical Association, the chapter on malpractice insurance might
well become required reading by physicians. As there is
little case law on the subject, the Legal Division prepared
a questionnaire based upon actual claims. This questionnaire was forwarded to thirty-five insurance companies
writing malpractice insurance, requesting an opinion
whether or not these claims were within the coverage of
the policies issued by the companies. The questionnaire
was answered by twenty-two companies. The results disclosed that coverage may be denied in four general classes
of cases: (1) operative procedures, such as abortions,
which are criminal violations in the jurisdiction where
performed; (2) undue familiarity during a physical ex-
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amination; (3) warranties that an operation or procedure
will be successful; and (4) technical assault, such as performance of an operation, different from or beyond the
scope of the original operation. In most of these cases,
the majority of companies would defend under a reservation of right, reserving the right to refuse payment of
a judgment. It is interesting to note that this survey
showed that by and large the physicians of reputable
standing in a community are the ones generally involved in
malpractice actions. In conclusion, this cogent observation is made:
"The responses indicate that the malpractice
protection which the physician purchases
mined not only by the policy provisions but
extent by the underwriting philosophy of
pany."

insurance
is deterto a large
the com-

The chapter on modern trial techniques in malpractice
suits, by eminent California counsel, may represent techniques in California, but not in Maryland. It advises
".... that patient's counsel carefully and thoroughly condition the jurors' minds from the very onset to a psychological acceptance of this type of litigation . . ." by "intensely" questioning the jurors on their voir dire ". . . so
that -eventually even the judge will join with you in questioning the jurors as to their state of mind, upon these
subjects, so that by the time your jury is empaneled, each
and every one of them has been thoroughly indoctrinated
with the truisms of which you speak ..... " It is believed
that Maryland judges would take a rather dim view of this
approach, while defense counsel would suffer contempt of
court, apoplexy, or worse.
A study of the endless struggle to maintain discipline
in school children provides the main substance for the
chapter on the tort liability of teachers. At common law
the right to discipline was derived from the fact that the
teacher was in loco parentis; today it flows from the fact
that the will of the parent cannot defeat the policy of
the State in the maintenance of public schools. If the
teacher is charged with the use of excessive force, the
issue immediately arises whether or not the teacher has
gone too far and abused the privilege. In this situation
the teacher stands alone since the school authorities have
the immunity of their sovereign body; this also occurs
when a teacher is charged with negligenee. In some states
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these problems have been solved by insurance coverage or
by private indemnity for loss incurred by a teacher.
Significantly, the great majority of reported cases have
come from those states carrying private insurance coverage.
The chapters on pharmacists and on architects and 'engineers follow each other and are in marked contrast.
The pharmacist's duty runs for the benefit of third persons,
while that of the architect or engineer does not, a lack of
privity of contract between the third person and the
architect or engineer being a defense. As a result, much
of the chapter on architects and engineers is concerned
with the problem of privity of contract. The chapter on
pharmacists, by contrast, begins with a history of pharmacy when the pharmacist ".... was both physician and
pharmacist, just as the surgeon and the barber were still
one." It reflects what is believed to be the Maryland law,
citing cases long familiar to the Maryland lawyer.
While medical malpractice is at present the most
flourishing source of malpractice litigation,' lawyers were
among the first to be held liable for their negligence. Unlike medical malpractice litigation, legal malpractice litigation has decreased over the years. The attorney's liability
for negligence arises out of the attorney-client relationship, which is created by contract; but the action against
the attorney may be either ex delicto or ex contractu, there
being an implied contractual duty on the part of the attorney to use due care. The chapter is well documented,
with special reference to law review articles.
Where the injury is to persons, as distinguished from
injury to property, the courts, following MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 2 have granted a right of action to third
persons injured by the negligence of another. But, in commercial transactions the courts have refused to follow
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and have denied a right
of action to third persons who have suffered an economic
injury because they have been unable to find any duty to
a party not privy to the transaction. The doctrine of
privity of contract has bedeviled diverse, and seemingly
separate, fields of law, as evidenced by the various discussions in this volume; but in no field of law has it come
under more serious attack and scrutiny than in the law
of accountants. The strained and tortuous modifications
of this doctrine in its application to accountants, from
1 Estimated at 6000 cases in 1959.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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Derry v. Peek3 through Glanzer v. Shepard,4 the famous
Ultramares case,' up to and including State St. Trust Co.
v. Ernst,6 with shifting emphasis from fraud to gross
negligence (or gross negligence amounting to fraud), is
clearly and concisely set forth with voluminous reference
to cases, annotations, and law review articles in the chapter
on accountants.
The remaining chapters deal with the liability of
abstracters, funeral directors (at times a gruesome subject), insurance agents, and artisans and tradesmen. They
add little by way of informative discussion, but contain an
excellent collection, of cases.

G. C. A. ANDERSON*
Mobile Home Parks And Comprehensive Community
Planning. By Ernest R. Bartley and Frederick H. Bair, Jr.
Vantage Press, Inc., 1960. Pp. 147. $3.00.
The authors have apparently valid credentials for the
treatment of their chosen subject. Each has an interest
born of personal experience as a mobile home dweller
and nurtured by years of professional planning. Mobile
homes (the word "trailer" was long ago discarded by the
industry as both inexact and odius) are an evident adornment on today's landscape. Their use is increasing, and
the authors detail many factors in support of their view
that this trend will continue. Planning and regulatory
measures, in the opinion of the authors, have woefully
failed to keep abreast of this trend; the mobile 'home resident and the community at large have been the victims of
this failing. Planning and regulatory measures have been
inadequate and frequently reflect community antipathy to
the mobile home and its occupants. It is to the enlightened
correction of these failures that the authors devote their
work.
The subject is treated from its economic, social, political',
and legal implications. The authors conclude that from all
of these viewpoints, failures have been costly and unpleasant (a fact apparent to any observing traveler, in the
opinion of this reviewer). An intelligent solution to the
problems must begin with the planning phase and the
814 A.C. 337,58 L. J1.Ch. 864 (1888).
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
5255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
0278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938).
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B. 1921, Princeton University; LL.B.

1924, Harvard University.
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enactment of suitable regulatory measures including zoning, building codes, subdivision regulations, health and
sanitation, codes. The authors feel quite strongly that the
problems must be resolved within the framework of existing regulatory measures and that treatment of the problem
through separate regulatory measures would be a serious
error. They suggest and discuss workable legislative provisions for dealing with the peculiar features of mobile
home living which may be fitted into the framework of
existing measures. The book contains many valuable
references to sources for further study and the text is
supplemented with a valuable model ordinance which may
be adapted for local usage.
In the opinion of the authors, good planning in urban
areas requires allowance for mobile home parks in areas
zoned for multi-family residential use and similarly requires judicious placement of such parks within the zone.
In this connection, local readers may be interested to
consider the practice followed by the County Commissiorers of Howard County, as reported in Costello v.
Seiling.1 In urban areas, mobile homes should not be permitted outside of mobile home parks. In rural areas, on the
other hand, the individual mobile home should be permitted, but on a basis which will insure its removal and
relocation should the area be rezoned to residential.
Numerous methods are reviewed for dealing with the
existing substandard mobile homes and parks, and for
insuring their improvement or eventual amortization. This
the authors believe can be accomplished by applying
existing and familiar regulatory measures relating to substandard housing.
The authors have treated this subject in an interesting
and authoritative manner. No one can seriously doubt their
conclusion that failure to deal intelligently with the mobile home and its location has created problems that communities can ill afford. Their facts, discussions, and suggestions can provide helpful insights in achieving solutions
to these problems. While certainly of interest to the lawyer
in general practice, the book will be of unquestionable
value to professional planners and to drafters of regulatory
measures.
C. STANLEY BLARn*
1223 Md. 24,161 A. 2d 824 (1960).
* Of the Harford County Bar; B.S. 1950, LL.B. 1953, University of
Maryland.
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Reflections With Edmund Burke. By Timothy E.
Sheehan. Vantage Press, Inc., New York. 1960. Pp. 288.

$5.00.
Woodrow Wilson was insisting sixty years ago that
"Burke was right" about the French revolution, and more
recently Professor Talmonr has demonstrated that the
Jacobins were the first totalitarians (THE RISE OF ToTALITARIAN DEMocRAcy (1952)).
This makes Burke the first
anti-totalitarian ideologue and polemicist, and he remains
to this day incomparably the greatest. So it is natural
that a world hastening to rehabilitate its moral (so much
more vital than its military) defenses against the grimmest
totalitarianism of all should turn again to the oratorstatesman-philosopher who reflected on the French Revolution 200 years ago.
Former Congressman Sheehan has made this turn and
like his fellow seekers has found a trove of political and
social wisdom. In this book he offers a kind of concordance
of Burke quotations running from "Absurdity," "Accidental Causes," "Accountant," and "Accusers," to "Words,"
"Worth," "Writers," and "Youth." In the somewhat haphazard and non-categorizing character of the head-words,
however, the quality of the book is pretty clearly shown.
In brief, if it is the love's labor of an amateur of Burke, it
is also a somewhat amateurish job.
Mr. Sheehan gives his quotations without page references, so we cannot readily check context or wider relevance. He does not even tell us what edition of Burke
he uses, whether the 8-volume Bohn or the 12-volume
Little, Brown recommended for British and American
readers, respectively, by the Burke scholars at the "Burke
Factory" in Sheffield (England), who are bringing out the
definite 10-volume edition of the Burke correspondence.
But it is somewhat pointless to criticize a man because
he hasn't done something he never intended doing anyway. Within his own design for an unpretentious book of
Burke maxims and aphorisms, Mr. Sheehan 'has done well
for the general reader. And he provides at least a jumpingoff place for some who may discover a desire to go into the
large Burke literature in a more searching way.
C. P. IvEs*
* AB. 1925, Brown University; M.A. 1938, Yale University; member of
the Editorial Staff of The Sun, Baltimore. Editorial Board, Burke Newsletter.
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